

SYRIA AND LEBANON

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S Y R I A
AND
LEBANON

A Political Essay

by

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To MY PARENTS and MISS RAY

PREFACE

THE course of events during the war, in underlining afresh the importance of the Middle East in international politics and strategy, has drawn attention to the lack of up-to-date studies on this region. The present is the first of several books which Chatham House plans to issue on Middle Eastern countries and problems. In Syria and Lebanon, with their diversities of religious, political, cultural and economic outlook, and the legacy of their status as Mandated Territories, most of the issues which affect the Middle East as a whole are to be seen in their most complex and baffling forms. No authoritative work has appeared in English on these questions during the last twenty years, and Mr. Hourani is, by background, training and recent experience, exceptionally qualified to present a reliable survey of their character and their wider bearings.

ASTOR

Chairman of the Council

*Chatham House,
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July 1945*

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book, like all political works written in war-time, suffers from certain defects. At a time when the face of the world changes so rapidly and the process of publication takes so long it is inevitable that books on current political problems should be partly out of date as soon as they are published. Moreover, there are important and delicate subjects which in normal times would require the fullest treatment but now can only be dealt with tentatively and circumspectly, if at all. Three chapters, in particular, are affected by these reservations. In Chapter VIII, which deals with foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon, I have analyzed those interests as they existed in 1939, leaving it to the reader to estimate how much they and the policies based upon them will have changed when the war comes to an end. In Chapter XII the narrative of events during the war years ends with the assumption of office by nationalist Governments in the middle of 1943 ; but the controversial happenings of later months are summarized in a postscript. At the same time, Anglo-French relations in the Levant since 1941 have only been treated in outline, without insistence upon painful detail. Finally, the discussion of Arab unity in Chapter XIII should be reviewed in the light of the series of conferences and discussions which began in Alexandria in September, 1944, after the book was substantially completed. In spite of these deficiencies I have decided to allow publication of the book to proceed because of the importance and urgency of some of the problems with which it deals.

At all stages of its growth my book has owed more than I can say to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me to an understanding of Middle Eastern politics, brought relevant information to my notice and read parts of the manuscript. I am particularly conscious of my many-sided debt to Dr. C. Malik, Dr. C. Zurayq, Professor H. A. R. Gibb, Mr. H. Beeley and Commander C. Schaeffer. More perhaps than they know they have influenced my thinking upon Arab questions, and what positive ideas the book contains mostly derive from one or other of them. I owe a debt of another kind, but equally great, to various members of the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and

the Oxford University Press, who prepared the book for publication during my absence from England. To all who have helped in any way I must express my warmest thanks.

A. H. HOURANI

London, 1945

PREFACE TO THE SECOND IMPRESSION •

NO change has been made in this impression of my book. Difficulties of war-time publication rendered the record of events in it partly out of date before it was published, and it is still more so now. To bring it up to date would require not only numerous additions but the re-writing of certain sections, and this is not possible in present circumstances. The book, however, is primarily a work of analysis, not of narrative ; and I hope that its survey of the underlying factors in Syrian and Lebanese politics is still valid.

A. H. H.

London, August 1946

CONTENTS

PREFACE	PAGE vi
AUTHOR'S PREFACES	vii
INTRODUCTION	I

PART ONE

CHAPTER

I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA	6
II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT	41

PART TWO

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION	59
•IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS	73
V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY	85
VI. ARAB NATIONALISM	96
VII. LEBANON AND THE MINORITIES	121
VIII. FOREIGN INTERESTS	146

PART THREE

IX. THE FRENCH MANDATE	163
X. POLITICAL HISTORY, 1920-1936	180
XI. THE TREATIES, 1936-1939	199
XII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1943	230

PART FOUR

XIII. CONCLUSIONS	259
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POSTSCRIPT

THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1943, TO APRIL, 1945	279
---	-----

APPENDIX A :

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS	308
------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX B :

RECENT STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF SYRIA AND LEBANON	385
---	-----

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	387
--------------------------------	-----

INDEX	391
-----------------	-----

MAPS

	PAGE
I. THE NEAR EAST : GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS . . .	7
II. THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT AND THE MANDATED TERRITORIES	45
III. LEBANON	131
IV. THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1941	239
V. SYRIA AND LEBANON	<i>following</i> 390

INTRODUCTION

I

THIS essay springs from a number of beliefs about Near Eastern affairs, which have been constantly in the author's mind during the writing of it, and to clarify which was the main reason for its being undertaken. They may be summarized as follows :

- (i) The spread of Western influences since the beginning of the nineteenth century has caused a fundamental change in the life of Syria and Lebanon, as in that of the other Arabic-speaking countries. The process of change has raised two questions which cannot wholly be separated from one another : first the question of forming a unity out of the two civilizations, their own and that of the West, between which the Arabic-speaking peoples are torn ; and secondly, the question of establishing a ' healthy ' relationship, based upon equality and mutual respect, between them and the peoples of the West.
- (ii) The solution of these two problems is of great importance not only for the Arabs themselves but also for the West, since the West now possesses living and inescapable relations, both moral and material, with the Arab lands.
- (iii) Arab nationalism is the political form of the response which the existence and the consciousness of these problems has aroused among the Arabs. It is an attempt to defend the existence of the Arab community against forces which threaten to disrupt it, and to control and direct the process of Westernization in the light of principles which the Arabs accept as valid.
- (iv) Arab nationalism is still an unformed movement and has not yet decided its attitude towards the West. There are two paths which it can follow, which may be called those of ' excommunication ' from and of ' communion ' with the West. The movement may become primarily one of opposition to the West, borrowing only the technical skill of Europe and America in order the better to resist both the encroachments of Western States and the challenge of the

Western spirit. It may, on the other hand, become a movement for the reconstruction of Arab society through a fundamental assimilation of the best elements in Western life (although not necessarily by imitation of them) ; in this task the help of Western Governments and peoples will be essential.

For the sake both of the Arabs and of the West, it is essential that the nationalist movement should take the second of these paths. If it takes the first, it will become impossible to establish a ' healthy ' relationship with Europe, and nationalism itself will turn into a purposeless movement of hatred and fanaticism. This will distort not only the political development of the Arabs, but their life in all its aspects.

- (v) Which of the two paths it will take will depend upon many factors. Among the most important of them are : the attitude of the Western Powers to the Arabs ; the changes in Arab social and economic life ; and the development of the Arab intellect. But the most important factor, and perhaps the least easy to predict, is the relationship which is established between Islam and a Westernized society, and between Islam and Christianity.
- (vi) In the great changes which are remoulding the life of the Arabic-speaking peoples, Syria and Lebanon have a peculiarly important part to play. On account of their geographical situation, their traditions and certain characteristics of their people, they can serve as mediators of Western civilization to Arab Asia. But they can only carry out this function if their political relations with the other Arab regions and with the Western Powers are defined in a satisfactory manner.

It is therefore of particular importance to study the problem of Westernization in Syria and Lebanon, and to make clear the conditions under which a unity or a balance can be established between the traditional and the new elements in the life of the Syrians and Lebanese, and between them and the Western peoples with whom they are in contact.

This essay is an attempt to consider these problems in their

political aspect. It tries to make clear the effect of changing spiritual, intellectual and social conditions upon political life ; the attempts which are being made to establish new political forms adequate to the needs of a new age ; and the relations of Syria and Lebanon with one another, with the other Arabic-speaking countries and with the Western Powers.

The first part of the book summarizes the history of Syria and Lebanon, with particular attention to the successive forms of government to which they have been subjected, the relations of those Governments with local communities, and the various influences which have helped to mould the nature of the inhabitants ; the process by which French rule was established is described in some detail. Part Two analyzes the general problem which lies at the root of almost all the political difficulties of the present period : the problem of a traditional society changing fundamentally under the impact of Western civilization. The effects of this impact on the economic, social and intellectual life of Syria and Lebanon are sketched ; its effects in the political sphere are discussed at length. It is shown how the contact between old and new has given rise to the Arab nationalist movement. The nature and weaknesses, the internal and external difficulties of nationalism are described ; and especially the difficulties which spring from the existence of a number of important minorities. This part ends with a summary of the interests of the Western Powers in Syria and Lebanon. Part Three contains a narrative of political history from the beginning of the French occupation to the present day. It deals mainly with the conflict between French policy and the aspirations of the nationalists, and summarizes the steps which have been taken and the statements made since the Allied occupation of 1941. Finally, Part Four sets forth the principles upon which must rest a successful definition of the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon, and of France and Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon. It ends with some general considerations upon the path which the Arab movement might profitably take.

In the course of the book questions are raised too numerous, complex and profound to be disposed of in so slight a work. The author has laid his main emphasis upon certain of them, and in a perhaps arbitrary manner has chosen only to touch the surface of others ; for example, the social and economic bases of Arab nationalism are dealt with in a summary fashion.

Other questions which would call for full discussion in a comprehensive treatise have been wholly ignored. The work has been described as an essay in order to indicate these limitations in its scope, no less than to avoid making too high a claim for the studies and experience upon which it is based.

2

It is important to make clear the way in which the term 'Syria' is used in the title and the text. Confusion has sometimes arisen from its use in several different senses : (i) In the past it has often been used to refer to the whole area stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the east. This area constitutes in many ways a single geographical unit, and its indigenous inhabitants form in some sense a single people. (ii) After the War of 1914-1918 this geographical unit was divided into two political areas ; the southern area, which includes the regions now known as Palestine and Transjordan, was placed under a British Mandate, and the northern under a French. The term 'Syria' is sometimes used to refer to the whole northern area. (iii) This northern area was subdivided by the Mandatory Power into several political units, to which was given the collective name of 'Les États du Levant' or 'The Levant States'. From 1925 to 1936 they were four in number : the States of Syria and Greater Lebanon, or, as they are now called, the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the Governments of Latakia (known at first as the 'State of the Alawis') and Jebel Druze. In 1936 the two Governments were formally annexed to the State of Syria, and were known no longer as 'Governments' but as 'Provinces'. Thus the term 'Syria' is often used in a third sense, to refer to the State of Syria, before 1936 excluding, and since then including, Latakia and Jebel Druze.

The explicit subject of this essay is 'Syria' in the second of the three senses defined above. This area will ordinarily be referred to as 'the French Mandated Territories', 'Syria and Lebanon' or 'the Levant States'. In the historical chapters (I-IV), however, it has been necessary to deal in general with the larger, geographical unit of the first definition. In these chapters, therefore, the term 'Syria' will be used to

cover the whole of that unit, which will normally be referred to as 'geographical Syria'. Elsewhere in this book the word 'Syria' will only be employed to describe the State of Syria or Syrian Republic : that is, in the third sense.

All these terms are used simply for convenience and without any desire to prejudice the questions, which will be touched upon in the course of the essay, whether and on what grounds the political separation of the British from the French Mandated Territories, and of Syria from Lebanon, was justified.

PART ONE


I. THE HISTORY OF SYRIA¹

I

EVEN were there no Syrian people a Syrian problem would still exist. Syria owes its political importance less to the qualities of its population than to its geographical position. Before its history can be fully understood, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the land and its relation with the surrounding world.

Syria is part of a larger area which may be treated as a single unit, in the sense that the course of affairs in one part of it has always had a peculiarly close relationship with that in some or all of the other parts. The southern base of this area is the Arabian peninsula, bounded on the west by the Red Sea, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. The west of the peninsula, the Hejaz and Yemen, is hilly and in parts fertile, and so too is a smaller area in the south-east; but the greater portion of the interior is fit only for pasturage, except in the oases. In the south, it is a sandy waste, in the centre, Nejd, a dry, hilly and often stony steppe. North of Nejd there is another belt of sand; and north of this belt is the dry steppe of the Syrian Desert, growing narrower as it goes northwards. Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the 'Fertile Crescent', a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which run southwards through it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq or Mesopotamia. The Fertile Crescent is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south-east by the head-waters of the Persian Gulf. In the north and east it is hemmed in by mountain-ranges: to the north the Taurus Mountains, the southern part of the Anatolian highlands which stretch across Asia Minor, to the north-east the mountains of Kurdistan, and to the east the Persian plateau. Joined to the western part of the Fertile Crescent by the peninsula of Sinai, but separated from Arabia by the Red Sea, is the land of Egypt, the fertile valley of the Nile surrounded by sandy deserts.

¹ In Chapters I-IV the word 'Syria' is used to refer to 'geographical Syria' as defined in the Introduction.



Thus the boundaries of Syria may be defined as the Taurus Mountains to the north, the Mediterranean to the west, Sinai and Hejaz to the south, and northern Mesopotamia and the Syrian Desert to the east. Its length is rather more than 500 miles, and the breadth of its cultivable area varies between 100 and 150 miles.

2

It is itself split up into several regions clearly marked off from one another by main lines of division running roughly from north to south, with subsidiary lines running from east to west. The first region is the Mediterranean coastal belt, in some places broad enough to be called a plain, for example the plain of Akkar, but in others no more than a narrow strip ; in general, it broadens as it goes south. Although it has few good natural harbours, it is studded with famous ports : Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Haifa and Jaffa. East of it is a highland belt : the Amanus in the north, then the Jebel Ansariyah, rising to some 5,000 ft., then Lebanon, of which the peaks reach 10,000 ft., and then the Palestinian hills, bounded on the south by the arid district of the Negeb. This belt is scarred with the valleys of streams flowing westwards to the sea, and cut across by a number of gaps, through some of which rivers flow : the plain of Antioch, the gap between Tripoli and Homs and the plain of Esdraelon. East of these ranges runs a line of comparatively narrow depressions varying in character from north to south. In the north there are the plain of al-Amq, the Orontes valley and the Ghab marshes ; south of them lies the Biqa' valley ; then the broken country in which lie the sources of the Jordan ; then the swampy district of Hulah ; then the narrow valley of the Jordan, lying below sea-level, opening out at one point into the Sea of Galilee and ending in the Dead Sea ; and finally the Wadi Araba, leading down to the Red Sea at Aqaba. A number of important rivers run for part of their courses along these depressions : the Orontes flowing north and then west, the Litani south and then west, and the Jordan south. Here also lie the important lakes of Syria : those of Homs and Hulah, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. The line of depressions is interrupted by the ridge of Baalbek, the watershed between the Orontes and Litani ; and farther south is linked with the coastal plain by the Esdraelon Gap.

Farther east there lies another belt of highlands. In the far north it takes the form first of the Kurd Daghs, then of a plateau and a series of low ranges, south of which lies the range of Anti-Lebanon, facing Lebanon across the Bīqā', and rising some 9,000 ft. above sea-level. South of Anti-Lebanon is Mount Hermon with its many valleys and its three peaks, the highest of which is over 9,000 ft. high. From Hermon the land drops into the Hauran plateau; south of it is the tableland of Transjordan, which itself ends in the steppe country of the northern Hejaz.

The northern plateau slopes eastwards until it reaches the valley of the Euphrates flowing south-east. The eastward slopes are in part cultivable land, but in part semi-desert and steppe, known sometimes as the 'Little Desert' to distinguish it from the Syrian Desert to the south of it. Around and across the Euphrates is a district known as the Jazīrah, which is geographically part of Iraq but of which a portion lies within the political frontiers of the Levant States. It is a district of stony hills and plains, but fertile in the river valleys, those of the Euphrates itself and of its tributaries, the Balikh and the Khabur.

East of the Anti-Lebanon the country is somewhat different. There is no plateau sloping gently to a river valley, but the eastern flanks of the mountains lead down to a barren steppe, formed of stone and gravel, with sand-dunes and coarse vegetation: the Syrian Desert. In places the Desert comes up almost to the foot of the inner range; but in others it is held back by areas of cultivable land. One such is the Ghutah, the fertile land around Damascus, well wooded and well watered by its streams. To the south of it, but separated from it by a plain of lava, lies another cultivable region, the Hauran, a large basalt plateau open to rain-clouds coming from the Mediterranean through the Esdraelon Gap. In the east this plain rises into the hilly but fertile district of Jebel Druze, of which the peaks are 6,000 ft. above sea-level. South of the Jebel Druze, the highlands of Transjordan slope eastwards and die away in isolated hills.

While the general climatic régime is similar throughout, there is great variety of temperature and rainfall in consequence of the sharp differences of relief and position. In all parts the rainy season is from October or November to April or May; but the amount of rainfall varies greatly from one

region to another. On some mountain heights it is over 40 in., while in the desert areas it sinks almost to nothing. The temperature also varies greatly, in general increasing from west to east and to a lesser extent from north to south. The differences of rainfall and temperature, together with such other factors as the presence or absence of rivers and springs, give rise to great differences in fertility and vegetation. The coastal regions have a Mediterranean climate, and are often well watered both by rainfall and by rivers ; they are suitable for cereals, tobacco and many kinds of fruit. The seaward slopes of the maritime ranges have a more temperate climate, and terraces of cultivable soil on which olive trees and vines can grow ; but the eastern slopes are more barren. The central depression has a sub-tropical climate. Parts of it are well watered by rivers and are fertile. In the Jordan Valley, fruits can be cultivated, and cereals in the more northern parts of the inner depression. Much of the inner range is dry and barren ; but on the plateaux of the north and of Transjordan there is sufficient rainfall to make possible the cultivation of cereals. This is true also of the Hauran and Jebel Druze. The Ghutah is suitable with irrigation for the growing of fruits of many kinds. East of the inner range the rainfall becomes scantier, the heat more intense, and the land less fertile ; until finally it becomes too arid to be suitable for anything but pasturage. But across the Euphrates conditions change once more, and it is possible to grow cereals in the river valleys of the Jazirah.

3

The nature of Syrian history has been deeply affected by the structure and position of the land. It is largely a history of economic, political and other movements affecting the whole area of which Syria forms a part. To those movements Syria has served at times as a starting-point, at others as a terminus or a bridge.

The first of the movements has been that of world trade. Syria has almost always been an important link in the trade-routes which connect the Mediterranean world with India and the Far East ; and its own products, oil, grain, textiles and metal work, have at times found a market in the Western world. Another and more specialized trade has been that with

the nomads of the Syrian and Arabian deserts, who have gone to the great towns of the Syrian interior to sell their products and supply their needs. In the economic as in every other sphere of life, the Arab hinterland has given a special colour to Syrian life.

Trade has tended to follow a limited number of routes, which have not varied much in principle from one generation to another. For the trade with Egypt there was the great route which went along the coast of Palestine by way of Gaza. For that with western Arabia, the route ran on the east of the Dead Sea by way of Maan or Petra, in what is now Transjordan ; this was also the path taken by the Pilgrims' caravan which went yearly from Damascus to Mecca. The caravans for central Arabia went down the Wadi Sirhan to the oases of Nejd. In the other direction, routes went north-west from northern Syria through Cilicia into Asia Minor, and north-east through Urfa, Diarbekr and Mosul into Kurdistan, Persia and central Asia. Among the most important routes were those which linked the Mediterranean with India and farther Asia. There were a number of alternative routes. Goods might come by sea to southern Arabia, then by land up the western Arabian route to Damascus or some other centre. They might go up the Persian Gulf, and be landed at or near what is now Basra. From Basra several possibilities lay open : the caravans might make for Aleppo or its equivalent in north Syria, or for Damascus, Homs, or some other town in the centre. If they chose the former route, they could go on the west of the Euphrates and then across the Little Desert ; or else up the Tigris to Baghdad or even Mosul, then across Mesopotamia to the Euphrates and on as before. If their destination was Damascus, at first they would take a similar path to that of the Aleppo caravan, and then skirt the southern edge of the Little Desert and pass through Palmyra to the great towns of central Syria. Once arrived in the towns of the Syrian interior, the goods would be carried down to the coast and shipped to the West : in northern Syria they would go by way of Latakia or the Gulf of Alexandretta ; in central Syria by way of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon or Tyre.

Not all these routes were in full use at the same time. The noon of one was often the twilight of others. Their rise and decline was determined largely by political conditions both in Syria and in the neighbouring countries ; but except in times

of unusual disorder a considerable volume of trade was always carried along one or other of the roads.

This world trade has meant much to Syria. It has brought her wealth. It has given her inhabitants an occupation ; until recently much of the trade not only passed through Syria but was handled in its passage by Syrian merchants. This has affected the nature of the Syrian towns, the caravan towns on the routes and the bazaar towns at the end of them. They have been cosmopolitan, the meeting-places of worlds, and their inhabitants have become quick-minded and flexible.

Trade has also affected the political history of Syria. Again and again powerful rulers in the neighbouring regions have stretched their hands over Syria, to tap the wealth of her cities and her routes. Often they have also desired to use her agricultural and forest resources. At other times it has been her strategic position which has tempted them ; they have wanted to use her either as a defence-post against rivals or enemies in other neighbouring countries, or else as a bridge across which their armies could pass to attack those countries. The armies, like the caravans, have trodden immemorial paths. They have come sometimes up the Palestinian coast from Egypt ; sometimes across the Euphrates from Mesopotamia or beyond ; once, and most memorably, from Arabia ; but most often from Asia Minor by way of gaps in the mountain barriers between Cilicia and northern Syria. Thus it has come about that for great parts of her history, Syria has been a province of an Empire larger than herself. On the whole, these have been the times of her greatest prosperity. Often she has been not only a part of an Empire or a world, but also its frontier.

Besides the movements of goods and armies, there has been a third movement, that of population. As a consequence of trade or war, or for other reasons, immigrants have flowed into Syria throughout history. There has been a trickle from Egypt and the Mediterranean countries, a larger stream from Anatolia, and occasional inrushes from central Asia ; but above all there has been an uninterrupted flow from the Arabian peninsula. Not only individuals but whole tribes have come in. Nomads of Arabia have moved northwards and westwards, either because means of subsistence in the peninsula were insufficient or else under the attraction of plunder ; from preying upon the cultivated land of Syria they have gradually

abandoned the wandering life, taken to agriculture and mingled with the settled population already established in the country, which was itself largely the product of a similar process at an earlier time.

The immigrants from the Arabian peninsula brought with them their distinctive customs and ideas and one or other of the 'Semitic' family of languages. Together with Mesopotamia on the other side of the Fertile Crescent, Syria has been throughout history the place where what may, by a not very misleading simplification, be called the 'Semitic' stream of population and influences has met and mingled with other streams. She has served also as the limit of the emigration from Arabia. The Semitic peoples and their languages have never taken firm root beyond the Taurus Mountains. Even in Syria they have not been unopposed, but they have always been of great importance. A large proportion of the population of Syria can trace its descent at least in part to earlier or later immigrants from Arabia; and while Mediterranean and other influences have largely affected forms of government and the culture of the cities, the language and the customs of the countryside have always been predominantly Semitic.

The two sets of influences, that from Arabia and that from other directions, have interacted in various ways. There has been conflict at times, and at times peaceful mingling. Often tension of some sort has existed between the more predominantly Mediterranean and the more predominantly Arabian elements in the population, and between successive waves of settlers from the same source. Sometimes that tension has mirrored itself in the individual soul, which has felt itself drawn in two directions, towards the desert and towards the West. It is only very rarely, if at all, that the influences have blended so completely as to remove all tension. It is true that there has always been a tendency to that end. Rulers and settlers from the Mediterranean lands have to some extent adopted Semitic ways and Arabian immigrants have acquired some of the characteristics of a Mediterranean people. But the process has never been allowed to complete itself; further invasions have occurred, a new Government has established itself, or there have been further waves of immigration, and the process of assimilation has had to begin again.

Syria has not been merely a passive receptacle for influences coming in from outside. Whether or not the hypothesis of an indigenous population and culture be accepted, it is certain that the geographical structure of the country, and the nature of its inhabitants as modified by that structure, have determined the forms which the incoming streams of influence have taken. For example, the sharp geographical divisions of Syria have helped to perpetuate the differences between various elements in the population, which have come into the country from different directions or from the same direction at different times: racial and tribal divisions have given rise to an intense localism of feeling, which has linked itself in various ways with the prejudices, the hostilities and the exclusiveness generated by the great political and religious conflicts of the past. Localism and particularism have deeply affected the political life of the country. Sometimes, when Syria has formed part of a larger political unit with a strong Government, they have been held in check ; but when the unit has disintegrated, or the Government has grown weak, the country has been partitioned between a number of petty and ephemeral local dynasties, more often than not at variance with one another.

Local and communal feeling is closely linked with the persistence of tradition. Throughout almost the whole of history the Syrians have been subjected to a succession of foreign conquerors. They have been forced at least partially to accept the customs and cultures of their rulers, and in the process they have acquired two arts : the art of rapid and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour and in new forms, their old beliefs and ways of living. ' Bow down to every nation which passes over you, but remember me in your hearts ' , said one of the founders of the Druze sect. It is a lesson which not only the Druzes have learned.

But the role of the Syrian population has not merely been one of assimilating, or resisting, outside influences. It has transformed these influences and spread them to the surrounding world, and it has made its own and original contributions to civilization. From the time of the Phœnicians, Syrian merchants have been scattered throughout western Asia and the Mediterranean world. Syrian officials helped to administer the Roman, the Arab and the Ottoman Empires.

Syrian writers and thinkers contributed to the culture of the Greek, the Latin and the Arabic languages. Even to-day, after centuries of stagnation, there are large and important Syrian mercantile communities in North and South America, in West Africa and elsewhere ; and Syrian teachers, journalists, doctors and officials are to be found in all the countries of the Arabic world.

Above all, Syria is the birthplace of Christianity and Judaism. Ever since Europe became Christian, the principles by which its spiritual and moral life have been guided have come to it clothed in an imagery drawn largely from the beauties and way of life of Syria's countryside ; and to the believer her very ground is holy.

5

As far back as our records go, the forces described above can be seen at work. The curtain of history rises on a Syria of which the population is already mainly Semitic, and is continually being reinforced in its Semitic character by fresh waves of immigration. For example, the Canaanites and the Phœnicians entered the country during the third millennium B.C., and the Hebrews and Aramæans in the second. At some time or another all of these peoples established States in different portions of the country. Thus a great part of coastal Syria was for many centuries under the control of the Phœnicians, who established trading centres throughout the Mediterranean and even beyond ; and for a time a portion of southern Syria constituted a Hebrew State.

These Semitic States deserved well of mankind. The Phœnicians built up a trading system which covered the whole Mediterranean basin, and established colonies as far away from their homeland as France and Spain. But what they did is of small account compared with the record of the Jews. Their intense and stormy history was the channel through which the world came to knowledge of God ; a knowledge which bore fruit among them in an unbending passion for righteousness and a matchless poetry of devotion.

From the earliest times Syria was in touch with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and the Ægean world, and usually the greater part of it was under the sway of foreign rulers. The whole or a large portion of the country was subdued successively by the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Persians,

and the Macedonian Greeks under Alexander the Great. Each of them established a Government for a time and left some mark on the life of the country. The Greek conquest in the fourth century B.C. had particularly important effects. Under the protection of the Government established by Alexander the Great and maintained with varying degrees of efficiency by his successors, the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, there grew up a number of Greek cities, centres of Hellenic life and thought in the Syrian countryside. They did not merely reflect the culture of their country of origin, but made their own contribution to it : more than one of the leading writers and thinkers of later Greek civilization lived in the Syrian towns. These cities gave as much to Syria as to Greek civilization : a new way of life and thought of which the power was seen in the complete Hellenization of many Syrians and in the development of a hybrid Greco-Syrian culture, a Greek grafted on to a Semitic stock.

6

The Seleucid age was marked by local risings and the appearance of local principalities : for example, the revolt of the Maccabees and the re-establishment of a Jewish kingdom in Palestine. But at length an end was put to the disorder. In the first century B.C. the Syrian possessions of Alexander's successors were conquered by Rome. They remained a Roman and then a Byzantine province for seven hundred years. It was during this period, or at least during the early centuries of it, that the Mediterranean influences in Syrian life attained their greatest strength. The country became an important and integral part of a vast international unit which covered the whole Mediterranean world, and within which men, goods, and ideas could move freely. Both inside and outside their country Syrians found full scope for their talents. Syrian merchants played an important part in the economic life of the Empire, Syrian officials and generals in its political life ; in the third century there were even Emperors from Homs and the Hauran.

The Romans' gift to the country was strong efficient rule, a framework within which the arts of peace could flourish. Their chain of frontier posts on the Euphrates and the edge of the Syrian Desert held back the Parthians to the east. The internal order which they established and their vast public

works encouraged commerce and agriculture. Until the last phase there was little popular resistance to their rule, for they did not interfere with the life of the country. The Hellenistic cities were left to govern themselves and remained Greek in culture. They prospered greatly. Antioch, for example, was for a long time the most important town in the eastern half of the Empire ; in it and its fellows the Greek language was cultivated by a succession of great writers, for example the poet Meleager and the satirist Lucian. Beside them, but not in opposition to them, there grew up Roman towns with a Latin culture. Beirut, for instance, became one of the centres for the study of the Roman law and produced jurists as notable as Ulpian and Papinian.

In the first phase of Roman rule, the petty Semitic dynasties which had partitioned the country under the later Seleucids were allowed to continue ; later, most of them were suppressed and replaced by direct Roman rule. Even so the stream of Semitic influence remained unchecked. The Arabian trade routes still ended in Syria ; the bazaar-towns of the interior, like Damascus, retained their Semitic character and their greatness. The language of the countryside was still Semitic : Aramaic for the most part, with an infiltration of Arabic during the later centuries. Strong government prevented the nomads from pillaging the sown land, but encouraged them to abandon the wandering life for that of the peasant. As ever, the infiltration and settlement of the nomads was largely a gradual and almost unnoticed process, but occasionally it attracted the attention of historians, when whole tribes such as the Tanukhids, Ghassanids and Taghlibids immigrated, or with the rise and fall of Semitic vassal states along the desert routes. One such was the Nabataean State in Transjordan, which reached its height at the beginning of the first century A.D., and was destroyed by Trajan at the end ; another was the Kingdom of Palmyra in the Syrian Desert, which, in the third century A.D., grew powerful enough to attempt to shake off the sovereignty of Rome and brought on itself its own destruction ; a third was the Ghassanid state in the Hauran, Aramaic and Arabic in language, Monophysite Christian in religion, and mixed Arab and Greek in culture, which served Byzantium during the sixth century A.D. as a bulwark against the nomads of Arabia.

It was in the Roman period that Syria most deeply influenced

the Mediterranean world ; for it was in this period that Syrians contributed most to the religious life of the West. Their contribution took many forms. Indigenous or long-established cults—the worship of the Sun, the cult of Adonis—spread throughout the world of the Mediterranean. Greek philosophy and mystery religions were assimilated and developed ; for example, Porphyry and others of the leading Neo-Platonists were Syrians. But above all, it was in Syria that the world of pagan culture was closed for ever by the earthly life and Passion of our Lord. There the Gospel was preached, men first called themselves Christians, and the Church found its first saints and its first martyrs. The Syrian desert was the home of the early monks and hermits ; the thinkers of the schools of Antioch and Edessa helped to formulate the doctrines of Christianity. There were among them not only great doctors of the Orthodox Church, like Chrysostom, but also great heresiarchs. Then, as always, Syria was fertile ground for theological controversy : the Nestorian and Monophysite doctrines, and much later the Monothelite, found devotees and martyrs. There are still Christian sects in Syria which cling to some of these doctrines, long since condemned and forgotten by the rest of Christendom.

Christianity spread slowly over the greater part of Syria ; and as it spread paganism declined, although it lingered on (and perhaps still lingers in disguise) in remote districts. The Jewish community in Syria also dwindled in numbers, with the dispersion of the Jews over the Mediterranean world. This was a gradual process. In one aspect it was a part of the general Syrian dispersion throughout the Roman Empire, and its main motive was trade. But it was intensified and embittered by the revolt of the Jews against the Roman authority and their repression by Titus (A.D. 70). From that time onwards no autonomous Jewish State arose in Palestine ; although there never ceased to be a Jewish community there, and the Jews in the outside world continued to remember Zion by the waters of exile.

7

After the third century A.D. the importance and prosperity of Roman Syria began to decline. The once unified Mediterranean world began to disintegrate. Yet even after the western provinces had been detached from the Empire Syria did not

lose its connexion with western Europe : Syrian traders, for example, were active in Merovingian France. Although Greek culture continued to exist, it was no longer creative. At the same time Byzantine administration decayed and more than in times past was felt to be oppressive. Popular discontent found expression in the spread of doctrines opposed to those of the official Eastern Orthodox Church. The Byzantine rulers also neglected to maintain the defences which their predecessors had established. This was the more dangerous because of the rise of the Sassanid Empire in Persia during the third century. In the series of Perso-Roman wars, Syria was a base and often a battle-ground, and was more than once occupied by Persian armies. But it was always re-occupied by Byzantine forces, and finally it was not to the Persians that Syria fell. While the two Empires had been wasting one another's strength, a new power had arisen in Arabia. The Prophet Muhammad had brought a new force into the history of Asia, with his gospel of monotheism, revelation and the Day of Judgement. In a few years his followers had conquered and united the Arabian peninsula. In 633 they invaded Syria. By 640, Damascus, Jerusalem and the other great cities had fallen to the invaders, the Byzantine armies had been defeated and had withdrawn, and Syria had become part of the Moslem Empire.

The conquest was all the easier since the Arabization of Syria had already begun. There were Arabic-speaking tribes in the country ; and although they were Christians, many were Nestorians or Monophysites and therefore hostile to the Byzantine Government and the Orthodox Church. After the conquest the process of Arabization was carried a step farther by the settlement in the country of many of the invading Arab Moslems,* and the adoption of Arabic, now the language of the ruling class, by some of the Semitic elements already settled there before the conquest. It was a gradual process ; Aramaic lingered on for many centuries, especially in Lebanon, and is not yet completely dead. The parallel process of conversion to Islam was also slow. The establishment of a Moslem Government, and the ties of race existing between the Moslem invaders and settlers and many of the other elements in the population, were inducements to conversion ; but neither the conquest nor the early period of Moslem rule was marked by religious persecution, or by proselytization

on a large scale, except among the Arab tribes. Christians and Jews, it is true, were regarded as in a sense standing outside the community ; they were not allowed to carry weapons, to bear witness against Moslems in courts of law, or to marry Moslem women ; and they were subject to special measures of taxation. But they were permitted to retain their beliefs and their property, to worship as they pleased, and to manage the internal affairs of their communities according to their own laws and customs. All Christian sects were treated alike ; for the heterodox, the Moslem conquest meant a greater toleration than they had previously known. For several centuries Christianity continued to be the faith of a large proportion of the population ; in north Lebanon, in the great towns and elsewhere, large Christian communities have continued to exist until to-day. Christian culture also flourished for a time. In the century or so after the Moslem conquest, Christian Syria gave to the world five Popes, the last of the great theologians of the Eastern Church, John of Damascus, and the greatest Christian Arab poet, Akhtal.

Within a generation of Syria's becoming part of the Moslem Empire, it had become the Empire's centre. In 661 the governor of the country, Muawiya, proclaimed himself Caliph, after the murder of his predecessor and antagonist, the Caliph Ali. From that date until the middle of the eighth century Damascus was the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate, of which the territories were gradually extended until they stretched from Spain and Morocco in the west to central Asia in the east. This Empire was largely administered by Syrians, Christian as well as Moslem ; and Syrian soldiers bore the burden of its defence and of its wars with Byzantium.

In spite of its expansion and the growing complexity of its organization, the Caliphate remained in a true sense Moslem and Arab under the Umayyad dynasty. Arabs constituted the ruling class ; Arabic soon replaced Greek as the language of administration in those regions which had formerly been Byzantine provinces ; and Arabic literature found a home at the Umayyad court. But at the same time Islam and the Arab way of life did not remain unaffected by the Greco-Aramaic civilization of Syria. The Moslem conquerors were themselves conquered, gradually and up to a certain point, by the culture of the intellect and senses, the social organization and the administrative system which they found in Syria. They gained

in technical mastery and maturity of the intellect ; they lost the pristine simplicity of their faith and way of life.

Thus the tension between Mediterranean and Semitic influences continued ; and by its side other conflicts developed. There was hostility between the stock of the original Arab conquerors and the Arabized and converted Syrians, the 'Mawali', and between both of them and the elements still unassimilated in language and religion. Among the Arabs themselves there were conflicts between tribes and parties, the greatest of them that of the Qaisite and Yemenite factions, which persisted in various disguises until comparatively recent times. Islam itself split up. The struggle between Muawiya and Ali did not end with the latter's death ; it was carried on by his sons and by his adherents, the 'Shi'ah' or 'partisans' of Ali ; theological dissensions were added to the original political differences ; and the Shi'i Moslems have remained distinct from the orthodox Sunnis until to-day.

8

A combination of religious, regional and dynastic conflicts led in the eighth century to the replacement of the Umayyad by the Abbasid Caliphs, and of Damascus by Baghdad as the capital of the Caliphate. Syria was never again the centre of the Moslem world ; Syrians no longer filled the great positions in the government. They were indeed oppressed by their new rulers, and more than once revolted against them. This change in the political balance was followed by a shift in the centre of western Asian trade, seen in the growth of the commercial importance of Basra. Because of these changes and the devastation of the wars with Byzantium, the prosperity of Syria began to decline and its population to decrease.

Under the Abbasids certain processes which had begun with the Moslem conquest of Syria came virtually to completion. The Arabic language became practically universal ; and Islam became the religion of the majority of the inhabitants, partly through fresh immigration from Arabia and partly because of the many inducements to conversion. Many Christians moved from the interior to the safety of the Lebanese mountains ; for example, about the ninth century the Maronites established themselves in northern Lebanon. The absorption of Greco-Aramaic culture and the development of an Islamic culture were carried farther. At the same time,

the original Islamic religious impulse was growing weaker ; and with its decline and the gradual decay of the Abbasid Caliphate new tendencies began to appear. The Byzantine armies passed from defence to attack, and harassed and at times occupied northern Syria. The country was divided by the rise of local dynasties (both Arab and Turkish) and heterodox Islamic sects. Of the dynasties perhaps the greatest was the Hamdanid, which ruled northern Syria during the tenth century, and was sometimes at war with Byzantium and sometimes tributary to it. At its court or in its domains there flourished some of the greatest figures of Arabic culture—the poets al-Mutanabbi and Abu'l-Ala al-Ma'ari, the anthologist Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani and the philosopher al-Farabi. Of more lasting importance were the new Islamic sects which developed out of Shi'ism in the ninth and subsequent centuries¹ : the Alawis, the Druzes, and the obscurely interrelated Carmathian and Isma'ili movements, which were not only movements of belief, of thought and of social reform, but also initiatory secret societies with political aims. These movements first came into Syria from Iraq, and then from Egypt under the leadership of the Fatimid dynasty during the later tenth century. The Fatimids held precarious and unstable sway over the country for a time. Finally, in the eleventh century, the Seljuq Turks from central Asia began to assert themselves in Syria as an independent force, at first in the name of the 'Great Seljuq' Sultans in the East, but later on their own account. With the establishment of their State, Syria virtually ceased to be part of the Abbasid Empire. The Seljuq State itself, however, did not last long ; it soon split into two minor dynasties, at Aleppo and Damascus.

9

At the end of the eleventh century a new element was introduced into a country already divided between Seljuq Turks in the north and centre, Fatimids in the south, and petty dynasties like the Tanukhids in Lebanon. The Crusading armies from western Europe invaded Syria and conquered the coastal regions and some portions of the interior. In the conquered areas they established a series of feudal states, Edessa, Antioch, Tripoli and Jerusalem, with a European ruling class, maintained by intermittent reinforcements from

¹ See Chapter VII.

the West, but tending in course of time to mingle with the indigenous inhabitants and adopt their ways ; rulers and soldiers were largely French by origin, the commercial class mainly Italian. The indigenous Christians were encouraged to become Catholics ; it was in this period that the Maronites entered into communion with Rome. As for the Moslems, in general they were treated tolerantly. In spite of wars between the Crusaders and the Moslem Governments in the interior, the Crusading States were the source of a fruitful interchange of goods and ideas between Latin Europe and Moslem Asia : the West derived from Syria not only new economic processes and products but new ideas and a stimulus to its imaginative life.

Even at their zenith, during the first half of the twelfth century, the Crusading States never reached as far into the heart of Syria as Damascus. During the second half of that century even their hold upon the coastal regions was challenged, first by Zengi, the Turkish ruler of Mosul, and his son Nur ad-Din, and then by the great Saladin. By origin a Kurd, Saladin was sent by Nur ad-Din to Egypt, and after his master's death gradually extended his sway over the greater part of the eastern Moslem world. His kingdom covered most of Syria, including the Holy Places, his conquest of which occasioned the third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century. To some extent this Crusade revived the fortunes of the Christian States, but only for a short time. Throughout the first half of the thirteenth century Syria was torn by internal dissensions and the rise and fall of petty principalities, both Christian and Moslem. These principalities were powerless to resist the Mongol invaders, who in 1260 swept all before them until they were defeated on the Palestinian coast by Baibars, later the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt. The Mamlukes profited by their victory, and gradually enlarged their control over the country. Acre, the last Crusading fortress, fell to them in 1291.

For the next two centuries Syria remained under Mamluke rule. It was a time of decay and of unrest. Twice more the country was ravaged by Mongol invaders : by the Ilkhans in the late thirteenth century and a hundred years later by Tamerlane, who sacked Aleppo and Damascus and carried away their artisans to Samiarqand. Several times there were local risings, which were suppressed by the Mamlukes : for example, the great insurrections of the Druzes and Shi'is in

Lebanon at the end of the thirteenth century. The period was one of economic decline, partly because of war and unrest, and partly because of the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, which changed the course of the world's great trade routes ; but there was still a certain trade with Europe, carried on by Italian merchants. The population decreased alike in wealth and in numbers. To the economic weakness of the country was added the decay of Mamluke rule ; and when the Ottoman Turks attacked Syria in 1516 they conquered it without difficulty.

10

From 1516 until 1918 Syria remained under Ottoman rule, and part of an Empire which included at its height the Balkans, much of central Europe, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, part of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Of the first three centuries of this rule there is little to say. In general they were centuries of stagnation. The Ottoman conquest did not seriously affect the racial composition of the people of Syria, their language or their way of life. Few Turks settled in the country, but the infiltration of nomads from Arabia continued. It was during this period that some of the great tribes, of which the descendants still, as nomads or as peasants, inhabit a large part of the country, first entered it : the Shammar and then various Anazah tribes, who drove the Shammar across the Euphrates and established their ascendancy over the Syrian Desert. Nor did the Ottoman conquest greatly affect the political structure of Syria. The country was divided into several Pashaliks, those of Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli, and later of Saida ; but often the authority of the Pashas was only effective in and around the great towns in which garrisons were stationed. Men gave formal reverence to the Sultan, who had also arrogated to himself the title of Caliph or head of the Islamic community ; but the limits of his Government's action were narrow. In practice customary law was supreme, and social power was in the hands of the feudal lords, on whom the Ottoman rulers, like their predecessors, mainly relied for the maintenance of local order and the collection of taxes.

Such being the structure of Ottoman rule, it was possible for local dynasts of ability to extend their domains and become virtually independent. Perhaps the greatest of them was the Druze Amir Fakhr ad-Din, a member of the Maani dynasty

which governed Lebanon throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the course of the fifty years of his ascendancy (1586-1635) he extended his territories far beyond Lebanon, and increased their prosperity by his encouragement to agriculture and to trade with Europe. He was tolerant in religious matters, protecting Christians and Europeans. He even attempted, with support from some European rulers, completely to throw off the suzerainty of the Sultan. Forced in 1613 to flee to Italy, he returned to Syria after a few years, and continued to dominate a great part of the country until captured and killed by the Turks.

His death was followed by the decline of the Maanis, who were succeeded in 1697 by the Shihabis. They ruled throughout the eighteenth century ; it was a time of upheaval in the life of Lebanon, marked on the one hand by the gradual spread of the Christian peasantry from northern Lebanon southwards into districts which had previously been wholly inhabited by Druzes, and on the other by intensive conflicts among the Druze nobility. These were conflicts of families and factions, the lineal descendants of the ancient Arabian dispute of Qays and Yemen. Many of the defeated faction emigrated from Lebanon to the hilly district beyond the plain of the Hauran, now known as Jebel Druze. In the remainder of Syria no less than in Lebanon the eighteenth century was marked by conflict and unrest. Finally a great part of the country fell into the hands of the Bosnian Jazzar, Pasha of Acre, who ruled it ruthlessly and cruelly from 1775 until 1804.

In general, the first three centuries of Ottoman rule were a period of economic decline. The population continued to shrink ; a harsh system of taxation and the uncertainty of life had their effect upon agriculture ; and Syria no longer lay on the main trade route from Europe to further Asia. But commerce was not completely stagnant ; trade with many of the surrounding countries was made easier by the incorporation of Syria into the Ottoman Empire, and at times the desert routes were prosperous. Damascus was still in decline, but Aleppo was one of the great centres of the internal trade of the Empire, and also of the trade between the Empire and Europe. Here and in other Syrian towns grew up colonies of French, Italian and other European merchants, through whose hands passed most of the trade between Europe and the Levant. These colonies were granted a special status and privileges by

the Sultans. The first such grant was made to the French communities by the Franco-Ottoman concordat of 1535, which together with subsequent concordats served as the basis not only of the foreign 'Capitulations' in the Ottoman Empire, but also of the French claim to protect the Catholic Christians of the Levant.¹

It was not only traders who came from the West. From the seventeenth century onwards Catholic missionaries were active, particularly among the indigenous Christian communities: Franciscans (the traditional custodians of the Catholic Holy Places), Jesuits and others. They slowly built up the various Uniate Churches, Eastern in rite but in communion with Rome. They gave the country its first modern schools, although on a very modest scale. More important perhaps than the schools founded in Syria was the Maronite College established at Rome to educate the Maronite clergy and draw closer their links with Western Catholicism. It was this College which had the honour of educating Joseph Assemani, Maronite Archbishop, Librarian of the Vatican and one of the earliest of the great modern orientalists.

II

The beginning of the nineteenth century found Syria a decayed and half-deserted land. After the rule of Jazzar had come to an end, Ottoman administration only functioned effectively in the large towns, where the garrisons of Janissaries were stationed, in a section of the coastal strip and certain portions of the countryside. A large part of the country was governed by local chieftains, ruling by virtue of descent or ability and practically autonomous; they held their fiefs no longer on condition of performing military service, but on that of collecting taxes for the Sultan's Government. Both the local dynasts and the Turkish Pashas were largely uncontrolled in their dealings with their subjects and with one another. Oppressed by rulers, by tax-farmers and by feudal lords, the peasants had neither incentive nor opportunity to scrape more than a bare living from the soil. The Beduin were virtually uncontrolled, and were a perpetual menace to the settled areas. What prosperity the country still possessed came less from agriculture than from the flow of commerce through the principal towns.

¹ See Chapter VIII.

Mount Lebanon was an oasis of order amid the chaos. It was ruled by the strong and ruthless Amir Bashir of the Shihabi family, who reigned from 1789 to 1840 almost as an independent monarch. He established law and security, preserved the character of Lebanon as an asylum of refuge, extended its boundaries far into the territory of the neighbouring Pashaliks and encouraged the trade of Beirut.

Lebanon was quiet during the first thirty years of the century, but beneath the surface important changes were taking place. There was a change in the relationship between Druzes and Maronites. The northern part of Lebanon was inhabited mainly by Maronites and other Christians, the southern by Druzes. The Christians were numerically preponderant and had for some generations been spreading southwards into districts formerly wholly Druze but now mixed in population. Although the Druzes were in a minority, and their numbers had been diminished by emigration to Jebel Druze in the eighteenth century, their feudal lords had for centuries been the dominant force in Lebanon, thanks to the strength of their communal spirit and organization. In the days of Bashir, the Christian peasants continued to spread southwards and the Druzes to emigrate from Lebanon to Jebel Druze. New difficulties also arose. To fortify his own power, the Amir curbed the power of the Druze notables and encouraged the latent tension between the sects. Within each sect, too, there was unrest. Among the Maronites there was a movement of the peasants against their lords, and a struggle for predominance between the lords and the clergy. The Druzes for their part continued to be torn by the strife of families. To add to these factors, a change for the worse was taking place in the economic position of Lebanon.

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12

Into this stagnant world a new force was about to enter : Syria, like the rest of the Ottoman Empire, was drawn into the orbit of Western life during the nineteenth century.

The impact of the West was first apparent in the political sphere. Already in the eighteenth century it had been clear that the Ottoman Empire had passed its zenith ; its European frontiers were contracting, and its hold over most of North Africa was precarious. But now it became increasingly probable that the Empire would collapse. Its collapse would alter the

political relationship between the European States. It therefore became expedient for the Great Powers either to hasten or to delay the collapse, according to their conception of their interests, and at all events to secure a position of paramount influence in the Empire. During the earlier part of the century the Powers mainly interested were Great Britain, France and Russia ; and in the pursuit of their interests all three attempted not only to secure a paramount influence over the Ottoman Government in Constantinople, but also to establish a special connexion with one or other of the peoples of the Empire, and of Syria among its provinces. The French had for some generations possessed such a connexion with the Maronites and other Catholic Christians ; at the end of the eighteenth century the Russians began to claim a special right of protection over the Greek Orthodox Christians in both the European and the Asiatic parts of the Empire ; and in the course of the nineteenth century Great Britain tried to cultivate the friendship of the Druzes. Thus motives of high policy impelled the Powers to intervene in the internal life of Syria, which had for so long been almost untouched by influences from the West.

The first great blow to the traditional life came in the last years of the eighteenth century, when Napoleon marched northwards from his newly-won base in Egypt. His advance was resisted by Jazzar as representative of the Ottoman Sultan. In order to weaken this resistance Napoleon tried to stir the Sultan's subjects into revolt. He had some success with the Maronites and Shi'is, none with the Sunnis, who remained hostile to him, nor with the Amir Bashir, who remained cautiously neutral. For a time the French army moved without hindrance up the coastal road ; but the resistance of Jazzar in Acre, supported by a British fleet, compelled Napoleon to abandon the campaign (1799).

13

Had Napoleon not been defeated, he might have awakened Syria from its long sleep. The work which he might have done had to wait thirty years. In 1831-2 Syria was occupied by the armies of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan. Muhammad Ali wanted Syria partly to make use of its resources in men and wood, and partly as a stepping-stone towards Constantinople and domination of the whole Ottoman Empire.

In 1833 the Sultan agreed to Muhammad Ali's control of Syria, and for the next few years it was ruled by Ibrahim. These years may be regarded as the beginning of the modern age for the country. For the first time in centuries it was given a centralized Government strong enough to hold separatist tendencies in check, and a system of taxation regular and comparatively rational, although burdensome. The judiciary was reformed, and greater equality than had previously existed was established between Moslems and others. The Government founded schools and permitted foreign missionaries to do so. The improved state of public order encouraged commerce and cultivation.

In spite of these innovations, at first Ibrahim Pasha tried not to break with the traditions of the country but to base his domination upon the local landowning and ruling families, and especially upon the Amir Bashir. For a time his rule was popular with a large part of the inhabitants. Later, however, it became unpopular: with the landowners because he tried to limit their political and social predominance, and with the peasants on account of the forced labour, conscription, compulsory disarmament and heavy taxation to which he found it necessary to resort. At the same time Muhammad Ali's control of Syria was disliked by the Sultan and by Great Britain and Russia. They conceived it to be in their interest to maintain the Ottoman Empire and were not inclined to allow the establishment of a new mushroom kingdom in the eastern Mediterranean, the more so because of the friendly relations between Muhammad Ali and France.

In 1839 the Sultan brought matters to a crisis by ordering his armies to invade Syria. They were met at Nizib by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, and were decisively defeated. The way to Constantinople now seemed open to Ibrahim. At this point the Powers intervened. With the exception of France they gave their backing to the Sultan's demand that Ibrahim should evacuate Syria north of Acre (1840). At the same time they sent arms to the discontented inhabitants of Syria and particularly to the Druzes and Maronites of Lebanon. When Ibrahim refused to agree to the Sultan's demand, a British expedition was landed on the coast, and Lebanon rose in revolt, although Bashir remained faithful to Ibrahim. Ibrahim was driven from Syria, which was restored to the Sultan; and the Amir was forced to abdicate.

Ibrahim went, but something of his work remained. He had opened Syria to Western merchants and travellers as it had not been open for generations, and he had helped to shake the Empire out of its long torpor. The rest of the century saw a determined if crude effort by the Ottoman Government to reform and modernize its structure ; it was initiated by the Sultan Mahmud II and carried further by his successor Abdul-Majid. To some extent this effort took the shape of formal acts designed to create a system of political standards and rights such as the Western Powers possessed. Thus in 1839, under the influence of the British Ambassador, Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan Abdul-Majid issued the ' Gulhane ' decree, which guaranteed security and public trial to all citizens, established a just system of imposing and collecting taxes, provided for equality of civil rights between members of the different religious communities and extended the obligation of military service to all alike. The next year a penal code was enacted, based upon the principle of equality before the law. In 1856, after the Crimean War (of which the rivalry of France and Russia for control of the Holy Places in Palestine had been a contributory cause), the Powers compelled the Sultan to issue a further edict, the ' Hatti Humayun ', defining and guaranteeing the spiritual and temporal privileges of the non-Moslem communities, and granting their members equality of civil rights with Moslems. Finally, in 1876, the Sultan issued a Parliamentary constitution, which was however suspended soon after its first application.

These steps were taken partly at least to appease or to impress the Governments of Europe, and were only very imperfectly carried out. More important, if less obtrusive, was the attempt to replace the old system of decentralized feudal government by a modern centralized and uniform administration. The first step to this was the creation of a professional army with Western training and equipment ; this was undertaken with considerable success by the Sultan Mahmud II. Thus it became possible for subsequent Sultans to try to break down the old autonomies and curb the power of the local dynasties : by the abolition of tax-farming and other measures designed to reduce the social power of the landholders and, where necessary, by military expeditions against too powerful subjects. The attempt was successful in some parts of the country, for example

with the Kurds and Turcomans in the north and the Alawis around Latakia ; unsuccessful in others, for example with the Druzes of Jebel Druze, who, in spite of expeditions against them in 1876, 1896 and 1911, and of occasional acts of submission on their part, retained their administrative and judicial autonomy and their exemption from military service.

For purposes of administration the country was divided into the Vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo ; subsequently a separate Vilayet of Beirut was created. A Sanjaq of Jerusalem and a Mutassarifat of Dair az-Zur, attached directly to the central Government at Constantinople, were also established.

15

In one region the policy of centralization was tried and failed. The social and religious situation in Lebanon at the beginning of the nineteenth century has already been described. The restlessness which existed was increased by the distribution of arms and the rising of 1840, as also by the support given by the French Government to the Maronites and by the British to the Druzes. After the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha and the restoration of Ottoman rule, the Sultan's Government set itself deliberately to foment religious conflict in order to make the traditional autonomy of Lebanon unworkable and so to create an excuse for the establishment of direct Ottoman rule over the Mountain. Its task was all the easier in that Bashir was succeeded by a weak member of the Shihabi family, who was unable to maintain order.

The first disturbances occurred in 1841, when civil war broke out between Maronites and Druzes. The Powers intervened and persuaded the Ottoman Government to promulgate a new constitution for Lebanon, dividing it into two districts, the northern under a Maronite and the southern under a Druze governor. The governors were to be appointed by the central Government, but the administrative privileges of the Mountain were guaranteed. The new system was set up ; but a few years later, in 1845, civil war broke out once more. The Government re-imposed order and partially disarmed the population ; in this as in other matters, however, it favoured the Druzes at the expense of the Maronites. It also made certain changes in the new administrative system, with the purpose of limiting the power of the feudal landlords and tax-farmers.

During the next years social and religious tension continued to increase ; it was encouraged by the weakness of the governors, who proved unable to control the feudal lords. Finally, in 1857, matters came to a head in the purely Maronite districts of north Lebanon, where the peasants revolted against their lords. Led by priests, by younger sons of land-owning families and by popular leaders of whom the most notable was Yusuf Karam, they established a peasant Government, put an end to the prerogatives of the nobility and divided up the large estates.

In the districts of central and southern Lebanon, where the population was partly Druze and partly Christian, the final outbreak was later in coming, and took a more complex form : it was both a religious conflict between the Druze and Maronite communities and a social conflict between Maronite peasants and Druze lords. In 1860, great disturbances broke out. Some thousands of Christians were killed in different parts of Lebanon by the Druzes with the connivance of the Turkish authorities, and thousands more in Damascus by the Moslem mob, in spite of the efforts of certain Moslem notables to restrain them. At this point the European Powers intervened. By international agreement, the Emperor Napoleon III sent a military expedition to Lebanon. It remained in occupation of the district for nine months, but had little to do, since the Ottoman Government had already taken steps to restore order and punish some of those held to be responsible. At the same time an international commission was set up to investigate the disturbances, to supervise the punishment of those who had instigated them and the indemnification of those who had suffered, and to make proposals for the future organization of the Mountain.

The Commission, which met first in Beirut and then in Constantinople, drew up a Statute formalizing and defining the autonomy of Lebanon. By the terms of this Statute, which was promulgated in 1861 and finally ratified in 1864, Lebanon was to be administered by a Christian Ottoman governor appointed by the Ottoman Government with the consent of the Powers, and directly responsible to it. He was to have full executive powers and to be assisted by a central administrative Council, on which the more important religious communities were to be equitably represented. They were similarly to be represented in the local administration. Lebanon was to have its own judiciary

and police force. Feudal privileges were abolished, and all were declared equal before the law.

Until the First World War Lebanon was ruled in accordance with this Statute. It was on the whole a period of increasing prosperity. It is true that unrest was not immediately stilled. The abolition of feudal privileges raised new social problems, and thus led to renewed agitation among the Maronite peasants, whose leader, Yusuf Karam, was finally sent away from Lebanon; and discontented Druzes continued to emigrate to Jebel Druze. But gradually the traditional state of religious toleration returned. The governors, who were Christians from outside Lebanon, were in general efficient and humane, and defended the autonomy of the Mountain against the attempts of the Sultan to infringe it. Agriculture revived, roads were built, schools were opened, and Western civilization extended its sway.¹

16

For the rest of the century the Ottoman Empire continued to be the object of European interest and rivalry. The tension between Great Britain and Russia which was temporarily relaxed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 did not directly concern Syria. But the struggle between Russia and France for control of the Holy Places in Palestine, which had been the occasion of the Crimean War, was still not altogether ended. By its side new rivalries grew up. Italy disputed France's rights in regard to the Catholic communities and Holy Places; and towards the end of the century Germany began to stake her claim. In the reign of Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1909) German influence over the Ottoman Government grew continuously and gradually replaced that which Great Britain had once possessed. The Berlin to Baghdad railway, which German enterprise partially constructed, skirted the northern edge of Syria and might well, had not the First World War broken out, have served as a means of German penetration into that and other provinces of the Empire.

17

Western influence thus played an important part in the political life of the country; it played an even more important one in the social and economic changes of the century. Syrian

¹ The exact boundaries of the sanjaq of Lebanon were never clearly established.

life in all its aspects underwent a gradual and still incomplete process of Westernization. The tastes and habits of the population were profoundly influenced by the inflow of goods from the West ; their beliefs and way of thinking still more profoundly so by the spread of Western culture.

The reception of Western civilization was helped by the emigration of many thousands of Syrians to other countries. In general they came more often from Lebanon than from other regions, and they were more often Christians than Moslems. Their motives for leaving their country were various. Many of the Christians desired to escape from a predominantly Moslem environment, especially after the events of 1860 ; many among both Christians and Moslems found Ottoman rule too oppressive to be borne ; young men educated in the mission-schools wished for opportunities and rewards greater than their native land could offer ; some were attracted by the legendary promise of the New World, its wealth and its freedom ; and others went abroad simply because their relations and friends had already settled there.

There were two main roads of emigration. The one led to Egypt and the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the other Arabic-speaking countries. This road had always been open, but it was rendered more attractive by the establishment of British control over Egypt and the Sudan. The British authorities needed subordinate officials who spoke Arabic and understood the ways of the Near East, but who were also acquainted with Western methods of thought and administration. They found what they needed in the graduates of the Syrian mission-schools, who for half a century loyally and effectively filled a variety of positions in the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan. Thousands of other Syrians went to Egypt as merchants, doctors and journalists. They progressed, and some among them played a considerable part in the cultural life of the country. Being largely an urban middle-class community, partly Christian and suspected of an excessive attachment to Great Britain or at least to the West, the Syrian-Egyptians have not always been liked by the Egyptians ; but many of them have become Egyptians in nationality and sentiment, and at least the Moslems among them may become assimilated in a generation or two to the population among whom they are living.

The Syrian-Egyptians are numbered in tens of thousands,

but those who have followed the other road, to North and South America, to Australia and to other of the more distant parts of the world, must be counted in hundreds of thousands. The great majority of them started as retail traders on a small scale, but many took to wholesale trade and to the manufacture of textiles and other goods. The process of taking root was harder for them than for those who went to Egypt, since it involved learning new languages and acquiring new ways of life ; but they have already been assimilated to a considerable extent, and the large Syrian colonies in the United States, Brazil and the Argentine, with smaller ones in other countries, have become prosperous, loyal and respected elements in the communities in which they are living. Most of them have given up all but a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and there seems to be no obstacle to their ultimate complete assimilation, the more so since the flow of emigrants to the countries of the New World has greatly diminished during the last two decades. It has been partly diverted to British and French West Africa, much of the internal trade of which is now in Syrian hands.

The consequences of the emigration for Syria were both good and bad. They were bad in so far as it was the more talented and enterprising of the country's youth who went abroad, during the period of their greatest energy and often for ever. On the other hand, the level of prosperity was raised by the remittances which successful emigrants sent home to their relatives, and by the savings which they brought back with them. Also, they introduced new ideas, and, what was even more important, the example of a new and in many respects attractive way of life. These ideas, this example and the bare fact that Syrians were prosperous and happy in foreign lands, deeply influenced the attitude of Syria to the West. All this was especially true of Lebanon, since it supplied so large a proportion of the emigrants.

18

Western influences also came by way of education. Students began to go abroad, to seek the new learning in the schools of Europe and America ; and Western schools became ever more numerous in the Near East. The greater number of them were established and maintained by foreign missionary institutions. Jesuit and other Catholic schools had existed since the

seventeenth century, but it was only in the eighteen-thirties that conditions arose in which their numbers and influence could increase ; and it was during the same decade that American Protestant schools became important. During the second half of the century a new step was taken, with the creation in 1866 of the institution which subsequently became the American University of Beirut ; nine years later, in 1875, the Jesuit college which was later to become the Université de S. Joseph, was transferred to Beirut from Ghazir, where it had been established in 1843. Towards the end of the century Russian, German and other religious schools were established, the French Mission Laïque began its work, and the Ottoman Government itself started to create schools and colleges on Western lines.

The spread of Western education, the growth of commercial relations with Western countries and other factors brought into existence a class of people who knew French, English and other European languages, often as well as and sometimes better than their native Arabic. Knowledge of these languages gave them the key to a whole new world of ideas and images.

The spread of Western ideas, the rediscovery and publication of the Arab classics by Western orientalists, the introduction of the printing-press and the establishment of newspapers and periodicals led to a revival of Arabic literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the creative use of the classical Arabic language had almost entirely ceased. The old authors were scarcely read ; such poetry and prose as were produced were imitations of archaic models ; except for religious schools, which mainly confined themselves to the memorization of the Quran, no sort of literary education existed. But gradually what had been dead came to life again. Around the mission-schools in Beirut gathered a group of Syrian writers, most of them Christians, who set themselves to evolve a modern Arabic idiom and style suitable for the expression of Western ideas, and to use the instrument thus created to familiarize the Arabs with the civilization of Europe and to render them conscious of their own problems. At the same time another group was being created in Cairo by means of the schools, educational missions and translations initiated or encouraged by Muhammad Ali and his successors ; similar to the Beirut group in many ways, it differed from it by a greater concern with the

question of Islam and modern civilization, and a greater caution in accepting ideas and innovations from Europe.

These two groups, and smaller, less important groups in other towns, have laid the foundations of a new Arabic literature. To a great extent their work has been preparatory. The Arabic language has been rendered more adequate and flexible, for example by the adoption or invention of technical terms. Western ideas have been spread through translations and works of popularization. New literary forms have been introduced—the poetic drama, the novel, the romantic autobiography—and at the same time old forms have been revived. In addition to the advances in form, the subject-matter of literature has been extended. Different groups have set themselves to expound subjects not hitherto treated : the relations between religion and secular culture, the position of women, the method of empirical science, and so on. In all this preparatory work, the influence of French and English thought and literature has been great and obvious.

Modern Arabic literature has so far produced nothing of great originality, nothing of much interest to the outer world. But there have been a number of honest, hard-working and courageous writers, who have deserved well of the Arabic-speaking peoples : for example, the religious thinker Muhammad Abdu, the social reformer Qasim Amin, the essayist al-Manfaluti, the poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, the playwright and novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim and the scholar Taha Husain.

These names are all those of Egyptians, and Cairo is the unquestioned centre of Arabic literature. But there have been very important Syrian and Lebanese writers, many of whom it is true worked for most of their lives in Egypt, although others remained in their own country. They include the scholars and poets of the Bustani and Yaziji families ; the religious reformer Rashid Rida ; the fathers of Arabic journalism Shidi'aq, Nimr, Sarruf, Zaidan and Taqla ; the poet Khalil Mutran ; the best of women writers in Arabic, May Ziada ; the traveller Amin Rihani ; and the mystic Khalil Gibran. The last two spent many years in the United States and wrote much of their work in English. They are the most distinguished of a group of Syrian-American writers who have planted in the new world a root of Arabic literature, which in spite of its qualities can hardly hope to survive a generation.

At the beginning of the present century Syria had ceased to be the stagnant land of a hundred years before. Lebanon in particular, and the rest of the country to a smaller extent, were in process of becoming Westernized and regaining their prosperity. The long decline in the population had ceased and been replaced by a steady increase, although during the nineteenth century there had been little immigration, apart from that of Zionist Jews towards the end of the century. The standard of living had risen. Commerce with the external world was greater than at any time during the Ottoman period, in spite of the diversion of transit trade to the Suez Canal. The country possessed several thousand kilometres of railways and modern roads, most of them built by French companies. Nowhere was the change so marked as in Beirut. In 1800 it had been a decayed town of a few thousand inhabitants, mainly Moslems. By 1900 it had become one of the main centres of trade and culture in the Ottoman Empire. It had a modern harbour, large colonies of foreign business-men and numerous schools and colleges which attracted students from far beyond Lebanon. The total number of its inhabitants was approaching 100,000. The percentage of Christians among them was constantly increasing; for throughout the century Christians had been settling in the town, attracted by the superior opportunities and comforts of urban life or seeking, after the massacres of 1860, the comparative safety of a coastal city in which European influence was strong.

But although the Syria of 1900 was more prosperous than that of 1800, it was also more consciously discontented. The rule of the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II was, indeed, less wholly destructive and regressive in Syria than in other provinces of the Empire, perhaps because some of his principal advisers were Syrians. Public works were built, notably the Pilgrims' Railway from Damascus to Medina, and the area of civil government and cultivation was extended; but his régime, in the greater part of Syria as elsewhere, was one of tyranny and of repression. For this reason, when political consciousness revived, the form which it took was largely one of opposition to the autocratic rule of the Sultan. It is true that he tried to attract the politically conscious Moslems to his side,

by means of the 'Pan-Islamic movement', which aimed at the union of the Islamic peoples under the leadership of the Sultan-Caliph. But Pan-Islamism was a bogey with which to frighten the European Powers rather than a serious political movement.

The revival of political consciousness was late in beginning. The very ideas of political association and public opinion did not filter into the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century ; and throughout the century police-measures and an exceedingly strict censorship made political organization practically impossible. But not all Abdul-Hamid's repressive policy could prevent the infiltration in one way or another of Western political concepts : democracy, responsible government, the party system, freedom of expression. Nor could it prevent the development of a daily and periodical press in Arabic, which was not, of course, allowed to print independent comment or very much news, but which raised the level of political knowledge and understanding and served as an intellectual unifying force.

There were two main movements of opposition in Syria. One was the movement, here as throughout the Empire, for the limitation of the Sultan's authority and the restoration of the democratic constitution of 1876, as a first step to the regeneration of the Empire : this was the programme of the so-called 'Young Turks', organized in the 'Committee of Union and Progress'. The other was the movement throughout the Arab provinces of the Empire for Arab national unity and self-government. These two movements were not at first sharply distinguished from one another, partly because both had as their immediate objective the overthrow of Abdul-Hamid's autocracy, and partly because Arab nationalism in its early stages thought rather in terms of autonomy within the Empire than of complete independence. But after the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908, and the substitution of the rule of the Committee for that of Abdul-Hamid, it soon became clear that the Committee was no more sympathetic to Arab aspirations than the Sultan had been ; the movement of unrest in the Arab provinces became more specifically Arab and also more articulate. Before 1908 the Arab nationalist movement, in so far as it had existed at all, had not been organized, except for a few rather ineffective societies, such as the 'Ligue de la Patrie Arabe' founded in Paris in 1904. But from 1908

onwards there began to appear those Arab political societies of which the story has been incomparably told by the late Mr. George Antonius.¹ At first they were public, and aimed not at complete independence for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but at administrative reform and decentralization within the Empire. Such were the 'Arab Ottoman Brotherhood' and the 'Literary Club', both established in Constantinople, and the 'Party of Ottoman Decentralization' founded in Cairo in 1912. But after a time secret societies were formed, with complete independence for the Arab provinces as their aim. The most important of them were 'al-Fatat', which was founded by a group of students in Paris in 1911 and established its headquarters in Syria two years later; and 'al-Ahd', founded in 1914 and consisting almost entirely of Army officers, among them a large number of Iraqis. In the previous year the nationalist movement had first attracted the notice of the outside world by holding its first Congress in Paris. The majority of the delegates were Syrians and Lebanese, and half were Christians. The Congress demanded full rights for the Arabs and decentralization within the Empire; but the Turkish Government made only a few illusory concessions.

By this time, however, few of the convinced nationalists hoped to achieve much by agreement with the Turkish Government. It was clear that the Empire was breaking up. By 1914 it had lost almost all its Balkan provinces and the whole of North Africa, although the Sultan's suzerainty over Egypt was still recognized in form; its territories had shrunk in Europe to a small district round Constantinople, in Asia to Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and part of western Arabia, with a claim to sovereignty over other parts of Arabia. The nationalists found themselves faced with a question of great moment: what would be the fate of the Arab provinces when the Empire collapsed? Would it be possible for them to constitute an independent State, or must they fall into the hands of new masters?

¹ G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, London, 1938.

II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

I

THE opening of the First World War in 1914 found a number of Governments and groups with an interest in changing the political status of Syria. First, there were the Arab nationalists, who wanted the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire to become autonomous. They were divided in their political ideas and preferences. Some wished to achieve their aims through the help of Great Britain or France or the United States ; others relied only upon their own strength and efforts. Some aimed at establishing an independent Arab State, others a self-governing Arab kingdom within an Ottoman federation, yet others a Syrian State loosely linked with the other Arabic-speaking regions. But all alike were hostile to the Young Turkish Government with its Pan-Turanian policy, and very many were willing, with greater or smaller hesitations and reservations, to throw in their lot with Great Britain should Turkey become involved in the war.

Arab nationalist sentiment was widespread among the army officers, officials, professional men and in general the educated classes. The nationalist societies in Syria like ' al-Fatat ' were in touch with Arab nationalists in the other Arabic-speaking regions : with the Iraqi army officers of ' al-Ahd ' ; with the powerful Syrian colonies in Egypt and the New World ; with the Sharif Husain, the ruler, under Turkish suzerainty, of the Moslem Holy Places in the Hejaz ; and with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, the most powerful ruler of central Arabia, and virtually an independent monarch in spite of a shadowy Turkish suzerainty.

Side by side with Arab nationalism there existed a lively particularist movement among the Lebanese Christians. They wished the autonomy of Lebanon to be completed and its frontiers extended ; they looked to France for help in achieving their aims and for protection when these should have been realized. Certain of them were not hostile to Arab nationalism, provided it recognized the special position of Lebanon ; some indeed worked actively for Syrian or Arab independence.

Of external powers, France was the most interested in Syria. She possessed important interests in the country : investments, Christian missions and schools and a traditional connexion

with the Catholics. She desired at all costs to preserve and if possible to extend them. In addition, she believed a foothold in the Levant would strengthen her position both as a Mediterranean and as a Moslem Power ; and if the Ottoman Empire were to collapse, she was anxious to take her share of the spoils.

Great Britain wished to secure control of the port of Haifa, and could not permit the establishment of an unfriendly Power on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. But in the northern part of Syria her interests were mainly indirect, arising out of her policy in other parts of Arab Asia. The Indian Government wished to use southern Iraq as an outpost for the defence of India and the Persian oil-fields. Oil was also known to exist in northern Iraq. In June, 1914, the Turkish Petroleum Company had been formed with mainly British capital, and had obtained a concession covering the Vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. Later this would give Great Britain an indirect interest in Syria, as the country through which the oil would flow on its way to the Mediterranean ; but in 1914 the importance of the Iraqi oil was not realized. Moreover, as the most influential power in the Arabian peninsula, Great Britain could not be indifferent to the fate of so important a centre of Arab life as Syria.

One other group had interests in Syria : the Zionist movement.¹ The Zionists believed that the Jewish problem in the world could only be solved by the creation of a strong and vigorous Jewish community in Palestine, with an economic and social structure more normal than was possible to the Jews in Europe, and with an autonomous culture and spiritual life. Some, the so-called ' practical Zionists ', hoped to create this community by direct means : immigration, the purchase of land, the establishment of agricultural settlements. Many of them laid special emphasis upon the revival of the Hebrew language and the recreation of the spirit of Judaism. By 1914 ' practical Zionism ' had had a considerable success : many thousands of Jews were living in rural colonies and in the new quarters of the towns, and Hebrew was becoming once more a language of everyday life and of education. But there was another group, the ' political Zionists ', which was not indeed opposed to the first, but which argued that the Jewish community in Palestine would not help materially to solve the

¹ For a further treatment of Zionism, see Chapter VI.

Jewish problem unless it possessed a definite political status or guarantee. The founder of organized Zionism, Theodor Herzl, had tried to secure such a status from the Ottoman Government. He had failed, and the eyes of the Zionists turned to the European Powers. Many of them hoped to persuade the German Government to put pressure on the Turks to relax their opposition ; but once the War broke out the most important section pinned their faith upon Great Britain.

2

The entry of Turkey into the war in November, 1914, gave all these parties an opportunity to realize their ambitions. In addition, it gave to Arab nationalism and Zionism a new importance for the British Government, as possible allies in the conflict with the Central Powers. The years of war saw not only practical collaboration between the parties, but also the conclusion of a series of agreements on the ultimate disposal of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Even before the outbreak of war informal contacts had taken place between British officials in Egypt and prominent Arabs. Shortly after the war began formal relations were established between the British authorities and the Sharif Husain. In his own name and on behalf of the secret Arab nationalist organizations in Syria, he expressed his willingness to organize an Arab revolt against the Turks, provided he were given British assistance and an undertaking to recognize Arab independence should the revolt be successful.

The negotiations which ensued took the form of an exchange of letters between the Sharif Husain and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. In his letter of October 24th, 1915, Sir Henry McMahon defined the limits within which His Majesty's Government was prepared to recognize Arab independence. Replying to the Sharif's request for the recognition of the independence of all the Arabic-speaking countries of Asia, he stated that :

‘ The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. . . . As for those regions lying within the proposed frontiers where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her

ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter :

‘ Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.’

In his reply, dated November 5th, 1915, Husain denied the British assertion that the Syrian coastlands were not purely Arab. ‘ The two Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut ’, he stated, ‘ and their sea-coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab.’ On December 14th, McMahon replied that as the interests of France were involved in both the Vilayets, the question would require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject would be addressed to Husain in due course. To this Husain responded, on January 1st, 1916, by postponing the question until after the war, but indicating what his attitude would then be.


‘ We have felt bound ’, he stated, ‘ to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities ; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts. . . . It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.’¹

3

In October 1915 the French Government was informed of these negotiations ; and shortly afterwards conversations took place between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot, representing the British and French Governments respectively, for the delimitation of the spheres of influence of their Governments in the territories at that time under Ottoman control. On May 16th, 1916, a secret agreement, commonly known as the ‘ Sykes-Picot Agreement ’, was concluded and embodied in a number of notes exchanged between the British, French and Russian Governments.

¹ For English translation, see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1939, H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 5952.

THE "SYKES-PICOT" AGREEMENT, 1916



This agreement differed greatly in spirit from that which had been concluded with the Sharif Husain. It provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into a number of zones. In the interior of Syria and the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain and France agreed to recognize an independent Arab State, or Confederation of States, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. In part of this region, including what is now Transjordan and a strip of territory in the south of the Vilayet of Mosul, Great Britain was to have the right of priority in enterprises and local loans, and she alone was to supply foreign advisers and officials ; in the remainder, France was to possess similar rights. In coastal Syria, from a point between Acre and Sur (Tyre) up to and including Cilicia, France was to be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as she might desire or deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation. In the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, Great Britain was to be in a similar position. In what is now Palestine an international administration was to be established, and the Sharif of Mecca among others was to be consulted on its form ; but Great Britain was to be accorded Haifa and Acre.¹

In letters exchanged at the same time British interests in the oil of Mosul were safeguarded by a French assurance that pre-war concessions in the area under French influence would be recognized ; and the British Government made it clear that it accepted the agreement on the understanding that the Arabs should obtain the towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

4

Negotiations had also been proceeding between the Zionist organization and the British Government. They resulted in an agreement which was embodied in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. (later Lord) Balfour, to Lord Rothschild on November 2nd, 1917. This letter, usually known as the ' Balfour Declaration ', stated that :

' His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of

¹ For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 428-30.

existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

5

The publication of the Balfour Declaration, and still more the revelation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolshevik Government of Russia, caused the Sharif Husain and other Arab leaders to doubt the sincerity of the British Government's undertakings. To allay their doubts, certain additional assurances were given them during the last year of the war. In January, 1918, Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo was sent to Jedda to give Husain (who had been proclaimed King of the Hejaz in November 1916) a verbal explanation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. Among other things he assured the King that 'Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population.'¹ Again, on February 8th, 1918, the British Government assured the King that they and their allies 'are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty's Government reaffirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples.'

On June 16th, 1918, an officer of the Arab Bureau made to seven Arab leaders in Cairo a declaration which reaffirmed once more the intention of the British Government to work for and to recognize the freedom and independence of the Arabs.

The effect of these assurances was increased by the public statements of peace aims made by Allied statesmen as the war drew to its end. Thus on January 5th, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George stated that 'while we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race . . . Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be, need not here be discussed. . . .'

Three days later, President Wilson included among his 'Fourteen Points' the provision that 'the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure

¹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1939, Cmd. 5964.*

sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured an . . . unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.'

Finally, on November 17th, 1918, a joint Anglo-French Declaration was issued from the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and circulated in Palestine, in the rest of Syria and in Mesopotamia. It defined the goal of the Allies in the Eastern campaign as the complete and final liberation of the peoples oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national Governments and administrations deriving authority from the free initiative and choice of the populations. Great Britain and France agreed to assist in the setting-up and recognition of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia. They did not wish to impose a system upon the populations of those regions, but to give such help as would ensure the smooth working of the governments elected by the populations of their own free will.¹

6

It was the British undertakings which induced the Sharif Husain and his sons to throw in their lot with the Allies, and lead the Arab Revolt against the Turks. The story of the Revolt need not be told in detail here; but it must be made clear that, although its events took place largely beyond the borders of Syria, Syrians played a great part in it. Syrian officers and soldiers participated in the campaigns of the Arab army; their number was constantly on the increase as the war went on, largely through desertions from the Turkish ranks. Moreover, British and Arab nationalist agents established contact with the chiefs of the great Beduin tribes of the Syrian Desert, and assured their favourable attitude to the Allied advance northwards. The friendliness of the Syrian population in general, no less than the support of the Arab forces beyond the Jordan, was of great assistance to the Allies in their final campaign.

On the whole, however, Syria's role in the war was one of passive suffering rather than active participation. In the later stages of the war the country was a battleground. In 1917 only the southern portion was directly affected by General Allenby's advance which reached Jerusalem in December. In September, 1918, Allenby moved northwards once more, in October

¹ For text of these messages and declarations, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 431-6.

Damascus was captured, and at the time of the Armistice Allied troops were in occupation of the whole of Syria as far north as Aleppo. But to be a battleground was not the worst which Syria endured. Throughout the war, the population suffered from serious shortage of food, due to bad transport arrangements, profiteering, a corrupt and inefficient administration and a plague of locusts. In the later stages of the war famine set in, with its attendant diseases. It was especially serious in Lebanon, where the Turkish authorities followed a policy of discrimination in the distribution of food as a reprisal for the sympathies of the population with the Allies. Mr. Antonius has estimated that in the whole of Syria 300,000 people died of starvation or malnutrition during the years of war.¹

To the terrors of famine were added the repressive measures adopted by Jemal Pasha, Governor of Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces there, against those suspected of Arab nationalist activities. These measures were first adopted after the discovery in the French Consulate at Beirut of documents incriminating a number of prominent Syrians in subversive activities aiming at the establishment of an independent Arab state. In 1915 and 1916 a number of those implicated were publicly hanged in Damascus and Beirut. Others were imprisoned and deported to remote parts of the Ottoman Empire. Almost everybody of any eminence lived under suspicion and surveillance, and the whole country went in fear of 'the Butcher' Jemal and his military tribunals. The rigour of Turkish rule naturally increased after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt and the development of a direct threat to the Turkish position in Syria from the British forces in Egypt.

7

When the war ended, the whole of Arab Asia was free from Ottoman rule. Mesopotamia was occupied by British and Imperial troops. The Turkish troops had been cleared out of the Hejaz, and King Husain had been recognized as an Ally. A number of other rulers in the Arabian Peninsula, of whom the most notable was Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, had made treaties with the Government of India and had repudiated Ottoman suzerainty. As for geographical Syria, the whole of it was occupied by Allied troops: British troops throughout

¹ Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 241.

the area, a small French force on the coast and the Arab army of King Husain in the interior. General Allenby was ultimately responsible for the military government of the area ; but it was only in Palestine to the west of the Jordan that a British provisional administration was set up. In the coastal regions north of Palestine, and subsequently in Cilicia, the provisional Government was French ; in the four cities of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, and in Transjordan it was Arab, under the Amir Faisal, the third son of King Husain. To the Arab administration a small number of British and French officers was attached ; its officials were mainly Syrians who had held posts in the Ottoman army or civil service, but there was also an influential group of Iraqi officers. The attempt of the Arab nationalists in October, 1918, to extend their rule to Beirut and the coast was thwarted by the intervention of General Allenby.

The grounds already existed for a conflict between the Arabs and the French Government. The latter regarded the whole northern half of Syria as lying within its sphere of influence, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It did not consider itself to be bound by the promises which its Ally had given to the Sharif Husain ; it was from the beginning sceptical and suspicious of the idea of establishing an independent Arab State ; and it was influenced by the attitude of the Lebanese Christians, many of whom had no desire to become subjects of an Arab kingdom governed by a member of the ruling family of the Hejaz. It was also lukewarm in its attitude to Zionism. The Arab nationalists for their part regarded themselves as entitled to complete independence, in virtue both of their participation in the war and of the undertakings given them by the Allied Governments. Their leaders knew of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, and repudiated both of them, although they do not appear at the beginning to have understood the implications of the latter. Though the Maronites as a whole wanted French control or a French mandate, the Arabs of Syria were for the most part hostile to France ; if foreign advice and control were necessary, they would have preferred British to French, and American to either. United in their demand for independence, they were divided on the form which it should take. A section among them would have preferred a separate Syrian State to one linked with the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula.

With its commitments to both parties, the British Government had a special interest in bringing about a settlement of the problem of Franco-Arab relations in Syria. At its invitation, the Amir Faisal visited Europe in November, 1918. In the course of his discussions with British statesmen and officials it was made plain to him that Great Britain was not prepared to quarrel with France over Syria, however sympathetic she might be to Arab aspirations.

8

The Peace Conference took up the question of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of 1919. On January 30th, it decided that the Arab provinces should be wholly separated from the Empire and the newly-conceived mandate-system applied to them. On February 6th, the Amir Faisal appeared before the Conference. After recalling the efforts of the Arabs during the War, and the Allied promises, he demanded the independence of the whole of Arab Asia, and suggested the establishment of a Confederation. He recognized that the Arabs needed help from outside, but not at the price of independence ; they should indicate to the League of Nations the help which they required, and the Mandatory whom they wanted ; if their wishes were not clear, an international inquiry should be held. He was prepared to accept the independence of Lebanon, provided that it entered into an economic union with the rest of Arab Asia and that the possibility of its joining the Confederation was kept open. As for Palestine, on account of its universal character he left it on one side for the consideration of all the parties interested. He does not seem at this time to have been unconditionally opposed to Zionism, as he then understood it, and in January, 1919, had, indeed, made an informal agreement with Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader.

Evidence was also given by a pro-French Syrian delegation, composed mainly of Lebanese Christians and without any representative character, which asked for a Syria independent of Arabia and under French control ; by a Lebanese delegation which claimed the autonomy of Lebanon, the extension of its frontiers and the protection of France ; and by a Zionist delegation which advocated the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine under a British mandate.

The decision on these various claims was delayed by a violent dispute between Great Britain and France upon the

future of geographical Syria. At a meeting on March 20th, 1919, the French representative, M. Pichon, claimed that Syria should be treated as a unit and not be divided, and that France should become the Mandatory for it. For Palestine he suggested an international administration : although a private agreement had been reached by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in December, 1918, by which Mosul and Palestine were to be included in the British sphere of influence, despite the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Reminded by Mr. Lloyd George of the agreement with King Husain, M. Pichon claimed that France was not bound by it. President Wilson suggested that an international commission of inquiry should be appointed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. This suggestion was at first accepted by Great Britain and France, but afterwards rejected. A purely American Commission, consisting of Dr. H. C. King and Mr. C. R. Crane, was then appointed. It toured Syria, including Palestine, in the summer of 1919, and presented a report to President Wilson, recommending the establishment of a Mandate for Iraq and another for geographical Syria, which should be treated as a single unit. In each of the two countries a constitutional monarchy should be set up, and the Amir Faisal should be King of Syria. In accordance with the wishes of the people, the United States should be asked to accept the Mandate for Syria, while Great Britain should be offered that for Iraq. The Commission was opposed to a French Mandate, and expressed grave doubts about the Zionist experiment in Palestine. The report was ignored at the time and was only published three years later.¹

9

The Versailles Conference broke up without having come to an agreement about the future of the Arab lands. But even before it ended, Faisal had returned to Syria, with his hopes disappointed. He found the situation there growing daily worse. The Arabs were embittered by the failure of the Conference to recognize their claims, and found much to complain of in the French administration in Lebanon, the attempt to introduce methods of Indian government in Iraq, and the activities of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. The French regarded the installation of Faisal in Damascus as contrary to

¹ For text, see Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, pp. 443-58.

their interests, and were suspicious of the activities of the British officers attached to his Government. In addition, there were local conflicts between Arab bands and French troops in regions on the borders of the French zone of occupation.

Most responsible Arab and French officials doubted the possibility of a peaceful agreement ; but Faisal still clung to the belief that Great Britain would use her influence with France in favour of the Arabs. This belief, however, was shaken by the Anglo-French Agreement of September, 1919, which provided for the withdrawal of British troops from Syria (excluding Palestine) and from Cilicia, and their replacement by Arab troops in the interior of Syria and by French troops on the coast and in Cilicia. When Faisal protested against the agreement, the British Government invited him to come once more to Europe and try to reach an understanding with France. Clemenceau at first refused to see him ; when they met, however, they came to a provisional agreement, by which the right of the Syrian Arabs to independence and unity was acknowledged, but their State was to be defended, advised and represented abroad by France.

This agreement was never put into practice. The Government of Clemenceau fell, and was succeeded by one more extreme in its Eastern policy. Moreover, the growth of the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which threatened France's position in Cilicia, made it more urgent for her representatives in the East to prevent the outbreak of disorder in Syria and to obtain control of the system of communications in the interior. They were further alarmed by the evidence of military preparations by the Arab Government. The Arabs for their part were apprehensive of similar preparations by the French ; their patriotic fervour was stimulated by the example of the growing nationalist movements in Iraq and Turkey ; and to their resentment against France had now been added an active hostility to Zionism. They were not disposed to be patient and sit by while their independence was taken from them.

On March 20th, 1920, a Congress of Syrian notables met at Damascus and offered the crown of Syria and Palestine to Faisal, who accepted it. This action was immediately repudiated by the British and French Governments, then engaged in preparing for the Conference at San Remo, at which the fate of the former Ottoman territories was to be decided. When the Conference met it allotted a Mandate of type ' A ' for the northern

half of geographical Syria to France, and one for the southern half to Great Britain, with the obligation of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration (April 24th, 1920). In reply, Faisal, who had refused to have anything to do with the Conference, declared that he would not recognize the imposition of foreign rule upon any portion of Syrian territory, including Palestine.

Both sides now prepared for war. The Arab Government attempted to increase its military strength, and the French army in Lebanon was reinforced with Senegalese and other colonial troops. On July 14th, 1920, General Gouraud, who had been appointed French Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon in October of the previous year, sent an ultimatum to Faisal. He demanded the unconditional recognition of the French Mandate, the reduction of the Syrian army, the abolition of conscription, the provision of facilities for the circulation of the new Franco-Syrian currency, French military occupation of the Rayaq-Aleppo railway and of Aleppo itself, and the punishment of those guilty of attacks upon French detachments. Against the wishes of the greater number of his supporters, Faisal accepted the ultimatum ; but his answer was unaccountably delayed, and did not reach Gouraud until the time-limit attached to the ultimatum had expired and the French forces had been ordered to advance on Damascus. When Gouraud received the answer he halted his troops, but sent a further ultimatum containing more stringent demands. This Faisal was unable to accept. Once more the French columns moved upon Damascus. After a fight with Arab forces at Maisalun they entered the city on July 25th. Subsequently the rest of the area assigned to France was occupied. Faisal left the scene of his brief, uncertain reign for exile and then for a new and more lasting throne in Baghdad.

He has never been forgotten in Damascus. Too short for positive achievement, his rule had aroused enthusiasm and loyalty throughout the country. His Government had had more solid foundations in the popular consent than any perhaps since Ummayyad times ; had it received help it might have endured. The generation which remembered Faisal could never forgive the French, nor give to their rule more than a forced acquiescence.

Faisal's departure cleared the way for a final settlement by the Allied Powers of the status of Syria. The texts of the Mandates for ' Syria and Lebanon ' (that is, the northern part of geographical Syria) and for ' Palestine ' (that is, the southern half) were formally approved, along with that for Iraq, by the Council of the League of Nations in July, 1922, and became effective in September, 1923. In 1924 the United States gave her consent to the Mandates by agreements with France and Great Britain.

The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon provided for the gradual establishment of self-government in those countries, and the progressive relaxation of the Mandatory's control.¹ That for Palestine, however, gave the Mandatory full powers of legislation and administration, and laid upon it the positive duty of helping in the construction of a Jewish national home, provided the rights of the rest of the population were not prejudiced. But the text of the Mandate made it clear that the national home was to be confined to those parts of the British area which lay west of the Jordan, that is to Palestine proper, and not to be allowed to spread east of the Jordan. The region east of the Jordan had been administered by Faisal's Government from 1918-1920. The French did not occupy it after the expulsion of Faisal, and by an Anglo-French agreement in December, 1920, it was placed within the British mandatory area. Shortly afterwards Faisal's brother Abdullah moved northwards from Hejaz with a view to attacking the French in Syria ; to prevent the attack he was offered and accepted the government, subject to Mandatory control, of the region east of the Jordan, or ' Transjordan '. The arrangement was at first provisional, but in April, 1923, it was announced that His Majesty's Government would recognize the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the Amir Abdullah, provided it was constitutional and enabled His Majesty's Government to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the territory.

11

At the San Remo Conference, which allotted the Mandate to France, certain other important decisions were also reached.

¹ The Mandate is summarized in Chapter IX, and its text is given in the Appendix.

By an Anglo-French agreement, France renounced the traditional protectorate over the Catholics so far as Palestine and the Holy Places were concerned, in view of British opposition to its continuance and the opinion of the Holy See that the time for it had passed.

By another agreement, the interests of the two Powers in the oilfields of Iraq were defined. The British Government undertook to grant to the French 25 per cent of the crude oil, if the fields were developed by Government action, or else, if a private company were used to develop the fields, 25 per cent of the shares in it ; arrangements were also made in regard to the transport of oil from Iraq and Persia through the French sphere of influence to the eastern Mediterranean. It was in consideration of this agreement that France officially recognized the inclusion in Mesopotamia of the district of Mosul, which under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was to have formed part of the French sphere of influence.

The frontiers of the French Mandated Territories were established by a series of agreements in the early years of the mandatory period. The frontiers with Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan were settled by two Anglo-French agreements made in 1920 and 1922. The delimitation was in some ways arbitrary. There was no good reason, economic or ethnic, for the inclusion of the Hulah district in Palestine ; for the separation of the Hauran and Jebel Druze from northern Palestine and Transjordan ; or for the separation of the Jazirah into Iraqi and Syrian sections.

The frontier with Turkey caused greater difficulty. Under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the sphere of French control was to have included Cilicia and a region to the east of it with a predominantly Turkish-speaking population. These areas were occupied by French troops after the Armistice ; and it was intended to settle in them a large number of Armenian refugees. But the revival of Turkish power under Mustafa Kemal made the French position difficult. Fighting broke out between the occupying army and the Turkish nationalist forces. With a view to avoiding the dangers and expenses of a large-scale campaign and to safeguarding the northern frontier of Syria, and also because the unsettled state of Anglo-French relations in the Near East made France not unwilling to win the friendship of the Turks, the French Government decided to come to an agreement with the

Turkish Nationalists. By the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 20th, 1921, France agreed to evacuate Cilicia and certain other districts ; the region of Alexandretta, with its largely Turkish population, remained under French control, but France undertook to give it a special administrative régime.¹ In spite of this agreement and of the extinction of Turkish rights in Syria by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, tension and unrest continued in the frontier regions between Turkey and Syria, where the population was mixed Arab, Turkish and Kurd. When in 1925 a Mixed Commission met to delimit the frontier, its work was obstructed by Turkish claims to a number of districts which had until then been considered parts of Syria. In February, 1926, a Franco-Turkish agreement was signed which settled the most important points at issue ; but it was not until June, 1929, that the controversy was closed for the time. In 1930 the eastern section of the Turco-Syrian frontier was delimited, and there was added to Syria a further district of the Jazirah stretching as far as the Tigris.

12

The Peace Settlement failed to fulfil the hopes with which the Arab nationalists had entered the war. It is true that the whole of Arab Asia had thrown off Ottoman suzerainty, that Hejaz had been recognized as an independent State, and that the Kingdom of Ibn Sa'ud in central Arabia continued to prosper, strong in the alliance and help of the Government of India. But the more advanced Arab communities of the Fertile Crescent had been placed under a Mandatory administration which they found it hard to distinguish from colonial rule. Moreover, they had been divided from one another. Geographical Syria had been separated from Iraq, and had also been partitioned into French and British mandated territories. In a portion of the latter area, there had been initiated an experiment in large-scale Jewish immigration which threatened to make impossible the achievement in that area of nationalist aspirations.

The ghost of the Peace Settlement has haunted Arab politics ever since. It turned into bitterness the enthusiasm which the Arab Revolt had aroused, and seriously damaged the moral influence of Great Britain and France in the Near

¹ For translation of the Agreement see *Parliamentary Papers, 1921, Cmd. 1556*.

East. The bitterness was all the more dangerous because during the war the Arabs had realized for the first time in centuries the strength which might be theirs, and had become conscious that their destiny was in their own hands. The sense of grievance and the sense of power have coloured the nationalist movement in this generation.

Not only the Arabs were disappointed by the settlement. The French were irritated that they had been permitted to establish only a temporary Mandate over Syria and Lebanon, and that only after a bitter and protracted dispute. Their irritation was directed not so much against the nationalists as against the British Government for having, as they alleged, placed and maintained Faisal in Damascus. The Zionists were grateful for the world's recognition of their right to colonize Palestine, but many of them resented the closure of Transjordan, which they considered as part of Palestine, to Jewish immigration. Great Britain had obtained most of what she wanted for herself; but some at least of her statesmen and officials disapproved of French policy in Syria, were uneasy about its effects upon the Arabs elsewhere, and regretted that it had prevented the complete fulfilment of the undertakings given during the war.

It was in this atmosphere of bitterness, suspicion and resentment that French rule in Syria and Lebanon began.

III. THE PROBLEM OF WESTERNIZATION

1

AT this point it will be convenient to interrupt the narrative and to analyze the problem which first presented itself to the Syrians in the nineteenth century, and which underlies the political difficulties with which they are faced in the present generation.

This problem can be stated very briefly. An old way of thought and life, which has gone unchallenged and fundamentally unchanged for some hundreds of years, finds itself in some ways opposed, in others inescapably transformed by the new civilization of the West.

In consequence, the Syrians find themselves no longer living in a united and coherent world, but torn between two worlds, neither of which is altogether their own. How will it be possible for them, by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?

2

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Syria formed part of a world which had a civilization of its own : a religion, a culture and a way of life. It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and from immemorial custom. This civilization may be called 'Arabo-Islamic', because its main characteristics were derived, with much borrowing from outside and with many adaptations to the peculiar conditions of Syria, from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another : the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian desert.

'Islam' means resignation, and the Moslem, the adherent of Islam, is he who resigns himself to the will of God : not in the sense of passive and fatalistic acceptance of anything which may come, but in that of the complete and voluntary submission of man's will to God's commandments. God is unique, the Creator of the Universe, all-wise and all-powerful ; He has revealed His will to man, in a measure sufficient for all the purposes of life, through a long succession of Prophets, who include Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Arabian of the seventh century, to whom was given the final revelation

which superseded and completed all previous ones. This final revelation is preserved for the use and knowledge of mankind in the Quran, the Moslem Holy Book.

The Quran embodies the principles in accordance with which a man's whole life should be lived ; on the basis of those principles Moslem thinkers have erected a moral system covering every form of human activity, however seemingly unimportant. Thus the religious duties of a Moslem are unlimited and all-embracing ; but certain of them are prior to others, and fulfilment of them is essential for every true Moslem. The most important of these are summarized in the so-called ' Pillars of Islam '. A true Moslem must testify that ' there is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God '. He must pray five times a day ; give alms to the poor ; fast during the month of Ramadan ; and make the pilgrimage to Mecca, should circumstances permit him, at least once in his lifetime.

Men should perform these and other duties primarily because they emanate from the will of God, but also because on their obeying or disobeying God's will depends the fate of their immortal souls in the next world. God who created the world will some day bring it to an end ; on the final Day of Judgement all will be held responsible for their actions. The virtuous will be granted eternal felicity in Paradise, but the vicious everlasting torment in Hell.

The moral system of Islam covers the life not only of individuals but also of human associations, and among them of that association called the State. Islam knows no Church, and therefore no distinction between Church and State, the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world. The Islamic State is an association of Moslems for the purpose of living in accordance with the tenets of their religion and of extending its sway throughout the world. The law of the State is the law of Islam ; the function of the ruler is to defend the State against unbelievers, to administer Moslem law as defined by those learned in it, and himself to be bound by it in his relations with his subjects. They for their part owe him loyalty as a religious duty. In short, the Islamic community as it has traditionally been conceived is to its members all and more than all that the nation is to the modern Western man. Islam in its great days was a nation, transcending distinctions of race or colour. Although an

Arabic-speaking Moslem might take a special pride in the peculiar relation of the Arabs to Islam, and in the dimly-remembered splendours of the early Caliphates, it is safe to say that normally he did not distinguish his being an Arab from his being a Moslem, and even when he did so it was the latter which was foremost in his thought and life.

3

For over a thousand years the majority of the population of Syria had been Moslem. There was not, however, complete unanimity in matters of religious belief. On the one hand, besides the Sunni or orthodox Moslems there were several heterodox Islamic and semi-Islamic sects: Shi'is, Druzes, Alawis and Isma'ilis. On the other hand, there still survived a number of Christian sects, Catholic, Greek Orthodox and others, which had come into existence in the early centuries of the Church's history; and there were in addition a comparatively small number of Jews.

Some of these communities were scattered throughout the country, while others possessed a local predominance in certain parts of it. Most of the districts held by these compact minorities were mountainous. The Lebanese mountains in particular were the homes of dissident communities, either because it was easier for the long-established inhabitants of Lebanon than for their neighbours of the plains to resist the pressure of Islamization, or else because sects which had grown up in the plains migrated to the mountains as an asylum where they would not be molested, or if attacked could better defend themselves. These mountain communities were marked by an especially unbending particularism and resistance to influences from outside.

4

Christians and Jews were left to carry on their own communal life without disturbance. For this there were two main reasons. The first was the Islamic doctrine in regard to Christianity and Judaism. Just as the Moslem regulated his life in accordance with the principles of his faith, so he did not deny a similar right to the Christians.

Moslems are not taught by their faith to regard Christians as inherently inferior, since it is in their power to become Moslems, and so enter the community of true believers in

which the only distinction is that of piety ; nor as adherents of a false religion, since Islam considers Jesus to have been one of the succession of true prophets. They regard them as having gone astray, first in taking the revelation of Jesus as the final and complete revelation, and secondly in looking upon Jesus not simply as a prophet, a man through whom God's word has come to mankind, but as God incarnate. It is the doctrine of the Incarnation, and therefore also the doctrine of the Trinity, which are for Moslems the stumbling-blocks in Christianity. As ' People of the Book ', believers in God, in prophecy and in the Day of Judgement, Christians like Jews are to be tolerated and to be allowed a certain status by the side of the Islamic community. But they cannot be regarded as members of that community. Nor can a Moslem willingly acquiesce in subjection to a non-Moslem Government, although his own weakness may compel a temporary submission.

Such is the attitude towards Christians which Islam enjoins : an attitude of reasoned and well-defined tolerance. But it is not surprising that there should during the thousand years of almost unchallenged Moslem supremacy have been periods of persecution, nor that the ordinary Moslem should have come to feel a certain contempt for the Eastern Christians who were the only Christians he knew : the contempt which he who knows himself to be strong feels for those in his power, and which he who believes himself to possess the truth feels for those who have rejected it.

The other reason for the persistence of the Christian and Jewish communities was the existence of a certain view of the State : a view which was universally accepted in western Asia, and indeed far beyond it, until recent generations. According to this view the Government existed to defend the cultivated lands, to maintain order, to tax their populations, and for nothing more. The laws by which the life of the individual and of society was regulated sprang not from positive enactment of the ruler but from the religious doctrines and ancestral customs to which individual and society adhered. It is true that since the ruling power was Moslem by faith, the Moslem religious law and the courts had a special relation to the Government. But a Moslem would no more have thought of compelling Christians and Jews to conform to Moslem law in matters of personal life and relationships than they of

abandoning their own religious codes. Law was personal. Not simply was there no concept of equality before the law ; there was no idea of sameness.

For these reasons, throughout the period of Arab and Ottoman rule the Christians and Jews were allowed a certain autonomy. Each sect formed a community, or as it was called in Arabic a ' millah ' and in Turkish a ' millet ', within the State and co-terminous with it. In matters affecting the community, the Government treated with it as a whole through its heads, and not with the members of it individually. Certain civil functions were devolved upon the spiritual heads and representative bodies of the communities. They were allowed to administer the property and institutions of their communities and to decide matters of personal status—marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on—in accordance with the tenets of their faith.

This system originated long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. It developed gradually and was only formalized in the nineteenth century by a series of Imperial edicts. Throughout the period of Moslem ascendancy it succeeded in preserving self-respect and a sense of community among the religious minorities, although it may also have helped to perpetuate bitterness and suspicion between them.

The heterodox sects which clung to the fringes of Islam were in a more ambiguous position. Officially they were regarded as parts of the general body of Islam ; but in fact the cleavage between them and the orthodox was almost as great as that between Moslems and Christians, and they like the Christians were usually left to direct their internal affairs in accordance with customary law and the precepts of their religions.

5

Since for Moslems and Christians alike consciousness of belonging to a religious community was the basis of political and social obligation, both were very conscious of not belonging to other communities ; and the sense of distinctiveness led easily to suspicion and dislike. This was true also of every Christian sect in its relations with the others, for each sect formed a separate ' millet ' ; and of the orthodox Moslems in their relations with the heterodox. Difference of sect was

no less important an element in the common consciousness than difference of religion.

It may be, indeed, that the religious doctrines to which the communities adhered were not in all cases the fundamental cause of their distinctiveness ; that when these doctrines were first preached certain elements in the population already felt themselves in various ways and for various reasons different from the peoples among whom they lived and by whom they were dominated ; and that they adopted the new doctrines as an expression of their distinctiveness. Whatever its origin, a sect once founded tended to become a closed community very conscious of its difference from the surrounding world : a difference which revealed itself not only in religious beliefs, but also in customs and traditions. The sect persisted as a social entity even after the impulse of affirmation which gave it birth had died away. To leave one's sect was to leave one's whole world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality.

6

Islam gave the traditional society of Syria its dominant creed, its explicit moral code and its political organization. Its language and literature and its images of heroism and human grandeur came from the Arabian desert.

The way of life of the Beduin has deeply influenced Islam and been as deeply influenced by it, but the two are distinct. It is a way of life which has developed in order to meet the needs of the nomadic existence, an existence of the utmost bareness, insecurity, homelessness and poverty. It has alone made that existence tolerable and given it dignity and even a certain splendour. For it the cardinal virtues are courage and the other martial qualities ; hospitality without limit or thought of recompense ; loyalty to one's family and tribe ; and reverence for the transmitted wisdom of the community, embodied in tribal customs and traditions and in a code of honour. The life of the Beduin has no room for subtleties and doubts, and would be wholly barren of culture were it not for the Arab love of language, of story and of poetry.

The Arabian desert produced not only a moral system, but also a social organization. It was based upon the clan and

the tribe or collection of clans, held together by blood-relationship and regulated by customary law dispensed by chieftains who owed their position to a combination of birth and ability.

Arab life and society were reflected in the literature of the Arabic tongue : a literature which at least in its early phases grew up in isolation, developing its own norms and methods. Later it was influenced by other literatures, but throughout its history it preserved a continuity of outlook and subject-matter and perfectly expressed the dreams, the convictions and the limitations of the people which produced it.

7

The Arabian influences were brought into Syria by the successive waves of Beduin immigrants from Arabia ; a few generations after the Islamic conquest they had permeated virtually the whole population, whether or not they were Arabian by origin. The popular morality, the folk-lore and the language of the people became Arabic, and the literate took pride in Arabic poetry and prose. Tribalism and loyalty to the clan or patriarchal family continued to be the bases of society even in conditions very different from those which had generated them. The depth of Arabization varies however from one part of the country to another. In certain sections of the coastal mountain-ranges Arab ways took longer to penetrate and perhaps went less deep than in the plains of the interior.

The only important elements in the population which were not Arabized were the Kurdish and Turcoman tribes which at a later period had established themselves in the northern portions of the country, and some of which from being nomads had become semi-sedentary or sedentary. They however were not wholly isolated from the majority, since they were orthodox Moslems and possessed a tribal organization similar to that of the Arabs. There were also Armenians, Turks and Europeans in the larger towns.

8

The Arab tradition was modified by the new economic conditions which the tribes found when they reached the Fertile Crescent. Those tribes which remained on the edge of the Crescent continued their pastoral life ; but those which

penetrated more deeply into the settled land gradually changed from nomadic pasturage to sedentary agriculture. They grew wheat and other cereals wastefully and by primitive methods which had not changed for many generations; sometimes using the remnants of the Roman irrigation system, but more often relying upon the rain and the sparse streams; producing mainly for subsistence, but selling what surplus they had in the towns. After the early Islamic period there was an uninterrupted decline in the agricultural productivity of the country. Its causes were mainly political: the exactions of tax-collectors and the depredations of civil war.

The constant immigration of new Beduin tribes prevented the maintenance of a stable agricultural life in all except the coastal regions. The Beduin always looked upon the settled land as a source of plunder, and gave no willing allegiance to any Government, or to any law except their own customary codes. Periodically the peasants' work was set back by the incursions of the nomads, and the constant threat of raids served as a discouragement from enterprise. The margin of cultivation was in consequence always shifting and uncertain; it moved eastwards into the desert when the Government was strong enough to hold back the Beduin or induce them to settle on the land, and when the Government was weak the opposite process took place.

In consequence of the change to agriculture, the relationship between tribesman and tribal chief was replaced by, or rather transformed into, that of peasant and landowner. Syria was a feudal country. Until the seventeenth century the lords had held their lands on condition of performing military service; but later the feudal army fell into disuse, and a new feudalism grew up based upon tax-farming. The Pasha of the province was normally the chief tax-farmer; he was required to transmit an annual tribute to Constantinople, and in return was allowed to squeeze as much as he could out of his subjects. Beneath him there was a hierarchy of feudatories, farming their districts or villages on similar terms. In some districts they were Ottoman officials, but in others the right of collecting taxes was given to the local or tribal chiefs, who were virtually autonomous. This was especially so in mountainous districts like Lebanon, Jebel Druze and the Alawi district.

The feudatory's tenure was precarious, and his power

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threatened by the avarice of his superiors, the encroachment of his equals and the insubordination of his vassals. The size of domains and the fortunes of noble families were always changing. A certain stability was, however, given to the system by the practice of turning lands into religious trusts (Waqfs) for religious or charitable objects. Families which were the custodians of such trusts, which benefited from them in other ways, or which by tradition filled important religious positions, had a better chance of retaining their wealth and influence than those which had become rich and powerful through tax-farming.

At the bottom of the feudal structure were the cultivators, who were serfs of their immediate lords, owing them a variety of feudal dues and oppressed by them. The usual practice was for a village to hold and cultivate its land in common ; small individual holdings were the exception.

9

Sometimes the local dynasts were adventurers, ruling by the sword alone and without any support from local tradition. But often their rule was firmly based upon local sentiment and loyalty : a localism which was reinforced by tribalism and, in those districts in which compact religious minorities were settled, by sectarianism. This was especially so in Lebanon ; but over the whole country it is true to say that the local community was the real political and social unit. There was no effective consciousness of an Arab nation, and ' Syria ' was no more than a geographical expression ; nor was there any sense of responsibility for the Government, which was generally regarded as essentially hostile, an instrument of oppression.

Side by side with the life of the countryside, there went on the distinctive life of the Syrian towns. The immemorial stopping-places on the trade-routes—the ports, the bazaar-towns and the caravan-towns—kept something of their greatness in the Ottoman period. There was still a lively transit-trade ; Syrian wheat and fruit still went to Egypt, cottons and silks to Europe. The town-populations were Arabic in language, and their ways were deeply influenced by Arab customs ; but their social structure differed from that of the countryside, and was determined by their peculiar economic function. They were naturally more open to influences

from outside than were the villages. The foreign merchants and artisans in the coastal towns and Aleppo, the pilgrims who every year met in Damascus for their long journey down the pilgrims' road to the Holy Cities in Arabia, left their mark. Thus beside the society of the desert and the countryside there flourished an urban society of merchants and craftsmen. Not only was the life of the great towns very different from that of the countryside ; they differed one from another. Each had a life of its own and was the focus of an intense local loyalty.

10

The Arabo-Islamic community of Syria was a part, although in some ways a distinctive part, of two larger units : the Arabic-speaking world which extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers of Persia, and included Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula ; and the Islamic world, stretching as far as the marches of China and embracing, in addition to the Arabic countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and large parts of Africa, India, China and the East Indies. In spite of local differences, of internal conflicts and of the difficulties of communication, each of these worlds was unified on a profound level.

Over a large part of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the spiritual and social unity which they possessed was reinforced by the political unity derived from common membership of the Ottoman Empire. The positive virtue of Ottoman rule was that it provided this political unity ; its negative that it did not interfere with the life and customary law of the subject-peoples. Nomads by origin, the Ottoman Turks cared little for the arts of peace, for commerce and industry, or for culture. They left them to others, and thus contributed nothing essential to the civilization of the Arab provinces which they ruled for four hundred years. In conquering the Arab world they had themselves been conquered by it. They had become Moslems, and in their intellectual and social life had adapted themselves to Arab ways.

The Turks performed also another function. Their military strength preserved the Arab civilization from interference or even from living contact with other civilizations. In the early Islamic centuries such contacts had existed, and the Arabo-

Islamic world had been much affected by influences from the Mediterranean countries, from Persia and from India. It had had the power to assimilate the products of other civilizations, and also to extend its dominion over peoples alien to the Arabs in origin and way of life. But later it ceased to develop and either to give out or to receive influences ; and although the stream of influences from the West never completely vanished, during the great days of the Ottoman Empire it was smaller and less effective than it had previously been and was again to become.

II

In the past century or more this Arab world has been shaken to its foundations by the impact of the West. Western ideas, learned from schools, from books and latterly from the cinema, have changed at least the externals of social life. The competition of Western goods has broken the old crafts and opened up new economic possibilities. New means of communication are breaking up the closed local community ; the life of the Beduin is threatened by the motor-car, the aeroplane and the extension of civil authority. The administrative machinery which the modern Government commands, and the extension of the limits of its action, are making the old feudal and sectarian organization unnecessary and even impossible. New Western rulers have imposed themselves, who have not even so much claim to be obeyed or such deep roots in popular memory and habit as had the Ottoman Sultan. The new social, economic and political life has in its turn shaken the domination of Moslem jurisprudence ; and men have begun to raise new questions of the adequacy of religious faith and loyalty as a basis for society, and the place of Islam in the modern world. A new world has revealed itself, which strikes at the very foundations of the old, and is indeed its exact antithesis.

The transformation of the old life has brought with it a number of difficulties and dangers. The Arabs, like other peoples in their position, are torn between two ways of life. Sentiment, tradition and the belief that there is something of value in their tradition make them unwilling to break entirely with the old civilization, even if that were possible. But at the same time the necessities of modern life, and often a conviction that the Western civilization is in some ways

better than their own, impel them to accept certainly the economic technique of the West and possibly much more.

This self-division between two ways of life is full of inconveniences. It may produce an abnormal tension of mind and nerve in the individual, and temporarily obscure moral and aesthetic standards. What is more important, it may stifle the creative energies of an individual and a people, and make it difficult for them to speak with their own voice and think their own thoughts. On another level, it is almost inevitable that the process of change should be attended with great economic dislocation, as the old crafts die out ; with social unrest, as the introduction of new economic processes brings in its train a new relationship of the social classes ; and with political instability, since it takes time to learn the art of constructing and managing a modern Government. Among the educated classes the tension may result in a profound melancholy and a paralysis of the will : the qualities which haunt the world of the Russian novelists of the nineteenth century.

The dislocation and difficulties have been particularly great for two reasons. The first is that the change has left no part of life untouched. It is a complete upheaval both of the Arab mind and of Arab society. Secondly, it is not a single change of which the force will sooner or later spend itself. It is the introduction of a dynamic principle by virtue of which one change prepares the way for another, and no end to the series is perceptible. The change is not from one static position to another, but from a static community ruled by custom to a dynamic society, moulded and governed by positive laws and by a conception of individual, social or national welfare.

12

It may be that the difficulties will so press upon the Arabs that they will accept self-division as inevitable and give up the attempt to reconcile the new and the old. If that happens, they will become Levantines.

To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either ; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of values of one's own, not

to be able to create but only able to imitate ; and so not even to imitate correctly, since that also needs a certain originality. It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair.

There have always been Levantines in the ports of the eastern Mediterranean, because they are places where more than one world meets to do business. But the special mark of the present age is the spread of the Levant inland to regions hitherto untouched by it. In a sense every Arab, or at least every educated Arab of the towns, is forced to live in two worlds. Not only his way of thought but his social life is becoming daily more deeply affected by Europe and America ; but at heart he is still an Arab and usually a Moslem. A few may be strong enough to face the problem and create a new unity out of discordant elements ; but the majority are likely to take the line of least resistance, and passively acquiesce in their division of soul. As the process of Westernization passes from stage to stage the problem becomes ever more acute. Will the few succeed in influencing the many, and showing them the way to a Westernized life which is nevertheless genuinely Arab and Moslem ; or will the many submerge the few, and all be drowned in a common Levantinism ? That is the crisis of Arab culture in our time.

13

There is only one bulwark against Levantinism : that the Arabs should believe in their own possibilities and their power, given the necessary conditions, of building up once more a world of thought and activity which they can call their own and through which they can make their contribution to the world's civilization. This belief exists, and in consequence there can be seen an active response by the Arabs to the new difficulties by which they are beset.

This response expresses itself in a striving towards unity such as the old community possessed : towards the creation of a ' world ' unified by the possession of common principles which permeate every aspect of society and which those who live in it recognize as valid. There is a further attempt, closely connected with this, to establish satisfactory relations between that world and the Western world, which it will inevitably resemble in many ways but from which it will

differ in others ; from which it has learned and borrowed much, but to which it may in future once more contribute something.

The creation of a unified world is an ideal to which only an imperfect approximation is possible. At no time is there complete harmony or complete disorder. But at least a nearer approximation than exists at present is possible and is necessary if the present maladies of the Arab community are to be overcome. The form of the new unity is not yet clear, and indeed it cannot become clear so long as it is unachieved, since a problem so vast as this cannot be solved by a synthesis effected in the mind of a single thinker. It will be solved by a multitude of decisions taken by innumerable groups and individuals and each of them leading to changes which themselves involve other changes perhaps unforeseen. The important matter is not that a few thinkers or politicians should plan out in advance the end which is to be achieved and the stages by which it may be reached, but that a large number of people should have a sense of the seriousness of the particular and immediate tasks to which they are called, and be resolved not to rest in confusion and self-division.

The decay of the old, the challenge of the new, self-division and the struggle for unity: such themes, which have been touched upon in this chapter, appear in every aspect of the life of Syria. The following chapters will analyze the process of Westernization in the intellectual, economic, social and political spheres.

IV. THE WESTERNIZATION OF IDEAS

I

THE coming of the West aroused a new process of thought not only in Syria but in all the Arabic-speaking countries ; this process originated earliest and has developed furthest in Cairo and Beirut, but exists in some form in the other centres of Arab life, and is a single process which does not admit of sharp regional divisions. Much of this chapter will therefore concern itself with the general movement of thought in Arabic. Moreover, it will be necessary for the sake of exposition to formulate theoretical standpoints more clearly, articulately and abstractly, and in sharper opposition to one another, than they are formulated by contemporary Arabic writers.

The civilization of the West revealed itself in many lights to the Arabs. It came to them asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East ; thus it aroused a sense of humiliation, the more bitter because the Arabs had for so long regarded themselves as the source of true religion and civilization. It came to them as a Christian civilization, and thus it compelled them to take a new view of Christianity and of its relationship with Islam. Again, although it was Christian, it was also secular, denying the theocratic idea of life and politics ; thus it stimulated thought about the place of religion in society. It preached and practised a new view of human relationships ; it was based upon an undreamed-of mechanical power and an unknown economic organization ; it was prosperous and unimaginably strong. In these aspects it was to be feared as a force of oppression and destruction ; but also perhaps to be imitated, since it held out hopes of an equal prosperity and strength. Above all, it appeared as a revolutionary force, threatening or promising radical change for worse or for better.

Some Arabs, among them many of the religious leaders, averted their gaze from the possibilities of the new world, and regarded it simply as a hostile force to be resisted ; except in the remote places of the Arabian peninsula, this school of thought has now practically died out. There were and still are others who are so intoxicated with the splendour of the West that they are prepared to give up not only their own traditions but even their faith in a special destiny for the Arabs and Islam, and to become fully and uncritically

Westernized as soon as possible. But the greater number of thoughtful Arabs have since the beginning of the Western penetration refused to go to either extreme. They realize that there is much that is good in Western civilization ; that their own civilization is ill ; and that its maladies would make it desirable, even did not its weakness make it inevitable, that it should be influenced and transformed by the West. But at the same time they can see clearly the faults in the West and the qualities of their own tradition ; more fundamentally, they have faith that the Arab and Islamic peoples have creative gifts of their own and in consequence a special part to play in human history. Therefore their reaction to the impact of the West has been neither uncritical rejection nor uncritical acceptance, but a process of questioning which still continues : What can the Arabs become ? What can they do in the world ? What form and degree of Westernization will best serve to revive their creative spirit ?

The paragraphs which follow will summarize some of the answers which different groups of Arabic thinkers give to these questions. It must however be made clear in advance that the explicit views of particular thinkers are only one among several factors which will determine the answer which the Arabs give to these questions. Men brought up in the Arabic language and the Moslem faith, and in unceasing contact with the West in their thoughts and their lives, are forced by the nature of their situation to make judgements and decisions about the acceptance or rejection of Western ideas and ways ; these judgements and decisions are influenced or even determined by the Arab and Moslem standards of those who make them ; and having been made they involve others which perhaps had not been foreseen. Thus by a process of unformulated and unsystematic thought the structure of society gradually changes. A thinker of genius may alter the direction of that process ; but in the absence of genius, the explicit doctrines of the intellectual élite may have only a very limited effect.

2

The first task of the Arab thinkers was to understand the West. It was effectively begun in the days of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, has continued ever since and is still far from completion. Its methods are various : schools on the Western

model or under Western control have been established ; students have sought foreign universities, on their own initiative or as members of official missions ; European languages have been studied and Western books translated into Arabic. At present the Arabs, at least in the more advanced of the Arab countries, have achieved a certain understanding of Western technology and natural science, and of the polite literature of England and France. But Christianity, European philosophy, music and art, the whole culture of Russia and central Europe and the literature of the ancient world are still very imperfectly known.

The study of the West has itself done something to Westernize the Arab mind. The student cannot be unaffected by the object of his thought. In so far as theories of Westernization have been formulated, they fall into two main categories, which may conveniently be called theories of Islamic revival and of secularization. As expounded below they are 'ideal types' ; any particular Arab thinker will probably be found to hold not one of the theories in its pure form, but a distinctive blend of several.

3

The movement of Islamic revival springs from a vision of an Arabo-Islamic society which neither apes the West nor clings blindly to outworn forms : of which the animating spirit and the principles of judgement are derived from Islam, but the ways of life and thought largely approximate or 'correspond' to those of Western society ; and which has a 'healthy' relationship to the Christian world, a relationship of mutual respect and influence, based upon the acknowledgment of equality.

This much would be generally agreed, but there is great difference of opinion about the methods by which such a state of affairs could be brought into existence. There are some who claim that what is necessary is not so much a regeneration of the spirit and thought of Islam as an effort to unify and direct the political efforts of the Islamic peoples in defence of the Islamic world against Western penetration. They wish to accept only the externals of Western civilization, the sources of its economic and military strength. This was the doctrine of the Pan-Islamic movement, originated by Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and elsewhere during the

later decades of the nineteenth century, and used by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in order to revive the waning prestige and influence of his throne. Its weakness was its failure to recognize the malady in the soul of Islam.

There are other movements whose exponents see the necessity not simply for political action but for a revival in the religious life of Islam, and who believe that Islam is capable of producing such a revival out of its own resources. This is the attitude of thinkers who support the Wahabi movement, which aims at returning to the primitive purity and fervour of the apostolic age of Islam, and at removing all those later accretions and distortions which can find no justification in the Quran or the Traditions of the Prophet. Wahabism originated in central Arabia in the eighteenth century, and has had a great influence upon Islamic life during the present generation, largely because of the political success of the Wahabi leader, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, King of Sa'udi Arabia.

Wahabism and similar movements are concerned primarily with religious practice, and regard theology and speculation with suspicion, as unnecessary and possibly dangerous. But there are other movements which, while not belittling the need for a revival of piety and the devotional life, believe also in the necessity for a reconsideration and re-statement of Islamic doctrine and for a revision of Islamic jurisprudence ; and they realize that these tasks can only be accomplished with the help of the intellectual methods and achievements of the modern West. The movement originated by Shaikh Muhammad Abdu in Egypt, and sometimes called the 'Islamic Modernist Movement', was in one of its aspects an attempt to respond to the need for a re-statement of Islamic doctrine. The leaders of this movement have been able and sincere men, and their achievement and influence have been great. But as a movement of thought its effectiveness has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, its knowledge and understanding of Western culture are defective ; it has been too exclusively concerned with modern science, or at least with nineteenth century 'scientificism' ; and it has not attempted to arrive at a profound understanding of the basic elements in Western thought, Greek philosophy and Christian theology. On the other hand, it has at times been much concerned with polemics, with showing that Islam has

something to offer the world, and that its doctrine is more fully in accordance with the discoveries of modern science than is that of Christianity; it has in consequence lacked the intellectual objectivity which is necessary for constructive thought.

4

Polemics and the study of modern scientific thought are necessary; but only slowly and among a few groups of thinkers in Cairo and Beirut is it being realized that something more fundamental is needed. The whole intellectual life of Islam needs to be re-created, in the same way as Wahabism is trying to re-create its devotional life. The formal precepts and practices into which Islam like all religions has tended to become crystallized need to be broken up, and the principles which lie at the root of them, and which they have attempted to express, to be once more seen naked and in themselves. The vital spirit of affirmation which is at the heart of Islam, and which has long been quiescent although not dead, should be revived; it should be made articulate in a system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual needs and answer the questionings of the modern mind.

The problem of the reconstruction of Islamic philosophy and theology is only beginning to reveal itself; it is too early to expect that anything should have been done to solve it. The method and success of its solution depend largely upon unpredictable factors: upon the emergence of Arab Moslem thinkers with gifts sufficient to their task, and the revival of the spirit of reflection and speculation. But it is possible to point to certain preliminary tasks which can be accomplished even in the absence of such factors.

The first is the study of the great Islamic thinkers of the Middle Ages, who tried to do for Islam what the thinkers of coming generations must attempt once more: to turn the simple creed of a nomadic people into a system of thought, an explanation of the great problems of human destiny, able to satisfy the reflective and inquiring minds of those trained in the philosophical tradition of Plato and Aristotle. To-day a similar problem arises—to construct an Islamic system of thought adequate to meet the intellectual doubts to which the modern world is prone; and those who are attempting to solve it will be helped by analyzing the thought of their

medieval predecessors, since philosophical problems are in a sense always the same, and the answers given by the great thinkers of the past never cease to have value. Just as modern Catholic thinkers base their attempts to build a modern Catholic philosophy upon the great scholastic systems of the Middle Ages, and are constructing a 'Neo-Thomist' system of thought on the basis of Thomism, so it may be that Islamic thinkers will attempt to revive and re-create the elements of unchanging value in the Islamic scholasticism of the medieval Arab thinkers.

The second task is the study and understanding of the most profound Western thought, Christian and other. This is important both because among the greatest of the problems which faces the Islamic East is that of its relations with the West, on every level of thought and life ; and because Islam will be helped in defining its attitude to philosophical issues by considering the attitude taken up by another religion, so near to it in some ways, so different in others. It is true that something has been done to this end. For several generations Arab writers have been studying the works of Western thinkers, and translating them into Arabic. But it has been done for the most part without system and uncritically ; much that is fundamental to an understanding of Western culture is still practically unknown. It is because of this that many and perhaps most Arab Moslem thinkers of to-day largely fail to understand the spirit of the West. Western civilization, they say, is wholly materialist ; it has no spiritual life to compare with that of Asia. Sooner or later, this mythical antithesis between the materialist West and the spiritual East will have to be exploded ; and they will be forced to realize that the spiritual life of Europe even to-day is as intense, profound and creative as anything which Asia has to offer.

If both these tasks are to be performed, it is of particular importance that Arab Moslem thinkers should try to understand the works of Plato and Aristotle, although not to the exclusion of other philosophers, and that these works should become, as they are in the West, to some extent the conscious or unconscious possession of every thinker. This is important partly because of all that Plato and Aristotle can do in providing what may be called an intellectual 'attitude' : an awareness of problems, a method of analysis and a set of

fundamental principles. But it is important also for other reasons. Greek thought lies at the root of that Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages of which the significance has already been mentioned : it is therefore part of the intellectual heritage of the Islamic East as well as of the West ; it may serve as that common ground of agreement and understanding which is necessary if a fruitful intellectual contact is to be re-established between the Moslem and the Christian worlds.

5

The Syrian people will have a special part to play in the intellectual reconstruction of Islam, because of certain characteristics which they possess. They are peculiarly aware of the ' tension ' between East and West, and between Islam and Christianity. This is partly because their minds are exceptionally subtle, flexible and sensitive ; but partly also because Syria has always been exposed to influences coming in from Mediterranean lands, and tends to be affected by them sooner and more profoundly than the other Arab countries. Through the mission-schools, through emigration and in other ways there has been built up in Syria an educated class Westernized in spirit as well as in externals, but still Arabic in language and for the most part in sympathies and feeling. Thus the conflict between East and West has become a conflict inside their own souls ; as such it raises problems which pose themselves with peculiar urgency.

The factors which make the problems more profoundly felt and more urgent in Syria than elsewhere make them also more likely to find a solution there. It is educated Syrians who are best fitted to see the tension between East and West on the level not of politics or polemics but of doctrine. But if they are to contribute effectively to the revival of the Arab and Islamic mind, they must develop an intellectual life of their own, and not be content to become culturally a province of Egypt.

6

There is one factor which gives Syria a unique position in the Arab world. It possesses a large Christian population, whose intellectual life and Christian consciousness have been reviving in recent years. The impact of the West upon them has been as great as upon the Moslems, although of course it has taken a

different form : the West has meant for them not only the discovery of a new way of life but, in the most fundamental things, a rediscovery of their true selves. The result has been an interesting and important revival of Christian culture, expressing itself through Arabic and through French. It began as a revival of literature and language, and as such was a part, and a very important part, of the general Arabic literary renaissance ; but gradually it is becoming conscious of the deepest spiritual question which faces it, the question of what it is to be an Arab Christian.

This movement of Christian life and thought is important first of all for its own sake, but also for the part it may play in the re-awakening of Islam. The Syrian Christians are, as Christians, particularly fitted to understand the culture of Europe ; while as Arabs, speaking the Arabic language and conversant with its literature, they can interpret Europe to the Arab Moslems and, what is more important still, can confront them inescapably with the challenge of Christianity. They do not feel the conflict between the West and the Islamic East in exactly the same form as that in which Moslems feel it. But they feel it in another form, and in one which raises problems of which the solution is both particularly necessary and particularly difficult. For them the problem poses itself as one of political loyalties, and therefore their material well-being and perhaps even their physical safety depend upon their solving it. In the conflict between the European Powers and the forces of nationalism, on which side should they range themselves ? Religious affinities, long-standing ties of friendship, gratitude for favours received and fear of Moslem domination draw them to the side of Europe ; but ties of language and culture, common feelings of humiliation and pride, and the desire to put an end to the religious dissensions of the past attract them to the nationalist camp. Divided loyalties of this sort are tragic, but they are also a necessary stage in the development of thought, alike for the individual and for whole peoples ; it is in the struggle to reunite the divided personality that the intellect becomes mature. The Christians stand to the Syrian people roughly as the latter as a whole to the Arab people : it is in them that the tension which is felt vaguely and in some degree by all goes deepest and may reach its crisis earliest. But if the crisis is to be fruitful, they must try at one and the same time

to remember that they are Christians, and revive their specific Eastern Christian thought and life, and to remember that they are part of Arab Asia and have a special mission to perform in the East. The attempt has already begun. Among the Catholics and Greek Orthodox of Beirut there are already small groups of thinkers who are trying to understand the nature of Christianity and of their special duty as members of the Eastern Churches ; there are other groups which are struggling with the question of the national existence and loyalty of the Arab Christians. There are very few, however, who are trying to hold together in a balance the two aspects of their being, as Christians and as Arabs. The attempt is difficult, some would say impossible ; but on its success depends much more than their own fate.

7

The other movement, that of secularization, springs from the belief of many Arab thinkers that the superior strength and stability of Western society is due to the limitations which have been imposed upon the action and influence of religion. (This belief illustrates one of the main characteristics of Arab thought to-day : the conviction that the West has a 'secret', which, if only the Arabs could find it, would confer on them success similar to that of the Western nations.) In Western thought, each 'field' is autonomous in the choice of its principles and methods ; and the Western community is a secular community, in which religion is tolerated, but no longer gives the regulative principles for every kind of human activity. Western thought is no longer theocentric, Western society no longer theocratic. In the same way the Arabs, these thinkers argue, should no longer attempt to regulate their society by Islamic doctrine and law ; they should curb the pretensions of the religious leaders, and having done so should reorganize each aspect of their community in the light of those principles which Western experience shows to be appropriate to it. Secularism has taken many shapes. It has been one of the factors in the growth of the nationalist movement.¹ It is also giving rise to a movement of philosophical, ethical and social thought.

In the sphere of philosophical thought, this movement has so far made little headway. Books have been written upon

¹ See Chapter VI.

the scientific spirit and upon freedom of thought, and there have been attacks on particular religious abuses. But the hold of Islamic orthodoxy upon educated and uneducated alike is still too strong for a frontal attack to be made upon its claims to explain the whole Universe and to regulate the whole of human life. Even those who have attempted to defend Islam in modern language have at times been reproached with infidelity and atheism.

Greater changes have taken place in the sphere of ethical and sociological thought. It is possible to see the beginning of a movement of 'Social Secularism', which seeks to make the welfare of the individual in this world the norm of social organization; and which as a corollary of this advocates sweeping reforms in the existing structure of society.

The movement for social reform must be clearly distinguished from the improvements in social conditions which have taken place during the present generation, and some of which are mentioned in another part of this book.¹ Of course the two are connected in the sense that the improvement of standards and ways of living constitutes the ultimate goal of the social welfare movement. But such improvements as have been effected during the past twenty years have been due rather to the action of the Government or to the increased prosperity of the country than to the pressure of any considerable body of opinion; and during that period the immediate concern of the social welfare movement has been not so much with the raising of standards as with an indispensable preliminary task: the creation of a social conscience, a conviction that certain standards are desirable.

In so far as this movement exists at all it is of very recent growth. Under the Ottoman Turks it would have been impossible for such a movement to come into existence without arousing suspicion and perhaps repressive action on the part of the authorities. Moreover, the very concepts of public opinion and voluntary organization are of recent introduction into the Near East. Even now the idea of social reform has not penetrated very deep. It is still largely ignored by most of the organized political parties, which tend to concentrate upon the political issue of independence and to treat all other issues as secondary.

Perhaps the most important social welfare organization is

¹ See Chapter V.

that which was established some years ago in the American University of Beirut. Its summer camps and other activities aim not so much at reforming the social life of the rural districts as at giving University students, who will in future constitute an important element in the ruling class, an awareness and understanding of the problems of rural life. Around the Jesuit University also there is growing up a movement which aims at making the educated Catholic youth of Lebanon more conscious of the social doctrine of their religion.

8

In addition to the problems inherent in the process of Westernization as such, there are others which are due to the particular phase which that process has reached. One such problem is created by the existence of two main streams of Western influence, French and Anglo-Saxon. The study of the French language and its culture has been stimulated by its being one of the official languages throughout the Mandatory period, by the teaching of it in almost all schools, both private and public, and by the long-standing connexion between France and certain elements in the population. The study of the English language is encouraged by commercial connexions with the Anglo-Saxon countries, by the existence of a number of American Protestant mission schools, by the movement of emigration and by the predominance of British influence in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Here as elsewhere, the exponents of French and Anglo-Saxon forms of Western culture have not always shown so great a solidarity with one another as might be desired ; and they have often been estranged from one another, not only because of the conflict of British and French political interests and rivalry between Protestant and Catholic missions in the Levant, but also because of fundamental differences in the French and Anglo-Saxon concepts of culture and education.

The differences between the two are reflected in the two Universities to which they have given rise. The Université de S. Joseph is maintained and largely staffed by Jesuits and is Catholic in spirit ; the American University was originally a Protestant college, but is now officially and so far as possible in practice unsectarian. The former has for many years been subsidized, at least in some of its faculties, by the French

Government, while the latter is wholly unconnected with any Western government. The former concentrates, so far as the majority of its students are concerned, upon mastery of the French language ; while in the latter, although English is the medium of instruction, an attempt is made to teach Arabic thoroughly. The political spirit of the former is one of attachment to France and distrust of nationalism ; while the latter has become in practice, and without the deliberate intention of its authorities, the intellectual centre of Arab nationalism. The former is perhaps a greater centre of research and scholarship, and has had prominent orientalists on its staff ; while the latter, although it has an impressive record of scholarly and scientific work, has tended in the Anglo-Saxon manner to exalt character above intellect, and to concentrate upon the training of citizens and public servants.

Ultimately the fact that higher education is largely in the hands of foreign institutions and is given through the medium of foreign languages, and that the two main centres of it differ so widely from one another, may prove not to be a handicap to Arab culture. At present, although it may be unavoidable and in some ways advantageous, it undoubtedly causes difficulties. There is not always sufficient common ground of understanding between the graduates of the two universities ; many of them are more at home in a foreign language than in their own ; and many in the attempt to master two languages and two cultures fail to master either.

V. THE WESTERNIZATION OF SOCIETY

I

THE first and most obvious sign of social change is the growth in the population of the French Mandated Territories in the last four generations. For some centuries previous to 1800 the population had been steadily declining. In the course of the nineteenth century it began to increase ; by 1914 it may have been in the neighbourhood of two and a half millions. Since then it has grown ever faster, because of the abolition of conscription, the decline in emigration, the rise in the standard of living and the improvement in medical and sanitary services. To-day the total population is nearly four millions.

The distribution of the population between the different provinces of the country is as follows :

Syria :	Province of Damascus	531,267
	„ „ Aleppo	752,196
	„ „ Homs	182,312
	„ „ Hama	137,882
	„ „ the Hauran	108,603
	„ „ the Euphrates	218,667
	„ „ the Jazirah	103,514
	„ „ Latakia	371,880
	„ „ Jebel Druze	70,706
	Total	2,477,027 ¹
Lebanon :	Province of Beirut	232,000
	„ „ Mount Lebanon	278,000
	„ „ Northern Lebanon	241,000
	„ „ Southern Lebanon	198,000
	„ „ the Bika'	167,000
	Total	1,116,000 ²

2

Two-thirds of this population live in villages and are dependent upon agricultural occupations. The total area of the country is some 58,000 square miles ; but only about 10-15 per cent of it is cultivated. An equal area could however be brought under cultivation if swamps were drained, barren wastes irrigated, and the margin of agriculture pushed

¹ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1938* (Paris, 1939), pp. 220-1. These figures exclude the Beduin population, who number over half a million, and also the population of Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey in 1939 (see Chapter XI). They are not to be accepted as more than a rough approximation. An estimate for 1944 gave the population of Syria as 2,800,000 (excluding the Beduin).

² Figures for 1942. 3

eastwards into the desert. At present the bulk of the population is concentrated in a comparatively small part of the total area of the country ; it is mainly in the West and in the river valleys of the Jazirah. The density of population is greatest on the coast and round Damascus and Aleppo.

The crops which are grown or could be grown vary greatly from district to district, in accordance with variations in climate and the soil's fertility. The Jazirah, the great plain of Homs and Hama, the Biqua' and the Hauran produce wheat, and to a lesser extent maize, barley and other cereals. Olives, vines and other fruits are grown on the coastal plains and the westward slopes of the coastal ranges ; tobacco in Lebanon and around Latakia ; cotton also around Latakia, and in the Biqua'. Some districts are well watered by springs, summer streams and perennial rivers, and some, in the north more than in the south and on the coast rather than inland, enjoy an adequate rainfall ; but the fertility of almost all parts of the country could be much increased were its water-resources to be properly exploited. The Orontes in the north, the Litani in the south, the Euphrates and its tributaries in the north-east and other rivers could be used to irrigate perhaps half a million more hectares than are irrigated to-day. The rainfall could be more fully utilized, and the agricultural situation improved in various other ways, by systematic reafforestation, to make up for the bad effects of neglect in the past. Under French rule a little has been done to this end, but more remains to be done.

The mineral resources of Syria and Lebanon have not yet been thoroughly investigated but are probably not extensive. Salt and some other minerals exist in quantities sufficient to supply the country's own needs ; but iron and other requisites of industry are found only in small quantities or else not at all. In recent years there have been reports of the discovery of oil in the Jazirah, but whatever oilfields exist are not yet being exploited.

In normal years the country's production of food equals and often exceeds its consumption, although the inadequacy of internal communications and other factors make necessary a certain importation of agricultural products from the neighbouring countries. Improvements in the quality of seeds and livestock and the modernization of agricultural methods have already begun, and greatly help in increasing

production. A reform in the system of land-tenure would also help. In some parts of Lebanon small free-holdings are to be found, but in Syria large estates are the rule, and 'métayage' is perhaps the most common form of tenancy. The 'musha' system of communal ownership, under which holdings are periodically re-distributed, is also widespread. In the past twenty years the Mandatory authorities have made progress with land-survey and the settlement of title, and with the division of lands held under the 'musha' system. But greater tasks remain. Large tracts of the country are still in the possession of a small number of landowners, who for the most part are not interested in improving either the productivity of their lands or the standard of living of the workers. The creation of a free peasantry, by the break-up of the large estates and the appropriate use of the vast state-domains, is still in the future. The facilities for agricultural credit are very inadequate; there are practically no co-operatives and very few agricultural banks, and in consequence the peasant is in the clutches of the money-lender. The tax-system is regressive and weighs heavily upon the cultivator.

A special problem is created by the Beduin, of whom there are over half a million. Their economic function is the breeding of camels in the steppes and desert regions where agriculture is impossible. They are divided into tribes of which the most important are the various Anazah tribes—the Ruwala, the Feddan, and the Sba—in the steppe and desert south and west of the Euphrates, and the Shammar in the Jazirah. Traditionally contemptuous of the settled population and of all government, in the past they have been a serious obstacle to agriculture; but during the last two generations or so the Government has made a serious attempt to control their wanderings, and to prevent their raiding each other and the settled regions, while allowing them to preserve their tribal law and organization. At the same time their economic position is being undermined by the decline in the demand for camels. This makes it the easier to induce them to settle on the land. In the Jazirah, in the Hauran and elsewhere tribes can be found which are abandoning the wandering life. They take to breeding sheep as well as camels and become semi-sedentary; then they begin to cultivate the land and in time become wholly sedentary, thus continuing

that process which has been going on since the beginning of history. But in the steppe and desert country where pasturing is possible and cultivation impossible, the Beduin still have an important part to play.

3

Approximately one-third of the population lives in towns. There are three towns, Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, with between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants each ; five others—Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Latakia and Dair az-Zur—with between 20,000 and 100,000. The inhabitants are mainly occupied in commerce and industry.

The structure of industry is changing more rapidly than that of agriculture. A two-fold change is taking place. On the one hand, the traditional textile, metal and other industries, which used to supply the needs of a great part of Ottoman Asia and the Arabian peninsula, are being killed by the Westernization of taste and by the competition of cheap Western and Japanese goods. On the other, modern industries are slowly being created, especially in the three principal towns, Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. Their development has been hampered by paucity of raw materials, the scarcity of capital and to a lesser extent of technical skill, competition from Europe, America and lately from Japan, the smallness of the internal and the absence of an external market. The modern industrial equipment of the country is still confined to a small number of factories for foodstuffs, textile goods and certain other products for the internal market. The silk industry of Lebanon, which was important until it was overwhelmed by foreign competition and the introduction of artificial silk, has had a partial revival during the last few years.

Not only the industrial but the whole economic development of the country is handicapped by inadequate communications. There is only one modern port, Beirut, which has been developed by French capital and enterprise, and through which flows the bulk of the country's external trade. Tripoli is important as the terminus of one branch of the oil pipe-line from Iraq, but it does not yet possess adequate harbour-works ; Latakia is small and undeveloped. The railway system, mainly built and administered by a French concessionary company, includes only a little over a thousand kilometres of track. Passengers and goods are carried

mainly by motor-car. The trunk-roads, built for the most part since the establishment of French rule, are good, local roads satisfactory in summer but often very bad in winter ; motor transport across the desert to Iraq is well organized by private companies. A trans-desert railway has been planned but not built. There are several civil airports.

The defective financial system is a further obstacle to economic development. Credit facilities are inadequate ; foreign capital has been invested in public utilities but not in industry ; long-term investment and constructive enterprise have been discouraged by the instability of the currency. Since 1924 the legal currency of the country has been the Syro-Lebanese paper pound, issued by the concessionary Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, of which the ownership is mainly French. It is a franc-exchange currency, one pound being equivalent to twenty francs ; and it therefore shared in the fluctuations of the franc. In 1941, after the invasion of Syria and Lebanon by the Allied forces, it was officially linked to sterling. As an unstable and a paper currency, it has never won the confidence of the bulk of the population, who prefer, in spite of official prohibitions, to use the Ottoman gold pound or the sovereign as the standard of value in important transactions ; since the relation between the value of the gold pound and that of the paper pound is constantly changing, problems are always arising in regard to the rate of repayment of debts calculated in terms of gold but actually paid in paper.

4

In commerce as in industry the old order is dying. So long as Syria and Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire, their towns were centres not only for the internal trade of a great part of Ottoman Asia but also for much of its trade with Europe. The last generation has seen the disintegration of the Empire into a number of separate States and the creation of tariff-barriers and other obstacles to the free flow of goods ; it has witnessed also the rise of the port of Haifa, and the consequent diversion of part of the transit-trade from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. In addition, the decline of the traditional industries and the decrease in the demand for their products, the slow growth of modern industries and the absence of any considerable demand in the world for

such goods as Syria's few modern factories produce, have between them severely limited the Syrian and Lebanese export trade.

According to the official statistics for 1938, the latest year for which detailed figures are available, the main countries to which the French Mandated Territories exported goods were Iraq, Palestine, France, Transjordan, Italy, the United States and Egypt, in that order.¹ Much the most important exports were vegetable products and textile materials and goods. The total value of exports and re-exports (excluding the oil of Iraq) was some 892,232,000 francs (£5,028,000).¹ The chief countries from which goods were imported were Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Germany, Italy and Roumania. The main goods imported were textile materials and goods, metals and metal work, vegetable and mineral products; and the total value of imports was 1,707,696,000 francs (£9,059,000).² There was thus an adverse trade balance of 815,464,000 francs (£4,031,000) which was largely offset by the revenue from certain types of invisible export. For example large sums were brought into the country by the many thousands of tourists who visited it, and by the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and others who spent the summer in the hill-resorts of Lebanon. Again, considerable sums of money were sent home by emigrants in America and elsewhere; this item is now much less important than during the past, but it is still not negligible. A third type of invisible export was the foreign capital invested in the country, and foreign credit granted to merchants. In spite of these invisible exports, however, both the size of Syrian and Lebanese foreign trade and the discrepancy between imports and exports are unsatisfactory. The situation can be improved, first by an increase and diversification in production, and secondly by the discovery of external markets for the goods produced, either in the neighbouring countries or elsewhere.

5

Syria and Lebanon are comparatively poor countries, and in spite of the changes which have taken place the standard of living in the countryside and among the poorer classes in

¹ For statistics of foreign trade, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 199-202.

² Calculated at the rate of 177.45 francs, to the pound sterling. This was the average rate for December, 1938.

the towns is scarcely above subsistence-level. In most parts of the country the huts of the peasants, made of wattle or mud-brick or in parts of stone, contain nothing but the barest necessities ; and the greater part of the population live on a diet of bread, olive-oil, milk and perhaps fruit and vegetables in season. Famine is rare, and has not occurred on a large scale since the First World War ; but malnutrition is very widespread. On account of this and of the absence of sanitation and the scarcity of doctors in the country districts, the standard of health is also low. Malaria, typhoid, trachoma and other diseases are endemic. The standard of living is highest in Beirut and the Christian parts of Lebanon, which have profited greatly from the savings and experience of the emigrants to the New World.

6

The changes in the economic system are beginning to cause far-reaching changes in the whole social structure. In the larger towns the externals of life are almost wholly modernized. Clothes and foodstuffs, the construction and furnishing of houses and methods of transport all approximate to those in use in Europe. The old externals it is true still linger on ; the camel and the motor-car jostle one another in the streets of Damascus. But it is generally recognized, and on the whole without regret, that it is only a matter of time until the old completely disappears. In the small towns and villages of the Christian portions of Lebanon, too, the process of Westernization in externals has gone far. In the smaller towns and countryside of the interior, the change is slower in coming ; but motor-cars and roads have prepared the way for it.

The fundamental social forms, however, are slower in changing. The dominant social class is still that of the land-owners, who continue to possess a semi-feudal status. No other social class is strong or self-conscious enough to stand against them. The cultivators have little effective power of moving from one estate or region to another ; although intelligent, they are too unenlightened to have much effective sense of grievance or capacity for political or economic combination. Only in parts of Lebanon does there exist a considerable number of free and comparatively enlightened smallholders. As yet there is neither an industrial middle

class of importance nor an organized urban proletariat (although there are the beginnings of a trade-union movement). There does, it is true, exist a large commercial middle class in the towns, but it is not an autonomous class capable of challenging the social power of the landowners. For this there are a number of reasons: many of the merchants are Christians or Jews, and therefore frightened of coming into conflict with important vested interests; many are bound by family ties to the landowners, and not conscious of a difference of interest from them.

Although the power of the landowners has not yet been challenged, almost certainly the coming generation will see its decline. The conditions which made it possible are ceasing to exist. Land is no longer the only source of wealth, nor is subsistence-agriculture by ignorant peasants the only practicable means of using it. The landlords have lost not only their economic but also their political function: their services as leaders of a feudal army and as tax-collectors have long since been dispensed with. It is not yet clear, however, which class will take their place. The processes which have taken place in parts of Europe—the transfer of power from landowners to capitalists, and the division of large estates into small freeholdings—may occur, but it is not necessary and perhaps not altogether desirable that they should. It is at least arguable for example that it would be better, economically and socially, to revive and develop the village community than to try to create a class of small farmers. Whether this be so or not, it is certain that great changes in the structure of classes are to be expected.

7

Again, the patriarchal family system remains in existence, but its days are probably numbered. The claims of the family are still prior to those of the individual member of it; but its solidarity is gradually being undermined by the ways of modern urban life and by the emergence for large sections of the population of alternatives to the cultivation of inherited land in the ancestral village.

The structure of the family is being radically transformed by the change in the status of women. The change is particularly great among the urban middle class. Girls' schools have been opened, and it is possible for women to

enter an ever-increasing number of occupations, including the liberal professions. But so far only the edge has been touched of the great problem, which like all great problems in this country is closely bound up with religion : how far is it possible in a modern society to retain the traditional Islamic view of women's status—seclusion and the veil, the theory and in a minority of cases the practice of polygamy, the divorce laws and so on? Of all the difficult questions which the process of Westernization raises, this is perhaps the most difficult ; and its difficulty and urgency are likely to increase. The process of change is being speeded by one manifestation of Western civilization above all : the film which expresses a way of feminine life, and a conception of the relations between men and women, which are far from those prevalent in the Islamic world.

The local and sectarian loyalties of the past also preserve something of their strength, but on the whole they are declining in force and are likely to continue to do so, with the spread of Western ideas, the introduction of new means of communication and above all the development of schools, in which the adherents of different religions grow up side by side.

8

The growth of education is indeed one of the most important, as it is one of the most obvious, changes of the last few generations. Landowner, merchant and peasant alike are eager to send their sons and daughters to school, as the first and essential step towards entering the free professions or Government service. Syria and Lebanon now possess the framework of a complete educational system, from elementary schools up to technical institutes and three universities : the American University of Beirut, the Jesuit Université de S. Joseph, also in Beirut, and the State University, in Damascus.

The table on page 94 shows the number of schools of different types, and of scholars in them, in 1938.

From these figures it will be clear that education is further advanced in Lebanon than in Syria. It is also further advanced in the mainly Christian districts of Lebanon than in the others ; among the Christians of Syria than among the Moslems ; and in Syria as a whole than in Jebel Druze and Latakia. The percentage of literacy is probably rather

over 40 per cent among men and under 20 per cent among women in Lebanon; in Syria it is considerably less.

There are four main types of school in the country. First there are the official schools maintained by the departments of education of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Secondly, there are a small number of privately-owned 'national' schools, so called because they are inter-sectarian and do not give religious instruction. Thirdly, there are schools maintained by the religious communities indigenous to the country, sectarian in control and in the content of their instruction. They are the most numerous of all; and the majority of them are maintained by the Christian communities. Finally, there are schools controlled and subsidized by foreign organ-

Grade of Education	Institutions or Courses				Scholars.			
	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria	Lebanon	Jebel Druze	Latakia	Rest of Syria
Elementary education	1,867	90	194	839	131,512	5,534	15,381	101,056
Secondary and technical education and teachers' training courses ..	104	—	6	42	9,803	—	643	7,398
Higher education ..	28	—	—	5	1,228	—	—	356

(In addition, there were some hundreds of students studying abroad, in Egypt, in France and other European countries and in the United States.)¹

izations. Practically all of them, with the exception of those belonging to the French 'Mission Laïque' and the 'Alliance Israélite', are maintained by Christian missionary societies. The majority of them are controlled by French Catholics of various religious orders; next in importance are those maintained by American Protestant missions. There are also British and other foreign schools. These foreign institutions are of particular importance because they include the two main centres of higher learning in the country, the two Universities in Beirut.

In 1938 the first type of school accounted for 31 per cent of the total number of scholars; the second and third between them for 49 per cent; and the fourth for 20 per cent. In

¹ For detailed educational statistics, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport, 1938*, pp. 214-15.

Syria the proportion of official to unofficial schools was larger, and in Lebanon it was smaller, than these figures indicate.

This diversity of schools may be a disadvantage in so far as it makes more difficult the creation of a common intellectual ground for the nation as a whole. There are other serious problems too which perplex the Syrian educationalist: the problem of making modern Arabic an adequate language for expressing modern scientific concepts, and of teaching it thoroughly while at the same time teaching European languages to a degree sufficient for professional and other purposes; the problem of widespread peasant illiteracy; and the problem of redirecting the schools to the production of farmers and technicians rather than of superfluous Government officials and lawyers.

VI. ARAB NATIONALISM

I

OUT of the changes which have been discussed in the last three chapters, and the problems to which they have given rise, has grown the nationalist movement. Since this movement has for the most part taken an Arab rather than a specific Syrian or Lebanese form, it is necessary at the beginning to ask whether and in what sense the Syrians and Lebanese are Arabs.

Racially the Syrians and Lebanese are not of exactly the same stock as the Arabs of the Peninsula. The latter are mainly of the 'Mediterranean' race, with some exceptions. In the Syrian desert and parts of the interior of Syria, the inhabitants are also mainly Mediterranean; but in the mountains the Mediterranean has been united with an 'Alpine' element, to produce a 'Dinaric' or 'Armenoid' type. In most of the interior the population is a mixture of these two types, with the Mediterranean predominating.

Racial origin, however, is not of much influence upon popular judgement. When Syrians and Lebanese say that they belong to the Arab people, they mean that they possess the Arab heritage of language, history, literature and customs, and that they are conscious and proud of possessing it. The only exceptions to this are the Kurds, Turcomans, Circassians, Armenians and Assyrians, who together constitute only a small percentage of the population.¹

It would perhaps be more correct to regard the Arab people, of which the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon form a part, as a group of peoples, which resemble one another in certain important respects but are dissimilar in others. The inhabitants of geographical Syria may be considered as constituting a single member of this group. They differ from the people of the Arabian Peninsula in that, while the latter are almost purely Arabic or 'Semitic' in their ways of life and thought, in the Syrians the Arab has been mixed with other influences. They differ on the other hand from the peoples of Iraq, of Egypt and of the other North African countries in that while these too have been partly moulded by other than Arab influences, the latter have not been identical with the influences upon Syrian and Lebanese life.

¹ See Chapter VII.

In Iraq such influences have been largely Persian and central Asian ; in Egypt there was an indigenous civilization which was not entirely submerged by the Arabian influences ; in much of the rest of North Africa there is a Berber race which has resisted all attempts to assimilate it. To these differences must be added those which spring from the mere fact of living in different regions possessing varying economic possibilities and subjected at times to very diverse historical processes.

It is possible to observe differences not only between the members of the Arab group of peoples, but also within each people. Physically and culturally alike, various elements within the people of geographical Syria represent varying blends of Arabic, of Aramaic and other Semitic, and of non-Semitic influences. Many such differences which formerly existed have in the course of time been levelled out and forgotten, but some of them still linger on, especially in mountain districts. For example, there are a few villages north of Damascus in which Aramaic is still spoken side by side with Arabic. What is more important, the Maronites and other Christians in northern and central Lebanon have not on the whole the same consciousness of being Arabs as the other inhabitants of the country. This is true also to a great extent of the Arabic-speaking Syrian Orthodox and Catholics and of the Alawis in the district of Latakia.

Thus the answer to the question which was posed above is a complex one. The Syrians and Lebanese are members of the Arab group of peoples ; but they differ in some important ways from other members of that group ; and they also differ among themselves in certain ways.

2

Although the Syrians and Lebanese have been Arabs in this sense for many centuries, it is only in the last two generations that an explicit nationalist movement has grown up.

Nationalism exists wherever two factors, which are to be found in some form in every society, take a particular shape and have a particular relation to one another. The one is the consciousness of solidarity : the sense that there is between the members of a certain group a special closeness of feeling, a special similarity of reaction, a possibility of understanding based upon the possession of common characteristics—language, customs, memories, real or imagined ancestry.

The other is the will to work together for the attainment of a common aim in which all believe and for which all are willing to sacrifice something or everything. When this will derives its content from the consciousness of solidarity, and the members of the group take as their common aim the preservation both of that consciousness and of the characteristics on which it is based, nationalism arises. Political nationalism comes into existence when the attempt is made to achieve the common aim by means of the establishment of a State, which includes all the members of the group and of which the Government is imbued with the nationalist ideal.

In Europe, the idea of nationalism became an important political force during the nineteenth century. In one aspect it was a development of the idea that 'the people' can and should be master of its own destiny : that the ordinary citizens of a State have both the right, and if effectively organized, the power to set up and to pull down Governments ; and that Governments are only entitled to demand the obedience of the community which they rule if and in so far as they emanate from the will of that community. In another aspect it was the child of Romanticism, which was, among other things, the attempt to discover in Time and History what for the Christian belongs only to eternity : an adequate object of sacrifice and worship, a supreme purpose and consummation of human life. One type of Romanticism found what it sought in the community and the life devoted to the service of the community ; and it was especially attracted to that type of community which is based on common memories and a common history.

3

Among the Arabs, nationalism in the sense defined above did not emerge until the later part of the nineteenth century. The sense of solidarity and pride in the Arab tradition had long existed ; but they did not form the basis of a coherent movement until the West began to impinge upon the Arab world. Its impact had two effects, both of which worked together to produce the Arab movement. On the one hand, the West brought new dangers to the Arabo-Islamic life. On the other hand, far from destroying the Arabs' faith in their having a special part to play in history, it gave them fresh vitality and the promise of new strength. Arab nationalism

may be defined as the resurgence of the will to live of the Arab people, produced by the action of the West upon it, and with the object of combating the dangers and realizing the benefits of that action.

It is true that the explicit aim of the nationalist movement in its first phase was not to come to terms with the West but to shake off the rule of the Ottoman Turks. But it was not simply a movement of revolt against an oppressor. The Ottoman rule was resented so much more bitterly than in the past, not because it was so much worse, but because it prevented the attainment of that new life of which the Arabs were becoming aware, and made it impossible for them to take what they believed to be their rightful place in the world. The overthrow of the Turkish régime, in the conception at least of the more thoughtful of them, would only be the beginning of their national effort. It would create the conditions in which it would become possible to face the real problems of their community.

What those problems were has already been made clear in Chapters III and IV. Most fundamental of all was the danger of the complete destruction of the principles of loyalty upon which the traditional community had rested : membership of the family, the tribe and the religious community, respect for the past, the habit of obedience to the suzerain. Should they go and nothing take their place, the community might dissolve into a rabble of individuals without loyalties or the consciousness of belonging to a group. It was to avoid this danger that the nationalists endeavoured to arouse a consciousness of the common heritage of language, historical memories and customs shared by the Arabs ; and to make that consciousness the basis of political action and ultimately of government.

A more immediate, although less fundamental, problem was raised by the penetration of Western goods and economic processes. This was beneficial in so far as it held out hopes of raising the standard of living of the people ; but it dislocated the traditional structure of commerce and industry, and it threatened to place the economic life of the Arabs in the power of Western trading and concessionary companies. A similar process of dislocation was taking place in other aspects of social life. Here again much that was bad in the old order was being swept away, but also what was valuable

was threatened. The process had a further effect : it emphasized, and made more unbearable, injustices and inadequacies which had formerly been accepted as inevitable or had passed unremarked. Thus there grew up the belief that social and economic Westernization was undoubtedly beneficial, but needed to be controlled and directed, and that a controlling and directing agency could not exist so long as the government was in the hands of foreigners who neither understood the needs of the Arabs nor cared primarily for their welfare.

A further element was added to the movement by the wounded pride which most Arabs felt when they considered the attitude of the West towards them. The Western Powers in act if not in word treated the Arab countries as if the desires and wishes of their inhabitants were matters of minor importance ; individual Westerners showed only too often their contempt for a people who dressed, believed and thought so differently from them, and were so backward in the material arts. The contempt was no less wounding when it was concealed beneath a romantic admiration for the primitive or the exotic. It was the more unbearable to the Arabs because of their conviction that in essentials they were not inferior to the West, no less than because of their suspicion that in many other things they were indeed far behind the West and had much to learn from it. It gave rise to a desire to equal the West in those things on which the West set value, and to be recognized by the West as equals. Since the West set value upon the independence and power of the national State, upon economic prosperity and a certain ordering of social life, the Arabs too must be independent and powerful, and modern in their social organization.

4

Such were the factors which produced the nationalist movement. The movement was specifically Arab, aiming at the creation of an Arab nation and State which should include all branches of the Arab people, and not simply at the establishment of Syrian, Iraqi, Hejazi and other separate nations ; and this for a number of reasons. The historic imagination of the Arab peoples had taken as its main and almost its only object the memories of the early Islamic period, of the orthodox Caliphs and their successors the Umayyads and

Abbasids. Thus they were vividly aware that there had been a time when the Arabs had been conscious of themselves as a special community, and as a community had played a leading part in history. The thought of the solitary moment of history when the Arabs had been united in a single Empire, in which they had been the dominant element, overshadowed in their minds the memory of ages before and since. The revival of interest in Arabic literature in the course of the nineteenth century had a similar effect: coming to them through the medium of their own language, it aroused their pride and the sense of their own possibilities in a way which would have been impossible for the Greek culture of Syria or the pre-Islamic culture of Iraq. Then again the vision of a united Arab nation seemed to offer to a people becoming conscious of their weakness, and of the internal divisions which were the partial cause of it, a strength such as a Syrian or an Iraqi nation could never possess.

5

In the light of this analysis, it is possible to summarize the assumptions and aims of the movement.

The basic assumptions of Arab nationalism are: first, that there is or can be created an Arab nation, formed of all who share the Arabic language and cultural heritage; secondly, that this Arab nation ought to form a single independent political unit, both in the interests of the nation itself and in those of the world; and thirdly, that the creation of such a political unit presupposes the development among the members of the Arab nation of a consciousness, not simply that they are members of it, but that their being members is the factor which should determine their political decisions and loyalties.

The ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to preserve and enrich the Arab heritage: to enable the Arabs to live in the modern world on an equal footing with other peoples, and to contribute to its civilization without being forced to break with their past. The political objectives of the nationalist movement are the independence of all the Arab lands; the establishment of some degree of unity between them; the encouragement of national consciousness; and the reorganization of the social and economic structure of the nation by means of a process of controlled and discriminate Westernization.

The movement of which these are the assumptions and aims is still at a comparatively early stage of development ; and its ideals, although they have found their expression in patriotic rhetoric and poetry, have not yet achieved a reasoned and systematic exposition. But although Arab nationalism is still largely inarticulate and unformed, it does not spring only from passion and prejudice, nor is it confined only to the educated few who are its spokesmen. It is a movement with rational grounds and purposes, which, although they have not yet become fully explicit, exist implicitly and as motive forces alike in the mind of the peasant, who feels nothing but a vague unrest ; of the educated townsman, in whom unrest has crystallized into definite emotions, desires and grievances ; and of the politician, who expresses the emotions, desires and grievances in speeches and programmes. Although they might not be able to define and defend nationalism, they are all in some degree Arab nationalists.

Like all immature movements, Arab nationalism has not yet found its own authentic voice. It tends to imitate Western nationalism in its programme and its terminology. It is of great importance to make it clear that the spirit of the movement has not yet been definitely or adequately expressed. Its present form is not the only form which it could take. It is possible that if nationalism fails to obtain its explicit objectives, or even if it achieves them and its success is followed by disillusion, the feelings and desires which have given it birth will express themselves in different ways. Instead of a movement for an independent State and a modernized society there might be an outbreak of religious fanaticism, which would not help in the establishment of good relations between the Arabo-Islamic world and the West. Instead of a movement with rational purposes, there might arise one whose only ends were destruction and self-destruction.

6

Which of these paths Arab nationalism will take depends very largely upon the relationship which it establishes, on the one hand with Islam, and on the other with the West.

Although the movements of Arab and of Islamic revival lay emphasis upon different points it is impossible wholly to separate Arab nationalist feeling from Islamic feeling. In most Arabs the two tend to flow together ; the movements

of national and of religious revival are energized by the same complex of desires and emotions within the individuals who have created and who sustain them ; and the ordinary Moslem Arab is not conscious of belonging in one aspect of his being to the Arab community, and in another to the Islamic, but rather of belonging to a single integrated ' Arabo-Islamic ' community in which he does not clearly distinguish the Arab from the Islamic elements. Even in analysis it is impossible wholly to separate the two. On the one hand there is in Islam no sharp distinction between spiritual and temporal, Church and State ; and in consequence a movement of religious reform will have its repercussions in every sphere of social and political life. On the other, many Arab nationalists, especially of the older generation, would define the Arab nation partly in terms of the Islamic religion, which most members of the nation profess, and of which the Holy Book is written in Arabic ; and they would therefore regard the preservation and revival of Islam as being among the aims of the nationalist movement.

What has just been said must be qualified in two ways. First, the secular view of life is becoming ever more widespread, especially among the younger generation and among those educated in Europe and America ; and it is giving rise to the belief that it is better both for religion and for political activity if the two are kept distinct from one another. Thus it is possible to see the beginning of the idea of a secular nationalism, which rests upon elements of unity other than participation in a common religion ; which aims at building a Westernized laic State ; and in which therefore Moslems, Christians and atheists alike can join on a footing of equality. This lay nationalism is not consciously hostile to religion, although it is opposed to theocracy ; but it is possible that at some time in the future it will come into conflict with Islamic orthodoxy.

Secondly, the connexion between Islam and Arab nationalism is perhaps emphasized less in Syria and Lebanon than in the other parts of Arab Asia. This is so not only because Syrians and Lebanese have assimilated Western thought more deeply than other Arab peoples and are more inclined to adopt modern Western secularism, but also because of the existence of an Arabic-speaking Christian element in the Syrian and Lebanese population. Moslem Arab nationalists

cannot leave the Christians out of account in their plans for the future of Syria and Lebanon, and many of them sincerely desire Christians and Moslems alike to participate in the national community of the future. There are many Christians too who share the ideals of Arab nationalism ; and indeed Syrian and Lebanese Christians were among the founders of the national movement, since they saw in the spread of the ideal of national unity the only way of escape from the religious differences which had for so long weakened their country. It is natural that Christian Arab nationalists should define the Arab nation mainly in terms of language, history, and race, and should draw a distinction, perhaps too sharply, between it and the Islamic community.

7

The present attitude of nationalism towards the Western Powers was determined during the years of the First World War and the subsequent peace settlement. Those years were not without their gains. It was then that the Arabs became conscious of their unity and of the strength which might be theirs. They gained collective pride and a memory of things done in common, and also legends and martyrs.

But they were also years of bitterness and disappointment. Freedom and unity seemed for a moment to be within the grasp of the Arabs, but they were snatched away. It has been described in Chapter II how the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided from one another into several States, only the most backward of which was recognized as immediately independent, the others being placed under British or French control. This was all the more disappointing because it was Great Britain which had promised the Arabs independence and unity and had appeared to be the friend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took on in those years an anti-British and anti-French, and even in general an anti-Western, complexion ; indeed the mere fact that Great Britain and France were now in control of the Arab countries would have been enough to give it such a complexion. The hostility was mingled with disappointment, since politically these two Powers had seemed for a moment to be the friends of the nationalists ; but also with gratitude, since culturally the movement was deeply in debt to them. The attitude of Arab nationalists to Great Britain and France has therefore

been complex during the last twenty years : opposition to their policy ; humiliation, anger and lack of confidence, as consequences of having, as they see it, been duped during the last war ; and in many cases intellectual attachment. This complex of factors has with some individuals led to downright hostility towards Great Britain and France, or towards the West as such ; but in others, and among them the most responsible and influential leaders, it has aroused a desire to reach such a settlement of outstanding issues and grievances as will make possible a relation of friendship and co-operation with the Western Powers.

It is not too much to say that the whole future of the Arabs, as well as of the Western Powers in the Middle East, depends upon the way in which the nationalist movement resolves this tension. It is not a question whether the Arabs will become Westernized ; a considerable degree of Westernization, at least in material things, will probably take place whatever the circumstances. It is rather a question whether that Westernization will be used by the Arabs as a means of opposing and driving out the West, or as a means to becoming in the fullest sense part of the West. In other words, the choice is between excommunication from the Western world or communion with it.

The choice will not be confined to the political sphere or determined wholly by political factors. But one of the main factors involved is the political attitude adopted towards the Arabs by the West ; it cannot fail to give rise to a corresponding attitude among the Arabs. This is a consideration which should be taken into account by Western Governments in framing their Middle Eastern policy.

8

The movement analyzed in the preceding sections extends throughout the whole of Arab Asia. In Egypt and in the rest of Arab North Africa analogous and closely related movements exist, but the special problems of these regions and the distinctive character of their modern history make it unwise to speak of a single Arab movement which includes all the Arabic-speaking regions.

Even inside Arab Asia, the political divisions introduced after the First World War, acting upon already existing local differences, have led to variations in the different local branches

of the nationalist movement. Each branch has been concerned to a great extent with its own local problems. But in spite of this, Arab Asia does form a political unity in an important sense. The workers for independence in any one region regard it not as an end in itself, but as a step towards a union of all the Arab regions ; a success or a setback in the struggle in one region has its repercussions in all.

9

Of all the factors which have stimulated the sense of Arab unity in the past twenty years, the most important has been the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against Zionism. In a previous chapter something has been said about the early history of Zionism. It is necessary here to sketch its nature and its relationship with the Arabs.

The roots of Zionism are in many ways similar to those of Arab nationalism. Although an off-shoot of the age-old Messianism of the Jews, in its modern form it arose from the sense of lostness, of exclusion and of humiliation which haunts the incompletely assimilated Jews of the Dispersion. A few exceptionally gifted or fortunately-placed individuals can escape from this sense and the conflicts to which it gives rise by merging themselves in the surrounding Gentile world ; but for the Jewish community as a whole, the Zionists argue, assimilation is neither possible, since if carried out on too large a scale it tends to provoke anti-Semitism, nor desirable, since it would involve the disappearance of the Jews as such and of all which their tradition contains of value to themselves or to the world. For the Zionist, the solution is not for the individual Jew to acquire the characteristics of the individual Gentile, but for the Jewish community to take on the characteristics of a national community : a normal economic and social structure, a national consciousness, a territorial home and political independence.

Zionism emerged at approximately the same time as Arab nationalism. Both movements were stimulated, although not created, by repression : the former by the Russian pogroms, the latter by the policy of the Young Turks. To both, the war of 1914-1918 was the time of crisis and opportunity. The adherents of both believed that they had been promised Palestine by the Allies : the Arabs by the McMahon letters, the Jews by the Balfour Declaration. For that and for other

deeper reasons both regarded themselves as possessing rights over or at least in the country. Thus after 1918 two movements, each in its dynamic stage and each believing itself to be in the right, found themselves facing one another in a single land.

The history of Palestine since 1918 has been dominated by the struggle between them. The Jewish community has been growing in size, in wealth and in self-confidence; it now numbers over half a million, that is, roughly one-third of the population of Palestine. It has developed distinctive social forms such as the collective farms, and has created cultural institutions, an elaborate system of internal self-government and a highly organized trade-union movement. On the whole, too, as the wave of European anti-Semitism has gathered strength, the claims of the Jews have increased; the old 'cultural' Zionism, which desired to create a religious and cultural centre for Jews throughout the world, has largely been swept aside by a political Zionism which aims at the establishment of a Jewish nation possessing all the political attributes of a nation and self-reliant no less in political than in other matters.

There has been a continuous growth in the strength of Arab opposition to the policy of the Balfour Declaration. They oppose it both because it prevents the achievement of their own national aspirations and because of the danger that the Jews will dominate Palestine politically and the surrounding countries economically. This policy has already in their view retarded the political development of Palestine; the independence conceded to Iraq and in a large measure to Transjordan would also, they believe, have been granted to the Palestinian Arabs but for the existence of the Jewish National Home. Moreover, the Zionists are determined that self-government shall be withheld until the Jewish community has been transformed by further immigration from a minority into an overwhelming majority capable of forming a Jewish State. Jewish rule in Palestine, if it were ever established, would cut the Arab population off from the life of the free Arab countries all around. This would be harmful not only to the Arabs of Palestine, but to those of the surrounding regions as well, for Palestine is the geographical link between Arab Asia and Arab Africa. The Arabs fear, in addition, that the Zionists, once in control of Palestine, would be dissatisfied with its

existing frontiers and would be compelled by the pressure of immigration and the need for markets to carry out a policy of expansion, of subtle economic and political penetration, and of alliance with those forces, both internal and external, which are hostile to Arab independence.

In short, the Arabs regard Zionism as a force which imperils their national future. Quite apart, however, from the possible evil consequences of the policy of the Balfour Declaration, they object to it on grounds of principle. They see no reason why they should be called upon to bear the whole burden of solving the problem of world Jewry, a problem which they have done perhaps less than other nations to create. They cannot understand by what right they can be forced to become a minority in a land which their ancestors have inhabited for innumerable centuries. Further, they are humiliated by the way in which Zionist immigration has been forced upon them without their consent being asked or given.

Arab opposition has expressed itself in constant unrest and a number of outbreaks, of which those of 1936 and of 1938-1939 were the most important. More serious even than these outbreaks has been the growth of a spirit of extreme distrust and hostility among Arab nationalists and Zionists alike. The states of mind of both parties are in some degree similar. Each movement has framed its programme without taking into serious consideration the claims or even the existence of the other. Now that they have come into contact with one another and can no longer ignore one another's existence, each tends to regard the other basically as an obstacle in the way of its legitimate aspirations, as a nuisance which must be removed by any possible means. With the passing of time, each has tended more and more to identify the other with the main opponents which it is fighting. The Zionists, bringing with them into Palestine the outlook of the Dispersion, regard Arab hostility to them as only another aspect of that blind unreasonable anti-Semitism which they have known in Europe. They think of the Arab nationalists as Fascists, or as mercenary tools of the Fascists. The Arabs on their side see in the Zionists those European characteristics which they particularly resent: the arrogance and the disrespect for tradition. They regard Zionism as an example of that Western penetration which it is essential for them to control and to meet on equal terms, if their whole heritage is not to be destroyed. More

particularly they regard it as the tool, the partner or even the master of Western Imperialism.

Thus far the parallelism goes ; but there are differences no less striking than the similarities. The Arabs are trying to defend what they already have, the Zionists to acquire a land which has not been theirs for two thousand years. The Arabs rest their case upon the right of possession, and the injustice of facing them with the alternatives of living as a minority under Jewish rule or leaving the country they have inhabited so long. The Jews appeal to historical rights, emphasizing their continued love for Palestine and connexion with it even in exile and dispersion ; and also to the right which their need creates, since it is only in Palestine that they can hope to build up a normal national life once more. This difference in the nature of the Arab and Jewish claims gives rise to an all-important practical difference : the Arabs are not conscious of needing the Zionists, while the latter can only hope to secure their way through the good will of the Arabs.

The Arabs for the most part do not believe that the presence of the Jews in Palestine can be of more than incidental benefit to them. The economic advantages they believe to be much less than is sometimes claimed by the Zionists themselves. The industrial possibilities of Jewish Palestine are limited by high wage-rates and the absence of raw materials and of stable external markets ; and with a few exceptions, the Jews can produce nothing which the Arabs of Palestine and of the surrounding countries could not at least equally well import from elsewhere or, after a certain time-lag, produce for themselves. In agriculture the Arabs can, it is true, learn something from the new methods introduced by the Jews ; but in their eyes this advantage is more than offset by the refusal of Jewish landowners or cultivators to employ Arab labour, and the provision that all land bought by the Jewish National Fund is inalienable. Moreover, the very unstable financial structure of the Jewish community may possibly be a source of danger and loss to Arabs as well as Jews. What is more important still, Arabs fear that any economic successes achieved by the Jews may have harmful political consequences to them. The cultural advantages of having a large European community in their midst are smaller than might appear. There can be few cultural contacts between Jews and Arabs so long as the former remain in a self-created 'invisible ghetto' and for the

most part do not know Arabic ; furthermore, Zionism is in a sense a turning-away from Europe and all it stands for.

Among the Zionists there are some who are obsessed by fear of Arab nationalism and regard any agreement with it as impossible. They wish it to be held in check either by British action or through the creation of Jewish defence-forces, and they are resolved to achieve their aims even without Arab consent. At the other extreme, there are some who believe that the strength of Arab opposition is largely illusory, and that in so far as it exists at all it can be easily broken down, if only the Mandatory Power and the Zionists show a determined front. Most Zionists, however, probably understand that they need Arab good will and do not at present possess it, and therefore are eager to find some way of conciliating the Arabs. Some maintain that a strengthening of personal ties between Jews and Arabs will be enough to dispel the clouds of prejudice and give the Arabs a true understanding of the purpose of Zionism, and that once they understand it they will cease to oppose it. Others rely upon the effect which the economic and social benefits of Zionist settlement will have on Arab opinion ; and others again wish to help awaken the Arab peasantry and proletariat, in the belief that they will join forces with the Jewish workers and peasants against the Arab landowning class.

In these suggestions of policy there lies a germ of truth : they recognize that the Jews can only win Arab good will by persuading the Arabs that they need Zionist help. Every such policy, however, comes up against an insuperable obstacle : it offers to the Arabs something which the Arabs regard as of secondary importance and asks the Arabs in return to concede something which they regard as vital. In other words, it does nothing to concede the essential demands of the Arabs.

The most important of these demands concern immigration, land-purchase and self-government.

The Arab nationalists are willing to treat the Jews who have already entered Palestine as full citizens of any Palestinian State which may be established, and to accept the validity of the land-purchases which have already taken place. They would respect the cultural autonomy of the Jewish community, would grant to individual Jews adequate guarantees of their civil rights, and perhaps also concede local self-government to

Jewish communities in those districts of Palestine in which they are in a majority. But they would not be willing to permit further immigration or land-purchase or to recognize Jewish independence in the whole or any part of Palestine. They demand the establishment in the shortest possible delay of a national Government in which the Jews will have a due share, but which will be able to participate fully in any Arab union which may be formed.

The Zionists for their part would not be prepared to accept what the Arabs would be willing to offer. The more conciliatory of them would be prepared to consent to temporary restrictions on immigration, as the price of Arab friendship ; but none of them would acquiesce in the complete stoppage of it. To stabilize the Jewish community at its present numerical level would be to close the doors of Palestine in the face of the persecuted Jews of eastern Europe. Further, a community of half a million Jews, surrounded by Arabs in whose guarantees and promises they have no faith whatever, would never feel secure ; without sufficient strength of its own, it would be forced to rely upon external support, which might at any moment be withdrawn. Above all, to accept the position of a permanent minority, even one whose rights were guaranteed, would be, in Zionist eyes, to betray the Zionist ideal. The whole purpose of Zionism is to escape from the Dispersion and its evils ; but to accept minority status in Palestine would be to add another chapter to the history of the Dispersion. It would be, the Zionists claim, to create another Jewish problem, the same in nature as that which already exists in the countries of eastern Europe. Not only would it do nothing to solve the problem in eastern Europe, but it would place the Jews already in Palestine in a position difficult enough in a country where they feel themselves to be exiles, but intolerable in the country which they regard as their own. Thus even the more moderate Zionists demand at the very least a position of parity with the Arabs in Palestine ; that is, that they should have at least an equal share in the Government and should not derive their civil and political rights from the good will or sufferance of the Arabs.

The British Government has made several attempts to solve the problem of conflicting promises. In 1922 it issued a

White Paper in order to define its commitments and policy, and thus allay the fears of the two sides. The Balfour Declaration, stated the White Paper, did not mean that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but only that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. The establishment of such a Home was defined as 'the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride'. For this purpose, it was essential that the community should know that it was in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. It was also necessary that it should be able to increase its members by immigration; but not to such an extent as to exceed the economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals, to be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, or to deprive any section of the present population of employment.¹

In 1936 a Royal Commission headed by Earl Peel was sent out to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances of that year, and to make recommendations for the removal of legitimate Arab and Jewish grievances in regard to the way in which the Mandate had been carried out. In its Report, a masterly analysis of the whole problem, it suggested the partition of Palestine into a Jewish section to consist roughly of those areas in which Jews had acquired land and settled, together with Galilee, and to be constituted into a Jewish State; and an Arab section to be joined with Transjordan to constitute an Arab State. Each of these States was to be in treaty relations with Great Britain. The Holy Places and a corridor linking them with the sea would remain under mandatory rule; as also would Haifa and other towns with a mixed population, at least for a time. There should be a transfer of the ownership of land and an exchange of population between the two States, which would in the last resort be compulsory.²

This scheme was rejected by the Arabs on grounds of principle; one section among the Zionists also rejected it outright, but another was prepared to consider a plan of partition, provided it were more in accord with Jewish

¹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd. 1700 (London, 1922).

² *Palestine Royal Commission: Report*, Cmd. 5479 (London, 1936).

aspirations than the Commission's plan. In addition, subsequent inquiries showed the technical difficulties of carrying it out. In May, 1939, after the breakdown of the "Round Table Conference" held in London between representatives of the British Government, the Zionists and the Arabs, a new scheme was propounded in a White Paper. It defined the ultimate objective of the Mandatory Power to be the establishment of an independent State in which the Arabs and Jews should share in the government in such a way as to safeguard the essential interests of each community ; it was contemplated that this State should be set up at the end of ten years, provided such relations then existed between Jews and Arabs as would make good government possible ; if such relations did not exist the creation of the State would, after consultation with the interested parties, be postponed. During the transitional period of ten years, immigration was to be limited to a total of 75,000 in the first five years (10,000 immigrants a year, and in addition 25,000 refugees, if adequate provision could be made for their maintenance), and was then to cease altogether unless the Arabs were ' prepared to acquiesce in it ' ; transfers of land were to be prohibited in certain areas and regulated in others ; and once peace and order were sufficiently restored, steps were to be taken to increase the participation of the inhabitants in the government of the country.¹

These proposals were rejected, by all sections of Zionist opinion, as a betrayal of the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs also rejected them as inadequate and vague, and because they had no confidence in the British Government's intention to carry them out ; but later, many Arabs showed their willingness to accept them as a step in the right direction. The White Paper also met with severe criticism in Parliament and from the Permanent Mandates Commission : four out of seven members of the Commission declared that they did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, while all seven agreed that it was not in accordance with the interpretation previously placed on the Mandate. Nevertheless it continued to be the basis of British policy during the years of war.²

¹ *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-9*, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939).

² For the present state of the Palestine problem, see Chapter XIII.

The concern of the Arabs in general for the fate of their brothers in Palestine was shown in the help and encouragement which they gave to the insurrections of 1936-1939, and also in the holding of a number of 'Pan-Arab Congresses' at which this and other questions were discussed. One such was held in Jerusalem in December, 1931, in close connexion with the General Islamic Congress held simultaneously. It formulated an 'Arab Covenant' which may be taken as giving a standard definition of the aims of the nationalists :

- ' (i) The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved or recognized by the Arab nation.
- ' (ii) All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the single goal of their complete independence, in their entirety and unified ; and every idea which aims at limitation to work for local and regional politics must be fought against.
- ' (iii) Since colonization is, in all its forms and manifestations, wholly incompatible with the dignity and highest aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will combat it with all its forces.'¹

The Congress set up an Executive Committee to further the aims embodied in the Covenant. This Committee did not prove very effective, but it took a step in the direction of Arab unity. In 1934, during the war between Sa'udi Arabia and the Yemen, it appointed a peace delegation to mediate between the two contending Arab states. The delegation went to Arabia and took part in the negotiations which ended in the conclusion of a treaty of peace. Three years later, in September, 1937, a Pan-Arab Congress was held at Bludan in Syria in order to consider the Palestinian problem. Organized by the Syrian Committee for the Defence of Palestine, it was attended by over three hundred delegates, all of them unofficial and most of them from Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. It passed a number of resolutions in regard to the solution of the Palestinian problem, and stated that the adoption of the policy embodied in these

¹ Translation in A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), p. 107.

resolutions would be regarded as a condition of friendly relations between the Arab peoples and the British Empire.¹

The problem of Palestine was also the reason for the holding of the Inter-Parliamentary Congress of Arab and Moslem countries in Cairo in October, 1938. Summoned by a Committee of Egyptian Senators and Deputies, it was attended by delegations from most of the Arab countries, although not from Sa'udi Arabia or Transjordan, and from several other Moslem countries. The Syrian and Iraqi Chambers were officially represented by delegations headed by the Presidents of the Chambers. The President of the Egyptian Chamber presided over the Congress. It adopted several resolutions concerning the problem of Palestine, and threatened that if its recommendations were not accepted the Arab and Moslem peoples would be compelled to regard the attitude of the British and Jews as inimical to them. The rulers of the Arab and Moslem countries were urged to carry out the resolutions by all possible means, and a Permanent Committee was set up for the same purpose.²

Shortly afterwards the interest of the Arab world in the Palestinian question was formally recognized by the British Government, which invited delegations from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Sa'udi Arabia and Yemen, as well as from Palestine itself, to the Palestine Conference held in London at the beginning of 1939. This was an important event in the history of Arab nationalism, both because it constituted the first official recognition by the outside world of the reality of Pan-Arab feeling, and because of the opportunity for practical co-operation which it gave to the Arab Governments.³

12

The events of Palestine have overshadowed those of the other regions of Arab Asia in the last few years, but the latter also have played their part in creating a united political sentiment. The Iraqi Revolt of 1920 and the Syrian Revolt of 1925 each in its turn stimulated whatever movements of discontent existed in the other Arab countries. The war between King Husain and Abdul-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, which ended in the extension of Ibn Sa'ud's rule over Hejaz

¹ Report in *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), October, 1937, pp. 497-9.

² Report in *Oriente Moderno*, November, 1938, pp. 587-601.

³ More recent developments in the movement for Arab unity are referred to in Chapter XIII.

and the creation of the kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, was followed with close attention throughout Arab Asia ; the wisdom and energy of Ibn Sa'ud, no less than his success as a ruler of Beduin, deeply impressed the Arab imagination. The signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930 and of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936 was also of great importance in stimulating the desire of other regions for independence.

Outside the Arab world the example of Turkey had a great influence on the Arab countries. By her own efforts Turkey had secured her independence and was trying to build up a wholly Westernized society. Arabs might not regard the path which Turkey had taken as one they could follow, but at least they were encouraged by her success.

13

In none of the countries of Arab Asia is the nationalist movement more influential than in the Levant States. It was by Syrians and Lebanese that the idea of the Arab nation was first expounded ; it was they who organized the first nationalist societies. Almost all political thought among the town-population of Syria, and among large sections of that of Lebanon, is Arab nationalist. Syrians and Lebanese have played a leading part in every phase of the movement's evolution. The schools of Beirut helped to revive the Arabic language, and their graduates to give it a modern literature. Syrians and Lebanese were active in the secret societies of the period before 1914. They participated in the Anglo-Arab negotiations during the war of 1914-1918. They gave the movement its martyrs, executed by Jemal Pasha in 1915. They supplied many of the officers and soldiers of the Arab army.

The nationalists claim that Syria and Lebanon are necessary to the Arab State which they desire. An Arab State which did not control the Mediterranean coast-line with its ports would be seriously handicapped in its trade, and strategically it would lie at the mercy of whatever Power controlled them. Culturally also an Arab State which did not include Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut would be at a serious disadvantage in the process of assimilating Western culture.

To the minds of Arab nationalists, the Arab State is as necessary for the Levant States as they for it. The bane of Syria and Lebanon has always been their internal divisions,

and the separatist spirit to which these have given rise. They can only be overcome or at least be rendered harmless by the development of a consciousness of unity more powerful and more effective than the consciousness of those factors which create division. Such a consciousness of unity cannot be created out of nothing ; use must be made of what already exists. At present there is little or no sense of Syrian unity, or even of the existence of geographical Syria as a separate country. But there does exist a consciousness of 'Arabism', with a richness of historical and literary association to which 'Syrianism' could never aspire. It is only, so the Arab nationalists claim, by developing this already existing consciousness that the forces of separatism can be overcome.

There are other advantages for which Syria and Lebanon can hope from Arab unity and independence. They can hope for a remedy for their present military and economic weakness. An independent Syria with four million inhabitants would always lie at the mercy of Turkey ; but the danger would be less great if she were supported diplomatically and militarily by an Arab union. Equally, the technical and commercial skill of her inhabitants would be given greater scope if the Levant States were part of a larger economic unit of which the very large economic resources are in need of development.

Not only in the economic but in every sphere of life the Syrians and Lebanese need opportunities such as their land cannot give. There is in them a certain greatness, which has been too long asleep and is now awakening. For two generations the educated youth have sought opportunities in Egypt and in the New World. But both these spheres are now largely closed to them, and the second of them could at the best of times only be entered at a great price : the loss of their language and their native land, and acceptance of the life of a stranger and an exile. It is not strange therefore that the thoughts of young Syrians and Lebanese, especially of those among them who feel responsible for the future of their country, should be turning eastwards and southwards ; and that they hope to find in the other regions of Arab Asia opportunities at once for the exercise of their talents and for the fulfilment of their duty to their people.

The progress of the nationalist movement in Syria and Lebanon is obstructed both by its own weaknesses and by the existence of certain forces which are hostile to it, or else which place obstacles in the way of a full attainment of its objectives. One weakness is the lack of outstanding political leaders. Even the most distinguished figures have never had a following comparable to that of Zaghlul in Egypt. This may be partly because the Syrian populace is critical and intelligent and not prone to hero-worship, but it is also due to the lack of leaders of an heroic stature. One cause of this is the execution by Jemal Pasha in 1915 of a number of the most prominent members of Arab nationalist organizations. Another is the drain upon energy and ability caused by the movement of emigration. A third is the absence during the last twenty years of opportunities for training in responsibility. The élite of the country, which in Iraq was drawn at least partly into the orbit of government almost from the beginning of the Mandatory régime, has in Syria been for the most part in opposition to the authorities since the end of the war of 1914-1918, and has never lost the defects of an irresponsible and powerless opposition.

Another weakness of the movement is the absence of a long-term social and economic policy. Parties may at times make grandiose promises about the nature of the new world which they propose to build, but there is no evidence that any of them is undertaking a profound and realistic investigation of the country's vast social and economic problems. Nationalists sometimes argue that the political problem is prior to all others, and that it will be time to face other problems when independence has been won. To discuss them now would not only divert attention from the struggle for independence, but would cause a split in the ranks of the nationalist movement, which is united in wanting a free Arab State, but divided on the kind of free Arab State which it wants. The lack of a constructive social policy is due partly to most of the nationalist leaders coming from the landowning class, which is interested in preserving rather than altering the existing social system. This is inevitable at present, because education is still largely confined to a single class, and also because of the absence of any other class strong enough to challenge the power of

the landowners ; but it is a source of weakness now, and may be even more so in the future.

15

Opposition to Arab nationalism comes from those who believe that the people of geographical Syria constitute a separate nation and not simply a part of the Arab nation. Geographical Syria, they maintain, must preserve its identity both against the imperialism of the Western Powers and against the ambitions of the Arab nationalists. Its destiny is to be neither wholly European nor wholly Arab. It is a link between the two worlds of which it forms the common frontier. But also it is more than a mere link ; it has a spirit and civilization of its own, which it must preserve. Those who hold this belief regard the hopes of the Arab nationalists as no more than dreams, without foundation either in history or in national interest. The basis of a nation, they maintain, is not language or religion or any such characteristic, but the will to live together, and this will can only arise out of a living interest ; but the interest of geographical Syria is not to merge with the other Arabic-speaking countries to the point where it loses its own power of independent decision. To do so would be to lose more than it would gain : not only in the economic and political spheres, but also because the other Arab regions are at a lower level of civilization and less inclined to accept the need for a fundamental modernization and reconstruction of society. Thus for Syria to enter an Arab State would be a retrograde step. While she should welcome co-operation with the surrounding countries in matters of common concern, it should be undertaken for a clear and reasonable purpose and not out of sentiment ; and it could only be profitably undertaken once a strong efficient Government and centre of political decision had been created in geographical Syria.

For those of this way of thinking, the first essential is therefore to build up a strong Syrian Government, which will take in hand the reform of social and economic life and will conduct the relations of Syria with other countries, Arabic-speaking or not, on a footing of equality. The obstacles to this are both external and internal. The danger from outside comes from the ambitions of the Imperialist Powers. That from inside, which is equally insidious, arises from the strength of sectarian and other divisions, the

domination of society by religious leaders, the weakness of national sentiment and the fascination of dreams of Arab Empire. These dangers can only be overcome by the activities of a carefully organized and disciplined party.

In its full and articulate form this is the doctrine of the 'Syrian National Party'.¹ But many who do not belong to that party and who indeed think of themselves as Arab nationalists would assent to some at least of these propositions, and insist that Syria has a special destiny inside the Arab world.

The young Socialist and Communist movements are potential opponents of nationalism, but so far no serious conflict between them has arisen. They are of very recent growth and have not yet acquired a large following. Of their adherents many are Armenians and thus not immediately concerned with the question of Arab nationalism ; while most of the Arabs who profess Socialist principles are prepared to join forces with the nationalists for the attainment of self-government, either because of patriotic sentiment or else because self-government is a necessary condition for the social reforms they advocate. Once independence were achieved, however, a conflict might arise as it has arisen in other countries ; and even now many of the nationalists disapprove of the Socialists and Communists, either because they dislike their social and economic ideas or else because they think it inopportune to raise such issues at the present time.

Other difficulties for the nationalist movement arise out of the existence of large religious and other minorities and of considerable foreign interests. The next two chapters will be given to an analysis of these factors.

¹ See Chapter X.

VII. LEBANON AND THE MINORITIES

I

THE greater part of the population of the Levant States, it was stated in the last chapter, is Arab by language and tradition; in addition the majority is orthodox Moslem by faith. There are, however, a number of communities which are not Arab, others which are heterodox Moslem or not Moslem, and some which are neither Arab nor Moslem.

The religious minorities are more numerous and of greater importance in the country's political life than the national minorities. The following list shows the sectarian composition of Syria and Lebanon:

Community				Syria ¹	Lebanon ²	Total
A. Moslems, and post-Islamic sects	1. Sunnis	1,737,402	175,925	1,913,327
	2. Shi'is	11,541	154,208	165,749
	3. Druzes	79,428	53,047	132,475
	4. Alawis	274,486	—	274,486
	5. Isma'ilis	24,390	—	24,390
Total				2,127,247	383,180	2,510,427
B. Christians	1. Maronites	11,800	226,378	238,178
	2. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite	4,750	—	4,750
	3. Greek Orthodox	115,118	76,522	191,640
	4. Greek Catholics	42,427	45,999	88,426
	5. Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites)	32,892	2,574	35,466
	6. Syrian Catholics	14,182	2,675	16,857
	7. Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians)	86,742	25,462	112,204
	8. Armenian Catholics	12,137	5,694	17,831
	9. Assyrians and Chaldean Catholics	3,759	528	4,287
	10. Protestants	7,660	6,712	14,372
Total				331,467	392,544	724,011
C. Jews	26,250	3,518	29,768
D. Miscellaneous	2,063	6,301	8,364
Total				2,487,027	785,543	3,272,570

Thus some 58 per cent of the total population are orthodox Sunni Moslems, 18 per cent belong to other Moslem communities, and 23 per cent are Christians.

¹ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220-1.

² Census of 1932. See S. B. Himadeh, *Economic Organization of Syria* (Beirut, 1936), pp. 408-9. These figures are now out of date, but are given here because they are more detailed than any published more recently. An official estimate for 1943 gives the following figures:—Sunnis 222,594, Shi'is 200,698, Druzes 71,711, Maronites 318,201, Greek Orthodox 106,658, Greek Catholics 61,956, Armenian Orthodox 58,007, Minorities 6,596—Total 1,046,421.

Among the Moslem communities the main line of division is that between the Sunnis and the rest :

- (i) The Sunni Moslems regard themselves as exponents of the original and unadulterated Islamic orthodoxy, as set forth not only in the Holy Book of Islam, but also in the Traditions of the Prophet and the system of theology and jurisprudence built up by the great Islamic thinkers. They constitute the vast majority of believers not only in the Levant States but in the Islamic world as a whole.
The other sects diverged from the main body of Islam at different times on account of political or theological dissension.
- (ii) The Shi'is (known in Lebanon as the Metawila) split off in the seventh century A.D., with the struggle for the Caliphate between Muawiya and Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law. Even after the death of Ali they clung to his cause ; their breach with the Sunnis was widened and made permanent by the Battle of Kerbela (681), in which Ali's son Husain was killed after the defeat of his army by that of the Umayyads. The Shi'is regard the succession to the Prophet as having passed, not to the orthodox line of Caliphs whom the Sunnis recognize, but to a hereditary line of Imams who were both the spiritual and the temporal heads of Islam, and of whom the first was Ali. The majority of Shi'is recognize twelve such Imams, the last of whom disappeared during the ninth century but will, it is believed, some day reappear.
- (iii) The Isma'ilis split off from the majority of Shi'is during the eighth century, over the question of the succession to the Imamate. They recognize the first six only of the Shi'i Imams, and regard as the seventh and last of the Imams the brother of the seventh Imam of the Shi'i line. They introduced into Islam a number of esoteric doctrines, such as the ideas of successive emanations or incarnations of God, and of the transmigration of souls. These esoteric doctrines they regard as placed above human discussion and

dispensed by the Imam to a chosen body of initiates. They look upon the Imam as infallible, and his followers as therefore owing absolute obedience to him. For a time during the Middle Ages part of Syria was ruled by the 'orthodox' Isma'ili Caliphs of Egypt, the Fatimids, but on their decline a heterodox branch was formed as a political secret society, which under the name of the 'Assassins' terrorized a large part of the Islamic world. To-day they owe religious allegiance to the Aga Khan.

- (iv) The Druze sect originated in the eleventh century, when some of the followers of the Fatimid Caliph Hakim, ruler of Egypt, put forward the claim that he was the last incarnation of the Deity. Forced to flee to Syria, they made converts among the adherents of Isma'ilism there, and in course of time those converts came to form a community distinct from the Isma'ilis. They preserved and in some ways developed the esoteric doctrines of Isma'ilism and the distinction between the initiates and the 'ignorant'. They are characterized by the cohesion of their social organization, the strength of their communal spirit and the rigour of their moral code.
- (v) Finally, the Alawis, who are also known as the Nusairis, took over from Shi'ism and developed the cult of Ali, whom they regarded as an incarnation of God. From Isma'ilism they borrowed the idea of an esoteric teaching hidden from the masses; and their liturgy, the possession of which distinguishes them from other Islamic communities, seems to be largely Christian in origin. Their faith also contains elements derived from the pre-Christian worship of nature.

3

There are five important groups of Christian sects in the country :

- (i) The so-called Greek Orthodox are members of the Eastern Orthodox Church which broke finally with the Western Church in the eleventh century. The two Churches differ on a number of doctrinal points,

the most important of them that concerning the Procession of the Holy Ghost. There are also divergences in ceremonial and discipline ; and the Eastern Church rejects the papal claim to universal supremacy. The Greek Orthodox in Syria and Lebanon are subject to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, who normally lives in Damascus. In the past the Patriarch and the upper hierarchy were Greek, while the lower clergy and the bulk of the laity were Arabs. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the whole hierarchy became Arab, and Arabic is to-day the main liturgical language.

- (ii) The Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) and the Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) both adhere to the Monophysite doctrine that Christ has only a Divine and not also a human nature : a doctrine which was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon (451). The Syrian Orthodox Church has a Syriac liturgy ; the head of the hierarchy is also entitled Patriarch of Antioch and resides at Homs. The Gregorian Church has an Armenian liturgy, and stands at the very centre of the Armenian national tradition. Of its five Patriarchs, the Catholicos of Eshmiadzin in Armenia is the most exalted.
- (iii) The Assyrians are the remnants of the Nestorian Church which originated with the Christological controversies of the fifth century. The Nestorians so overemphasized the distinction between the Logos and the man Jesus that there was a tendency to prejudice the conception of a real union between them. Their doctrine was condemned by the Council of Ephesus (431) ; subsequently, those who adhered to it formed themselves into an independent Church, which spread eastwards and sent missions as far as China. It was almost entirely destroyed by the Mongols in the fourteenth century. It has a distinctive Syriac liturgy ; and its spiritual head is the Mar Shimun, formerly resident in Iraq but now in exile.
- (iv) The Roman Catholics are mostly members of the

Uniate Churches : that is, those Churches whose members formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Catholic Churches, and at some time in the past acknowledged the papal supremacy and gave up doctrines which the Roman Catholic Church regards as heretical, but retained their own liturgies and certain distinctive features of discipline and organization. There are five Uniate Churches with important bodies of adherents in Syria and Lebanon : the Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic and Chaldaean Catholic Churches, which split off from the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Nestorian Churches respectively ; and the Maronite Church, which originally held the Monothelite doctrine that Christ has two Natures but one Will, and which returned to Rome finally and as a whole in the twelfth century. The Maronites, like the Syrian Orthodox and Assyrians, have a Syriac liturgy, and a Patriarch of Antioch, resident in Lebanon, as their spiritual head. There are comparatively few Roman Catholics of the Latin or Western rite.

- (v) The Protestants are the fruits of the labours of American and other missionaries during the nineteenth and present centuries.

The Jews are mainly Arabic-speaking and long-settled in the country.

4

Of these religious communities, the Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic), the Assyrians and some of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics are not Arabic-speaking and have, for the most part, come recently into the Levant States. The Armenians came originally from the Caucasus and have their own language and national traditions. Most of those now resident in Syria and Lebanon have entered the country during the last half-century, in consequence of the great massacres in Asia Minor (1895-1915), and more recently of the annexation of Alexandretta by Turkey.¹

Most of the Assyrians have been settled in Iraq since the

¹ See Chapter XI.

last war, when they were dislodged from their original homes in the Kurdish mountains; the Chaldaeans have lived in the Mosul area of Iraq for many centuries. In 1933 a period of tension between a section of the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government ended with the killing of some hundreds of them by Iraqi troops. Several thousands in consequence crossed the frontier into Syria, and although some of them later returned to Iraq, others were settled in the Jazirah with assistance from the League of Nations. Their settlement became an integral part of the Syrian State in 1942.

A large part of the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics still speak Syriac. They have been settled since before the coming of Islam in north Syria and south Turkey, in and around the Taurus hills, against which the wave of Arab influence exhausted itself. Thus they have been able to preserve their Syriac dialect which farther south has been replaced almost everywhere by Arabic. Many are, however, bilingual in Arabic and Syriac, and others have abandoned Syriac and are now Arabic-speaking.

There are certain other groups which resemble the Armenians and Assyrians in not being Arabic-speaking, but unlike them are orthodox Moslems. The most important of them are :

- (i) The Kurds, of whom there are perhaps 200,000.¹ They are mountaineers from the high country which links the Anatolian and Persian plateaux, and speak a dialect akin to Persian. Some of them have long been resident in the country, but others have emigrated in the last twenty years from their homes in the mountains of eastern Turkey, in order to escape the repressive measures of the Turkish Government. There are small numbers of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis, Alawis and Christians, but most of those who speak Kurdish as their native language are Sunnis.
- (ii) The Turcomans, who number perhaps 30,000. They came originally from Central Asia, and their language is a dialect of Turkish. Originally nomads, they have now become semi-sedentary or wholly sedentary cultivators of the soil.

¹ These figures are only rough estimates; there are no official statistics for national and racial minorities.

- (iii) The Circassians, who are by origin Moslems from the Caucasus. They fled from their homes after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, and were settled by the Ottoman Government along the western edge of the Syrian Desert, to prevent the encroachments of the tribes. There are about 20,000 of them.
- (iv) There are also a number of Yazidis, adherents of a secret dualistic religion and with a dialect of their own ; but they are only a small offshoot of the main community in Iraq.

5

With these exceptions the minorities are Arabic-speaking and have lived in Syria and Lebanon for many generations ; akin to the majority in many things, their basic difference is one of religious loyalties.

The general nature of the problem which they raise can be stated briefly. It is a product of two factors : first, of certain traditional differences which linger on in a new age ; secondly, of the varying relations of the different elements in the population to the process of Westernization.

Serious at any time, religious differences were made more serious in the past by the prevalence of the theocratic view of life ; differences of religious belief involved different political loyalties and principles of social conduct. The theocratic view was the basis of the 'millet-system', which, while it allowed a certain autonomy to the minorities, also increased the completeness of their separation from one another and from the majority. This was particularly true of those minorities of which a large proportion lived compactly in a single area ; they came to regard themselves, if they had not always regarded themselves, as a 'peculiar people' linked by no moral or political tie with their neighbours. To complete their isolation there was added the memory of injustices, real or imagined, which they had suffered at the hands of the majority.

The persistence of these divergences in the present age adds a new and complicating factor to the problem of Westernization. It is not only that different communities have different paths to tread if they are to Westernize themselves : for example, the problems of social organization

among the Druzes of Jebel Druze are different from those among the Lebanese Christians. The growth of the Arab nationalist movement has also affected the problem of minorities. It is true that in principle Arab nationalism need not and indeed should not involve a problem of religious minorities. But there are several reasons why at the present day it does involve such a problem. The first reason is to be found in the immaturity of political thinking among the Arabs. Arabism, as the previous chapter made clear, has not yet determined its relationship with Islam ; more generally, neither majority nor minorities have yet faced the problem of the connexion between religion and the State. Thus there is a tendency for many of the nationalists, although not their most thoughtful leaders, to regard members of the minorities as imperfect Arabs because they are heterodox Moslems or not Moslems at all ; equally there is a tendency among the minorities to be suspicious of nationalism as a movement for unrestrained Sunni ascendancy. Among some of the Christian minorities there is a further tendency to regard the West as their spiritual home, to which they can belong in a way in which they could never belong to the Arabo-Islamic world to whose fringes they have so long clung.

The mutual suspicion has been increased in the last twenty-five years by the bad relations which have existed between the nationalists and the French authorities. In these years Arab nationalism has been largely a movement of opposition to France. Those whose nationalism is still coloured by religion draw from that an additional reason for suspecting the Christians as being of the same religion as the French. But quite apart from religious prejudice, suspicion has inevitably been aroused by the long-standing attachment of certain of the Christian communities to France. Many of the nationalists believe that this attachment has been used by her as an instrument in a policy of dividing, weakening and in other ways opposing the nationalist movement. Those of the minorities who have been used unwittingly in this way they regard as obstacles to the achievement of their aspirations ; those who have lent themselves willingly to it they regard as traitors to the national cause.

Even when members of minorities become Arab nationalists, as many of them do, they often wear their nationalism with a difference. It is not only that they tend to emphasize

points in the nationalist programme other than those which are emphasized by the Moslems ; they also sometimes conceive of themselves as having a special duty to perform in the movement. For example, some of the Christian nationalists regard it as their task to mediate Western civilization to the Arabs. This sense of a special duty makes for difference, if not for opposition.

6

This much can be said of the whole of Syria and Lebanon. But if a more detailed analysis is to be attempted, Lebanon must be separated from Syria. While in Syria, and in the Levant States taken as a whole, the Sunni Moslems have an overwhelming preponderance, in Lebanon neither they nor any other community forms an absolute majority of the population, and the number of Christians of different sects is slightly greater than that of Moslems, orthodox and heterodox.

Inside Lebanon also a distinction must be made. As will be described later,¹ the Lebanese Republic of to-day was formed after the First World War, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon itself, of certain towns and outlying districts. In the former, the population is almost entirely Christian (mainly Maronite) and Druze. The additions included the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Saida (Sidon) and Sur (Tyre), and the districts of the Bika' in the east and Jebel Amil in the south. In the towns the population is largely Sunni Moslem, although there are also numerous Shi'is, Greek Catholics and Orthodox and Armenians (mainly in Beirut). In the Bika' and Jebel Amil the Shi'i Moslems are predominant, but here again there are large Greek Orthodox and Catholic and other communities.


In Mount Lebanon the majority is Christian, but the Druze community is large and strong enough to have played at least an equal and sometimes a greater part in the history of the Mountain. Thus the sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon is very different from that of the rest of the Mandated Territories. To a great extent also its history has diverged from that of other parts of geographical Syria. This has given rise to a specific Lebanese tradition. It is a tradition of asylum : remnants of sects and tribes, driven for one reason or another

¹ See Chapter IX, p. 172.

from the plains of the interior, have found refuge in the previously almost impenetrable valleys of Lebanon, where they could worship and live unmolested from outside. The various communities which have established themselves there have usually respected one another's beliefs and ways. There have been tension and suspicion between them, but in normal times they have lived peaceably together. It is true that for generations Lebanon was torn by internal strife, but it was the strife of factions and families. It was only for a short time during the nineteenth century that it took the form of a religious war, and even then the fundamental causes were social and political rather than religious.

The Lebanese tradition was also one of autonomy. Caliphs, Crusading rulers and Ottoman Sultans alike refrained from demanding more from Lebanon than tribute and the formal recognition of their suzerainty. They left the internal affairs of the Mountain to the care of local dynasts, more often than not members of local landowning families. Often Lebanon was partitioned between more than one of these dynasts; but on occasion a ruler succeeded in uniting the whole Mountain and even in extending his sway beyond it. His rule over the Lebanese, however, was never absolute. The social organization was feudal. In principle and sometimes in fact the ruler of the Mountain was elected by the feudal lords; and although this principle was not always observed, and the principate tended to become hereditary in a great family such as the Maanis or Shihabis, even the strongest member of such a dynasty would hesitate before interfering with the estates of the great landowners. As in medieval Europe, when the political power was in weak hands the pretensions and rivalries of feudal lords led to civil war and chaos. It was not until the nineteenth century that this feudal organization began to break up.

This much is true of the whole Mountain. Among the Maronites however the tradition was enriched by several other strands. It was a tradition of clericalism. More even than other Syrian sects they were dominated by their clergy. The priests were national leaders, the centre around which turned the struggle of the community to survive and retain its identity; and the Maronite Patriarch, the only Patriarch residing in Lebanon itself, was a temporal as well as a spiritual power in the northern portion of the Mountain.



Again, there was the traditional attachment of the Maronites to France. This is dealt with elsewhere,¹ and its effects upon French sentiment are discussed. It had equally great effects upon Maronite sentiment. It affected the modern form of their political consciousness ; it also gave them the assurance that Western Christendom had not forgotten them, and thus helped them to resist better than other Eastern Christian sects the temptations to despair and to Islamization to which their position laid them open. Some of them went so far as to adopt French as their native language ; in Beirut to-day there are a number of interesting Lebanese Christian writers who use French as their medium of expression.

In the last few generations certain new factors have arisen to add their weight to that of tradition. The first of them is the rapid advance which the Lebanese have made in the assimilation of Western culture : Western schools were established earlier in Lebanon than in the interior of Syria, more Lebanese than Syrians emigrated to the New World, and Christians were in general more eager and able to understand the West and to become part of it than the Moslems. In many ways, although perhaps not in all, the Lebanese are the most Westernized of the Arabic-speaking peoples.

The growth of Arab nationalism has also affected Lebanese political thought. There were Lebanese, both Christians and Druzes, among the founders of the nationalist movement, and still are among its most enthusiastic supporters. But very many Lebanese, even those who favour Arab unity and independence in principle, cannot help doubting whether Lebanon will gain anything from becoming part of a larger unit, the other parts of which are less advanced. Others, while conscious of themselves as in some sense Arabs and Orientals, also believe that the Lebanese tradition, different from although not necessarily exclusive of the Arab tradition, is worth preserving.

In addition to these developments, the revival of Christian thought which was mentioned in Chapter IV has influenced certain elements among the Lebanese. It has led them to regard Lebanon not primarily as the western frontier of the Arab world but as the eastern frontier of Christendom ; and to ask, as the first and most profound of the political questions which face them, what are the conditions which will make

¹ See Chapter VIII.

it possible for the Lebanese most fruitfully to perform their duty to Christendom.

Finally, the establishment of the French Mandate, and the tension which has existed between the mandatory authorities and the bulk of the population, have placed a number of difficult choices before those communities which have a special connexion with the French. Should they cling to the French connexion even at the cost of a deep estrangement from the rest of the population of Syria and Lebanon? Should they throw in their lot with their fellow-countrymen even at the cost of abandoning their connexion with France? Can a middle way be found between these two difficult paths?

7

Thought about these problems, at different levels of profundity, has led the inhabitants of the Mountain to a number of alternative conceptions of the nature of Lebanon. These conceptions are often expressed in the form of historical or ethnological answers to the question whether the Lebanese are or are not Arabs; for example, there is a school of thought which emphasizes their Phœnician origin. At the basis of them, however, there is something more than an assertion of fact; there is a view of the function which Lebanon should perform, an answer to the question what her relations should be with the West and with the Arabs.

There are some who do not regard Lebanon as possessing a special mission. For them the Lebanese are simply a branch of the Arab people, distinguished from the other branches by nothing of political significance; their destiny is indistinguishable from that of the Arab people as a whole. Others do not go quite so far. They admit that history and tradition give Lebanon a slightly different character from the other Arab regions; but they do not regard this difference as forming the basis of a special mission or destiny in the present. It is nothing but a relic of a past age, an obstacle to be overcome before the Lebanese can fulfil their true function, which in the view of this as of the first group is to become a full part of the Arab people.

A third group believes in a special function for Lebanon, but a restricted one. It is to continue to provide an asylum for those whose religious loyalties or racial origins make it difficult for them to live in neighbouring regions. This,

although a noble conception, is also a limited one : first because it can only be actualized under perpetual foreign protection or guarantee, since the hills and valleys of Lebanon no longer render her immune from interference ; and secondly, because it offers to the communities who seek refuge in her no ideal except to be left alone and to live on the margin of history, and no common aim except that of defence.

A more positive conception is that of those Christians who realize that Lebanon's being largely Christian and her being more advanced than the surrounding countries impose upon her peculiar and positive duties. There are some who maintain that Lebanon should become fully a part of the Western Christian world and that she should not be politically or in any other way a part of the Arab world, although she must retain close and friendly relations with that world. For them the ideal in the political as in other spheres is that Lebanon should be self-subsistent, but if that is impossible they would wish her to be dependent upon a Christian European State rather than be part of a Moslem Arab State.

Finally there are some who wish Lebanon to remain Christian without at the same time ceasing to be Arab. The specific duty of the Lebanese is a duty at the same time to the Christian West and to the Arabs : it is to serve as a centre from which Christian and in general Western influences can radiate to Arab Asia. If they are to perform this duty, the Lebanese must form an integral part of the Arab world, politically as in other ways, but receive a special position and special treatment inside that world. They also need the help of some Western State or institution which will take in them an interest other than purely political and self-regarding, though they must avoid becoming the clients of a Western State in a way which will alienate them from the rest of the Arab people.

The differences between these five conceptions are not closely related with the differences between the sects. Roughly however, and with considerable reservations, it may be said that the first two views are held by many of the younger generation of the Druzes and Greek Orthodox Christians, but by fewer of the Maronites ; the third view by those, to whatever sect they belong, who are deeply suspicious of the Sunni Moslems and at the same time conscious of their own weakness. The fourth and fifth views are of course

held only by Christians : the fourth by many of the Maronites, the fifth by those who have been moved by the nationalist sentiment without trying to make it a substitute for religious belief.

Probably the majority of French missionaries and officials in the last generation have professed the third or fourth views : that is to say, they have regarded Arabism as primarily an Islamic movement in which the Christians can have no place, and thus they have tried to make Lebanon into a place where the Christians can at least be safe and can perhaps even build up a national life of their own. Their attitude is determined partly by religious belief, partly by a sense of France's historic obligations and partly by a certain conception of French interests. As for the third party to the question, the Arab nationalists in Syria and the other Arab countries, they believe that Lebanon is a part of the Arab world and are afraid of its being used as a centre for foreign intrigues against them ; but the more reasonable and responsible of them recognize the peculiar traditions and needs of Lebanon and are prepared to make special provision for them.

8

The problem of the Shi'is is in some ways similar to that of the Christians and Druzes of the Mountain, since it arises from distinct religious loyalties complicated by a separate tradition and memories of persecution. But there is also another complicating factor : the backwardness of the Shi'is in social organization and their low standard of living. Their first need is for a reformed social organization and improved economic conditions. Once this need has been satisfied, it is possible that their outlook and feeling will be near enough to that of the Sunnis to make special treatment unnecessary.

There is one community which possesses a special relation to all the rest. The Armenians, whether Gregorians, Catholics or Protestants, have two characteristics which distinguish them from the remainder of the population of Lebanon. First, they are not Arabic-speaking, but have their own language, culture and national consciousness. Secondly, they are mainly of recent settlement there. The majority established themselves in and around Beirut in consequence of the measures taken against them by the Turkish authorities

during and after the war of 1914-1918; and a large number entered the country even more recently, in 1939 after the cession to Turkey of the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, where many Armenian refugees from Turkey had settled. Most of the Armenians arrived penniless and were dependent in the beginning upon international relief organizations, but in the last twenty years their economic situation has greatly improved. They are mainly craftsmen and small traders and almost all are now town-dwellers.

Foreign in language and appearance and socially half-isolated, they have not always been popular with the inhabitants. Some nationalists disapprove of them because they are still unassimilated and because they have added another minority problem to those already existing. Their competitors accuse them, as minorities in their position are often accused, of depressing the level of wages and of monopolizing the trades and crafts to which they have applied themselves.

These Armenians have several alternative conceptions of their future as a nation. There are some, mainly those who have made good, who are prepared to live permanently in Lebanon as a minority; in order to make this possible they wish the Armenians to learn Arabic, to prove themselves good citizens and to co-operate with the bulk of the population in matters of common interest, but at the same time to retain their Armenian characteristics and loyalty. Probably the majority of the Armenians however regard their residence in Lebanon as a temporary exile, and hope sooner or later to return to their own country. Of these, the Tashnak party wish to see their country once more an independent national state, while the Communists and others accept the incorporation of Armenia in the U.S.S.R. and are eager to return and become Soviet citizens. Both these parties recognize that their exile although temporary may be long and that therefore an interim policy is necessary. Some of the Tashnak have tried to follow the example of the Maronites and throw themselves upon a foreign protector; but very many of their party, and all the Communists, desire to reach a *modus vivendi* with the political forces among the Arabs, either with the Arab nationalists or else with the Arab Socialists and Communists.

In the State of Syria two different types of minority problem exist. First, there are problems in regard to the protection and the rights of the 'scattered' minorities, which are in a minority in all parts of the country. Secondly, there are the problems raised by the existence of a number of 'compact' minorities: communities which, while forming a minority of the population of Syria as a whole, nevertheless possess a local predominance in certain regions of it. Here the question is not simply how to guarantee the security and rights of these communities, but what should be the political status and administrative organization of the regions in which they are predominant. There are two districts, those of Latakia and Jebel Druze, in which this question is important; and there is a third, the Jazirah, in which the position is similar in some respects, although very different in others. It will be convenient in the pages which follow to treat the situation in these three districts separately from that in the remainder of Syria.

Jebel Druze was mainly settled in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Druzes coming from Lebanon as a consequence of internecine disputes, changes in the traditional balance of social power and increased interference by the Turkish Government and the Western Powers. They sought in the Jebel freedom to manage their own affairs without control or interference. They now constitute an overwhelming majority of the population; in 1938 there were approximately 62,000 Druzes out of a total population of 70,000, the remainder being mainly Greek Catholics and Orthodox.¹

Before the War of 1914-1918 the Druzes were almost completely autonomous; Turkish attempts to subdue them had at most a temporary success, and Turkish suzerainty existed only in name. They held aloof from the Sunni Arabs, and preserved in their isolation certain traits which might otherwise have been modified: suspicion of orthodox Moslems, resentment of all interference and attachment to their feudal organization and customary law. It is the persistence of these traits which has given rise to the political

¹ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 220-1. The figures for Latakia, the Jazirah and the rest of Syria, given in the following sections, are from the same source.

problem of Jebel Druze. What degree of control should the French or Syrian authorities attempt to impose? How is the social system of the Druzes to be adapted to the needs of the present?

One answer to such questions (and it is that given by most French officials during the mandatory period) starts from the premise that the Druzes cannot be treated as ordinary members of the Syrian Arab people. What they need, it is said, is firm and enlightened administration which, while taking into account the strength of their conservatism, will aim at the same time at softening such of their customs as are incompatible with modern civilization. Such administration can best be given by officials drawn from their own great families, fortified by European advisers and modern education; it would be useless and dangerous to attempt prematurely either to assimilate them to the rest of the population or to modernize their social system.

The Arab nationalists start from the opposite assumption, that the Druzes are Arabs who by reason of their history and geographical isolation have developed distinctive customs and a particularist spirit; this spirit will only be strengthened by the grant of autonomy and may become so intense that the Druze resentment of interference will act as a permanent obstacle to unity and good government in Syria. What they need, say the nationalists, is to be given a consciousness of their solidarity with the Arab nation, into which they must be reabsorbed socially and politically. Either their claim to self-government should be denied, or else such administrative privileges as are given them should be limited both in duration and in extent.

Among the Druzes themselves there are parties which adhere to both these schools of thought, some who feel themselves Arabs and support the aspirations of the nationalists for unity and independence, and a smaller number who desire autonomy under European control and protection. But the majority probably have an equal fear of Arab and European interference, since both must ultimately lead to the break-up of their traditional and uncontrolled way of life.

The Druzes may be able to defend their isolation against the nationalists and against European powers for a time; but their conservatism has other more formidable enemies. The whole feudal organization of their society is breaking up:

the smaller landowners resent the domination of the greater, the peasants are restive under their lords. A small but powerful class of educated young men is growing up which can no longer be satisfied either with the preservation of a closed and unchanging society or with Druzism as a system of belief. These social and intellectual processes are bound to alter the whole basis of the problem in the next generation or two.

10

The district of Latakia includes the mountain-range known as Jebel Ansariyah and the coastal plain at its foot. It is in some sense a natural unit, and the bulk of its population possesses a distinctive character. In 1938 its inhabitants numbered approximately 370,000, of whom 235,000, or roughly 60 per cent, were Alawis, 70,000, or about 20 per cent, Sunnis, 6,000 Isma'ilis, and most of the remainder Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox. In the town and immediate surroundings of Latakia itself, the Sunnis formed the largest single community.

The Alawis are the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of the district, who have endured a number of conquerors but have managed to preserve their individuality under varying forms. For the greater part of the Ottoman period the district was virtually autonomous while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan; but during the nineteenth century the control of the Ottoman authorities was greatly extended. Local autonomy in practice meant local tyranny by the feudal lords, who were to a large extent Sunnis. This is indeed one of the differences between the situation in Latakia and that in Jebel Druze: whereas in the latter the predominance of the Druzes is unchallenged, in the former the Alawis are in a majority but the Sunnis constitute a large proportion of the landowning class. Moreover both the Sunnis and the Christians are at a higher level of education and political consciousness than the Alawis, who are themselves sub-divided into sects and tribes and possess little communal consciousness.

Making allowances for local differences, what was said about the problem of the Druzes applies also to that of the Alawis. There are some, especially among French officials and missionaries, who believe that the first task is to raise

the standard of living and education among the Alawis and to develop their corporate consciousness ; and who believe that if this is to be done the Alawis must be given a separate administration specially adapted to their needs and under benevolent foreign tutelage. There are others who admit the importance of these tasks but who emphasize that it is equally necessary to give the Alawis a consciousness of being part of the Arab nation as an alternative to sectarianism and to a paralysing localism. Among the Alawis themselves, one party adheres to the former school of thought, a second to the latter, but the greater number are suspicious of all interference from outside and wish only to be left alone.

Here, as in Jebel Druze, great social and intellectual processes are beginning of which the results have yet to appear. But it will probably take longer to bring Alawi society to a point where it becomes possible to face the problem of its definitive political status.

11

The problem of the Jazirah, the north-eastern province of Syria, is in many ways different from that of Jebel Druze and the Alawi territory. Before the War of 1914-1918 it was largely an empty district, except for Beduin tribes and some Kurdish villages. The land was sparsely cultivated where it was cultivated at all ; life was insecure and government scarcely existed. When the French occupied Syria they established a considerable measure of public security, and this increased the attraction for settlers which the Jazirah already possessed by virtue of its fertility. The French authorities encouraged the settlement of members of Christian and other minorities who had been forced to leave their dwellings in Turkey, or who preferred not to live in the predominantly Moslem parts of Syria. In the last twenty years many thousands of Armenians, Jacobites and Syrian Catholics, together with Assyrians from Iraq after the events of 1933, have moved into the province ; and even larger numbers of Kurdish Moslems, dislodged from their homes in Eastern Turkey by the policy of forcible assimilation adopted by the Turkish Government. The new towns of Hassetché and Qamishli and new villages have been created and new crops introduced, and the district has been opened up to regular commerce. The Beduin have been controlled

and certain tribes among them persuaded to settle on the land.

Thus in the years between the two wars the Jazirah was almost entirely resettled by immigrant groups. The greater part of the population are still Arab Moslems, but very many of these are nomads ; and of the settled population, which in 1938 was estimated at 103,000, more than 20,000 are Christians, while probably a majority and certainly a large proportion of the remainder are Kurds.¹

Among the settled population the proportion of those whose native language is not Arabic is much larger than in any other part of Syria. Split up between a large number of sects and peoples, none of whom dominates the rest, and lacking the element of stability which an old-established population would give, the Jazirah presents a complex problem, the nature of which is determined by a large number of factors : tension between Christians and Moslems, and between Arabs and Kurds ; the everlasting conflict between the Beduin and the sedentary population ; and interference by Turkey and Iraq from just across the frontier.

Here, as in Jebel Druze and Latakia, there has long been a conflict between the greater number of French officials, who insist that what the district primarily needs is good and special administration such as the Syrian Government could not give it, and the nationalists, who wish to make it clear from the beginning that the Jazirah is an integral part of Syria. Of the inhabitants, the Arab Moslems are for the most part nationalists, while many of the Arab and other Christians oppose them and claim autonomy. Opposition comes also from those Kurds who demand autonomy and who are being increasingly influenced by Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds have a tribal organization, the most important tribal groups being the Barazi and Milli ; and most of them have no political loyalty except to the tribe. The majority are opposed to Turkey and frightened of Arab rule, although there is a continuous process of assimilation to the Arabs ; and some of them have a superficial attachment to France. It is only fairly recently that a nationalist movement has arisen among them, directed by the intellectuals in Damascus and elsewhere and organized in the ' Hoybun ' party. It aims at the

¹ Another estimate for 1937 was as follows : Arab Moslems 41,900 ; Kurds 81,450 ; Christians 31,050 ; others 4,150 ; Total 158,550. To this should be added 8,000 Assyrians.

formation of a Kurdish State which should unite the different parts of the Kurdish nation, now divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In general, however, the Kurds are still too hostile to government as such for nationalism to have made much headway among them.

The different sections of the separatists do not seem to agree upon anything except their opposition to Syrian rule ; for the population of the Jazirah possesses no such cohesion as the Druzes and Alawis. They are a collection of refugees, with something of the refugee mentality.

12

In the rest of Syria—that is to say, in the six provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, the Hauran and the Euphrates—there were at the end of 1938, according to official statistics, 352,000 members of religious minorities out of a total population of about 1,941,000, excluding the nomads. Approximately 250,000 were Christians, 91,000 heterodox Moslems and 24,000 Jews. Thus almost 20 per cent of the total population belonged to religious minorities, and of those 20 per cent roughly two-thirds were Christians. Most of the Christians are Arabic-speaking, with the exception of the Armenians. There must also be taken into account the several thousand Circassians, Turcomans and Kurds who are Sunni Moslems and therefore not members of religious minorities, but who constitute racial and linguistic minorities.

The members of religious minorities are most numerous in the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, in each of which they number over 100,000, out of a total population of 530,000 in the former and 750,000 in the latter ; but it is in the provinces of Homs and Hama that they form the largest proportion of the population (about 35 per cent). In the other two provinces—those of the Hauran and the Euphrates—there are comparatively few of them.

13

The differences between the Arabic-speaking Christians and the Moslems may be exaggerated. They share a language, many social customs and traditions ; they are in some sense a single people. But while this is true and important, it must also be remembered that they differ from one another not only in religion but also in certain of their intellectual,

social and economic characteristics. For example, the Christians accounted in 1938 for about 32 per cent of the total school population, and for an even larger proportion of pupils in the secondary schools. It is important to notice that 32 per cent of the Christian students attended schools controlled mainly by foreign Christian missions, 61 per cent attended private schools mostly maintained by religious communities, and only 7 per cent attended official schools.¹ Since the education given in the first two types of school is sectarian, Christians are receiving a different kind of education from Moslems, a far larger proportion of whom attend official institutions.

Educational differences are reinforced by social ones. The Christians still form a social unit, or rather a series of interconnected units, of which the relations with the Moslem community are peaceful and correct but not in normal circumstances cordial. This is especially true of the older people brought up under the Ottoman régime. The introduction of freer social customs from the West, the spread of education and the growth of the idea of nationalism are helping to make the young less conscious than their elders of their confessional loyalties, and may in the end succeed in breaking down the barriers between the sects and religions. Economically, also, the Christians tend to constitute a more predominantly urban community than the Moslems, with all the differences which that involves, but there is a Christian peasantry in certain parts of the country, similar in many ways to the Moslem peasantry.

In spite of incidents like those of 1860, on the whole the history of Syria has not been one of religious persecution on a large scale, and the Christians have enjoyed long periods of toleration, although not of equality with the Moslems. Such toleration has existed partly because of the long residence of Christians in the country, partly because they were not numerous enough to constitute a serious threat to Moslem supremacy, and partly because clergy and laity alike were for the most part Arabic in language and culture.

On the whole the growth of the nationalist movement has not had unfavourable consequences for the Christians. Individual Christians have played an important part in the movement in Syria as elsewhere. Nor is it merely isolated

¹ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 91.

individuals who are sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Such sympathy is widespread among the Greek Orthodox. (One reason for this may be that since the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Greek Orthodox have had no external 'protector' and so have had to understand the necessity of being on good terms with their neighbours.) Nationalist ideas are particularly strong in the younger generation, who imbibe them in school and elsewhere. The Uniates tend to be less sympathetic, partly because they are less conscious and proud of their Arab traditions; partly because they are much influenced by French Catholic missionaries and teachers; and partly because of all sections of the population they have been the best treated by the French authorities, so that any relaxation of French control would mean the loss of their privileged position.

The leaders of the nationalist movement have always professed the best possible intentions towards the Christians, and have been quick to disown anything which might give the opposite impression. The periodical crises of national feeling have often been accompanied by scenes of Moslem-Christian fraternization. This attitude on the part of the leaders springs from a genuine desire to create a national unity which will transcend religious differences and make them less acute; and also from the wish not to alienate Western opinion. While, however, the more moderate and responsible nationalists are tolerant on principle and by sentiment, there is a certain suspicion of Christians among their less enlightened followers.

14

The Druzes and Alawis in the six provinces are outlying sections of the larger communities in Jebel Druze and the district of Latakia respectively, and do not require separate discussion here. The Isma'ilis form a compact community in the province of Hama; they keep much to themselves and want only to be left alone. The Circassians are to be found in the Hauran, on the northern frontier and on the Euphrates; they still constitute a separate entity with their own language and customs. During the Syrian revolt of 1925 they were used as irregulars by the French authorities, and this made them more unpopular with the Arabs than before. Some of them have at times demanded local autonomy, but

without success. Being Sunnis and living in mainly Arab regions, they will probably in time become assimilated. The Turcomans in the province of Aleppo have on occasion caused trouble to the authorities by their turbulence, but do not raise any special political problem. Kurds are also to be found in the province of Aleppo and there is a colony of several thousands in Damascus. From here and Beirut, the Kurdish nationalist movement is directed. Its main weight comes from the Jazirah, but it is strong in other parts of Syria, though by no means all Kurds are nationalists. Some of these scattered Kurds are nomads, others semi-sedentary or sedentary. There are several thousands of Jews in Damascus and Aleppo. They have been treated with tolerance broken by occasional incidents : in 1840, for example, the Jews of Damascus were accused of ritual murder. Like the Arabized Jews in general, they openly repudiate Zionism, and events in Palestine have not gravely affected their position ; but in recent years many of them have emigrated to Palestine.

Finally, much of what was said about the Armenians in Lebanon applies to those in Syria. They are of particular importance in Aleppo, where more than 65,000 of them live ; a large proportion of these have been settled there for several generations. They are prominent in many branches of trade and industry. Their failure to become Arabized is resented by many Arab nationalists ; while the fact that as Christians they help to increase the Christian element in the population of the town arouses the hostility of some Moslems. But Aleppo is not a fanatical town ; it is primarily a commercial centre, and much more tolerant of diversity and less liable to be carried away by political enthusiasms or hatreds than is Damascus.

Memories of the past have embittered the feelings of practically all Armenians towards Turkey. At the time of the Alexandretta affair,¹ the rumour that Turkey intended to claim the district of Aleppo caused a great stir among the Armenians of northern Syria. Had Aleppo been ceded to Turkey, this would probably have been followed by the emigration of large numbers of Armenians southwards.

¹ See Chapter XI.

VIII. FOREIGN INTERESTS

I

OTHER difficulties which the nationalist movement has to face arise from the existence of important foreign interests in Syria and Lebanon. This chapter summarizes those interests as they stood at the outbreak of the war of 1939 ; it is clearly impossible to state with any precision the state of affairs which will come into existence after the war.

Before 1939, the interests of France far exceeded those of other States. That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon should have been conferred upon her rather than any of the other Great Powers was due immediately to the war-time agreement between the Allies for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but more fundamentally to the long-standing French connexions with the Ottoman Empire in general and Syria and Lebanon in particular, and to the sentiment which that connexion had aroused in certain quarters in France. French writers sometimes trace it back to Charlemagne, who conducted obscure negotiations with the Abbasid Caliph, Harun ar-Rashid, and is said to have obtained, after an exchange of letters and presents, the custody of the Christian Holy Places. They are on firmer ground when they emphasize the part played by Frenchmen in the Crusades. It is true that the Crusades were by no means an exclusively French enterprise. But French Kings, priests, nobles and knights were prominent in the organization of the Crusading States in geographical Syria. The ruling-class of the States was largely French in origin and language. They left their mark upon Syria in the castles and churches which they built and of which the ruins still survive ; and equally the Crusaders and the land which they had conquered and for a time ruled made a deep impression upon the imagination of France. It is unwise to ignore the historic imagination of peoples, even when its content is partly legend and only partly history.

The Crusades were an isolated episode. During the two centuries which succeeded the fall of Acre in 1291, no particularly close connexion existed between France and geographical Syria : commerce between the Levant and Western Europe was largely in the hands of the Italian merchants, while cultural and political relations scarcely existed. The modern French connexion with the countries of the Eastern

Mediterranean cannot be traced back beyond the first half of the sixteenth century, when the French King Francis I began to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottoman Sultan, in order to secure an ally against his enemy the Emperor Charles V. In 1535 the first Franco-Ottoman agreement was reached; the Sultan issued the first 'capitulation', permitting French citizens resident in his dominions to practise their religion, and granting them certain other privileges. This agreement served as the basis for that protection of Catholic interests in the Levant which the French Government now began to take upon itself. France's friendship with the Ottoman Government enabled her to intervene with it in favour of European Catholic priests and pilgrims, whether or not they were French.

In the course of the seventeenth century the capitulations were more than once renewed, and the French protectorate of the Catholics increased in scope and importance. Under the terms of the renewal of 1673, all ecclesiastics of the Latin rite in Ottoman territory were to be regarded as French subjects. The number of such ecclesiastics was constantly increasing, by reason of the foundation of Jesuit, Franciscan and Carmelite missions, which began the work, which they have carried on until to-day, of educating the Catholics of the Levant and of winning back to Catholicism the adherents of the dissident Eastern Churches. Moreover, the French protectorate began in this century to be extended from the Catholic subjects of Western European States resident in the Ottoman Empire to the Catholic and other Christian subjects of the Empire; this was a development which had no formal basis in the capitulations or any other official act. Thus in 1639 the French Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed by his Government 'to protect and assist the Christians and Catholics of the Levant as far as possible, interposing the name and authority of His Majesty wherever he judges that he can usefully do so'. Ten years later, in 1649, a particularly close connexion was established with one of the Catholic communities: a Maronite bishop went to the French court in order to ask for the protection of the King of France, who issued letters-patent taking the whole Maronite community into his special protection. In the second half of the century a Maronite, a member of the important Khazin family, was appointed French Vice-Consul in Damascus,

and the Catholic missions established schools for the Maronites, one of the most famous of them the Jesuit College of Antourah, which was later transferred to the Lazarists and is still among the great centres of French education in the Levant. Gradually the custom arose of according to the representatives of France liturgical honours in the services of the Uniate Churches.

The tendencies which had first appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued throughout the greater part of the eighteenth. The Franco-Ottoman friendship was maintained; the French Government continued to interest itself in the fate of the Christians of the Levant; French commerce with the Near East grew in volume, and with it there grew up French mercantile communities in the great trading centres of the Ottoman Empire. But towards the end of the century the position of France suffered a decline, with the temporary decrease of French influence in the world, and with the growth of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. In 1774 the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji gave the Russian Government a vague right of protection over the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.

The French Revolution and the Egyptian campaign of Bonaparte caused a temporary and partial breach in the continuity of French policy. The early Revolutionary Governments withdrew their support from the Catholic missions; and in order to facilitate his rule over Egypt, Bonaparte claimed to be the protector of Islam. It is true that in his invasion of Syria (1799) he received certain help from the Maronites and attempted to secure the assistance of the ruler of Lebanon, the Amir Bashir. But by invading Egypt and Syria he broke the other strand of French policy, friendship with the Ottoman Sultan. The latter declared war upon France; but in 1802 a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed, restoring to French residents in Ottoman territory their capitulatory privileges. Shortly afterwards the reversion to tradition was carried a step further; the help and encouragement of the French Government was once more accorded to the Catholic Missions.

The resumption of continuity was not complete, however. The creation by Muhammad Ali of a virtually independent Egyptian State which threatened to overwhelm the Ottoman Empire confronted the Powers with a new problem. All of them decided that it was in their interests to maintain

the Empire, with the exception of France, which, forsaking her traditional ally, gave almost uninterrupted support to Muhammad Ali. This was one of the reasons why, after the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha from geographical Syria and its restoration to the Sultan, the Ottoman Government did all it could to weaken the position of the Maronites, the traditional protégés of France. The Druzes were encouraged to attack them; there followed the series of disturbances which culminated in the massacres of 1860. They gave the opportunity for the most spectacular exercise of the French right of protection. With the consent of the other Powers, reluctantly and conditionally given, a French expeditionary force occupied Lebanon and remained there several months, until, in 1861, the international Conference sitting in Beirut finished drawing up the statute of Lebanese autonomy. In the same period, the conflict over the Holy Places between Catholics and Orthodox, supported by France and Russia respectively, was one of the contributory causes of the Crimean War.

In less spectacular ways, too, France's concern for the Christians of the Levant showed itself throughout the nineteenth century. The work of the missions, religious, educational and humanitarian, grew continuously, thanks partly to the annual subsidy given them by the French Government. French diplomatic intervention helped to secure the recognition by the Ottoman Government of one after another of the Uniate Churches, and in many ways to promote the interests of Catholic foundations. The French protectorate over the Catholics in the Holy Places was given formal international recognition in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878; and in the same year the Prefect of Propaganda at the Vatican addressed a circular to the Catholic authorities in the Levant, instructing them that their dealings with the local authorities should be conducted through the diplomatic representatives of France. Similar statements were made again in 1888 and 1898.

The growth of anti-clericalism in France, and the separation of Church from State in 1906, made no difference to the policy of the French Government. It is true that it led to the establishment by the 'Mission Laïque' of non-religious schools for the propagation of French culture in a secular form, and that there was a decline in the number of French missionaries and teachers, and a corresponding increase in

that of the Italians. But officially French Governments of whatever complexion recognized that anti-clericalism was not for export, and worked to preserve and strengthen their connexion with the Eastern Christians and their protectorate over Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire. It was the existence of the French tradition which led to part of the northern Syrian coastlands being excluded from the scope of the promise of Arab independence made by the British Government to the Sharif Husain, which caused Syria and Lebanon to be assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, helped to form the decision of the peace-makers to confer on France the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and has largely determined the nature of France's policy in her Mandated Territories until to-day.

2

The existence of this tradition must be taken as a factor which, even if it rests to some extent upon legend, cannot be ignored. But it must be made clear in what the tradition consisted. One aspect of it was the protectorate over the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. It is sometimes forgotten that it had also another aspect, friendship with the ruling power of the Empire. These two aspects, moreover, were not unconnected with one another. It was only because France was the traditional friend of the Sultan that she was able to intervene successfully with him in favour of his Catholic subjects; and it was not an accident that when France temporarily severed her friendship with the Sultan, and gave her assistance to Muhammad Ali, the attitude of the Sultan's Government towards the Eastern Christians became more unfavourable than it had been.

There is no room in this essay to discuss what historical rights are, and whether they exist. What must be emphasized is that the historic connexion summarized above, together with the legends and associations which cling to it, have helped to determine the emotional attitude of the French public to Syria and Lebanon, and thus to mould French policy. It is not only Catholics who attach value to the French tradition in the Levant; it is in some degree all those to whom history and tradition have meaning.

The foremost interest of France was to preserve the sympathy and affection which her long protection of the Christians had won for her among them. The Catholic Christians were the only wholeheartedly pro-French element in the population of the Mandated Territories, and their friendship was an asset too valuable to be given up. It was largely in order to strengthen their position and to reward their fidelity that the State of Greater Lebanon was created at the beginning of the period of French occupation;¹ this may or may not have been a wise method of attaining the desired end, but the considerations which led to its adoption must always have had weight with any French Government, whatever its political complexion and its general policy in regard to the Mandated Territories.

In the years between the two wars, France came to regard herself as having special obligations not only to the Catholic Christians but to all the minorities, and especially to the Druze and Alawi communities and the mixed population of the Jazirah. She had made articulate the corporate consciousness of these groups, where she had not created it; and she had given expression to it in her administrative organization. She could not therefore ignore the effects which her policy might have upon their relations with the remainder of the population. More particularly, she had to take into account that the nationalists suspected her of having fostered particularist feelings both in order to weaken the sentiment of national unity and to use them as an excuse for delaying the grant of independence. Some of the resentment which they felt towards France was directed towards the minorities, and especially those of them who were traditionally attached to France. Frenchmen who realized this feared that should French influence be wholly withdrawn, this might have had serious consequences for some at least of the minorities, and maintained that it was therefore both an interest and an obligation for France so far as possible to ensure the safety of her protégés and friends after the termination of the Mandate no less than while it was still in force.

It must be added that not all these minorities reciprocated the feelings which France had or claimed to have for them;

¹ See Chapter IX.

some recognized 'foreign protection' as a gift too dangerous to be accepted.

4

Sympathy for France depended not only upon her special links with certain elements in the population, but also upon the hold of French culture over the educated classes. Most educated people of whatever religion speak French ; many know it as well as they know Arabic, and there are some, mainly among the Catholics, for whom it has replaced Arabic as their native language. French books are widely read, French social customs copied, and there are many who have travelled or studied in France and have a profound affection for the country, its people and its way of life.

It is the Catholic missions, working through schools and other institutions, which have played the largest part in winning Syria and Lebanon for French civilization. The mission-schools and colleges and the Université de S. Joseph in Beirut have always concentrated on imparting to their students a mastery of the French language, even if that should involve neglect of the teaching of Arabic. The majority of those who possess any understanding of European culture have been trained by the Jesuits, the Franciscans or other missionaries ; and so long as the Catholic schools continue to provide the best intellectual education which the country can offer, there is no need to fear for the position of French culture. The social work carried out by the missions must also be mentioned ; they have borne on their shoulders a great part of the work of alleviating social conditions, and have deserved the gratitude of those who care for social justice. Thus all French Governments, clerical or anti-clerical, regarded it as essential to maintain for the missions their right of unrestricted activity.

Long before the beginning of the French occupation, the Governments of France, seeing more clearly than some others the political significance of cultural ties, set themselves to preserve and extend the predominance of French civilization. The institution of the Mandate gave greater freedom for their efforts. In some ways the position of French culture was improved in the years between the two wars. French was one of the official languages and knowledge of it was an indispensable qualification for holding most of the higher

offices in the administration. The organization and procedure of the law-courts was based upon French models, and the system of laws which they dispensed, although basically Islamic, was deeply influenced by the French codes. French was the main foreign language taught in official schools, and the official system of examinations was adapted from that of France. (This was one of the considerations which led certain sections of French opinion to oppose the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. Although the exchange of letters attached to the Treaty contained guarantees for the preservation of French cultural influences and provided for the recruitment of foreign officials and advisers from France in preference to any other country, the critics regarded the termination of the Mandate as likely to bring to an end the supremacy of French culture in Syria and Lebanon.)

In spite of the efforts of the French Government, however, it is probable that twenty years of French rule harmed rather than helped the position of French culture. The political grievances and discontents of those years, and the almost continuous opposition of the greater part of the Syrian and Lebanese people to their French masters, shook the ascendancy of France over men's spirits. In 1939 there were more who spoke French than there had been in 1918, but perhaps fewer who loved and believed in France.

5

France's economic interests in her Mandated Territories, although not of first-rate importance, nevertheless were not negligible. There were only a few thousand private French citizens resident in the country, and comparatively little landed property was in French hands; Syria and Lebanon had never been looked upon as regions for settlement. The total value of French investments was of the order of magnitude of one milliard francs; it had not increased to any great extent since before the War of 1914-1918. Most of it was invested in public utilities: the railways, the port of Beirut, electric power, waterworks and so on. A French company also held the monopoly for the production of tobacco. In fact, almost all public concessions of importance had been given to companies wholly or mainly French in ownership. About one-tenth of the total investment was sunk in the railways, almost all of which were controlled by the 'Damas-

Hama et Prolongement ' (D.H.P.) company. Since 1925 this company had had an agreement with the local Governments by which the latter made good any losses incurred by the company in the working of the railways, and received a progressive share of any profits which were made.

There were a number of French financial institutions with interests in the Mandated Territories. The bank of issue, the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, had its headquarters in Paris, and of its 25½ million francs of share-capital over 20 millions were in French hands, while twelve out of its sixteen directors were French, the remainder being Syrians and Lebanese. By an agreement made in 1924 and subsequently renewed, the Banque was given the exclusive right of issuing Syro-Lebanese currency. It also performed the functions of an ordinary commercial bank. In addition, a great deal of commercial banking, mortgage and land-credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie and the Compagnie Algérienne.

In 1938 France imported goods of greater value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine ; and she exported to them goods of greater value than did any other country except Great Britain. The total value of her imports from them was 105,894,000 francs. The main articles which she imported were vegetables and fruits ; she did not obtain from the Levant States any important raw materials for her industries. She exported to them 197,818,000 francs worth of goods, including large quantities of iron and iron goods, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods.¹

The Mandated Territories were also important for French commerce as providing a link in France's communications with her Far Eastern possessions : the civil air-ports were used as stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China. Moreover, one of the two pipe-lines through which the oil of Iraq is conveyed to the Mediterranean passes through Syria and Lebanon to reach the sea at Tripoli. This was of dual importance to France : first because French interests owned 23½ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and secondly because France obtained between one-third and one-half of her total oil-supply from Iraq, by

¹ For detailed figures, see Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, p. 203.

way of Tripoli and Haifa. There was a possibility that Syria might in the future come to be more important still to France ; oil-prospecting had been going on in the Jazirah for some years, and in 1940 an agreement was concluded for the exploitation of oil discovered there between the Syrian Government and Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

One more economic factor which could not be left out of account was the immense cost to France of her occupation of Syria and Lebanon. There was first the expense involved in installing herself in Syria and Lebanon : her participation in the Eastern Campaign during the last war and her conflict with Faisal after it. Even more important than these were the expenses of the civil and military administration of the Mandate. According to an official estimate, by 1936 the Mandate had cost France 4,843 million francs, of which the military expenditure accounted for 4,300 millions and the civil for 543.¹ By Article 15 of the Mandate France was entitled, once an organic law had been framed, to ask the national Government to whom she was handing over responsibility for repayment of the expenses she had incurred in performing her duties as Mandatory Power.

6

The primary strategic purposes which France hoped to fulfil by her presence in Syria and Lebanon were the maintenance of her position as a Mediterranean Power, on a level with Great Britain and Italy ; the protection of her maritime and air routes to the Far East ; and the defence of the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli, through which she derived a large proportion of the oil needed by her armed forces. None of these objects was capable of achievement by France alone, but only by France in conjunction with Great Britain, the dominant foreign Power in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq ; the Levant States were only of first-class strategic value to France in so far as the possibility existed of a co-ordinated Franco-British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it was an essential French interest to pursue in the Levant a policy similar in the most important respects to that pursued by Great Britain ; this was normally recognized by French

¹ G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre D'Etude de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939), p. 22.

Governments, however suspicious their representatives in the East might be of the activities of the British in the neighbouring countries.

The attainment of the strategic objects mentioned above did not necessarily involve the permanent military occupation of the whole of the Mandated Territories. This was recognized by the French Government in the Treaties of 1936, which provided for the unrestricted use of Lebanese territory and waters by French forces, but also for the complete withdrawal of land-forces from Syria after a transitional period, and the retention on Syrian soil of two air-bases alone. Even this was perhaps more than was absolutely essential. It would perhaps have been enough for France to retain control of the naval base of Beirut, the terminus of the pipe-line at Tripoli and an air-base, and to have in addition the assurance of the alliance and co-operation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should war break out.

7

One other political interest of France must be mentioned. She was the dominant Power in North West Africa, of which the majority of the inhabitants are Arabic-speaking Moslems. One of her motives for occupying Syria had been the desire to control so important a centre of Arab and Moslem opinion ; and in framing her policy in Syria and Lebanon, she had always to take into account the repercussions it was likely to have in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis. To repress nationalism in the Levant might have caused unrest in North Africa ; but to concede everything to nationalism in the Levant might have strengthened the demand for similar concessions in North Africa, where it would have been more difficult for France to grant them.

8

Thus any French Government which wished to preserve the essential interests of France felt bound to pursue a policy in Syria and Lebanon which would serve : (i) to protect the Catholic and other Christian communities, in accordance with the French tradition in the Levant, and also the other minorities ; (ii) to safeguard the work of the missions and the position of French culture in Syria and Lebanon ; (iii) to assure her control over at least one naval and one air base, and

perhaps over other strategic points as well ; (iv) to conform with her general policy in the other Arab and Moslem territories which she controlled ; (v) to conform with British policy in the surrounding Arab countries ; and (vi) to safeguard her investments, her commercial interests, and her access to the oil of Iraq, by means of the pipe-line to Tripoli, and also to the oil of Syria itself if it should prove to be worth exploiting.

9

Great Britain had no direct interests of great significance in Syria and Lebanon. Her trade with those countries was important for them, but only of small value for her ; and her investments were negligible. There were a few British missionary schools, but for the most part British missions had restricted their activities to the British Mandated Territories, leaving Protestant missionary work in the French area to the Americans. The British Government had never in recent times regarded the country as falling within its sphere of interest, although during the Eastern crisis of the 1870's Disraeli had considered the possibility of occupying Alexandretta, but rejected it in favour of Cyprus.

Such interest as Great Britain possessed in Syria and Lebanon sprang from her position first as a Mediterranean Power and secondly as the Western Power having the closest connexion with a great part of the Arab world. An unfriendly Power in possession of naval, military and air bases in Syria or Lebanon would have been able to threaten the key points of the British strategic system in the Eastern Mediterranean : the naval bases at Haifa and Alexandria, the Suez Canal, the air and land routes from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the oil-wells of Iraq and Persia and the pipe-line from Kirkuk to Haifa. For Great Britain it was therefore necessary either that the strong points in Syria and Lebanon should be under British control or that they should be in the hands of a Government, indigenous or foreign, which was likely to be on the same side as the British Government in any major international issue which might arise.

Her position, both as a Mediterranean sea-power and as paramount Power in India, had led Great Britain to extend her political influence over the greater part of Arab Asia as well as Egypt. She had therefore been brought face to

face with Arab nationalism, and had been compelled to work out a policy towards it. Thus she could not be indifferent to trends of political opinion and activity in Damascus and Beirut, two of the main centres of Arab nationalism ; the more so because of the part which Syrian and Lebanese teachers were playing in moulding the minds of the young and spreading the nationalist gospel in all parts of Arab Asia. Further, Great Britain's interests were affected by the policy adopted towards Arab nationalism by the Government or Governments in control of Syria and Lebanon. If that Government was a national one or if, although foreign, it was favourable to the nationalist aspirations in those respects in which they were at variance with British policy, nationalist discontent in countries under British control might receive encouragement and help from Syria or Lebanon. During the years of the Arab revolt against British policy in Palestine, for example, not only individual Syrians and Lebanese but also the Syrian Government, although not the French authorities, gave support to the insurrection ; the leaders of the revolt found a refuge in Beirut and Damascus after they were compelled to leave Palestine, and continued to direct the revolt from there. If on the other hand the controlling Power in Syria and Lebanon showed itself less favourable to Arab nationalism than Great Britain, then there would be discontent and unrest in those countries ; and this state of mind might communicate itself to the regions in the British sphere of influence. If the Power in control of Syria and Lebanon were allied to Great Britain, it was possible that the latter would receive part of the blame for the shortcomings of her ally's policy.

Thus Great Britain was concerned to ensure first that the strategic points in Syria and Lebanon should be in friendly hands, and secondly that if those countries should be under foreign control, the policy adopted by the controlling Power in regard to Arab nationalism should be in general conformity with that adopted by Great Britain.

IO

Of other Western Powers, the United States had a certain interest in Syria and Lebanon. She wished to safeguard the property and unrestricted activity of the American religious, educational and philanthropic institutions : the missions, the

schools, the University of Beirut and the hospitals. These institutions had been built up by American talent and devotion, and millions of dollars had been sunk in them; they were largely responsible for the respect with which America was regarded in the Levant.

Moreover, there are in the United States some hundreds of thousands of American citizens of Syrian and Lebanese birth and descent, most of whom still have a sentimental attachment to their country of origin, and many of whom still possess property there. Apart from such property, American economic interests were not large; the most important of them arose from the American ownership of 23½ per cent of the share-capital of the Iraq Petroleum Company. An American Government which was concerned to look after the American foreign investments could not be indifferent to the political fate of a country so near to the oil-fields of Iraq, and through which runs the oil pipe-line from Kirkuk to Tripoli.

For many years the Italian Government had been attempting to create interests in Syria and Lebanon, presumably with a view to using them as pretexts for an extension of its political influence in the Levant. At the beginning of the present century an attempt had been made to challenge the French protectorate over the Catholics. Schools and hospitals had been built, which, with the help of subsidies from the Italian Government, continued to function until the entry of Italy into the war. In the last few years before the war, attempts were made to increase Italian trade with Syria and Lebanon. Those attempts were partly successful; and there were also some important Italian economic enterprises in the country, the most important of them the Banco di Roma. But the main object of these measures, as of more obvious and direct measures of propaganda, was not achieved. Apart from a few individuals, there was no section of the population which was Italophil or with which the Italian Government had succeeded in establishing particularly close relations. This was perhaps due to the belief that the Italian Government regarded Syria and Lebanon as possible fields for Italian settlement.

The German Government had no direct interests in Syria and Lebanon, except in so far as it had been able during recent years to use Arab discontent as a means of weakening

the position of Great Britain and France. The Russian Government had shown no special interest in the area since the Revolution of 1917 ended the traditional connection of Russia with the Greek Orthodox.

II

The Vatican also had an interest in Syria and Lebanon arising out of the existence of large Uniate communities. This interest is looked after by an Apostolic Delegate ; the seat of the Delegacy is Beirut, and in the past it has been filled alternately by French and Italian clerics. The Uniate Churches, which cling tenaciously to their privileges and traditions, have direct contact with the Vatican, where there exists a special Eastern Congregation charged with the affairs of the Eastern Uniate communities. The Vatican was concerned to safeguard the position of the Churches and the rights of individual members of them, and thus was interested in the nature of the régime existing in Syria and Lebanon. It was also anxious to protect the interests of the Catholic missions which undertook so many activities in the country and exercised a profound influence upon large sections of its population.

12

The main Turkish interest in Syria sprang from geographical proximity. The southern frontier of Turkey adjoins northern Syria. For the most part it is an arbitrary line, following the Baghdad Railway. On the Turkish side of the frontier there are many thousands of Arabs ; on the Syrian side, there are not only a large number of Turks and Turcomans, but also Kurds and Armenians who have emigrated from Turkey for political reasons during the last two generations. In these circumstances, frontier incidents and complications are always to be feared. It was therefore in the interest of Turkey that whatever Government controlled Syria should be strong enough to maintain order in the frontier regions and at the same time should have no desire to embarrass its neighbour by stirring up frontier troubles.

There had always existed among the nationalists in Syria a suspicion that as Turkey grew stronger she would attempt to revive the glories of Ottoman days and to expand southwards. This suspicion was intensified when, after the signature

of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, Turkey revived her claim to Alexandretta and Antioch. She finally obtained them in 1939¹; and although in return she gave for the first time a guarantee of the Turco-Syrian frontier, it was widely believed in Syria that Turkey only wanted the Hatay as a first step to the seizure of Aleppo, which before the war of 1914-1918 had been the economic centre of a large region which included much of what is now southern Turkey as well as what is now northern Syria. There has, however, been no indication that this belief was justified, or that Turkey possessed any desire to extend her rule over non-Turkish populations. Turkey was not in principle hostile to Syrian independence, so long as a Syrian or Arab national Government would be neither able nor willing to threaten Turkish security, or to attempt to win back the Hatay. It was possible, however, that at some time in the future she would demand a rectification of the Turco-Syrian frontier, on the ground that the present frontier hampered trade on the railway, which more than once crosses from the Turkish to the Syrian side and back again.

13

Of the other Near Eastern States, Egypt's interest in the fate of Syria and Lebanon sprang partly from the bonds of religion and language which link her people with theirs, partly from her anxiety to see the strategic strong points in friendly hands, whether indigenous or foreign, and partly from her economic connexions with them, actual or potential. In Egypt alone of the Arab countries was it possible to see the beginnings of an indigenous capitalism: the industrial and other enterprises affiliated to the Banque Misr were rapidly expanding, and in the future they and similar groups would probably look more and more to the surrounding Arab countries, and Syria and Lebanon among them, as markets for their products and fields for investment. Already there was a subsidiary of Banque Misr working in the French Mandated Territories, the Banque Misr-Syrie-Liban. About half the share-capital in it was owned by Egyptian interests, the other half by Syrian and Lebanese. So far it had devoted itself to commercial business rather than to the financing of industry.

Iraq shared with Egypt the desire to see the strong points

¹ See Chapter X.

in Syria and Lebanon in friendly hands. Even more than Egypt she was conscious of the ties of religion and nationality which bind the Iraqis to the Syrians and Lebanese ; indeed, the independence of the whole of geographical Syria, as a first step to Arab union, was one of the cardinal points in the foreign policy of Iraq, whose Government had been sympathetic to every movement of Arab unrest or revolt in Syria or Palestine. Its sympathy was due largely to genuine Pan-Arab feeling, which is strong among the ruling elements in Baghdad, but also to Iraq's need for an outlet on the Mediterranean.

PART THREE

IX. THE FRENCH MANDATE

I

THE principle of the Mandate system was formulated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that :

‘ To those colonics and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

‘ The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. . . .

‘ Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory . . .

‘ In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

‘ The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

‘ A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.’

The preamble of the Mandate recorded the decision of the Principal Allied Powers to entrust Syria and Lebanon to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population in accordance with the provisions of Article 22. France had undertaken to exercise the Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. Within three years she was to frame an organic law for Syria and Lebanon in agreement with the native authorities and taking into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population. She was further to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent States, and so far as circumstances permitted to encourage local autonomy (Article 1). She was empowered to maintain troops in the territory for its defence ; to recruit local forces from the inhabitants for defence and the maintenance of order ; and to use the ports and communications for the passage and maintenance of her troops and materials. Once the organic law entered into force, the local forces would be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and control of the Mandatory. Syria and Lebanon might contribute to the cost of maintaining the forces of the Mandatory (Article 2). The Mandatory was entrusted with exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and Lebanon and the protection of their nationals abroad (3). She was to ensure that no part of the territory was ceded, leased or placed under the control of a foreign Power (4). For the duration of the Mandate the privileges and immunities which foreigners had enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire would not be applicable in Syria and Lebanon (5). The Mandatory was to establish a judicial system which should assure to natives as well as foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights (6). Guarantees should be given for the personal status, religious interests and endowments of the various peoples, and for freedom of conscience and worship ; and no discrimination of any kind should be made on grounds of differences in race, religion or language (6, 8). The Mandatory was charged to encourage public instruction in the native languages and to safeguard the right of each community to maintain its own schools, teaching in its own language (8). It was to refrain from interfering in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines,

and to limit its supervision of religious missions to the maintenance of public order and good government. The activity of these missions should not be restricted provided it was confined to the domain of religion ; they were also to be entitled to concern themselves with education and relief (9-10). In economic matters there should be no discrimination against the nationals or goods of any state member of the League of Nations, as compared with those of the Mandatory or any other foreign State ; subject to this condition, the Mandatory might impose such taxes and duties as it thought necessary. Again subject to this condition, it was empowered to take such steps as it might think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the territory and safeguard the interests of the local population. There should be no distinction of nationality as between state members of the League in the grant of concessions for the development of natural resources. General monopolies should not be granted ; those of a purely fiscal nature would however be permitted, provided they did not involve a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor infringe the economic equality guaranteed above (11). Further articles dealt with the régime of extradition ; with the adherence of Syria and Lebanon to international agreements in a number of spheres and to measures of common utility adopted by the League for preventing and combating disease ; and with the establishment of a law of antiquities (7, 12, 13, 14). Article 15 empowered the Mandatory, once the organic law referred to in Article 1 should come into force, to arrange with the local Governments for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred.

French and Arabic were to be the official languages (16). The Mandatory was obliged to make an annual report to the Council of the League of Nations on the measures taken to carry out the provisions of the Mandate (17). The Council's consent would be required for any modification in the terms of the Mandate (18). On the termination of the Mandate, the Council would use its influence to safeguard the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and Lebanon of financial obligations regularly assumed during the period of the Mandate (19). Finally, the Mandatory agreed that any dispute between it and another member of the League in regard to the interpretation or application of the Mandate should be submitted

to the Permanent Court of International Justice if it could not be settled by negotiation (20).

3

The Permanent Mandates Commission provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant was duly set up, and met regularly until the outbreak of the present war. It was composed at the beginning of nine members, but in later years the number varied ; they were appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and a majority of them was drawn from countries other than those to which Mandates had been entrusted ; the members sat as private individuals and not as representatives of Governments.

Its business was to examine the report on the political, social and economic development of the Mandated Territories submitted annually to the Council of the League of Nations by the French Government ; to record its comments, recommendations and criticisms in regard to the matters dealt with in the report ; and to receive and examine petitions addressed to the League by inhabitants of the Mandated Territories or other interested parties. In the performance of these tasks it was helped by the presence at its meetings of a representative of the Mandatory Power, and sometimes of the High Commissioner himself, who in statements and in answers to questions endeavoured to explain his Government's policy.

The Commission on the whole performed its functions with great skill and honesty. It was never unwilling to record its frank but responsible criticisms of French policy and to suggest improvements. Its activities were beneficial in so far as they upheld the principle that the Mandatory Power had been given the Mandate as a sacred trust of civilization, and also in so far as they gave publicity to the way in which the Mandate was being exercised. But its usefulness was limited by various factors. Its operations were slow ; it had no direct contacts with the population of the territories with which it was dealing ; all petitions had to come to it by way of the Mandatory authorities ; and it was handicapped, as it occasionally had reason to complain, by the unwillingness of the French Government to provide full information on controversial subjects. Moreover, it had no power except that of sending observations to the Council of the League.

That the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon was entrusted to France was due mainly to her claiming special interests in the Levant. It was therefore natural that her policy during the Mandatory period should be determined only partly by her conception of the Mandate, and partly by her conception of her own interests. In so far as her policy was based upon the second factor, it was directed to two ends : firstly to opposing and weakening the growing tide of Arab nationalism, with its claim for complete independence ; and secondly to strengthening the traditionally or potentially Francophil elements, the Christians, Alawis, Kurds and other minorities, and especially to strengthening the position of Lebanon *vis à vis* the interior. This second aim was partly a means of achieving the first, but partly an end in itself, arising out of France's traditional friendship with certain of the Christians.

The claim to independence was opposed for various reasons. There were some who, while not opposed to Arab nationalism as such, were reluctant to make any concessions which would, as they believed, weaken the position of France in the world ; their thought, like that of almost all Frenchmen, was dominated by the fear of a world war and the need to build up the strength of France. Others, in those circles where suspicion of British intentions was current, regarded Arab nationalism as inspired by and allied with Great Britain ; or at least its success was regarded as likely to lead to an expansion of British at the expense of French influence in Syria and Lebanon, since if they became part of an Arab union they would also become part of the sterling bloc, and English would tend to replace French as the main foreign language in business and education. By some, Arab nationalism was thought to be essentially a movement against the West, a reaction of Asiatic obscurantism and traditionalism against the forces of light and progress, and therefore an enemy of France's tutelary mission. By many Catholics it was regarded as a movement of Moslem fanaticism and necessarily opposed to Christianity, and more particularly to the work of Christian missions in the Levant and to those Syrian Christians who had for so long relied upon French protection.

Others again, while not opposed to the grant of independence in principle, believed that the time was not ripe for it, since the Arabs had not yet learned to rule themselves

wisely and efficiently, and more particularly to treat their minorities with discretion. This school of thought was critical of Great Britain's premature withdrawal from Iraq, partly because it forced France's hand in Syria and Lebanon, and partly because the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was not thought to provide adequate guarantees for minorities. Its fears were increased by the killing of the Assyrians in 1933. Opposition was strengthened by the tendency of French statesmen, soldiers and officials to look at Syria and Lebanon with North African eyes : not simply to regard the Arabs of the Levant as similar to those of French North Africa, but to frame their policy in the Mandated Territories with an eye to its repercussions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis.

Nevertheless it must not be thought that French opinion was universally opposed to the independence of the Mandated Territories. There were many on the Left who were opposed to imperialism, who had a guilty conscience about French policy in the Mandated Territories and who wished to make amends for the injustices of the past. There were others who realized that French policy in Syria and Lebanon was bound to keep in line with British policy in the other Arab countries ; and if Great Britain chose, wisely or unwisely, to negotiate treaties of independence with those countries, then France could not do otherwise in Syria and Lebanon. There were advocates of an "enlightened imperialism," who started from the assumption that sooner or later nationalism was going to achieve its objectives in some form or other, and that it lay in the power of France only to help to determine the form, and in particular to determine whether nationalism triumphant would be friendly or hostile to France. They hoped to win the friendship of nationalism while there was yet time by concluding a definitive agreement in which France's essential interests would be preserved but everything else freely and sincerely given up. Finally, there were those who believed that France ought to concentrate upon strengthening her position in Europe and not to incur heavy commitments in the outside world.

Perhaps the best statement of the case against orthodox French policy was made by M. Pierre Viénot, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Popular Front Government of 1936, in a lecture in March, 1939. The Mandated Territories, he insisted, could not be regarded as a colony. For one thing,

there had been practically no French settlement in them, and their economic links with France were only tenuous. What was more important, their population could not be treated as a backward people incapable of governing itself. This had been recognized in the text of the Mandate. According to the conception of the Mandate, "the Mandatory Power commands and governs only to educate. Its role is that of a tutor, its authority provisional and transitory." This idea was not simply a theory. It was accepted by the population of the Mandated Territories, whose desire for independence was strong and of long standing. Unless French policy conformed to that envisaged in the Mandate, there was a danger that French influence in the Levant would decline, to be replaced by that of Italy, of Great Britain or of Turkey.¹

5

The conception of the Mandate held by the French Government was defined by its accredited representative, M. de Caix, at a session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in February, 1926 :

'The idea which has governed, if not the whole exercise of the Mandate, at any rate all the efforts made to organize it, is the following: the Mandate is a provisional system designed to enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. This presupposes that the Mandatory Power will gradually create native organizations in the mandated territory, such as may, when complete, be able to ensure entirely the government of the country and such as may, if they carry out their duties in a proper manner, render the intervention of the Mandatory unnecessary. It appears from this that there should not be any intervention on the part of the organizations of the Mandatory Power in the internal affairs of the native governments. . . .

'In conformity with this conception, countries like Syria and the Lebanon, which have not one but several governments, must be provided with a native organization, not only for the government of the various States but also for the purpose of internal relations between them.

'Since the populations under mandate are endowed with a

¹ G. Henry-Haye and Pierre Viénot, *Les Relations de la France et de la Syrie* (Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris, 1939).

government including the necessary organizations to make them self-supporting, provided that they perform their duties in a normal manner, it is necessary, on the other hand, that the Mandatory Power should be in a position not only to give advice but also to correct the working of the native governments and even to make up for their deficiencies. . . .

‘Consequently, the mandate system calls for a complete native organization, but side by side with it an organization of a tutelary nature, possessing the necessary authority to ensure the good government and progress of the country.’¹

6

It was in the light of this conception that the political organization of the Mandated Territories was framed during the first years of the Mandatory period. It may be described as a dual organization. On the one side stood the High Commissioner, the representative of the Mandatory Power. His was the ultimate responsibility for the administration of Syria and Lebanon ; but in principle (which was, however, often contravened in practice) his functions were restricted in normal times to advice and supervision. To assist him he had at his headquarters in Beirut a political and a military ‘cabinet’, and a number of departments, staffed in the upper ranks by officials from France or the French Empire, and under the control of the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner’s principal administrative assistant ; they included departments of public security, education, public works, antiquities, etc., and the organization for Beduin affairs. He also had an information service composed of army officers acting under his direct control and charged with the function of keeping him in touch with movements of political feeling, thought and action throughout the country. These officials of the ‘*Services Spéciaux*’ were to be found in every district and in practice exercised an almost unlimited influence over the local administration and political life. A special group of them was in charge of the Beduin, whose affairs were thus brought under the direct control of the High Commissioner.

This was the ‘organization of a tutelary nature’ of which M. de Caix spoke ; its expenses were paid from the French Budget. But in addition to it, there were certain other

¹ *Minutes of the eighth session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, February-March, 1926, p. 45.*

departments under the immediate control of the High Commissioner. The most important of them were the customs administration, the posts and telegraphs, and the control of concessionary companies (this was important because the railways, most public utilities, and the production of tobacco were in the hands of such companies). These departments dealt with matters of common interest to all parts of the Mandated Territories, and could not therefore be wholly controlled by the Governments of the different regions into which, as will be shown below, the Territories were divided. When some organization representative of all those Governments should be established, it would take over the control of these departments; but until that should occur, they were provisionally administered by the High Commissioner. Known collectively as the 'Common Interests', they had their own budget, with funds drawn almost wholly from the customs revenues; from it their expenses were defrayed, and the surplus was distributed between the indigenous Governments.

When the High Commissioner was a soldier, he was himself Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Syria and Lebanon, which were mainly French and colonial but included a number of units, the 'Troupes spéciales du Levant', raised from different sections of the population. When he was a civilian, the forces were under a separate Commander-in-Chief, who was himself, however, subordinate to the High Commissioner. A large part of the expenses of the army of occupation was a charge upon the French Budget; but the 'Troupes spéciales' were paid for out of the budget of common services.

7

The High Commissioner, as has been said, exercised general functions of advice and supervision; but in principle the actual work of administration was performed by indigenous Governments, established by the High Commissioner and controlled by him through his Delegates or representatives in the main administrative centres of the country. They were staffed mainly by local officials, when competent ones could be found, but in the earlier years the governors were often French. A number of French administrative 'conseillers' and technical advisers were attached to the various departments; they ranked as officials of the Governments to which

they were attached and not as members of the High Commissioner's staff. These Governments had legislative as well as executive powers, subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his Delegates, and within limits of the 'conseillers': a control which at times deprived the Governments of almost all freedom of action.

That the Mandatory Power decided to establish several indigenous Governments instead of one for the whole territory was officially explained as being due to the separatist feelings of various sections of the population and their different levels of development. The first of them to be set up was the State of Greater Lebanon, which was created in August, 1920, by the addition to the pre-war autonomous Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida; the wheat-producing regions of Baalbek and the Bika'; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya, stretching southwards from the foot of Mount Hermon to the Palestinian frontier. Its independence was proclaimed in September, 1920. In the same month, the Territory of the Alawis was established in the region around Latakia. It was given the name of 'State' in July, 1922. In April, 1922, the independence of Jebel Druze was proclaimed, in consequence of an agreement for the establishment of a Druze national Government, signed in March, 1921, by a number of Druze notables and a representative of the High Commissioner. The remainder of Syria had been divided after the expulsion of Faisal into the two States of Aleppo and Damascus, created in September, 1920. Within the State of Aleppo, the Sanjaq of Alexandretta was given a special régime, in accordance with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. Legislatively the Sanjaq formed part of the State, but administratively it possessed a large degree of autonomy, it had a special budget, and Turkish was recognized as an official language side by side with French and Arabic.

This organization was intended to be provisional only. Although in the first instance the personnel of the Governments was appointed by the High Commissioner and many of the most important posts were filled by French officers and officials, it was anticipated that self-governing institutions would be established as soon as possible, and that some permanent and regular system of co-operation between the governments would be created. In 1922, a Representative Council was established in Lebanon. In June of that year a

further step was taken with the creation of a Syrian Federation which included the States of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawis, but not those of Greater Lebanon and Jebel Druze. The Federation was given wide legislative powers, exercised through a Federal Council composed of delegations elected by the Representative Councils which were established in the member-states. At its first meeting the Council elected as its President Subhi Barakat, an Antiochene of Turkish origin.

The Federation did not work satisfactorily. The States of Damascus and Aleppo desired a closer form of union, and certain elements in that of the Alawis one less close. In December, 1924, General Weygand, who had succeeded General Gouraud as High Commissioner in April, 1923, dissolved the Federation. As from January, 1925, the two States of Damascus and Aleppo were combined into a single State of Syria, of which the capital was Damascus and within which the Sanjaq of Alexandretta continued to possess a special régime. The State of the Alawis resumed its separate existence without any direct connexion with the new Syrian State.

Thus from the beginning of 1925 onwards the Mandated Territories were divided into four different political units : the State of Greater Lebanon, known later as the Lebanese Republic ; the State of Syria, later called the Syrian Republic and including the partly-autonomous Sanjaq of Alexandretta ; the State of the Alawis, known from 1930 as the Government of Latakia ; and the Government of Jebel Druze. This organization continued unchanged until 1936, when Latakia and Jebel Druze were formally annexed to Syria ; in 1939 they were again given almost complete autonomy, but in 1942 were once more attached to the Syrian State.

The judicial system was complex and not altogether satisfactory. Many although by no means all matters of personal status—for example, marriage and divorce—continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the religious communities. All other matters were subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts, administering a system of law based partly upon Islamic jurisprudence and partly upon modern European codes. In cases in which only citizens of the Mandated Territories were concerned, the personnel of the courts was almost wholly indigenous. But cases involving citizens of foreign States or their interests were taken before the 'mixed

courts', of which the personnel was partly French and only partly indigenous ; this system replaced that of the ' capitulations ' which had existed in the Ottoman Empire and of which the operation was suspended so long as the Mandate should continue.

8

The declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941 have been gradually followed by a partial extension of self-government. Although the Mandate has not yet been formally extinguished, strict Mandatory control no longer exists. During the years from 1918 to 1941, during which France exercised this control, her efforts were attended with some success, but in general met with failure.

Briefly stated, the achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential conditions which would make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society. Law and order were firmly established, even in backward regions where civil government existed scarcely or not at all in Turkish days. The improvements which were effected in the system of communications assisted this process. Good trunk-roads now link the main towns, and subsidiary roads have opened up the countryside to motor-traffic. These and other improvements have served not only to increase the efficiency of government but also to diminish local differences and prejudices.

The system of public finance was reduced to some sort of order. It was placed on a comparatively reasonable basis, although there are still serious flaws, as for example the regressive incidence of taxation. On the whole budgets balanced ; and after the share of the French Mandated Territories in the Ottoman Debt was paid off in 1933 they had no public debt at all.

The improvements in public order and administration made possible an extension in the area of cultivation. The nomads were no longer allowed to raid the settled land, and were being gradually induced to become peasants. Some of the areas which they formerly dominated were thus opened up to agriculture ; this was especially marked in the Syrian Jazirah.

For the first time for many centuries, the religious minorities were treated on a level of full equality with the Sunni Moslems in all official matters, judicial and administrative alike. (Some

of them indeed were better treated than the bulk of the population.) Special regard was paid to their needs and traditions, and opportunities were given for the development of their self-consciousness and self-respect. The effects of generations of inferiority cannot be wholly wiped out in the course of twenty years, but in those years Syria and Lebanon made a certain advance towards individual equality as the democratic countries of the West understand it.

Among the most urgent of the country's social problems is that of the archaic system of land-tenure. No direct assault, it is true, was made on the position of the great semi-feudal landowners. But the first step towards reform was taken by the establishment of a modern system of land-registration and the initiation of a land survey. Also the number of small freeholders was increased by the sale of public domain and the encouragement of the permanent partition of land held communally on the 'musha'' system.¹ In addition something was done to help foreign trade by the extension of harbour and other facilities.

A State system of schools was constructed almost from nothing; it is still very imperfect and not yet able to supply so good an education as is given by the best of the private schools, but at least it includes every grade of school, from primary up to the Syrian University in Damascus, an official institution set up in the early years of French Mandatory rule with the object of providing higher education in Arabic.

The foundations which have been laid are solid, but there is still much to be done before Syria and Lebanon possess even the framework of a modern society. Thus expenditure on public works and social services is still very small; the medical services are inadequate. No adequate census has been taken, although there has been a very elaborate and complete one in the neighbouring territory of Palestine. Labour legislation scarcely exists. Most serious gap of all, only inadequate measures to improve agricultural conditions have so far been adopted. Little provision has been made for agricultural education. Although excellent plans for irrigation have been drawn up, few of them were put into effect until the Allied occupation of 1941. The authorities had done little to provide facilities for agricultural credit, and nothing to encourage the formation of co-operative societies.

¹ See Chapter V.

The great failure of French rule was to win the approval and co-operation of the Syrian and the bulk of the Lebanese people. A large part of the population, and especially of the more articulate elements in it, was from the very beginning highly critical of French rule if not irreconcilably opposed to it ; and criticism and opposition did not grow less with the passing of time.

To a great extent this attitude was based upon particular grievances, real or imagined. It was complained that France had failed to provide a reasonable standard of administration. The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary ; while the Syrian and Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility. In consequence of this, the development of public services, even in spheres far removed from controversy and where the necessity of advance is generally recognized, was unsatisfactory, and Syria and Lebanon fell behind the neighbouring countries in providing amenities of life and opportunities of work.

The French officials, the indictment continues, not only proved themselves inefficient, but adopted a harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled. They did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony, and the inhabitants as on a level with France's African subjects ; and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs. The use of Sengalese troops first to expel Faisal and then on garrison duty seems to the Syrians and Lebanese to be a sign of this contempt.

It was further alleged that the elementary rights of the individual were denied : there was no freedom of speech, of assembly or of publication ; imprisonment without trial was frequent. A particularly widespread complaint was of the activities of the officials of the 'Services Spéciaux', who, it is claimed, far exceeded their duties and often became petty despots in their districts, and even fomented disorder for their own or for France's benefit.

There were also various economic and financial grievances. It was said that the tariff-system did not give adequate protection to local enterprise ; and often the extent to which **France's hands were tied in this regard by the provisions of**

the Mandate was ignored. The grant of all the more important concessions to French companies was widely resented. The terms of the contracts between the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were criticized as being too favourable to the Banque ; and the linking of the currency to the fluctuating franc was resented as introducing into the country a factor of economic instability which might have been avoided. The arrangements by which French military and civil personnel could obtain imported goods duty-free, and the abuses which sprang from it, formed another common grievance. Finally, there was the widely-believed accusation that the French deliberately drained the country of the gold which it possessed in Ottoman times.

The inadequacies of the French administration were resented by almost all in both Syria and Lebanon, whatever their general political views. But there was also a large section of the population which opposes French rule on grounds of principle. The majority of the nationalists always refused to recognize the Mandate, which they regarded as contrary alike to the 'natural right' of nations to independence, to the promises made by the Allies during the first world war, and to the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, which provides for administrative advice and assistance, but not for semi-colonial rule. Besides opposing the Mandate as such, they resented the way in which it was imposed upon the Syrian people, and still more the way in which it was carried out. Not only was no independent Government established, but no appreciable progress was made towards that end. Only half-hearted attempts were made to set up representative institutions ; little was done to create an efficient civil service ; what was more important still, the division of the country into a number of States, and the encouragement given to separatism and to the intransigence of the minorities, seriously diminished the possibility of establishing a stable and representative Government. In the light of these facts, the nationalists believed that France never made a sincere attempt to fulfil the obligations imposed upon her by the Mandate in virtue of which she ruled Syria and Lebanon. They believed also that the longer France remained in the Levant, the more she would gradually destroy the possibility of national revival and self-government.

Underlying all these grievances was resentment at the division of geographical Syria into French and British Mandated Territories : a division which was criticized both on grounds of principle and because of the economic and administrative dislocation which it caused. It is true that France was not wholly to blame for this, but it was an additional reason why the nationalists wished to obtain freedom of action.

10

The ultimate political objectives of Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon are the same as those of the nationalists in other parts of Arab Asia : the unity and independence of the Arab people. But in so far as the political fate of Syria and Lebanon has been different from that of the other Arab regions, the immediate objectives of the Arab nationalist movement in the French Mandated Territories have differed from its objectives elsewhere. From 1918 to 1941 these immediate objectives were to bring about a radical change in French policy and to replace Mandatory rule by genuine self-government.

Although Arab nationalists were united in desiring the attainment of these objectives, they differed upon the means by which and the speed with which they hoped to attain them. Some of them did not consider that Syria and Lebanon were yet fit for complete independence, and advocated co-operation with the Mandatory Power, the gradual extension of self-government, the creation of a modern administrative machine and an educated ruling-class and electorate, and thus the achievement of independence by gradual stages. They included some considerable personalities but were never able to organize themselves into an effective political group. Others, who refused to recognize either the Mandate or the administrative partition of the French Mandated Territories, demanded immediate independence and unity.

The adoption of one or other of these attitudes did not necessarily imply friendship or hostility towards France as such. Even among so-called 'extremists' there was a widespread admiration for French culture, and a recognition that without the influence of that culture the Arab literary and political revivals would have been impossible. Those who opposed French policy were not necessarily hostile to France ; and those who were Francophil were not necessarily free from

all distrust of French policy in the Levant. To call the nationalist opposition anti-French or xenophobe would be misleading, although it does contain elements to which those terms could be applied.

Nor would it be correct to regard the 'moderate' and 'extremist' groups as sharply differentiated from one another. They differed not on fundamental questions but on questions of means; they were akin to one another in sympathies, and individuals from the two often worked together. In so far as they were groups at all, they were groups of which the membership was constantly shifting. This was true also of the differences inside the 'extremist' section. There were some who saw no hope of obtaining independence except by the use of force. There were others who hoped to obtain it by the negotiation with France of a treaty similar in its nature and its terms to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which terminated Great Britain's Mandate over Iraq. There might be a few who disapproved of methods of violence on principle, and at the other extreme a few who disapproved of negotiating a treaty which would involve compromise and concession. But the majority would have supported negotiations for a treaty when they seemed likely to be fruitful, and have been willing to resort to violence if that should seem the most hopeful or the only way of attaining their objectives. As Chapters X-XII will show, the history of the years between 1920 and 1941 saw several changes of attitude on the part of the nationalists.

During those years, however, the nationalist movement was always essentially one of opposition. In Iraq, nationalism achieved its first objective, independence, comparatively early, and was brought face to face with practical problems of administration and construction. But in Syria and Lebanon the first objective was not so easily achieved, and in 1941, after more than twenty years of effort, the nationalists were still striving towards self-government, which obsessed them to the exclusion of other aims.¹

¹ Although the declarations of independence made in 1941 changed the formal nature of French rule in Syria and Lebanon, they did not materially alter the attitude of the population to France. The complaints which were made during the earlier period are still made, and the Syrians and Lebanese are less willing than ever to acquiesce in French predominance. See Chapter XII and Postscript.

X. POLITICAL HISTORY, 1920-1936

I

THE political organization described in the last chapter remained fundamentally unchanged until 1936. In two out of the four units the years 1920-1936 were on the whole marked by political tranquillity and administrative progress. In Lebanon, constitutional development was more rapid than in the other States. In 1925 the High Commissioner entrusted the Representative Council with the task of drafting a constitution for the State. The constitution was promulgated in May, 1926. It provided for the establishment of normal republican institutions : an elected President, who by convention was always a Christian ; a responsible Ministry ; an elected Chamber and a nominated Senate, which after a time were combined into a single Chamber, two-thirds elected and one-third nominated. Article 90 reserved the rights and duties of the Mandatory Power, as derived from Article 22 of the Covenant and from the Mandate ; while Article 91 stated that where circumstances permitted Lebanon would apply for admission to the League of Nations, and in doing so would have recourse to the good offices of the Mandatory Power.¹ Modified in 1927 and 1929, the Constitution was suspended in 1932 because it had proved too cumbersome and expensive ; the administration was carried on directly by the President of the Republic, until in 1934 the High Commissioner issued a decree provisionally re-establishing a small Chamber.

Some of the Moslem and other elements in Lebanon were immediately responsive to movements of opinion in the State of Syria and the rest of the Arab world, of which they considered Lebanon to form a part. But to a great extent Lebanese political life developed in its own way ; it was dominated by the problems arising from the extension of the frontiers in 1920. Lebanon as it existed before 1914 had contained a large Christian majority ; but in the Lebanese Republic established in 1920 Christians formed scarcely more than 50 per cent of the population.² Moreover, both Christians and Moslems were subdivided into a number of sects, the largest of which, the Maronite sect, included only 30 per cent

¹ For text of the Constitution, see F. R. and P. Daresté, *Les Constitutions Modernes* (4th edition, Paris, 1933), Volume V, pp. 706-19.

² See Chapter VII.

of the population. Several of these sects possessed a local predominance in some part of the Republic: the Maronites in the north, the Druzes in the south, the Sunnis in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida, and the Shi'is in the Bika' and the extreme south. The consequences which are likely to flow from such a situation are clear. The political life of the Republic was deeply affected by the struggle for equality or superiority between a number of communities, none of them so strong as to be able to dominate all the rest. Sectarian loyalties and sectarian jealousies thus continued and perhaps strengthened themselves. In addition, the domination of the spiritual leaders over the members of their communities was perpetuated; the Maronite Patriarch in particular wielded an incalculable influence over the political life of the country.

2

The importance of communal differences in Lebanon was recognized by the Mandate. Article 8 stated the necessity of guaranteeing the most complete liberty of conscience and worship; the equal treatment of all inhabitants irrespective of differences of race, religion and language; and the right of communities to maintain their own schools. Article 6 required the Mandatory Power to respect the personal status and religious interests of the different sections of the population. These guarantees were reaffirmed in the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated in 1926, Article 9 of which declared: 'Liberty of conscience is absolute. In rendering homage to the Most High, the State respects all confessions and guarantees and protects the free exercise of them, on condition that no harm is done to public order. It guarantees equally to populations belonging to every rite respect for their personal status and their religious interests.'

These guarantees were respected by the Mandatory Power to a considerable extent. For example, the traditional jurisdictions of the communal courts were maintained in some matters of personal status, although a large proportion of such matters were transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree in which the historic communities were given explicit legal recognition. Their statutes were given the force of law, and

the application of them placed under the protection of the law and the control of the public authorities. They were to possess corporate personality, and to be represented in their relations with the public powers by their spiritual heads. Members of the communities would be obliged to conform to the communal statutes in matters of personal status, and to the civil law where the statutes of the communities were silent. Anyone who attained his majority would be at liberty to leave his community and enter a new one ; and provision was made for individuals who were not members of any religious community. This decree was opposed by religious authorities, and in 1938 a new one was issued modifying it at certain points ; but this also aroused opposition from several sides.

3

In the political sphere the relations between the communities were defined in the Constitution, which formulated two principles. First, all Lebanese citizens were equal before the law, possessed of the same rights and duties, and equally admissible to all public offices without any distinction (Articles 7 and 12). Secondly, Article 95 laid it down that, at least provisionally, the communities should be equitably represented in public offices and in the Ministry, in so far as that did not detract from the welfare of the State.

The whole political organization of the State was permeated by these principles, but by the second more than the first. It has already been mentioned that the President of the Republic was always a Christian, and with the exception of the first President a Maronite. To counter-balance this, the Prime Minister was normally a Sunni Moslem, and the other Ministries were distributed among the different communities as equitably as possible. The Chamber of Deputies was so constituted as to represent the communities roughly in proportion to their numerical strength ; every district elected a number of deputies belonging to the different communities living in it, but every deputy was elected not only by his co-religionists but by the whole electorate of the district. The maintenance of the balance between the communities was an important and often the most important consideration in the making of appointments in central and local administration alike.

It is doubtful if the system could have worked even as well as it did had it not been for the control and intervention of the Mandatory Power. But this again was a source of trouble. The French authorities were believed to be not altogether impartial in their efforts to hold the balance, and to show excessive favour to the Maronites and other Uniates. Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the alliance between the two.

The situation just described had the approval of the majority of the Maronites, who chiefly profited by it. Many of the religious and secular notables of the other communities also did not disapprove of the conception of a Lebanon based upon sectarianism, either because they derived advantage from it or else because they could not conceive of any loyalty except that to the religious community. But the more thoughtful members of both the Maronite and the other sects, and especially the younger of them, saw the need for the creation of some sort of corporate consciousness or sense of solidarity. In the Sanjaq of the years before 1914 this had to some extent existed ; it had been based upon a common way of life and a common tradition of autonomy which all alike had valued. In the new Republic this was lacking and would have to be created. On the question of what form it should take, different opinions were held, corresponding in the main to the different conceptions of Lebanon expounded in Chapter VII. Those who regarded Lebanon as an asylum for religious minorities, together with those who regarded the Lebanese as a distinct people, wished to create a specific Lebanese nationalist spirit transcending communal differences ; and they wanted the enlarged Lebanon to be an independent state, protected by or in alliance with a European Power who would take an interest in it which was other than purely political. Those who looked upon Lebanon as a point from which Christian and Western influences could radiate throughout the Arab East, wished to encourage the consciousness of Lebanon as both a distinctive unity and part of a larger unity ; for them, Lebanese autonomism and Arab or Syrian nationalism were not opposed to each other but complementary, and they desired to see Lebanon, with or without the restoration of its

older more restricted frontiers, a self-governing member of a Syrian or an Arab federation. Those who considered Lebanon as simply one Arab province among others wished to stimulate Arab nationalist sentiments among its inhabitants and advocated its integral incorporation in a Syrian or Arab State, with only such administrative privileges as its distinctive history made necessary.

This last conception was particularly strong among the Sunni Moslems of the coast towns, most of whom clamoured either for the inclusion of Lebanon in Syria or at least for its reduction to the frontiers it had possessed before 1914. Some of them desired this because as Moslems they resented living in a State which had a mainly Christian atmosphere ; others because they were totally opposed to the Lebanese particularist idea. Yet others, while conceding the claims of the Christians, Druzes and Shi'is to special treatment, did not agree that the coastal towns had any part in the natural or historical unity of Lebanon. This sentiment was strongest in Tripoli, with an almost wholly Moslem population. It was shared by the greater part of the Arab nationalists in the State of Syria. They were willing to accept a certain carefully defined autonomy for the historic Lebanon, provided its rulers would co-operate with the Syrians in matters of common interest. They bitterly resented, however, the inclusion in Lebanon of the coastal towns, especially of Tripoli, partly on grounds of principle because they interpreted it as a move in the supposed French game of dividing and weakening the Arabs, and partly because they did not like to see Tripoli and Beirut, two of the natural ports of Damascus, in any hands except their own.

For the most part these differences of opinion did not embody themselves in organized parties. The parties which dominated elections and the life of the Chamber were scarcely more than loose alliances of prominent politicians, based upon common personal interest rather than common doctrine. They were usually so organized as to include representatives of all the leading sects. The most important of them were the 'Unionist' group led by Emile Edde, and the 'Constitutionalists', of whom the leading member was Bishara al-Khuri. The main division between these two groups was the personal rivalry of their leaders ; but on the whole the former was more intransigent in its belief in Lebanese

independence, and less disposed to establish close relations with Syria and other Arab countries than the latter.¹

5

The State of the Alawis also remained tranquil, once the rising of 1919-1921 had been suppressed. The effort of the Mandatory authorities was directed mainly to encouraging the communal consciousness of the inhabitants (often by playing on their fears); and to raising their material and intellectual level through such measures as the creation of educational and medical services and the giving of assistance to agriculture. In these tasks they had considerable success; socially and economically the district progressed. Further, a greater degree of equality than had previously existed was established between the Alawis, Sunnis and Christians. The administration was mainly in French hands, although there was a Representative Council and efforts were made to increase the share of the inhabitants in the government, as trained and suitable administrators became available. In 1930 an Organic Law was promulgated defining the nature and activities of the political institutions of the State, whose name was then changed to 'the Government of Latakia'.

The Alawis and many of the Christians were content to have no direct connection with the State of Syria, and among the former there developed a more conscious particularist spirit than they had previously possessed. But the Sunnis, here as in Lebanon, disapproved of a situation in which from being the dominant class they became a minority, and accused the Mandatory Power of neglecting their interests in favour of those of the Alawis; they, and all those who held Arab nationalist views, saw clearly the dangers in France's policy of encouraging the separatism of the Alawis and teaching them to rely on foreign support. They demanded the reincorporation of the region in the State of Syria, and their demand was supported by the Sunnis and Arab nationalists in Syria.

6

The history of the other two States was not so tranquil. Alike in Syria and Jebel Druze unrest and discontent appeared in the early years of the Mandate, and issued finally in the revolt of 1925-1926.

¹ For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

In the State of Syria the disquiet may be traced back to that opposition to the general policy of the Mandatory Power which has been analyzed in Chapter IX. The opposition was strengthened by the many administrative and economic grievances which have also been dealt with. It found expression in a number of local disturbances and risings at the very beginning of the French occupation, the most notable of them the revolt of Ibrahim Hananu in North Syria and the rising in the Hauran. As time went on the restlessness was increased still further by the instability of French policy : the appointment and recall of a number of High Commissioners ; the consequent changes in the higher personnel of the mandatory administration ; the creation and then the dissolution of a Federation. These were further causes of disquiet : the repercussion in Syria of the growing hostility of the Palestinian Arabs to Zionism and to British policy, and the activities of Syrian emigrants, particularly of the Syro-Palestinian Committees in Cairo and in Geneva. Of the group in Geneva the leading spirit was the Amir Shakib Arslan, a distinguished writer and publicist, by origin a Lebanese Druze, who had given all his life to the spread first of Pan-Islamic and then of Pan-Arab ideas.

All these factors contributed to create a strong opposition to French rule ; it was led and organized by the ' People's Party ', which grew rapidly in the years prior to the revolt. The nationalist opposition was to some extent concerned with general Arab problems : the independence and union of the whole Arab world. In local matters, its main purposes were two. First, it advocated the union of the French Mandated Territories. Jebel Druze and the Alawi region, it was claimed, should be wholly incorporated in the State of Syria ; Lebanon was to be at most autonomous within a Syrian or Arab State, and was to be shorn of the territories assigned to it in 1920. Secondly, Syria should be given genuine self-government immediately, and complete independence as soon as possible. This would involve on the one hand the relaxation of French control over the administration ; on the other a rigid definition of the points at which and the period for which French armed forces could be maintained in Syria, and ultimately their complete withdrawal. It was around these two points that Franco-Syrian relations revolved throughout the period of the Mandate.

In Jebel Druze discontent developed later and more suddenly. The Druzes were not hostile to the Mandatory Power so long as the latter was ruled in its dealings with them by the agreement of 1921. An indigenous administration was established. Salim al-Atrash, a member of the leading family of the Jebel, was chosen as Governor by the Druze notables. His tenure of office was troubled, it is true, but this arose entirely from conflicts inside the Druze community. There were rivalries within the Atrash family ; for example, Sultan al-Atrash revolted against his kinsman the Governor. Moreover, there was a growing movement of the smaller land-owners against the great families of the Jebel ; the Druze feudal organization was beginning to crack.

In 1923, on the death of Salim al-Atrash, the Druze notables elected as Governor a French official, Captain Carbillet. He initiated a policy of administrative and social reforms. They were sincerely intended to improve social conditions in the Jebel, and were carried out with great vigour. But the novelty of his measures, the use of compulsory labour and other harsh methods to execute them, and a lack of tact about Carbillet's way of dealing with opposition, quickly alienated many sections of the population.

Until 1925 there was no open unrest ; and there was no contact between Arab nationalist circles in Damascus and the malcontents in Jebel Druze. But in May, 1925, Captain Carbillet went on leave, and the unrest of the Druzes came to the surface in complaints against him and demands for the redress of grievances. These demands were not sympathetically received by General Sarrail, who had succeeded General Weygand as High Commissioner in November, 1924, and who had already aroused widespread hostility by his anti-clericalism, his disrespect for tradition and his clumsy handling of people. He increased the discontent of the Druzes by declaring that in his view the agreement of 1921 had only an historical importance, and he brought it to boiling-point in July, 1925, when on his orders three Druze leaders were lured to Damascus under pretence of receiving their demands, arrested there and sent into enforced residence at Palmyra.

In August they defeated a large French force which had been sent against them. In September they were joined by a number of Damascene nationalists of whom Dr. Shahbandar was the most conspicuous, and who proclaimed a general Syrian rebellion and the formation of a national Government. The rising now spread beyond Jebel Druze to several parts of Syria. The insurgents secured a foothold in Damascus ; and in October General Sarrail ordered the bombardment of the city. Parts of it were laid in ruins, and many people were killed. This incident led to the recall of Sarrail, but did not quell the revolt, which spread in November to the Druze portions of Lebanon. Only the French defence of Rashaya prevented the insurgents from dominating a large part of southern Lebanon and even threatening Beirut.

By the end of 1925 the conflict had reached its greatest extension. It covered Jebel Druze, the district of Damascus, part of the district of Homs and part of southern Lebanon ; apart from the activities of guerilla bands, it never spread to northern Syria. But in the early months of 1926 the power of the insurgents began to wane. The French forces, which had been considerably strengthened, re-occupied most of the discontented parts of Lebanon, while in the interior the war tended to become a guerilla conflict between the insurgents and the Circassian and Armenian auxiliary forces raised by the French authorities. After an attempt to come to terms with the leaders of the rising had failed, a French army attacked the centre of the revolt in Jebel Druze and captured Suwaida, the capital, in April. In May an attempt was made to clear Damascus of the rebels ; for the second time the city was bombarded and great damage was done. By July the pacification of the region of Damascus was complete ; and from August onwards the last strongholds of insurrection in Jebel Druze and the districts of Lebanon at the foot of Mount Hermon were gradually reduced. By the end of 1926 the revolt was virtually over, except for scattered bands in remote parts. Even these were finally dispersed in 1927. The more intransigent of the insurgents went into exile, the largest group of these being Druzes who crossed with Sultan al-Atrash into Transjordan. But most of them made their submission ; and in February, 1928, a general amnesty was proclaimed, excluding however a number of leaders.

The insurrection had many consequences in the Jebel. It prevented any further attempts to interfere with the customs and social structure of the Jebel. Its administration was placed under stricter French control, but its separation from the State of Syria was maintained. The administrative system was formalized by an Organic Law issued in 1930. Under this Law, the region was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner, and possessed of considerable legislative and financial as well as executive powers. In practice he was always a Frenchman. He was to be assisted by a Council of Government, composed partly of heads of administrative departments and partly of appointed members chosen from among the notables. All important acts of the Government would require the approval of the High Commissioner, who was also to exercise such sovereign powers as did not belong to the local Government.¹

The administration of the Jebel followed a policy the effect of which, whether deliberate or not, was to drive a wedge between the Druzes and the Arab nationalists, whose temporary alliance had given the revolt of 1925 its strength. The separatist spirit so deeply grounded in Druze tradition was encouraged, and there was grafted on to it among a certain section a feeling of dependence upon France. There remained, however, another section who wished for union with Syria.

In the State of Syria, the process of pacification was accompanied by one of political change, with the aim of improving the state of feeling and removing some of the grievances of the nationalists : grievances which had been partly endorsed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its special session to investigate the revolt, held at Rome in February-March, 1926. The change was initiated by M. Henri de Jouvenel, who replaced General Sarrail in November, 1925. He took the first steps which were designed to lead ultimately to self-government. In Lebanon he allowed the Representative Council to draft a Constitution for the State ; in the State of the Alawis he held elections for a Constituent Council to draft an Organic Law ; and in the State of Syria he ordered elections for

¹ For text, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 694-7.

similar Councils to be held in all parts of the country not under martial law. In spite of a boycott by the nationalists, the Syrian elections were held, but the Representative Councils which resulted from them proved ineffective.

The next step was to form a Government which should be more acceptable to public opinion than that which had been presided over by Subhi Barakat since the creation of the Syrian State, and which resigned in December, 1925. The Presidency of the State was offered to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the son of one of the most respected religious leaders in Damascus. He laid down certain conditions of his taking office. The High Commissioner could not, however, accept them, and after some delay appointed as provisional President Damad Ahmad Nami, a Circassian by origin. He formed a Ministry which for a short time included members of the 'People's Party'; its programme envisaged the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty and the attainment of Syrian unity by negotiation with the other States included in the French Mandate.

II

In June, 1926, M. de Jouvenel declared to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the French Government intended to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Next month he resigned and was succeeded by M. Ponsot. The new High Commissioner took the first step towards the establishment of the self-government which had been foreseen by his predecessor, by preparing for the elaboration of an Organic Law. A beginning had indeed already been made with this: M. de Jouvenel had consulted various notables on the form which the future political organization of the country should take.

In July, 1927, M. Ponsot made a declaration in which he explicitly identified himself with the policy approved by the French Government and the League of Nations and defined by his predecessors. Regard for the wishes of the people concerned had, he maintained, been the idea which had throughout inspired French policy. In accordance with this idea, the framing of the definitive constitution of the countries under French Mandate was to be the work of those peoples. The Mandatory Power would exert itself to bring about a general agreement and to arbitrate in any differences which

might arise ; in default of an agreement, it would take appropriate measures to maintain order and to guarantee peace. The Mandatory Power desired to favour and hasten the political evolution of the States under its protection, and to promote their economic development. As for the 'Common Interests', the High Commissioner would continue to administer them with the active and ever-increasing assistance of the representatives of the States.¹

A few months later, in February, 1928, M. Ponsot judged that the time had come for the election of a Constituent Assembly. In that month the state of siege declared at the beginning of the revolt was finally raised, the censorship suppressed, the special tribunals established during the revolt abolished, and a general amnesty issued. At the same time Damad Ahmad Nami's Ministry was replaced by a new provisional Government of 'moderate' politicians presided over by Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, with the task of preparing the way for the creation of regular institutions to which it could hand over its functions.

The elections were held in April of the same year. In the towns, most of those elected belonged to the more uncompromising section of the nationalists, the opponents of Shaikh Taj ad-Din's Ministry ; in the countryside, however, they were mainly moderates. Of the seventy members of the Assembly, over two-thirds supported the Government, but owing to their lack of cohesion and the decision of the Government not to intervene in the proceedings, it was the so-called 'extreme' nationalists who dominated the discussions. They were the more powerful in that they had recovered from the confusion caused by the collapse of the revolt, and had succeeded once more in organizing themselves in a party, the 'National Bloc'. In so far as it had a founder he was Ibrahim Hananu, an Aleppine and a man respected even by his opponents. The Bloc was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It included leading members of important landowning families, like Jamil Mardam Bey from Damascus, Saadullah al-Jabiri from Aleppo, and Hashim al-Atasi, the President of the Bloc. It included also individuals important rather for character and intellect than for representing large sections of opinion, like Faris al-Khuri, a Protestant lawyer, law-teacher and financier. It

¹ For text, see *Oriente Moderno*, September, 1927, pp. 409-11.

was supported by several groups which preserved something of their individuality inside the alliance. The most important of them was the 'Istiqal' group, descended from one of the secret societies of the years before 1914. It advocated the complete independence of the Arab countries and tended to be more uncompromising than the other constituent elements of the Bloc. Its leader was Shukri al-Quwatli. Among its other prominent members were Nabih al-Azmah, the Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh as-Sulh, perhaps the most important Arab nationalist leader in Lebanon.

One of the most prominent of the members of the Bloc, Hashim al-Atasi, was elected President of the Assembly when it met in Damascus in June, 1928; while Ibrahim Hananu became President of the Commission set up to draft the Constitution. The Commission completed its work by August, and laid its draft before the Assembly. The Constitution which it had drawn up was modelled on those of Western democratic countries, and provided for the exercise of legislative powers by a single Chamber elected by universal suffrage, and of executive powers by an elected President and a responsible Ministry. In addition it contained guarantees for the rights of individuals and communities. Thus Article 6 stipulated that all Syrians should be equal before the law, and there should be no inequality of treatment on grounds of religion, sect, race or language. Article 15 guaranteed liberty of conscience, the free exercise of all forms of worship, and the safeguarding of the religious interests and personal status of every sect. Article 28 guaranteed the rights of the religious communities, including their right to establish schools, teaching in their own language, subject to the principles laid down by law; and Article 37 declared that the electoral law to be issued subsequently would provide for the representation of religious minorities. (This provision was carried out. Each Parliament elected since 1930 has contained a number of representatives of the minorities, roughly proportionate to their size.)

In general the draft was acceptable to the High Commissioner, but there were certain articles to the inclusion of which he objected. Thus Article 2 declared that the Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity, which was unaffected by the divisions which had arisen between the end of the war and the

present time. This was a denial of the separate existence of Jebel Druze, the Alawi district, the Lebanese Republic, Palestine and Transjordan ; and M. Ponsot judged it to be irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law. Again, four other Articles asserted the right of the President of the Republic to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint representatives abroad and proclaim martial law (73, 74, 75 and 112) ; and Article 110 declared that the organization of the army would form the subject of a special law. These five Articles also the High Commissioner thought to be incompatible with the obligations of France. He therefore asked that the Articles concerned should be separated from the general body of the draft. The Assembly refused, and M. Ponsot thereupon adjourned it for three months in August, 1928, and for a further three in November. He made an alternative suggestion, that the Assembly should inodify the wording of Article 2 and should retain the other offending articles but add to the draft a general reservation safeguarding France's international obligations. This also proved abortive, since he and the Assembly could not agree upon a text for the reservation.

In February, 1929, the work of the Assembly was prorogued *sine die*. During this period and throughout 1929 the split between the National Bloc and ' moderates ' grew ever wider. The former, while remaining tranquil, demanded the negotiation of a Treaty to replace the Mandate ; the latter continued to advocate a policy of co-operation with France, and attempted without much success to form an effective political organization. The High Commissioner found it impossible to reach an agreement with the nationalists on the constitutional question, while the ' moderates ' were too weak and divided for their support to be of value to him ; he therefore felt himself bound to give up the attempt to entrust to the Syrian people the responsibility for the elaboration of their own constitution. Accordingly he dissolved the Constituent Assembly in May, 1930, and on his own initiative issued a Constitution for the State of Syria. It was to come into force after the election of the members of a Chamber of Deputies, at a date to be fixed by the High Commissioner.

This Constitution was virtually the same as that drafted by the Assembly, except for such changes as were necessary to

enable the Mandatory Power to carry out its obligations under the Covenant. Thus Article 2 was modified, and stated merely that 'Syria forms an indivisible political unity'; and an additional article (116) was added to the effect that 'the provisions of the present Constitution are not, and cannot be, in opposition to the obligations undertaken by France in regard to Syria, particularly obligations towards the League of Nations. . . . So long as the international obligations of France in regard to Syria remain in force, any provisions of the present Constitution which are of a nature to affect those obligations will be applicable only under conditions to be determined by agreement between the French and Syrian Governments'.

Simultaneously a number of other decrees were promulgated. In addition to the Organic Laws for the Governments of Latakia and Jebel Druze, already mentioned, they included laws for the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and for a Conference of Common Interests composed of Delegations from the States and Governments, and charged with the management of their common financial and economic affairs.¹

12

The elections for the Chamber of Deputies took place in January, 1932, and the Chamber met in June. More than three-quarters of its members were 'moderates'. Only a quarter were 'extreme' nationalists demanding full and immediate independence; but as had happened in the Constituent Assembly, the minority soon showed itself to be the dominant element. Its hopes were raised and its case strengthened by the recent conclusion of an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, the termination of the Mandate and the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations (1930-1932).

The first task of the Chamber was to choose the President of the Republic. It elected Muhammad Ali al-Abid, son of Izzat Pasha al-Abid who had been secretary to the Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. He entrusted the construction of a Cabinet to a prominent moderate, Haqqi al-Azm, who formed a Ministry of which half the members were 'moderates' and half 'extreme' nationalists. Negotiations were opened between the Ministry and the High Commissioner for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

¹ For texts of these documents, see Dareste, *Les Constitutions Modernes*, V, pp. 676-98.

The negotiations had not gone far before it became clear that there existed divergences of views between the High Commissioner and the nationalists. The latter claimed that the Treaty should provide for the inclusion in Syria of the Governments of Jebel Druze and Latakia ; while the High Commissioner asserted that, although there was no question of granting those regions independence, they were still in need of a special régime, and had not yet reached the stage of development at which it would be possible to come to a final decision upon their political destiny. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the two Governments supported the High Commissioner's contention and opposed their incorporation in Syria. Further, there was disagreement whether, as the French authorities demanded, the Treaty should impose no restrictions upon the occupation of Syria by French forces, or whether, as the nationalists desired, the occupation should be limited in space and time. There were also differences of opinion upon the questions of Syro-Lebanese relations and the retention of French control over the administration of the Common Interests. Deadlock having been reached on these issues, the nationalist ministers resigned in April, 1933, and their places were taken by 'moderates'. The reconstructed Government carried to a conclusion the negotiations for the Treaty, which was signed in November of the same year by the Ministry and by the Comte de Martel, who had succeeded M. Ponsot as High Commissioner. The Treaty declared that France and Syria agreed, once the Mandate should be terminated, to consult one another on foreign policy whenever necessary ; to collaborate in the peaceful settlement of any quarrel between Syria and a third state and, if need be, in defensive measures. The French Government undertook to maintain forces in Syria ; to help in the organization and equipment of the Syrian army and police ; to lend such technical advisers and civil servants as might be required ; and to facilitate the admission of Syria to the League of Nations. The Syrian Government undertook to guarantee the rights accorded to individuals and communities in the Syrian Constitution, and to respect the rights of racial and religious minorities. The two States further agreed to maintain the economic unity of the Mandated Territory. The Treaty was to be concluded for twenty-five years, the transfer of authority

from the Mandatory Power to the Syrian Government being completed within four years.¹

The Treaty was immediately laid before the Chamber. Its reception by the nationalists inside and outside the Chamber was so unfavourable as to make it clear that it had no chance of acceptance. Accordingly the High Commissioner suspended the sittings of the Chamber, withdrew from its cognizance the terms of the Treaty, and authorized the President of the Republic to govern provisionally by means of decree-laws. A year later, in November, 1934, he suspended the Chamber *sine die*. These acts aroused the resentment and indignation of the nationalists, but in general the country remained quiet, apart from local and ephemeral disturbances, throughout 1934 and 1935. In March, 1934, the Government of Haqqi al-Azm was replaced by that of Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, which continued in office for practically two years.

13

Perhaps the most important development of the early 1930's was the growth of a number of political parties with a special appeal to the educated youth of the towns, and therefore of great significance in a country whose political circumstances gave peculiar weight to the actions of the young. Very different from one another in their doctrines and their aims, these parties were alike in that they endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older parties had not for the most part possessed; alike, too, in that they tried to base their activities not upon gusts of feeling or some immediate objective, but upon systematic and reasoned doctrines. They expressed and attempted to direct the spirit of the youth of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and the other towns: a restless youth, discontented both with its foreign masters and with its own older generation, conscious of talents and ideas and cramped by lack of opportunity, drawn simultaneously towards and away from the West, eager and suspicious, hasty and thoughtful. Even when the youth-movements took a paramilitary form, that does not necessarily mean that they were Fascist; they were merely endeavouring to satisfy certain human needs which in more fortunate

¹ For text, see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1933* (Paris, 1934), pp. 189-95.

countries are satisfied by days of national celebration, by military service and voluntary organizations.

One of these organizations was the 'Syrian National Party', founded by Antun Saadeh, a Lebanese Christian brought up in South America. This Party professed or rather formulated the specific Syrian as distinct from Arab nationalism which has already been mentioned.¹ At first a secret society, it was discovered by the authorities in 1935, and its leading members imprisoned. From that time it grew in size and importance, in spite of the many obstacles in its path. These obstacles were of various types: the hostility of the authorities, who more than once dissolved the party; the opposition of the Arab nationalists, who regarded it as a separatist movement; and the widespread belief that the party was in too close touch with European Fascism. That it was able to hold its own was also due to several factors. First, it made a more determined effort than any other organization to think out the whole national problem in all its aspects, and to formulate a programme in the light of clear and valid political principles. Again, it was rigidly organized on the membership principle, with a hierarchy, a logical division of functions and a strict discipline. Finally, its leader was a man of courage, decision and powerful intellect.

The party reached its zenith a year or two before the beginning of the war. It had several thousand adherents, largely but not exclusively Lebanese Christians. With the departure of the leader for South America in 1938 a decline set in, but whether temporary or permanent has still to be seen.

Simultaneously there grew up a number of Arab nationalist youth organizations. The most influential of them was the League of National Action, which tried to weld into a unity the youth of all the Arab countries. Its form was that of a federation of local societies. It stood for the independence and union of the Arab world, and was not prepared to accept any agreement with the Western Powers unless they should completely renounce their imperialist designs. Its programme was formulated at a conference held in Lebanon in 1933, and for some years after that it flourished in the Syrian towns, But it was never important in the other Arab countries, and even in Syria it suffered an irreparable blow by the death of

¹ See Chapter VI.

its first President and most important member, Abdur-Razzaq ad-Dandashi.

One of the principles of the League was to hold itself aloof from established Governments and leaders. In this it differed from the Nationalist Youth. An offshoot of the National Bloc, with a paramilitary organization, the Nationalist Youth rose to prominence in 1935 and 1936. Its doctrines were not greatly different from those of the League, but the two groups wasted much of their strength in conflict with one another.

In addition to the Syrian and Arab nationalist groups, there arose a Lebanese nationalist party, the 'Phalanges Libanaises'. It was not strictly a political organization, and indeed tried to remain independent of Governments and politicians. Its purpose was to arouse among all sections of Lebanese youth a consciousness of the separate existence and destiny of Lebanon, and of their duty to it ; and to give them the discipline and opportunities of service without which they could not fulfil that duty. Although in principle open to members of all religious communities, in practice the majority of its adherents, like its leader, Pierre Jumayyil, were Maronites educated by the Jesuits. Its main rival in Lebanon was a Moslem organization with Pan-Arab doctrines, the 'Najjadah'.

Finally, there was the Communist Party, which continued to work steadily and unobtrusively among the young intellectuals and the few groups of organized and class-conscious urban workers. Small in numbers, it had several able leaders and exercised a certain influence through its newspaper and its other publications.

XI. THE TREATIES, 1936-1939

I

AT the end of 1935 nationalist feeling in Syria came once more to a head. This was due not so much to internal events as to the general unrest in the Eastern Mediterranean, arising out of the Italo-Abyssinian War ; this unrest appeared also in Palestine and in Egypt, where it led to the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a measure which stimulated the demand for the conclusion of a similar treaty between Syria and France. The immediate occasion of the outburst was the death at the end of 1935 of Ibrahim Hananu, the leader of the National Bloc. At his funeral, incendiary speeches were made ; and in the first days of 1936 a general strike broke out in Damascus in protest against the failure of the French Government to grant Syria her independence. The strike spread rapidly to the other towns, and soon took on an organized character. It was directed by the National Bloc, which issued a 'National Pact', demanding independence, equality of rights between members of all sects, national unity and co-operation with nationalist movements in other Arab countries, and the raising of social, economic, moral and cultural standards among all classes, as well as the abandonment of the policy of the Balfour Declaration in Palestine.

At first the High Commissioner attempted to break the strike by measures of repression ; for example, several of the leaders of the disturbances were arrested. But gradually he took up a more conciliatory attitude. In February he replaced Shaikh Taj ad-Din as Prime Minister by Ata al-Ayyubi, a moderate politician who was more acceptable than his predecessor to the nationalists. At the beginning of March he took a further step, by making a provisional agreement with the nationalists : a Syrian delegation was to go to Paris in order to conduct negotiations with the French Government for the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian Treaty.

The delegation reached Paris at the end of March. It was composed of six members, four of them, including the President, drawn from the National Bloc, and two of them from the Ayyubi Ministry. At first its negotiations with the French Government did not proceed smoothly, since they came up against the same obstacles as had proved fatal to the Treaty of 1933 : first, the question of the inclusion of Jebel Druze

and Latakia in the Syrian State, and secondly that of the degree of control which France should retain. The doubts of the French Government upon the first point were increased by the uneasiness of a large section of the Alawis and Druzes at the prospect of being incorporated in Syria.

In June the situation was changed by the accession to power in France of the first Popular Front Government. MM. Yvon Delbos and Pierre Viénot, respectively Minister and Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were more friendly to Syrian aspirations than their predecessors had been. The negotiations were resumed on a new basis and it was not long before agreement was reached. On September 9th, the Franco-Syrian Treaty was initialled.

The news of the initialling of the Treaty had repercussions in Lebanon, where the Maronites and other supporters of Lebanese independence demanded the negotiation of a similar treaty with France, both as a sign of equality with Syria and as an additional guarantee that the placing of relations between France and Syria on a new and more friendly basis would not involve any change in the status of the Lebanese Republic. The French Government was immediately responsive to this demand. Negotiations were opened in Beirut between the High Commissioner and a Lebanese delegation representative of all important elements in the population and headed by Emile Edde, who had been elected President of the Republic at the beginning of 1936. The negotiations met with no serious obstacle, and in November a Franco-Lebanese Treaty was initialled; it was approved by the Lebanese Chamber in the same month.

2

The preamble of the Franco-Syrian Treaty recited the progress towards independent nationhood made by Syria, and the agreement of the two Governments to fulfil the requisite conditions for the admission of Syria into the League of Nations. The Governments had decided to conclude a Treaty of friendship and alliance in order to define the relations which would exist between the two States after the cessation of the Mandate, and to settle, through agreements which would form an integral part of the Treaty, the method of executing it.

The text of the Treaty provided for peace, friendship and

alliance between France and Syria (Article 1). The two Governments were to consult one another in all matters of foreign policy affecting their common interests, and to adopt towards foreign Powers an attitude consistent with their alliance (2). They agreed to take steps to ensure, when the Mandate should cease, the transfer to the Syrian Government of the rights and obligations resulting from agreements concluded by the French Government in the name of Syria (3). The two countries would act together to settle peacefully any difference between either of them and a third state; and if either found itself involved in a conflict, the other would immediately come to its aid. The Syrian Government would give the French Government all requisite assistance and facilities, including the use of communications (4). The Syrian Government was to be responsible for maintaining order and defending its territory and would ensure the permanent maintenance and protection of French air-routes crossing Syrian territory (5).

The Treaty was to last for twenty-five years, with the possibility of renewal should the parties so desire; to be ratified as soon as possible and communicated to the League of Nations; and to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations (6-7). On the Treaty's entry into force, the Syrian Government was to take over from the French all responsibilities and obligations arising out of international decisions or acts of the League (8).

A number of subsidiary agreements and letters defined the military position of France, also her rights and interests, and the relations of the Syrian Government towards Lebanon, the Druzes and Alawis and the minorities in general. The military convention provided for the formation of a Syrian army with the help of a French military mission and with equipment on the French model. It stipulated in addition that two sites for air bases should be put at the disposal of France for the duration of the alliance; until they should be ready she should be accorded the use of the existing air-fields near Damascus and Aleppo. Moreover, for five years from the coming into force of the Treaty, France was to maintain troops in the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, but this was not to be regarded as constituting an occupation. The Syrian Government was to give all facilities required

by the French forces ; and to permit the use of Syrian waters and ports by French vessels.

Exchanges of letters laid it down that Syria would normally recruit foreign advisers and officials from France ; that the French Government would protect Syrian nationals and interests in places where the Syrian Government was not directly represented ; that the representative of France was to have the rank of Ambassador and to take precedence over representatives of other powers ; that the Syrian Government would respect the rights acquired in the name of or for Syria by French real and corporate persons ; and that the existing monetary parity between the two countries would be maintained (Exchanges of letters Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9). Furthermore, the French Government waived its right to demand repayment of the military and civil expenses of the Mandate (11).

In another exchange of letters the Syrian Government undertook to maintain the existing régime in regard to foreign institutions (7) ; while a protocol provided for the establishment of a judicial régime which should protect foreign interests and at the same time take into account the progress made by the Syrian Government in judicial organization.

A safeguard for the scattered minorities was contained in Exchange No. 5, in which the Syrian Government undertook to carry out the guarantees for individuals and communities laid down in the Constitution. As for the compact Druze and Alawi minorities, their districts were to be annexed to the Syrian State, but to be granted a special administrative and financial régime (6). The maintenance of French troops in those districts would also in fact constitute another guarantee for them.

The Treaty contained no formal recognition by the Syrian Government of the separate existence of the Lebanese Republic, but such recognition was implied by a protocol which declared the readiness of the Syrian Government to enter into negotiations with Lebanon for the regulation of all outstanding questions ; the French Government would transfer the administration of the Common Interests either to whatever new organization the two Governments decided to establish, or, if they decide not to set up such a common organization, to the Governments themselves.

The Treaty and its attached documents, as has already been

mentioned, were to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations. But there was a long process to be accomplished before that should happen. First the Treaty must be signed by whatever Government issued from the elections shortly to be held in Syria. Then it would need to be ratified by the French and Syrian Parliaments. After ratification would come a transitional period of three years, during which the machinery of an independent State would gradually be constructed. Only when that period had ended would Syria apply for admission to the League of Nations.¹

The Lebanese Treaty was in principle similar to the Syrian. The only important differences were that it was to be renewed by tacit consent at the end of twenty-five years ; that the military convention placed no limits upon the employment of French forces ; that the exchanges of letters contained explicit guarantees for equality of civil and political rights between all nationals, and for the equitable representation of the different sections of the population in the Government service ; and that the Lebanese Government undertook to carry out a programme of administrative and fiscal reform.²

The signature of the Treaty was received with approval by a certain body of opinion in France. The view of the parties forming the Popular Front was expressed by M. Pierre Viénot, who had played a leading part in the negotiations. In a speech made at the ceremony of signing the Treaty, he stated that the new alliance between France and Syria did not represent a fundamental change in policy so much as a new form which the traditional relations between the two countries had taken. The Treaty defined the international position of Syria, and at the same time ensured the maintenance of France's collaboration in the economic and cultural life of the Syrian people. In another statement on the same day, he declared that while the Treaty was modelled on that between Great Britain and Iraq, in one respect France had learned by Britain's mistakes, and had provided for the protection of the minorities.

Nor was approval confined to the Left Wing. *Le Temps*, for example, in a leading article published on September 8th, declared that by the conclusion of the Treaty France had fulfilled her whole duty as Mandatory Power. The solution

¹ For the text of the Treaty, see Appendix A2.

² See Appendix A3.

of the minority problem contained in it was satisfactory. When the Treaty was ratified, it would firmly establish on a contractual basis a French influence which the too-long maintenance of an authoritarian régime might in the long run compromise.

3

In Lebanon the signature of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty was welcomed by the Maronites and some other sections of the population. The Sunnis, however, regarded it as a blow to their aim of reunion with Syria ; their anger found expression in communal clashes in Beirut and elsewhere at the end of 1936. In spite of their opposition, however, steps were immediately taken to carry out the policy of the Treaty by re-establishing self-governing institutions. The Constitution of 1926 was restored in January, 1937 ; the Chamber met, and Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, a Sunni, formed a Ministry. But it soon became apparent that the signature of the Treaty and the revival of constitutional forms had not affected the essential nature of Lebanese political life, which continued to be dominated by sectarian issues.

A new electoral law was passed in 1937, replacing the existing Chamber by a new and larger one, two-thirds elected on a sectarian basis and one-third nominated. The elections of November, 1937, were marked by corruption on an extensive scale ; and the Chamber which resulted from them, and which remained in being until 1939, was remarkable only for the bitterness and complexity of its internal dissensions. The Ministries of the Amir Khalid Shihab and Abdullah al-Yafi succeeded those of Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, and none of them had any notable legislative or other advance to show.

The consequence of this was a general loss of interest and faith in the constitutional system as it existed in Lebanon. It was not simply that the established leaders and the parliamentary parties, the Unionists, Constitutionlists and so on, ceased to possess even so limited a hold over public opinion as they had perhaps had ; more than that, Lebanese began to ask themselves what purpose was served by the existence of a costly Parliament, filled with landowners and lawyers, wasting its time in internecine quarrels and showing no effective interest in the country's welfare. Had not Lebanon been better ruled under the simple system which had existed

before 1914 ; and was it not ridiculous, as well as expensive, for so small a region to have so grandiose and complex a constitution ?

As a further consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges Libanaises', the party of Lebanese nationalism, received much support. So too did the 'Syrian National Party', with its doctrine of the total separation of Church and State ; while the Arab Nationalists pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself.

4

In Syria, the first steps towards the execution of the Treaty were taken immediately after the return of the Syrian delegation from Paris. Arrangements were made for the holding of Parliamentary elections ; the Chamber was to consist of 86 members, 16 of them representing the religious minorities and 7 the Beduin tribes. The elections, which took place in November, 1936, resulted in an overwhelming majority for the candidates of the National Bloc ; and when the Chamber met, on December 21st, its first important act was to choose Faris al-Khuri as its President, and its second to accept the resignation of Muhammad Ali al-Abid from the Presidency of the Republic and to elect Hashim al-Atasi in his place. The Ayyubi Ministry having resigned, the President entrusted the formation of a new one to Jamil Mardam Bey. All the members of his Ministry were drawn from the National Bloc.

This Ministry found no difficulty in securing the confidence of the Chamber, which unanimously approved the Treaty in December, 1936. It was formally signed by the High Commissioner and the members of the Ministry on December 22nd.

In the same month, after consultations with notables of the districts of Jebel Druze and Latakia, their annexation to the Syrian State was proclaimed. This proclamation was accompanied by special Statutes granting a measure of administrative autonomy to the two regions. Despite protests from separatist groups against the concept of a unitary Syria, the régime envisaged in these Statutes was inaugurated by the appointment in January, 1937, of two prominent members of the

National Bloc, Mazhar Raslan as Governor of Latakia and Nasib al-Bakri as Governor of Jebel Druze.

Although the Treaty had not yet been ratified by the French Parliament, it was agreed that the transitional period should be regarded as starting on January 1st, 1937. A beginning was made with the transfer to the Syrian Government of functions hitherto exercised by the French authorities. The Government was given the right freely to prepare and carry out its budget, and a certain control over the police ; in principle the High Commissioner ceased to exercise his right to veto legislation, and the ' conseillers ' to control ministerial acts. But the Mandatory Power still retained the conduct of foreign relations, the ultimate responsibility for public order and certain administrative services such as the supervision of the Beduin tribes.

These events seemed to show that the policy of the Bloc was successful. It was still united ; it had an overwhelming majority in the Chamber ; its adherents filled the offices of the Government ; it commanded a large measure of support in the country, especially among the younger generation.

Opposition to the Bloc existed, but it was so far largely inarticulate and undirected. It consisted of a handful of Deputies ; of some extreme Arab nationalist organizations, which refused to recognize the Mandate and regarded co-operation with the French as treason ; and of the separatist movements among the Alawis and Druzes and in the Jazirah.

The hopes of Syrian independence reached their climax in the celebrations which marked the return to Syria of the newly-amnestied exiles, Dr. Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash in May, 1937, the Amir Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri in June. It seemed as if the country were entering upon a new period of national construction under leaders whose patriotic energy had only been strengthened by disappointment, imprisonment, and long years of exile.

5

The next two years saw the collapse of these hopes. The claims of Turkey to Alexandretta, the growth of separatist movements, the failure of the French Government to secure the ratification of the Treaty, the unrest caused by the disturbances in Palestine, the administrative failure of the Nationalist Government and finally the growth of an internal

opposition : these factors between them brought to an end the experiment in national government which had been initiated in 1936.

The first blow to Syrian hopes came almost immediately. It has been described how the Turkish Government had consented in 1921, under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, to the inclusion of the district of Alexandretta (called in Turkish the 'Hatay') in the French Mandated Territories, on the understanding that it should be granted a special régime.¹ The special régime was set up, and worked on the whole satisfactorily. But the signature of the Franco-Syrian Treaty, which contemplated the establishment of a unitary Syrian State presumably including Alexandretta, impelled the Turks to raise the question once more in September, 1936. The district of Alexandretta, they claimed, contained a Turkish majority, which could not be left to the mercy of an inexperienced Arab nationalist Government in Damascus. They therefore demanded that a separate treaty should be concluded with the Sanjaq. This demand the French Government twice rejected, but it was agreed that the matter should be brought before the League Council in December, 1936. The Council heard both sides of the case but postponed any decision, meanwhile appointing M. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, *rapporteur* on the question and dispatching three neutral observers to Alexandretta.

After a period of considerable tension and prolonged and difficult negotiations between the French, Turkish and other interested Governments, an agreement was reached, and embodied in the report presented to the Council of the League of Nations by M. Sandler. This report was adopted by the Council on January 27th, 1937. Under its terms, the Sanjaq was recognized to be a distinct entity ; it was to enjoy full autonomy in its internal affairs ; but its foreign relations were to be conducted by the Syrian Government, and it was to have a fiscal and monetary union with Syria. Turkish was to be an official language, and the Council might determine the conditions of employment of another official language. No international agreement entered into by the Syrian Government, and of such a nature as to affect the independence and sovereignty of Syria, was to apply to the Sanjaq except with the formal consent of the League Council. There was to be

¹ See Chapter II.

resident in the Sanjaq a delegate nominated by the Council and of French nationality ; he was to have the power to suspend for four months, and to refer to the League Council for its definitive decision, governmental acts contrary to the Statute or Fundamental Law of the Sanjaq. The Turkish and French Governments were to be responsible for enforcing, where necessary, the decisions of the League Council. The Sanjaq was to be demilitarized, except for a local police force. There were to be special rights for Turkey in the port of Alexandretta. The report also envisaged a Franco-Turkish treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq ; and an agreement between France, Turkey and Syria, guaranteeing the inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier and prohibiting, in the territories of Syria and of Turkey respectively, all activities directed against the régimes of the other country.¹

A committee of experts was set up in February, 1937, to draft a Statute and Fundamental Law for the Sanjaq. It presented its report to the Council in May. Among the various points in the draft Statute and Fundamental Law may be noticed the recommendation that Arabic as well as Turkish should be an official language, and the vesting of legislative power in an Assembly of 40 members, to be elected in two stages by the different communities of the Sanjaq—Turkish, Alawi, Arab,² Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Kurdish. The task of devising and controlling the procedure for the registration of electors was to be entrusted to an international commission for the organization and supervision of the first elections.³

After some objections on the part of the Turkish Government had been disposed of, the report was accepted by the Council on May 29th, 1937. It was decided that the new régime should come into operation on November 29th. At the same time a Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed guaranteeing the integrity of the Sanjaq, and an Agreement guaranteeing the Turco-Syrian frontier.⁴

The régime duly entered into force on November. 29th. Even before that, the international commission appointed by the President of the League Council to supervise the elections had begun its labours. After two months spent in studying

¹ See Appendix A7.

² i.e. Sunni Moslem Arab.

³ Texts in *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, May-June, 1937, pp. 580-9.

⁴ Text in *Official Journal*, May-June, 1937, pp. 838 ff.

the situation on the spot, it returned to Geneva at the end of November, 1937, and set about preparing its report.

These events did not pass unnoticed in Syria. The immediate reaction was a series of Turco-Arab conflicts in the Sanjaq, which continued throughout the year, more than once leading to the intervention of French troops and to loss of life. Throughout Syria the affair gave rise to protests and widespread indignation. It was realized that sooner or later Turkey would ask for the cession of the Sanjaq ; this, it was claimed, would mean a permanent threat to Aleppo and the whole of North Syria. Again, the loss of Alexandretta was a blow to national pride and self-respect, which had been exalted by the Treaty of 1936. Above all, the Alexandretta question was regarded as a test of the policy of Franco-Syrian co-operation. Nationalists, supporters of the Bloc and its opponents alike, watched eagerly to see how France would deal with Turkish demands and threats. Would she be true to her Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with Syria and reject such demands ? Or would she secure the friendship of Turkey, which was so important to her in view of a possible Franco-Italian conflict, by a concession made at Syria's expense ? The settlement of 1937 was regarded throughout Syria as a betrayal by France ; the mood of enthusiasm and co-operation began to pass into one of disillusionment and suspicion ; and the power of the National Bloc began to decline.

The Government had, indeed, done all that it could to defend the rights of the country ; but it could do nothing except protest. Speaking in the Chamber on April 19th, the Prime Minister stated that the League settlement of the Alexandretta question was unacceptable to Syria, but at the same time emphasized the importance for Syria of good relations with its northern neighbour, and of the conclusion of a Franco-Turco-Syrian agreement. Turco-Syrian conversations with a view to making such agreement did indeed begin, but had no positive result.

In May, and again in December, the Syrian Chamber formally refused to recognize the new Statute of the Sanjaq. To this, and to other signs of Syrian dissatisfaction, the Turkish Government replied at the beginning of December by denouncing the Turco-Syrian Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Non-Aggression, signed in 1926.

Even before the end of 1937 it was obvious that the Turkish Government, having won its first victory by the establishment of a special régime in the Sanjaq, was determined to take a second step and to secure for the Turkish element a dominant position under that régime. Thus on December 15th, and again on the 24th, it protested to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations against the electoral law drafted by the Commission of experts appointed for that purpose, and more especially against the law's provisions for the registration of voters. According to these provisions, an elector was to be registered in one or other of the recognized communities not simply on the ground of his own unsupported declaration but also in accordance with the evidence furnished by the particulars of his language and religion, which he had to provide. The allotment of seats in the Legislative Assembly was to be proportional to the number of voters registered in the different communities. For the Turks to obtain a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly, a majority of the voters would have to be registered as Turks. This would not be possible if the recommendations of the Commission were adopted, since those who could by language, religion, and so on, be registered as Turks only amounted to about 39 per cent according to the 1936 figures of the population of the Sanjaq. But if registration were to be by declaration only, and if the Turks could obtain control of the police and of the electoral machinery, a Turkish majority would be possible.

As a consequence of Turkish protests, the League Council on January 28th, 1938, appointed a Committee to consider the Commission's draft law and the Turkish objections to it. This Committee issued the definitive text of the electoral law on March 19th, 1938. It provided that every elector 'shall be presumed to be a member of the community to which he declares himself to belong'. The provisions against intimidation were also set aside. (The English representative on the Commission resigned immediately in protest.)

In May the international commission began to register electors under the revised electoral law. The process was marked by tension, disturbances and bloodshed. By the end of May the Turks had still not succeeded in obtaining a majority. Direct pressure was then brought to bear by the Turkish Government upon the French Government. The

latter was in no mood to resist. On June 3rd Franco-Turkish negotiations upon the subject began in Paris, and on the same day martial law was proclaimed in the Sanjaq.

The negotiations in Paris soon led to an agreement that Turkish troops should be allowed to enter the Sanjaq to co-operate with the French in maintaining order. The details of this co-operation were fixed in military conversations held at Antioch during June. In the same month, the Turkish Government announced that it could no longer recognize the status of the electoral commission, and on June 26th the commission abandoned work, accusing the French Mandatory authorities of systematic efforts, by means of arrests and other methods of intimidation, to deprive the non-Turkish part of the population of its freedom of election.

Shortly afterwards, on July 3rd, the conversations at Antioch ended in an agreement for the joint policing of the Sanjaq by Turkish and French troops, until the new régime should be working normally. On July 4th a new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was initialled in Ankara. It provided not only for mutual non-aggression but for active co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹ It was to be followed by a tripartite agreement between Turkey, France and Syria. Discussions upon this agreement began in Ankara on July 7th, but after a few days were suspended.

On July 5th Turkish troops marched into the Sanjaq, and towards the end of the month preparations for the election were resumed, under joint Franco-Turkish control. The final electoral lists showed the Turks as constituting 63 per cent of the total number of electors. It was accordingly decided that the Turks should have 22 out of the 40 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

The elections were held, and the new Assembly met for the first time on September 2nd. It elected a Turk as its President and another Turk as head of the State. A third Turk became Prime Minister, and formed a Cabinet composed entirely of Turks. The Sanjaq was now known as the 'Hatay'.

The effects of these events upon Syrian opinion were mixed. There were some who deduced from it the necessity of attachment to France, and of France's maintaining her hold upon the country as the only bulwark against a Turkish invasion. But others believed that France, now that she had made

¹ See Appendix A8.

friends with Turkey, would be less desirous of coming to terms with the Syrian nationalists. In internal politics, the effect was to weaken the position of the Bloc. It was criticized both for not making sufficient efforts to defend Syrian rights, and for not resigning when its efforts proved unsuccessful. The disturbances throughout the country which marked the year were directed as much against the Government as against France, and in June an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate the Prime Minister.

7

In 1937 Turkey obtained the establishment of a special régime for Alexandretta. In 1938 she secured a dominant voice for the Turkish element under that régime. In 1939 she took the third and last stage and annexed the Sanjaq.

It was indeed obvious that the Turks would not be satisfied with anything short of annexation ; and the French Government was not opposed to it in principle ; it merely wanted to delay it until the termination of the Mandate over Syria. Turkey, however, demanded an immediate and final settlement of the question.

The first steps towards such a settlement were taken almost immediately after the opening of the Legislative Assembly. With a Turkish Ministry, a Turkish majority in the Assembly, a Turkish army in occupation of the territory, and Turkish officials holding the key positions in the police and the administration, there was no obstacle to the Hatay's adopting the Turkish criminal and civil codes in January, 1939, and the Turkish fiscal, currency and postal systems in the course of the next few weeks. Many of the Arabs and Armenians preferred to abandon their houses and cross the frontier into Syria rather than live any longer under Turkish rule.

The French Government was now more than ever in need of Turkish support in view of the increasing dangers of the international situation. Consequently, when the Turkish Government hinted that only the Alexandretta question prevented the speedy conclusion of such a pact, it met with no opposition in Paris. Negotiations began in April and continued, despite a certain tension when a large Turkish army was reported to be concentrated on the Syrian frontier, until their successful conclusion on June 23rd. On that day there was signed in Paris a Declaration of Mutual Assistance

between Turkey and France, including an engagement by France not to alienate her rights in Syria to any third Power. Simultaneously, the agreement for the cession of the Hatay was signed in Ankara, Turkey recognizing the inviolable nature of her frontier with Syria, and promising not to interfere in any way in the affairs of Syria, by propaganda or by any other means.¹

One month later, the last French troops having left the Hatay, it was finally assimilated to Turkey, becoming Vilayet No. 63 of the Turkish State.

In Syria the cession aroused protests and disturbances. The indignation which these expressed was not so spontaneous as it had been in previous years, because the cession had been so long expected and took no one by surprise ; but it was no less real for that.

8

The union of Jebel Druze and the Alawi Territory with Syria, which was agreed upon when the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 was concluded, was effected by decree in December of the same year. Each was to possess a special administrative and financial régime, but otherwise was to be subject to the constitution and laws of the Syrian State. This new system was to come fully into force with the ratification of the Treaty. The statute defining the special régime for each of the districts provided for the appointment of the Governor by the President of the Republic, of other officials in part by the President and in part by the Governor. The latter was to have the power of issuing ordinances, and was to be assisted by an administrative council with an elected majority. Each district was to have its special budget, but was also to make an annual contribution to the State of Syria.² Subsequent decrees provided for the representation of the two districts in the Syrian Chamber : Jebel Druze by five Deputies (three Druzes, one Christian and one Beduin), and the Alawi district by 16 (ten representing the Alawis and six the other communities).

In addition to these administrative privileges, a further guarantee for the good treatment of the two districts was contained in the military convention attached to the Treaty of 1936. It provided for the maintenance of French troops in

¹ See Appendix Ag.

² See Appendix Aa.

both districts for a period of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty.

The Treaty and the new régime were received with approval by a number of the Druzes and Alawis ; even former autonomists expressed their loyalty to the Syrian Government. This reaction, however, was transient and deceptive. In Jebel Druze discord began to arise early in 1937, after the appointment of Nasib al-Bakri, a Damascene Moslem, as first Governor of the province. A powerful party demanded the appointment of a Druze notable, Hasan al-Atrash, and also a large measure of autonomy ; the nationalists asserted that it was encouraged to go to extremes by local French officials. There were also, however, many Druzes who supported the nationalist Government and the Governor whom it had appointed. Attempts were made with no more than a temporary success to reconcile the advocates of separatism with those of unity. The disturbances were not ended until the Governor resigned and was replaced after an interval by Hasan al-Atrash. By the end of 1937 the Jebel was quiet enough to enable Parliamentary elections to be held. The calm continued throughout 1938, but at the beginning of 1939 disturbances began once more. The separatist group accused the Syrian Government of bad faith, expelled Syrian officials from the province and declared the independence of Jebel Druze under the protection of France.

A similar process had meanwhile been occurring in the Alawi district, which was known under the new régime as the Province of Latakia. Here, as in Jebel Druze, there was tranquillity at first, and Parliamentary elections were held in 1937. But the calm was short-lived. The Alawi notables protested against the appointment of Syrian Moslem officials, and more especially of nationalist Governors, first Mazhar Raslan from Homs and then Ihsan al-Jabiri, a Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. The nationalist policy of assimilation was perhaps carried out hastily and tactlessly, the Governor alienated large sections of the population, and at the beginning of 1939 armed bands rose in revolt under the leadership of the deputy Sulaiman Murshid, a brigand who had proclaimed himself ' God ' and had secured considerable local influence with the help of certain French officials. At about the same time the visit of the High Commissioner, M. Puaux, was made the occasion for demonstrations in favour of autonomy. Soon

afterwards the Governor found his position impossible and was compelled to abandon it. He was not replaced, his powers being assumed in July by the High Commissioner's Delegate.

9

The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 effected no formal change in the status of the Jazirah, but its signature was followed by the replacement of the French officials who had ruled it until then, by Syrian administrators. Here as in Jebel Druze and the Alawi region discontent soon showed itself. There were some who felt and expressed loyalty to the new national Government. But there was an important element which demanded that the ties between the Jazirah and the central Government in Damascus should be as loose as possible, or should be severed altogether. Their minimum demand was that the local officials should be chosen from among the local population; their maximum, for complete separation from Syria. Their discontent was increased by the lack of wisdom shown by some of the more irresponsible nationalists, although the Government itself acted on the whole in a conciliatory manner. The autonomists appear to have been encouraged by certain of the local French officials; the nationalists claimed, indeed, that here as among the Alawis and Druzes the minorities would have acquiesced in their rule had it not been for the activities of French agents. The separatists were themselves divided on everything except their dislike of being ruled by the nationalists of Damascus. Some were Kurds, who objected mainly to being ruled by Arabs; others Christians, who objected also to being ruled by Moslems. These two groups sometimes but not always acted together during the years from 1936 to 1939.

Serious trouble first broke out in June, 1937, when the Kurds of Hassetché revolted against the appointment of nationalist officials from outside the Jazirah. The rising was quelled with the aid of the French military authorities, but it was soon taken up in Qamishli and elsewhere by the Christians, who demanded a special statute similar to that of Alexandretta, an administration which would give equal weight to the rights of all sects and races, and the withdrawal from the province of officials who had not been chosen from the local population.

The disturbances reached their height in August, when a number of Christians in Amudah were killed in an altercation with a group of Kurds instigated by a Kurdish chieftain who supported the nationalist Government. The intervention of French troops and the removal of certain unpopular officials restored order for a time. But beneath the surface discontent continued, and the separatists began to form themselves into societies for the defence of their rights, with a central committee to co-ordinate their activities. In December, 1937, some separatists from Hassetché kidnapped the Governor of the Jazirah, Tawfiq Shamiyyah, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus ; he was released after a few days, and his kidnappers were arrested.

The Governor was shortly afterwards replaced by a new one, a Moslem, who made a conciliatory statement of policy. It did not, however, appease the separatists. They demanded the release of those who had been arrested for kidnapping the former Governor, and also the dismissal of certain officials. When the new Governor failed to persuade the Syrian Government to yield to these demands, he was chased from the province. The separatists then drove out other nationalist officials, boycotted the administration and reaffirmed their demand for a separate government under French control.

While these events were occurring in the Jazirah, the separatist case was being urged in Paris and Rome by Cardinal Tappouni, the head of the Syrian Catholic Church, who had constituted himself the spokesman of those Christian minorities who were opposed to nationalist rule. In a memorandum submitted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November, 1937, he spoke of the possibility of a massacre of the Christians in the Jazirah and elsewhere, and made various proposals for avoiding it : that the religious communities should be given complete equality in religious and personal matters ; that an equitable number of Christian officials should be appointed ; that the Syrian Government should maintain, in districts where the Christians might be menaced, adequate means for their protection ; and that a régime of decentralization should be introduced, such as to safeguard the interests of the minorities. The French Government, which was then negotiating with the Syrian Prime Minister in order to obtain more explicit guarantees, replied in a vague and conciliatory fashion.

The situation remained as it was until the beginning of 1939, when agitation for the release of the kidnappers of the former Governor occurred. In June organized manifestations on a large scale took place in all the towns of the province ; but the French authorities intervened and restored order.

10

No sooner had the Franco-Syrian Treaty been signed than criticism of it began to appear in France. In part this criticism came from those who opposed the whole idea of a treaty, believing the Syrians to be still unfit for self-government. Others, while admitting a treaty of some sort to be desirable, were doubtful of the adequacy of the existing Treaty : because it aimed at creating a unitary State in a country so divided as Syria ; or because its guarantees for minorities and its provisions for the maintenance of French military forces upon Syrian soil were insufficient ; or else because it did not stipulate for the repayment to France of the expenses incurred in the administration of the Mandate.

These doubts were reinforced by the events of 1937 : the Alexandretta question, and the growth of the separatist movements in Jebel Druze, the province of Latakia and the Jazirah. It was obvious that the French Chamber and Senate would only ratify the Treaty provided that they were reassured on these and certain other points. The Syrian Prime Minister therefore went to Paris in order to negotiate with the French Government an agreement upon the points at issue. He left Syria in November, 1937, and returned towards the end of December. The result of his visit was an exchange of letters between him and M. de Tessan, Under-Secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 11th, 1937. The letters included a further guarantee by the Syrian Government of its intention to respect all the rights granted by the Treaty to the minorities living under its sway ; and an undertaking by the Government to accept the technical experts recommended to it by the French Government. The letters closed with a statement of the desire of both parties to continue the policy of co-operation.¹

These undertakings were accepted by nationalist opinion as being inevitable in the circumstances, and ratification of the Treaty was eagerly awaited. In March, 1938, indeed, Mardam

¹ See Appendix A4.

Bey declared to the Chamber that ratification could be expected soon, and received a unanimous vote of confidence in the policy he was pursuing. But as the year grew older, it became more and more obvious that the opposition to the Treaty in France was becoming stronger. Some of the reasons for this were local. The persistence of trouble among the minorities, especially in the Jazirah, aroused the fear of those who were mindful of France's special connexion with the Christians. (Similar fears were expressed on several occasions by members of the Permanent Mandates Commission, who had been deeply affected by the massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq, and blamed themselves for having consented to what they now regarded as a premature termination of the Iraqi Mandate.) Again, the possibility that oil would be discovered in the Jazirah influenced the opinion of those groups which had not forgotten the abandonment of the French claim to Mosul and did not wish to see it repeated in Syria. But the main reasons were not local. On the one hand, the Popular Front Government was replaced by one further to the Right, and including members of groups among whom the main enemies of the Treaty were to be found. On the other, the international situation was growing increasingly dangerous, and it was imperative for France not to weaken her military position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The attitude of Turkey in regard to Alexandretta had shown what dangers might fall upon Syria should France's control be at all relaxed.

Once more Jamil Mardam Bey went to Paris, in an endeavour to save the Treaty even at the price of serious emendations. He left Syria in August, 1938, and, after three months spent in Paris and Geneva, finally signed an agreement with M. Bonnet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on November 14th.

The text of the agreement was not revealed at the time, but it was published in full next year by a number of newspapers. It consisted of a 'Protocol' and a 'Joint Declaration'. In the former, the Syrian Government stated the measures by which it proposed to give full effect to the previous agreement of December 11th, 1937. It undertook to guarantee effective liberty of conscience to all, and in particular to recognize the rights of the Christians in matters of personal status. It promised also to safeguard the position of the

French language in the schools; and declared that it had made satisfactory arrangements in regard to the renewal of the concession of the Banque de Syrie and the investigation and exploitation of the country's oil deposits (two matters in which France had an important economic interest). Steps were to be taken to develop Franco-Syrian commerce, and French financial help to be given to the Syrian Government. In view of the interest of both Governments in putting the Treaty into effect as soon as possible, the French Government was willing to fix the end of the period of transition at September 30th, 1939, and would submit this proposal to Parliament. In the 'Joint Declaration', the two signatories expressed their hope that the Syrian Government would give its approval to the amended Treaty by January 20th, 1939, at the latest; and that the French Chamber and Senate would receive the reports of their Foreign Affairs Commission before December 10th, 1938, and would authorize the ratification of the Treaty before January 31st, 1939.¹ There were also military discussions in which General Huntziger, Commander of the French forces in the Levant, participated.

It was too late to save the Treaty, however. In Syria the concessions made by Jamil Mardam Bey were widely regarded as unacceptable, by his own followers as well as by those of Dr. Shahbandar and Shukri al-Quatli. In France there were some, like M. Bonnet, who supported the amended Treaty on the ground that France could not afford to throw away Syrian friendship and many on the Left who had not abandoned the original Treaty of 1936. A powerful body of opinion, however, was opposed to ratification. The Syrian and Lebanese Treaties were now submitted to the Foreign Affairs Commissions of Chamber and Senate. On December 9th, 1938, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate received the reports of its two 'rapporteurs' on the Treaty. One of them, M. Bergeon, warned against the dangers of a premature ratification; while the other, M. Henry-Haye, went further and declared that the very basis of the Treaty seemed to him incompatible with the interests of France. He proposed, therefore, that France should denounce the Syrian Treaty (as also the Lebanese) and the later agreements, and assume once more the direct administration of the country, until the bases of a new treaty could be thought out. After discussion the

¹ See Appendix A5.

Commission decided that a letter should be sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, emphasizing the importance of interrupting the process of transition provided for in the agreements.

Later in the same month M. Gaston Riou, the 'rapporteur' on the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, made a statement on the Treaties to a Beirut newspaper. He did not, he said, object to the Lebanese Treaty in principle, and such changes in it as were necessary could easily be made; but the whole conception of the Syrian Treaty was wrong. France had tried to make a unitary treaty with the least unitary nation in the world; Syria was a 'League of Nations' and needed a confederation.

In the face of such signs of Parliamentary opposition, M. Bonnet abandoned his intention of submitting the Treaty to Parliament. On December 14th, 1938, he declared to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber that the Government did not intend for the present to ask Parliament to ratify the Syrian Treaty. France, he stated, did not wish to modify the situation in the Mediterranean at the moment. (It was exactly a month since he had signed the 'Joint Declaration' with the Syrian Prime Minister.)

Such statements made it clear that even with the additional undertakings the Treaty had very little chance of ratification in France. On December 31st, 1938, the Syrian Chamber adopted unanimously an order of the day defining its attitude to France. While desirous of an alliance with France, it stood firm by the Treaty of 1936; it regarded as null and void any agreements not submitted to it for ratification; it regretted the failure of the French Government to stand by its commitments and charged the Syrian Government to watch over the rights, independence and unity of Syria, and to take full powers into its hands without delay; it took note of the Prime Minister's declaration that he did not consider himself bound by any agreement that he had signed; it asked the Syrians not to co-operate with any commission which might be sent out by the French Government; and it called upon the Government to deal promptly with the acts of rebellion against law and order that were occurring in the Jebel Druze, Latakia and the Jazirah.¹

This motion marked the beginning of the political crisis of 1939, which led to the dissolution of the National Bloc, the

¹ For text, see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport*, 1938, pp. 3-4.

suspension of the Constitution and the complete breakdown of the policy of 1936.

II

The Bloc was the more incapable of weathering such a crisis, because by now there had appeared a strong nationalist opposition to it. Already in 1936 such a potential opposition had existed ready to take shape so soon as, on the one hand, the Bloc disappointed hopes, and on the other an alternative leader or group of leaders appeared. At the time neither of the two conditions was fulfilled. The Bloc was at the height of its success ; and the few Deputies who opposed it were neither prominent nor strong enough to become popular leaders.

During the next few years, however, matters changed. The Bloc gradually lost a great part of its popularity, on account of its failure to secure the ratification of the Treaty and its impotence in the face of Turkish designs upon Alexandretta. The natural tendency of Governments in office to disappoint individual hopes and create individual grievances worked in the same direction.

The discontent was increased by the comparative failure of the Government in internal administration. Among the causes of failure were the inadequate powers of the Government, the widespread belief that it did not enjoy the backing of the French authorities, its own lack of experience and the absence of an efficient civil service ; but it was nevertheless discouraging to its supporters and irritating to ordinary citizens. On the whole the departments were no better administered than they had been ; and there was a succession of petty acts of discrimination against members of minorities. The relations between the central and local authorities were often difficult, the tendency to excessive centralization conflicting with the innate localism of some of the provinces. This conflict had indeed existed before the nationalists came to power, and in order to end it, the High Commissioner had issued a decree on provincial organization in January, 1936. Besides altering the number and boundaries of the provinces, this decree had defined the scope of the central and local authorities and provided for the establishment of provincial councils. In spite of declarations, this decree was never fully applied.

Another failure, for which however the Syrian Government was by no means exclusively to blame, was the breakdown of negotiations with Lebanon on the future of the customs and other departments known collectively as the 'Common Interests' and at the time administered by the High Commissioner. The Treaties, it will be recalled, anticipated negotiations between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the disposal of these interests when the Mandate should come to an end. The Governments might either set up a joint organization to administer them or agree each to retain its liberty of action; and the Mandatory Power bound itself to act in conformity with the decision of the Governments, and transfer the interests either to whatever new organization was set up or to the two Governments.

Syro-Lebanese negotiations on the subject took place in August, 1937. The two Governments agreed on the principle of separate customs administrations, without prejudice to the close economic relations existing between Syria and Lebanon. In later discussions, however, they failed to agree on the method of applying this principle and in particular on the proportion of the customs revenues to be allotted to each of the two Governments. In 1938, as a consequence of this failure to agree, the Syrian Government decided to impose a tax on Lebanese products, and the Lebanese Government retaliated. These measures were much opposed by business interests, and were never effectively carried out; but the disagreement continued until after the outbreak of the war.

To these particular grievances was added the general unrest caused on the one hand by the economic dislocations resulting from successive devaluations of the franc, and on the other by the Arab revolt in Palestine (1936-1939). This revolt aroused great enthusiasm in Syria, and helped to drive the nationalist movement along the path of extremism and violence, both because of the close links between Syria and Palestine and because of the presence in Syria and Lebanon of a large number of Arab nationalist refugees who had found it impossible to remain in Palestine. It was in Syria that the Pan-Arab Conference of 1937 was held. Lebanon became the home of the Mufti of Jerusalem after the suppression of the Arab High Committee in 1938; and to a great extent the revolt in its later stages was directed by Palestinian refugees and Syrian sympathizers through the Committee for

the Defence of Palestine, in Damascus. Nationalists in Syria regarded the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs as their own struggle; and their opposition to French policy was strengthened and sustained by the constant thought of the battle which their fellow-countrymen were waging against Zionism and the policy of the Balfour Declaration.

The conditions for the growth of an opposition now existed. Its leader was found in Dr. Abdur-Rahman Shahbandar. A well-educated, intelligent and masterful Damascene, he had been Foreign Minister under Faisal, and had played an important part in the revolt of 1925-1926. Sentenced to death by the French, he had taken up residence in Egypt. He returned to Syria after the amnesty to the political exiles in May, 1937. This first visit of his lasted only a month, but he found time publicly to declare his opposition to the party of the National Bloc—an opposition due partly perhaps to his disbelief in the policy of co-operation with the French, but partly also, there can be no doubt, to pique at seeing the leadership of the nationalist movement in other hands than his.

He was absent from Syria for the rest of the year 1937, but at the end of the year he came out into the open with a manifesto accusing Jamil Mardam Bey of having made unacceptable concessions to the French Government during his recent visit to Paris, and of having done nothing to defend Syrian rights in Alexandretta. He soon gathered around him a number of those who for one reason or another were dissatisfied with the Government of the Bloc.

In February, 1938, the Government replied to Dr. Shahbandar's memorandum by arresting his leading supporters, on the charge of having distributed a seditious manifesto repeating his accusations. Despite their denial of the charge, they were all sentenced to several months' detention, but the sentences were reduced after a re-trial.

Two months later, the crystallization of Dr. Shahbandar's supporters into a definite political group was marked by the issue of a manifesto, signed by Zaki al-Khatib in the name of the 'Free National Front'. It stated that any interference in the internal affairs of Syria on the pretext of defending minorities would be regarded as an infringement of national sovereignty; that any detachment of Syrian territory in order to transfer it to another State or to retain it under the Mandate would be considered an infraction of the Treaty;

that all projects for retaining French preponderance in the Mixed Courts would be equivalent to maintaining the yoke of the Capitulations ; that any partial removal of the schools from national control would be incompatible with national unity, and a danger to national culture ; that any delay in handing over the control of the army would open Syria to the danger of aggression ; and that any linking of the Syrian currency to a foreign currency, or any petroleum concession which did not assure to Syria a fair proportion of the proceeds, would be a menace to the country's prosperity. The manifesto, which was obviously an attack upon the concessions made or supposed to have been made by Jamil Mardam on his recent visit to France, ended by declaring that Syria would not accept any Treaty which gave it fewer rights than those possessed by Iraq.

The Government replied by confining Dr. Shahbandar to his house when he returned once more to Syria in July, 1938 ; by arresting once more those of his followers who had been arrested in February ; and by suspending their newspaper. But the opposition continued and the end of the year saw the formation of a ' Constitutional Bloc ' consisting of 27 deputies, including not only the immediate followers of Dr. Shahbandar but also some of the representatives of the Beduin, the Druzes, the Alawis and the inhabitants of the Jazirah.

Very many, however, of those who were discontented with the way in which things were going grouped themselves not around Dr. Shahbandar but around Shukri al-Quwatli, who had been a member of Mardam Bey's Ministry at first, but had resigned from it in March, 1938. From that time onwards he remained not indeed openly hostile to the Ministry, but critical of it, and voiced the opinion of those who would accept no compromise in the struggle for Arab unity and independence. He had the support, among others, of a section of the League of National Action, which had never shown more than an uneasy acquiescence in the rule of the Bloc. Another section of the League, however, held itself aloof from all established politicians and regarded even the un-amended Treaty of 1936 as too great a sacrifice of the national interests. This independence of established powers was professed also by a new youth-organization, the ' Arab Club ', of which the leaders, although not the rank and file, were suspected of too close a contact with Nazi ideas and agents.

Against the opposition of these two youth-movements, the Bloc's own organization, the Nationalist Youth, was almost powerless. It had taken a leading part in the disturbances of 1936, but when the leaders of the Bloc came to power it proved more of a nuisance than an asset and was quietly silenced by them.

12

The final crisis was delayed for a time by the arrival of the new French High Commissioner, M. Gabriel Puaux, who had been chosen to succeed M. de Martel in the previous October. M. Puaux left France for Syria at the beginning of January, 1939. The belief that he was coming to bury the Treaty explains why, when M. Puaux landed at Beirut on January 8th, his arrival was marked by some enthusiasm in Lebanon, but by hostility and manifestations in favour of Syrian unity in the cities of the interior. The tension was heightened rather than relieved by a broadcast speech of the High Commissioner on January 11th, in which he reminded the nationalists that France had a mission to maintain order and justice in the Levant, and that 'were she to withdraw or her forces to be weakened, Syrian patriots would see their dearest dreams disappear.'

Shortly afterwards M. Puaux made his first visit to Damascus. It was marked by strikes, and other measures of protest against the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the Treaty. A ministerial crisis seemed imminent; but after heated discussions in the Chamber, it was agreed that the Ministry should remain in office and no steps be taken until M. Puaux had had time to study the situation and form his opinion upon it.

M. Puaux spent the remainder of January visiting the different parts of the country. Disturbances and tension continued, and he had hardly completed his travels when a crisis occurred.

In March, 1936, the High Commissioner had issued a decree determining the rights of the officially recognized religious communities in matters of personal status, and the relations between the communities. It aroused considerable opposition in orthodox Moslem circles, partly because they believed its provisions to be contrary to those of Islamic law, but more fundamentally because it treated the Moslems as one sect

among many, and thus struck at the root of the traditional Moslem conception of the State. Its application was temporarily suspended, pending the issue of a revised law by the Syrian Government. The Government having failed to pass such a law, in November, 1938, the High Commissioner issued a decree modifying and completing the previous one. The new decree, officially published in December, met with no greater favour from the religious leaders.

Throughout the first weeks of 1939 Moslem opposition to the decree grew in intensity. Pressure was put upon the Government to suspend it. This the Government was the more willing to do because it resented the issue of the decree on the High Commissioner's own authority, over the head of the legislative organs of the Syrian State. In February it issued an order to the Courts not to apply the decree. At the same time it sent a memorandum to the High Commissioner, declaring its intention to apply the order of the day passed by the Chamber on December 31st, 1938, and to take over the functions previously exercised by the Mandatory authorities ; accusing the French of encouraging the separatist movements ; and asserting that since all legislative power belonged to the Chamber, decrees issued by the High Commissioner could have no validity in Syria.

On February 18th, the High Commissioner demanded that the Ministry should withdraw its order to the Courts and its memorandum, on the ground that decrees issued by him could not be suspended by any authority other than his own. The Ministry refused and resigned. A number of important officials resigned with it. The National Bloc continued formally in existence, but the resignation of the Mardam Ministry made its temporary decline inevitable. In April a group of prominent members left it.

13

Jamil Mardam Bey was succeeded as Prime Minister by Lutfi al-Haffar, his former colleague ; with one exception, all the members of the new Ministry were members of the Bloc ; and their policy, like that of their predecessors, was to maintain the Treaty of 1936, and to conclude an agreement with France on the basis of it. This, together with the continued deadlock over the communities question and further troubles among the minorities, did not allow the Ministry

to last long. It resigned on March 16th, in circumstances somewhat similar to those in which the Mardam Ministry had fallen. Its resignation was accompanied by further disturbances.

The unrest, and the difficulty of finding anybody willing and able to form a new Ministry, impelled the Mandatory authorities to take over, by decree of the High Commissioner, the powers necessary for the maintenance of public order. The disturbances were quelled by the use of French troops; several prominent leaders were arrested, including Nabih al-Azmah. New and severe restrictions were also placed upon the press. But at the same time a concession to popular feeling was made by the decision of the High Commissioner, at the beginning of April, to suspend the application of the Communities Statute to the Sunni Moslem community.

A few days later, on April 6th, the Ministerial crisis was ended by the formation of a non-political Ministry, headed by Nasuhi al-Bukhari. Although its members did not belong to the Bloc, this Ministry was as firmly attached as its predecessors had been to the Treaty of 1936; and it was generally felt that it offered the French Government its last chance of concluding an agreement that could satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Syrians. If it failed to take this opportunity, there would be no alternative for the nationalists except to resort once more to the methods of the first months of 1936.

Shortly after the formation of the Bukhari Ministry, M. Puaux left Syria for France. It was known that he had gone in order to discuss with the French Government the policy to be adopted in Syria. Speculation ranged over the alternatives among which a choice would have to be made: the negotiation of a new Treaty, the return to direct rule by the French, the establishment of a monarchy. This last possibility especially was the subject of much excited controversy and the names of various possible candidates were put forward: the Amir Abdullah, the Amir Abdul Munim, son of the ex-Khedive of Egypt, a Sa'udi or a Tunisian prince. Even the possibility of a personal union of Syria and Iraq under King Faisal II was entertained.

On May 10th, the High Commissioner returned from France and three days later delivered a radio speech, in which he declared that the French Government was determined to

reach an agreement with Syria on the basis of the 1936 Treaty with the amendments of November, 1938, but that due satisfaction must be given to the legitimate aspirations of the minorities. Moreover, the international situation necessitated new military arrangements between Syria and France. He ended with an appeal for the maintenance of law and order.

The nationalists saw in this statement a determination to strengthen France's hold over Syria in preparation for the imminent world war. The last hope of the ratification of the Treaty was now extinguished.

On May 15th the Bukhari Ministry resigned. On May 23rd the Syrian Chamber voted unanimously an order of the day, affirming Syria's sympathy for French democracy in the hour of its peril, but at the same time emphasizing its attachment to the unamended Treaty of 1936 as the only firm basis for Franco-Syrian co-operation.

This time there was no way out of the deadlock. All attempts to form a new Ministry failed. Finally, the President of the Republic resigned (July 7th). A few days later M. Puaux took the extreme step of dissolving the Chamber, suspending the Constitution, and appointing a non-political Council of Directors to govern by decree-laws under his own direction (July 10th). The Council was composed of permanent officials, with Bahij al-Khatib as its President.

14

At the same time the High Commissioner issued decrees re-establishing in Jebel Druze and the Territory of Latakia separate administrations similar to those which had existed until 1936, and providing for the special administration of the Jazirah.

The decree for Latakia stated that the Organic Law promulgated in 1936 was to be replaced by a new one, to come into force immediately. The new law provided for the government of the region by a Governor, assisted by a council of heads of departments and by the Council of the Territory. He was to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the Council of the Territory, was to hold office for five years and might be re-appointed. His powers were executive, financial and within limits legislative. The Council was to consist of at least seventeen elected members, to hold two ordinary sessions a year and to discuss financial and

other matters, without, however, possessing much power of independent decision. The Territory was to enjoy financial autonomy, apart from a contribution to the expenses of general administration of the State of Syria. It was also to have judicial autonomy, except for the provisions that the Presidents of the High Court and the Court of First Instance at Latakia, both of them French magistrates, were to be appointed by the head of the Syrian State on the nomination of the French Government ; and that conflicts of competence between the Courts of the Territory and those of other parts of the French Mandated area were to be decided by the Court of Cassation at Damascus.

The provisions of the decree relating to the Jebel Druze were virtually the same, with a few minor variations. That for the Jazirah removed the province from the control of the Syrian Government, and placed it under the direct rule of the High Commissioner's Delegate at Hassetché. (This measure was enough to end the disturbances. By December, 1940, life in the Jazirah had returned to normal, and it was possible for an agreement to be reached between the Mandatory authorities and the Syrian Government, under the terms of which the functions of Governor were once more transferred from the High Commissioner's Delegate to a Syrian official.)¹

¹ See Appendix A6.

XII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-1943

I

THE outbreak of war brought immediate changes in every sphere of life, in Syria and Lebanon as in the other countries involved. For months past reinforcements had been arriving for the French army of occupation. At the beginning of the war the important part for which the forces in the Mandated Territories were cast was shown by the appointment of General Weygand as Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant. Other measures were taken to place the Territories in a state of defence. The urgency of the situation was somewhat eased, however, by the decision of the Italian Government to remain neutral.

Various political measures were also taken to ensure the safety of the country. In Lebanon the High Commissioner dissolved the Chamber, dismissed the Ministry, suspended the Constitution and confided the administration to a Secretary of State directly responsible to the President of the Republic. In Syria, a number of political organizations believed to be favourable to the enemies of France were dissolved, and some of their leading members were arrested. During the next few months many of them were sentenced by military tribunals to terms of imprisonment, in some cases exceedingly long, on charges of subversive action and conspiracy. Those affected were mainly members of uncompromising nationalist organizations or of the Communist Party; no leader either of the National Bloc or of the Shahbandarist group was touched. Most leading personalities indeed gave formal expression to their attachment to France and to democracy, and their unwillingness to do anything which might hinder the victory of the Allied arms.

In spite of formal statements by political leaders, the general attitude of the population towards the war seems to have been one not of enthusiasm but of mingled fear and apathy. There was fear of a repetition of the terrible experiences of the war of 1914-1918: famine, disease and the reign of terror. Except among the Francophil elements, people tended to think that, although the belligerents might invoke the noblest of principles to justify their taking up arms, in reality all were equally moved by self-interest, and that from the point of view of the exploited nations of the East there was nothing to choose

between the oppression exercised in the name of democracy and that exercised in the name of Fascism. This tendency was encouraged by the efforts of the competing propaganda services, each of which purported to unmask the true face of the other party. Moreover, painful memories remained of the conduct of the Allies during the last war. The Arabs had trusted to Allied promises then and had been, as they saw it, cheated. They were therefore sceptical, and afraid to give their full trust to either side. Still more bitter were the memories of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war : the cession of Alexandretta, the failure to ratify the Syrian and Lebanese Treaties, and above all the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had aroused intense feeling throughout Arab Asia, and had done more than anything else to alienate the Arabs from the Allied Powers.

These and other currents of political feeling existed beneath the surface, but there was little overt political activity during the first nine months of the war. The High Commissioner and the Syrian and Lebanese authorities confined themselves mainly to measures of administrative reform and economic and financial control ; the safeguarding of the food supply against the activities of hoarders and profiteers was their constant preoccupation. In external affairs one source of anxiety was removed by the conclusion in November, 1939, of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Pact, and in March, 1940, of a Turco-Syrian Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. But a new anxiety grew up, with the German offensive on the Western front in May, 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war in June ; it reflected itself in the additional measures of precaution taken in the Mandated Territories.

2

After the capitulation of France there was some doubt about the attitude which the French authorities in the Levant would adopt. It was resolved by the order of the day issued on June 27th by General Mittelhauser, who had succeeded Weygand after the latter had been recalled to take command of the Allied Forces in France. ' According to the terms of the French armistice', he announced, ' there will be no change in the status of the Mandated Territories. Consequently, the cessation of hostilities has been ordered. The French flag

will continue to be flown in these territories, and France will carry on her mission in the Levant.'

The cessation of hostilities had the gravest effect upon the Allied position in the Middle East, and occasioned great anxiety to the British Government. At the beginning of July the Foreign Office issued the following statement :

' His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that General Mittelhauser, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Levant, has stated that hostilities have ceased in Syria. His Majesty's Government assume that this does not mean that if Germany or Italy sought to occupy Syria or the Lebanon and were to try to do so in the face of British command of the sea, no attempt would be made by the French forces to oppose them. In order, however, to set at rest doubts which may be felt in any quarter, His Majesty's Government declare that they could not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by any hostile Power or to be used as a base for attacks upon those countries in the Middle East which they are pledged to defend, or to become the scene of such disorder as to constitute a danger to those countries.

' They therefore hold themselves free to take whatever measures they may in such circumstances consider necessary in their own interests. Any action which they may hereafter be obliged to take in fulfilment of this declaration will be entirely without prejudice to the future status of the territories now under French Mandate.'¹

Subsequent developments increased the anxiety of the British Government. In August an Italian Armistice Commission arrived in Beirut ; in spite of official disclaimers, its object was generally believed to be to prepare the way for the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Axis Powers. It was generally unpopular and had little success ; by the end of the year it had practically faded out of the picture. More important was the unobtrusive extension of German influence throughout the country ; and also the gradual replacement of officials believed to have democratic or pro-British sympathies by others thought to be in agreement with the ' New Order ' in France and Europe. In November the High Commissioner himself was recalled and replaced first by M. Chiappe and then, after his death when the aeroplane carrying him to the East was shot down in the

¹ *The Times*, July 2nd, 1941.

Mediterranean, by General Dentz. These measures could not, however, prevent the spread of pro-Allied sympathies both in the army and in the civil administration ; towards the end of 1940 a number of those suspected of having such sympathies were arrested and interned.

While Axis interference was increasing, Franco-British relations in the Levant as elsewhere were becoming ever more strained. The British blockade was extended to Syria and Lebanon, trade between which and the neighbouring Arab countries greatly diminished in consequence. Travel between Palestine and the French Mandated Territories was severely restricted. The French authorities prohibited public listening to British radio programmes. From time to time, moreover, the French authorities issued statements to the effect that the French army of the Levant still existed and was prepared to defend French territory against aggression from whatever direction it might come.

3

Among the population, the effect of the French capitulation and of subsequent events was not so much to bring new tendencies into existence as to encourage those which already existed. The growth of Axis influence and of British determination to oppose it increased the fear that the country would become a battleground. The restriction of trade with Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, and the persistence of hoarding and profiteering in spite of all measures taken to stop them, brought nearer the spectre of famine. The ambiguous position of France after the Armistice made it even more difficult than before for Syrians and Lebanese to take sides in the war. There were, it is true, a small number who approved of the New Order in France, and extreme nationalists who desired a German victory ; there were others who, from principle or interest, desired a British occupation of the country. But for the majority of politically conscious Syrians, the collapse of France and her subsequent difficulties served not so much to throw them into the arms of her former ally or her former enemy, as to make them more than ever eager to rid themselves of French and all foreign domination. They felt it a humiliation to be subjected to a defeated and weak nation ; and with the withdrawal of France from the League

of Nations on April 18th, 1941, they regarded the juridical basis of French Mandatory rule as having disappeared.

Political meetings and demonstrations being forbidden, nationalist uneasiness remained for the most part beneath the surface throughout 1940. But it revealed itself in the press of other Arab countries and the activities of their Governments; this was especially true of Iraq. Thus in July, 1940, Nuri as-Said, then Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Ankara, Beirut and Damascus in order to discuss with the Turkish and French authorities and with prominent Syrians and Lebanese the future of the French Mandated Territories. At the conclusion of his journey he issued a statement to the effect that both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments thought that Syria should be for the Syrians and that the country should enjoy complete independence.

A symptom of the prevalent unrest was the murder of Dr. Shahbandar in Damascus in the same month, while his political influence was at its height. Within a few days his assassins were arrested. After the preliminary investigation had been completed a special tribunal was set up to try them and certain other persons believed to be implicated in the crime. Among the latter were three of the leaders of the National Bloc, Jamil Mardam Bey, Saadullah al-Jabiri and Lutfi al-Haffar. They were accused of deliberate complicity in the assassination. Almost at the same time as the accusation against them was published, all three left Syria for Baghdad.

The trial of the accused persons began in December, 1940. In the course of it the leader of the assassins made a complete confession: their motive in deciding to kill Dr. Shahbandar had been religious, since they regarded him as one of those responsible for the decay of Islam; they had tried to throw the blame for their crime upon the leaders of the Bloc, who in reality had had nothing to do with it. The trial ended at the beginning of January, with the condemnation of six persons to death and several others to imprisonment, and the complete exoneration of Jamil Mardam Bey, Lutfi al-Haffar and Saadullah al-Jabiri. The sentences were carried out immediately.

long latent came to a head. Strikes and demonstrations began in the Syrian towns in February, in protest against the dearth of essential foodstuffs and the failure of the authorities to stop profiteering. They very soon turned into political disturbances, directed by a number of nationalist committees and leaders, and above all by Shukri al-Quwatli, who in March issued a manifesto setting forth their objectives. He condemned the existing Government of Bahij al-Khatib as a group of men whose sentiments were not those of the population; he declared that the legal basis of French rule no longer existed since the League of Nations had ceased to function; and he therefore demanded the immediate formation of a national Government. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of the continuation of the disturbances, which indeed spread for a few days from Syria to the towns of the Lebanese coast, the Government of Bahij al-Khatib resigned. There was a temporary cessation of unrest while the High Commissioner negotiated with Shukri al-Quwatli and others for the formation of a more representative Government; but disturbances broke out once more after the failure of the negotiations.

The recrudescence of the troubles appears to have convinced General Dentz of the necessity of making further concessions. At the beginning of April he broadcast a statement to the Syrian people, setting forth the conclusions to which his conversations with Syrian leaders had led him. First, the independence of Syria remained the aim towards which the Syrians were striving; France was in agreement with this, but the present international situation made it impossible to contemplate a definitive settlement of the problem of the form of government in Syria. Secondly, Syrian public opinion was demanding the establishment of a Government endowed with wider powers. Thirdly, there was a need for an economic and social programme which would help to solve the problems of unemployment, the food supply, agriculture and commerce. In the light of these conclusions the High Commissioner had decided upon the following measures: the replacement of the Council of Directors by a Ministry presided over by a 'Head of the Government'; the formation of an Advisory Assembly, to be composed of representatives of the political, cultural and economic life of the country and of the younger generation, and in which the Druzes and Alawis would also be represented

while retaining their special Statutes ; the establishment of a Council of State to draft legislation ; the participation of the Syrian Government in the organization of the food supply for Syria and Lebanon ; and the execution of an important programme of public works. 'The day of fulfilment is at hand and existing difficulties will be resolved by the co-operation of all and not by demonstrations in the streets. The Syrian nation wishes to carry on its work in an orderly and peaceful manner. Order and peace shall be safeguarded.'¹

A few days later a prominent business man and member of a leading Damascene family, Khalid al-Azm, was appointed Prime Minister, with a Ministry most of the members of which, like the Prime Minister himself, had not previously taken a prominent part in the political life of Syria. In its programme the new Government promised to reform the administration, to develop external trade, to pay special attention to the problems of education and youth, to ameliorate the lot of the workers and officials, and to preserve strict non-partisanship in all political matters.

Shortly afterwards a similar change took place in Lebanon. The President of the Republic and the Secretary of State resigned their offices, and were replaced by a politically neutral Ministry headed by Alfred Naccache, a Maronite judge who had hitherto played no important part in politics.

5

During these uncertain months the true centre of Syrian political life was Baghdad. It has already been made clear how united is political feeling in the different centres of the Fertile Crescent. The Palestinian Revolt of 1936-1939 had received encouragement and help from the neighbouring Arab countries ; and after it subsided the thought persisted that the sorrows of Palestine, and also the sorrows of Syria, could only be ended by a united effort of the whole Arab people. It was also widely believed that in this effort Iraq would have to play the leading part, since it possessed greater freedom of action than most of the other Arab regions, and also the nucleus of a trained army. The sense that the destiny of their nation depended on them exalted the spirits of a certain group among the Iraqi Arabs ; and their enthusiasm was further increased by the teaching of the

¹ See Appendix A10.

many Syrians and Palestinians, teachers, government officials and political exiles, who thronged Baghdad in the first years of the war. To the general Arab unrest there were added particular Iraqi grievances; and both were encouraged to express themselves violently by the comparative failure of British arms in 1940 and 1941 and the great though temporary influence of German propaganda. Finally, when the general position of the war seemed most propitious, Rashid Ali raised the banner of revolt. He was supported by some, although by no means all, of the nationalists in other Arab countries; in imagination they saw the revolt not as a seizure of power by the Army but as a protest of the Arabs against British policy in Palestine and French in Syria. When the revolt failed, a wave of doubt and self-criticism swept over the nationalist ranks, in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, no less than in Iraq.

6

These events were swiftly followed by others of even greater import. Ever since the French capitulation German agents had been active in Syria and Lebanon. In the first months of 1941 German influence was thought to be increasing rapidly and alarmingly; and it was believed that the completion of her Balkan campaign had brought nearer the possibility of a gradual infiltration of German troops and agents into the French Mandated Territories, until finally Germany would be able to obtain complete control of them. Her forces would then be in a position to threaten the British armies in Palestine and Egypt, and Turkey to the north.

The danger was brought to a head by the outbreak of the Iraqi insurrection in May. German aircraft were permitted by the Government of Vichy to use Syrian air-bases as stages on their journey to Iraq; and it was obvious to those who had studied German methods of infiltration that this was the beginning of a process which would, unless forestalled, soon take on such proportions that to check it would be of the greatest difficulty.

It therefore came as no surprise to the general public when on June 8th, 1941, a mixed force of Imperial, Free French and other Allied troops crossed the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon; the whole force was under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and the Free French contingent under that

of General Catroux. General Dentz's troops put up an unexpectedly strong resistance. It had been generally hoped that it would be nominal or else would be overcome without much difficulty, on account of the supposed bad state of morale among the French troops, the alleged poor condition of their equipment, the repatriation of a large part of the army of the Levant to France after the Armistice, the defection of a number of officers and men to the Free French cause, and the pro-British sympathies of certain elements in the population. This hope was not fulfilled. General Dentz's troops resisted strongly, for a number of reasons : because of hostility to Great Britain and Free France and suspicion of their intentions ; from professional pride and the desire to wipe out the shame of the French capitulation of 1940 ; because the policy of Vichy included the defence of the Empire against all attacks upon it ; and because of severe disciplinary measures taken by General Dentz in the weeks preceding the attack.

The Allied advance was made in several columns, some of which entered the country from Palestine and Transjordan in the south, and the others from Iraq in the east. Of the columns advancing from the south, one took the coastal road, with Beirut as its goal ; a second went northwards from Metullah into the region beneath the western slopes of Hermon, heading towards the Bika', the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, in which lies the air-base of Rayaq ; a third advanced towards Damascus by way of Quneitra ; and others towards Damascus through the Hauran. Of the columns which invaded Syria from Iraq, one struck across the desert towards Palmyra and then towards Homs and the roads and railway which run north and south connecting the great towns of the interior ; another moved up the course of the Euphrates towards Dair az-Zor and then south-west to Palmyra ; and a third westwards along the northern frontier, towards Aleppo. The northward and westward movements tended to converge as the columns moved forward, pushing the enemy forces before them towards the north-western section of the country. In the first days of the campaign the forces from the south captured Sur, Dera' and Merjayun and advanced beyond them. But the further they went the fiercer the resistance to them grew ; they captured Kiswe, a few miles south of Damascus, but there they were halted, while the French forces launched a counter-attack and on June 16th recaptured



Quneitra and Merjayun. They were dislodged from the former in a few hours, but from the latter only after more than a week of heavy fighting on June 24th. By that time the other columns had made considerable progress ; on June 20th the deciding battle for Damascus was fought. An Indian brigade penetrated after hard fighting into the suburbs of Mezze to the west of Damascus ; the Australians following in support took Fort Gouraud. In the face of this threat from the west and pressure from Free French columns to the south and east General Dentz ordered the evacuation of the city. Free French troops under Colonel Collet led the Allied entry of June 21st. In the next few days a rapid advance was made north of Damascus by Allied troops, while those moving westwards through the desert drew nearer to the railway and Aleppo, Homs and Hama ; and those on the coastal road continued their approach upon Beirut, in spite of heavy resistance at Damur and elsewhere.

By the beginning of July the end of the campaign was in sight. On July 8th General Dentz was forced to ask for terms ; and after several days of negotiations, an Armistice Convention was initialled at Acre on July 12th and signed on the 14th. Allied forces were to occupy Syrian and Lebanese territory ; the French forces were to be accorded the full honours of war ; all war material was either to be transferred to the British authorities or to be destroyed under their supervision ; prisoners of war were to be released ; the free choice between rallying to the Allied cause and being repatriated was to be left to individuals on the French side ; the rights of French cultural institutions were to be respected ; all public services, means of communication, port installations, naval establishments, ships, aircraft, air installations, and equipment and fuel stocks were to be handed over intact ; and no reprisals were to be taken by the British authorities against Syrians or Lebanese who had been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity. The execution of the Convention was to be supervised by a commission of control, of which three members, including the President, were to be nominated by the British authorities and the other two by the Vichy French authorities.¹

¹ See Appendix A13.

In the period which has elapsed between the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon and the present day, a number of statements have been issued for the purpose of defining the policy which Free France should follow in the Mandated Territories, her attitude to the inhabitants and her relations with Great Britain.

The intentions of the Free French towards the Syrians and Lebanese were stated on the day on which the invasion began, in the proclamation issued by General Catroux :

‘ Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon !

‘ At the moment when the forces of Free France, united to the forces of the British Empire, her ally, are entering your territory, I declare that I assume the powers, responsibilities and duties of the representative of France in the Levant. I do this in the name of Free France, which is the traditional and real France, and in the name of her Chief, General de Gaulle. In this capacity I come to put an end to the mandatory régime and to proclaim you free and independent.

‘ You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples, and you will be able either to form yourselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. In either event, your independent and sovereign status will be guaranteed by a Treaty in which our mutual relations will be defined. This Treaty will be negotiated as soon as possible between your representatives and myself. Pending its conclusion our mutual position will be one of close unity in pursuit of a common ideal and common aims.

‘ Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, you will see from this declaration that if the Free French and British forces cross your frontier, it is not to take away your liberty, it is to ensure it. It is to drive out of Syria the forces of Hitler. It is to prevent the Levant from becoming an enemy base directed against the British and against ourselves.

‘ We who are fighting for the liberty of peoples cannot allow the enemy to subjugate your country step by step, obtain control of your persons and your belongings, and turn you into slaves. We cannot allow the populations which France has promised to defend to fall into the hands of the

most wanton and pitiless master that history has known. We cannot allow the age-long interests of France in the Levant to be handed over to the enemy.

‘Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon ! If, in answer to our appeal, you rally to us, you should know that the British Government in agreement with Free France has promised to grant you all the advantages enjoyed by the free countries which are associated with them. Thus the blockade will be lifted and you will enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous advantages from the point of view of your imports and exports. You will be able to buy and sell freely with all the free countries.

‘Inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon ! A great hour in your history has struck. France declares you independent by the voice of her sons who are fighting for her life and for the liberty of the world.’¹

Simultaneously, the British Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson, made the following statement in the name of the British Government :

‘General Catroux, on behalf of General de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French, has issued a declaration to the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon before advancing with the object of expelling the Germans. In this he declares the liberty and independence of Syria and Lebanon. He undertakes to negotiate a treaty to ensure these objects.

‘I am authorized by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to declare that they support and associate themselves with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon.

‘I am also authorized to give you the assurance that should you support and join the Allies, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom offer you all the advantages enjoyed by free countries who are associated with them. The blockade will be lifted and you may enter into immediate relations with the sterling bloc, which will give you enormous, besides immediate, advantages from the point of view of your exports and imports. You will be able to sell your products and to buy freely in all the free countries.’²

¹ For the French text, see Appendix A11.

² *The Times*, June 9th, 1941.

On June 24th, after the capture of Damascus, General de Gaulle issued two decrees, the one nominating General Catroux Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Levant, and the other appointing him 'Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary' of the Chief of the Free French for the States of the Levant. (This title was to replace that of High Commissioner.) In a letter to General Catroux announcing these appointments, General de Gaulle laid down the main lines of the policy which he was to adopt in regard to Syrian and Lebanese independence.

'You are going to exercise your powers and functions in my name and in that of the Council of Defence of the French Empire. Your mission will consist particularly in restoring the economic situation in the Levant as rapidly and completely as the circumstances of the war permit; in negotiating with the qualified representatives of the interested peoples treaties establishing the independence and sovereignty of the Levant States, while guaranteeing their alliance with France and safeguarding the rights and interests of France; in assuring the defence of the territories against the enemy and co-operating with the Allies in the military operations in the East.

'Until the régime resulting from the treaties to be concluded is established—and this ought to take place as soon as possible—you should assume all the powers hitherto exercised by the High Commissioner of France in the Levant and all the responsibilities incumbent upon him.

'Furthermore, your powers will include that of representing France so far as treaties are concerned, and you will be at the same time Commander-in-Chief of our forces.

'You will bring about, whenever it shall be possible, the establishment of assemblies fully representative of the whole of the population and the formation of Governments having the confidence of those assemblies. You will immediately enter into negotiations with these Governments, so as to bring about the conclusion of treaties of alliance. These treaties will be signed by those Governments and by me.

'In spite of the confusion and chaos resulting from the temporary reverses of the French armies and in spite of the intrigues of the invader in our country, the Mandate of

France, which was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1923, should be exercised up to the moment when it is effectively ended, and until then the work of France ought to continue.

‘In consequence, you will take as the point of departure for the negotiations with the Levant States the treaties of alliance concluded with them in 1936. You will suggest to the Governments of the Levant States the temporary measures which should be taken in common in order to meet the needs of our common defence in this war, and which therefore will form the subject of special conventions.

‘I take it upon myself to bring to the knowledge of the League of Nations, at the appropriate time, the replacement of the mandatory régime in the Levant by a new régime which will pursue the aims for which the Mandate was established.’¹

9

Although since the armistice the Free French have been in territorial control of Syria and Lebanon and responsible for the civil administration, the country has been mainly garrisoned by British and Imperial troops of the Ninth Army, and supreme military authority has been in British hands. Economically and financially it has become part of the bloc of British-controlled Middle Eastern territories. In September, 1941, for example, it was admitted to the sterling area. Thus Free French policy in the Mandated Territories has affected not only Franco-Arab but also Franco-British relations.

The attitude of the British Government towards the future political régime in Syria and Lebanon was made clear from the beginning of the Free French administration. First, it desired to see these States given their independence; but secondly, subject to the fulfilment of that condition, it acknowledged the priority of France's position over that of any other European Power in Syria and Lebanon. This attitude was defined in an interchange of letters between Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Minister of State in the Middle East, and General de Gaulle on August 15th, 1941. Mr. Lyttelton wrote:

‘At the conclusion of our talk to-day I am happy to repeat to you the assurance that Great Britain has no

¹ For the French text, see Appendix A12.

interest in Syria or the Lebanon, except to win the war. We have no desire to encroach in any way upon the position of France. Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the predominant position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. It is in this spirit that we have always acted. You will have seen recent utterances of the Prime Minister in this sense. I am glad to reaffirm them now to our friends and allies, who have our full sympathy and support.

‘On our side, I am happy again to receive your assurances of the determination of Free France, as friend and ally of Great Britain and in accordance with the agreements and declarations which you have already made, to pursue relentlessly to the finish the war against the common enemy. I am happy that we should thus reaffirm our complete understanding and agreement.’

General de Gaulle replied :

‘I have received the letter which you have been kind enough to send me following our interview of to-day. I am happy to note your renewed assurances regarding the disinterestedness of Great Britain in Syria and Lebanon, and the fact that Great Britain admits as a basic principle the pre-eminent and privileged position of France when these shall have attained independence in conformity with the undertaking which Free France has taken with regard to them.

‘I take this opportunity of repeating that Free France, that is to say, France, is resolved to pursue the war at the side of Great Britain, her friend and ally, until the attainment of complete victory against our common enemies.’¹

The British guarantees were repeated with even greater authority by the Prime Minister. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 9th, 1941, he said :

‘We have no ambitions in Syria. We do not seek to replace or supplant France, or substitute British for French interests in any part of Syria. We are only in Syria in order to win the war. However, I must make it quite clear that our policy, to which our Free French Allies

¹ *Bulletin of International News*, XVIII, No. 17, p. 1,115.

have subscribed, is that Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians, who will assume at the earliest possible moment their independent sovereign rights. We do not propose that this process of creating an independent Syrian Government or Governments—because it may be that they will not be one Government—shall wait until the end of the war. We contemplate constantly increasing the Syrian share in the administration. There is no question of France maintaining the same position which she exercised in Syria before the war, but which the French Government had realized must come to an end. On the other hand, we recognize that among all the nations of Europe the position of France in Syria is one of special privilege, and that in so far as any European countries have influence in Syria, that of France will be pre-eminent.' (Hon. Members : 'Why?') 'Because that is the policy which we have decided to adopt. We did not go there in order to deprive France of her historic position in Syria, except in so far as is necessary to fulfil our obligations and pledges to the Syrian population. There must be no question, even in wartime, of a mere substitution of Free French interests for Vichy French interests. The Syrian peoples are to come back into their own. This is fully recognized in the documents which have been exchanged between the Minister of State and the representatives of the Free French.

'I was asked a question about our relations with Iraq. They are special; our relations with Egypt are special, and, in the same way, I conceive that France will have special arrangements with Syria. The independence of Syria is a prime feature in our policy.'¹

10

There followed a period of negotiations and discussions, during which the Government of Khalid al-Azm in Syria and that of Alfred Naccache in Lebanon remained in office. General Catroux, in the letter in which he asked the Syrian Prime Minister to remain in office, stated that the Mandatory régime could not be terminated until the occupation of the country was complete; after that a régime of independence would be inaugurated, to be guaranteed by a treaty negotiated on a footing of equality.

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, Vol. 374, col. 76.

The decision on the form of political organization to be adopted was reached sooner in Syria than in Lebanon. In September, 1941, there was published a letter from General Catroux to Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani. In this letter the General stated that, after having diligently consulted public opinion and having no object in view but the good of the country, he considered Shaikh Taj ad-Din to be better qualified than any one else to organize the new independent and sovereign Syrian State. 'I propose therefore to Your Excellency that you take in hand the destinies of Syria with the title, the prerogatives and the privileges attached to the office of President of the Syrian Republic, and as such set up the government of the State with the shortest possible delay. If, as I hope, you accept this offer, you can be certain of my entire support and full collaboration.'¹

The new President was the son of a Moslem divine of Damascus, Shaikh Badr ad-Din. He himself had been prominent in Syrian politics in the years between the two wars, as an advocate of collaboration with the Mandatory Power who had at the same time always regarded himself as a nationalist. He had twice been Prime Minister : from 1928 to 1931 and again from 1934 to 1935. Since 1935 he had taken no active part in Syrian political life and his reputation for wisdom and probity was by no means high.

A few days later, on September 28th, 1941, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Syria :

'Syrians,

'On June 8th last, at the time of the entry into the Levant of the Allied Armies, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of her Chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent State, under the promise of a treaty guaranteeing our reciprocal relations.

'The British Government, the Ally of Free France, acting in accord with her, associated itself by a simultaneous declaration with this important political act. On the 16th of this month, I put my declaration of June 8th into effect by translating into established fact the principle there enunciated.

'Thus the era is begun in which independent and sovereign Syria will herself control her destinies.

¹ *La Bourse Egyptienne* (Cairo), September 17th, 1941.

‘His Excellency Shaikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani has consented to organize the new régime of independence. His experience of affairs and his profound understanding of the country’s needs mark him out for this high mission. I assure him as well as the whole Syrian nation of my support and of my loyal collaboration.

‘In this collaboration I shall be guided by the following principles :

‘The Syrian State will enjoy from now onwards the rights and prerogatives of an independent and sovereign State. These will be subject only to the restrictions imposed by the present state of war and the security of the territory.

‘Her position as *de facto* Ally of Free France and of Great Britain necessitates a strict conformity of her policy with that of the Allies.

‘With her accession to independent international life, Syria assumes naturally the rights and obligations hitherto undertaken in her name.

‘She has the power to appoint diplomatic representatives in countries where she judges that her interests demand such representation. Everywhere else, the authorities of Free France will lend her their good offices in order to ensure the defence of her general rights and interests as well as the protection of her nationals.

‘The Syrian State is empowered to organize its national military forces. Free France will lend it all help to this end.

‘Great Britain having already committed herself on several occasions to the recognition of the independence of Syria, Free France will intervene without delay with other allied or friendly Powers, so that they also should recognize the independence of the Syrian State.

‘Free France considers that the State of Syria forms politically and territorially an indivisible unity, of which the integrity ought to be preserved against any dismemberment. In consequence she will look with favour upon the strengthening of the political, cultural and economic links which unite the different portions of Syria. To this end, the Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France will revise the texts defining the particular status formerly accorded to certain regions, in such a way that, while the administrative and financial autonomy to which they show themselves firmly attached is preserved, they shall be

politically subordinated to the Syrian central power. Thus the principle of Syrian unity and the particular aspirations of these regions will be reconciled.

‘It remains understood, moreover, that the guarantees of public right set out in the organic statutes in favour of individuals and of communities will be maintained and given full effect.

‘Free France undertakes to act as intermediary between Syria and Lebanon for the purpose of seeking and establishing the basis of economic collaboration between the two countries, and of removing the difficulties which this collaboration encounters at present.

‘This “entente”, necessary between two countries which are both brothers and neighbours, must guarantee the respective rights of the two parties, and establish their relations on the basis of reciprocal confidence.

‘To safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Syria and bring the common struggle to a successful issue, the Allies will undertake the defence of the country during the period of war. To this end, the Syrian Government will put the Syrian national forces at the disposal of the Allied Command, in order to co-operate in the defence of the territory. Further, the Allied Command will make use from now onwards, as far as military necessities demand, of the resources and public services of Syria, particularly of means of communication, aerodromes and coastal establishments. The defence of the territory demands also that a strict collaboration should exist at all times between the Commander-in-Chief and Delegate-General, and the gendarmerie, police and security services of the Syrian State. Syria must indeed be defended in time of war not only against her enemies without but also against those within.

‘By reason of the inclusion of Syria in the war-zone and in the economic and financial system of the Allies, the strictest collaboration between the Syrian Government and the Allies is also necessary in order to ensure, for the duration of hostilities and in the common interest, the observance of all measures taken to conduct the economic war satisfactorily.

‘To this end, for the duration of the war the widest facilities will be accorded to assure the greatest possible freedom of exchange between Syria and the countries of the

sterling bloc. Syria, having now entered the sterling bloc, will in the economic and financial sphere and especially in that of exchange take the necessary measures to follow the general policy of the sterling bloc.

‘The preceding stipulations reconcile respect for Syrian independence and sovereignty with the necessities of war. They are inspired by a single thought, that of winning the war and by this means assuring to Syria the future of a free people. They give the Franco-Syrian problem a solution which springs from the desire of Free France not to retard, in spite of the war, the accomplishment of Syrian national aspirations and the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Allies. But it is necessary that a final settlement should be substituted for them as soon as possible, in the form of a Franco-Syrian Treaty which will definitively guarantee the independence of the country.

‘Long live independent Syria! Long live England! Long live France!’¹

At the same time the new President of the Syrian Republic took up his duties. In October Shaikh Taj was able to announce the formation of a Government, at the head of which was Hasan al-Hakim, a well-known financial expert and a former collaborator of Dr. Shahbandar. Among the members of the Ministry were an Alawi and a Druze, but none of the leaders of the Bloc.

The declaration of independence and the formation of a Government aroused no enthusiasm among the population. The nationalists preferred to wait before giving their approval, to see what steps Free France would take to render her undertakings effective. They also objected to the appointment of the President instead of his choice by a freely elected Chamber; and in particular they disapproved of the appointment of Shaikh Taj.

II

The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26th, 1941. General Catroux's proclamation ran as follows:

‘Lebanese,

‘The proclamation which I addressed to you on June 8th in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of Free France, and

¹ For the French text, see Appendix A14.

which Great Britain supported by a special simultaneous declaration, recognized Lebanon, under the guarantee of a treaty to be concluded with a view to defining Franco-Lebanese reciprocal relations, as a sovereign and independent State.

‘As the trustee for the French liberal tradition and anxious to honour the engagements undertaken towards you, Free France, at the moment of entering the Levant, began with an act of emancipation, in spite of the war and the exceptional circumstances which it imposed : she made you free and independent.

‘Your aspirations are satisfied. It is now a matter of organizing your independence. As far as I am concerned, I have two tutelary duties. The first is to confide the work of installing and directing the régime to a man fully qualified to accomplish this difficult task in present circumstances. After very extensive consultations both with individuals and with public opinion throughout the whole extent of the territory, I have understood that the hopes of the Lebanese nation are fixed upon His Excellency M. Naccache. I have asked him to remain in power with the title and prerogatives of President of the Republic, and to govern by means of a ministry which will be responsible to him and in which the just representation of all the regions and confessions which form the Lebanese nation will be assured.

‘I assure President Naccache, as well as the Lebanese community, of my friendship and entire support.

‘The second task is to define the spirit and forms of the collaboration to be established between Lebanon and Free France, while awaiting the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and friendship.

‘In recognizing your independence, France is inspired solely by her traditional friendship with Lebanon, by her tutelary mission in this country throughout the centuries, and by the privileged position which she has thus acquired. Her aid remains assured to Lebanon in all things, in the spirit of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1936, which received the unanimous approbation of the Lebanese population. Moreover, the circumstances of war and the occupation of Lebanese territory by the Allied forces place Lebanon temporarily in a special position.

There flow from this a certain number of rights and obligations, among them in particular those stipulated below.'

The remainder of the proclamation was substantially the same, with minor and verbal variations, as the proclamation of Syrian independence.¹

This declaration was received lukewarmly by the greater part of the population. It was open to objection on various grounds. Those who advocated the union of Lebanon with Syria regarded the proclamation as a repudiation of the promise contained in Catroux's statement of June 8th, that the Syrians and Lebanese would be free to form themselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. They objected also to the assertion that Lebanon was politically and territorially an indivisible unit. A similar statement had appeared in the Syrian proclamation and had there been open to no objection; but in the Lebanese proclamation it was taken to imply that any modification of the frontiers between Syria and Lebanon was out of the question.

Furthermore, all those who were opposed to the maintenance of French control, whether they were believers in Lebanese, in Syrian or in Arab nationalism, resented the references to France's 'mission' in the Levant and the statement that the future treaty would be negotiated on the basis of the Treaty of 1936.

These criticisms were not lessened when it was announced that a Ministry had been formed, with Ahmad ad-Da'uq as Prime Minister, and composed of colourless personalities without any claim to represent the population.

12

The British Government approved of the Free French policy of proclaiming Syrian and Lebanese independence, and gave its formal recognition to both the newly independent States, in the shape of letters of congratulation sent by His Majesty King George VI, to the Syrian President on October 27th, 1941, and to the Lebanese on December 26th.

In February, 1942, Major-General Sir Edward Spears, who had been connected with the Free French movement since its beginning, and had been in the Levant as head of the 'Spears Mission' since 1941, was appointed first British Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics.

¹ For the French text, see Appendix A15.

In addition to Great Britain, the independence of Syria and Lebanon was recognized by a number of the Allied Governments in exile. That of Syria, but not of Lebanon, was recognized by Sa'udi Arabia; while Egypt recognized the independence of the Syrian State but not its present form of government. The other Arab Governments, however, withheld their recognition, preferring to make no move until the form of independence should acquire reality through the re-establishment of constitutional government. Turkey, too, gave no recognition, not having official relations with the Free French. Most important of all, the United States Government maintained a reserved attitude. Mr. Cordell Hull, in a statement issued on November 29th, 1941, stressed the sympathy which the American Government and people had always felt for the 'natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Syria and Lebanon'. The convention of 1924, in which the U.S. Government gave its consent to the Mandate, clearly embodied the principle of Syrian and Lebanese independence. It must be regarded as continuing in effect until new instruments of a mutually satisfactory nature could be negotiated and ratified. The U.S. Government was hopeful that as soon as international conditions permitted such negotiations would take place, enabling the Government to extend formal recognition to Syria and Lebanon.¹ In October, 1942, Mr. George Wadsworth was appointed U.S. Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

13

In spite of the declarations of independence, the French authorities showed no eagerness either to restore constitutional life or to transfer powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. In August, 1942, indeed, General de Gaulle stated categorically in a speech made during his visit to the Levant that elections could not yet be held. The only progress made was the issue in February, 1942, of decrees once more incorporating Jebel Druze and the Alawi district in the Syrian State, while at the same time endowing them with special administrative and financial régimes similar to those which had existed from 1936 to 1939.² Apart from this, the only political events of the years were changes of Ministries. In

¹ For text, see P. W. Ireland (ed.), *The Near East, Problems and Prospects* (Chicago, 1942), p. 236.

² See Chapter XI.

Lebanon the Government of Sami as-Sulh succeeded that of Ahmad ad-Da'uq. In Syria, Hasan al-Hakim resigned in April, 1942, and was succeeded by Husni al-Barazi, who himself gave way in January, 1943, to Jamil al-Ulshi. These changes had only a very limited significance.

This failure to restore the constitutional Government increased the discontent which had already been caused in both Syria and Lebanon by the way in which their independence had been proclaimed. The administrative methods of the Free French officials were also much criticized ; more particularly, a general contempt was felt for the many officials who had served Vichy and had only gone over to Free France after the occupation of the country in 1941. Thus the belief grew up that Syria and Lebanon had gained nothing by their change of masters. It was a belief held not only by the political classes but by ordinary citizens who resented the inefficiency of the French administration ; not only by Arab nationalists but even by many of the Lebanese Christians, who could not feel towards the Free French the admiration, gratitude and trust which they had had for France as a great Power. In the circumstances it was natural that Great Britain should be largely blamed for the actions of her ally.

One consequence of the discontent was a revival in the power of the National Bloc. The dissensions between its leaders were patched up, and the Bloc united in its demand for the restoration of the Chamber of 1936-1939 or else the holding of fresh elections. Its spokesman was Shukri al-Quwatli, whose reputation had grown steadily throughout the years. In October, 1941, shortly after the Allied occupation, he absented himself from Syria on a visit to Arabia and Iraq ; but after his return to Damascus in September, 1942, he became once more the dominant figure of the political scene. Side by side with the revival of the Bloc there went a growth in the size and influence of the Socialist and Communist movements ; this was due not so much to the spread of Marxist doctrines as to the universal discontent with the existing order and the eagerness to snatch at any hope of change.

14

In Syria and Lebanon alike, the attention of the greater part of the population was concentrated upon the economic problems of the war. Two of them were peculiarly important.

First, there was the problem of guaranteeing the supply of wheat, guarding against both the fear and the reality of shortage and putting an end to the hoarding of grain which had been going on since the beginning of the war. Shortly after the Allied occupation, a large quantity of wheat was brought into the country by the Allied authorities and sold to the wholesale merchants, for the purpose of making hoarders disgorge their stocks. Since many of the merchants either hoarded the wheat or else sold it to Turkey, this measure did not have the effect which had been hoped. For the harvest of 1942, a different plan was adopted. A Commission was appointed, with English, French, Syrian and Lebanese members, and under the ultimate control of the British and French authorities. Its task was to buy the whole wheat-crop, over and above the needs of the cultivator ; it was then to be distributed directly to the population at fixed prices and in limited amounts. This scheme also did not work well at first. The population was unused to such interference by the Government in economic processes and suspicious of its motives ; the various authorities concerned did not always agree ; there was much hoarding, and not a little corruption. But gradually things improved. In spite of numerous temporary and local difficulties, the situation of the wheat supply is not unsatisfactory.

The other problem was that of the inflationary tendencies which appeared as a consequence of the shortage of supplies, the practice of hoarding, the excessive issue of paper-money, and the general lack of confidence in the future of France and even more of the Free French.

Measures have been taken to keep this tendency within limits ; for example, in May, 1943, the restrictions upon the purchase of sterling were removed. But the danger is bound to remain so long as the war lasts. Perhaps the most important of the steps taken to improve the economic situation is the attempt which has been made through the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo to increase the local production of goods which the Middle Eastern countries need, and to improve their distribution. Established to deal with the situation caused by the shortage of shipping, the Centre has tended more and more to become a planning organization for the economic life of the area which it serves.

Unemployment, too, might have been a danger, had it not

been for the large programme of public works undertaken by the Ninth Army; they include the construction of a railway line between Haifa and Tripoli, the building of roads and the execution of schemes of irrigation.

15

After long hesitation, the Free French at last decided to restore constitutional government. This step was made easier in Syria by the death of Shaikh Taj in January, 1943. A few days later M. Helleu, who was deputizing for General Catroux, absent in North Africa, announced that the General would authorize the re-establishment of the Constitution on his return to the Levant. In March, 1943, provisional Governments were established in both Syria and Lebanon in order to make the necessary arrangements for the elections; that in Syria was headed by Ata al-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon by Dr. Ayyub Tabit.

In Syria the arrangements were soon completed. It was decided that the Chamber should consist of 124 deputies, including a number of representatives of the minorities; and that the elections for it should be held in two stages. The primary elections were held on July 10th-11th, the secondary on July 26th. They resulted in an overwhelming majority for the National Bloc. The victory of the Bloc was more complete in Damascus than in Aleppo, where there was a split in the nationalist ranks.

On August 17th, 1943, the new Chamber met and elected Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic and Faris al-Khuri President of the Chamber. A few days later a new Ministry took office, drawn almost wholly from the Bloc. It was constituted as follows:

Prime Minister	Saadullah al-Jabiri.
Minister for Foreign Affairs			Jamil Mardam Bey.
Minister of the Interior	..		Lutfi al-Haffar.
Minister of Finance	..		Khalid al-Azm.
Minister of Defence and			
Public Instruction	..		Nasuhi al-Bukhari.
Minister of Public Works			
and Supplies	Mazhar Raslan.
Minister of Justice	..		Abdur-Rahman al-Kayyali.
Minister of Agriculture			
and Commerce	..		Tawfiq Shamiyyah.

In Lebanon the preparations for the elections took longer to complete. The main question at issue was that of the distribution of seats in the new Chamber. It was agreed that the Chamber should consist only of elected members, not as previously of a majority of elected and a minority of nominated ones ; but Dr. Tabit's suggestions for allocating seats between the sects were opposed by the Moslems. M. Helleu, who had succeeded General Catroux as Delegate-General in June, was compelled to replace Dr. Tabit by Petro Trad ; and finally an agreed settlement was reached by which the Christian sects would have 30 seats and the Moslems 25.

Elections were held at the end of August. As in previous elections, the differences between the candidates were largely personal ; but there was also a conflict of principle involved, the more extreme supporters of Lebanese independence, with Emile Edde as their most prominent figure, being opposed by the more moderate advocates of autonomy, led by Bishara al-Khuri, and the Arab nationalists. The former were completely defeated in spite of the support given them by the French authorities. On September 21st the Chamber met and elected Bishara al-Khuri President of the Republic by 44 votes to nil.

The new President asked Riyadh as-Sulh to form a Ministry. A Sunni Moslem, by origin from Southern Lebanon, Riyadh as-Sulh had for long been recognized as one of the leaders of the Arab nationalists in Lebanon, and had been an associate of Shukri al-Quwatli in the ' Istiqlal ' group.

The new Ministry was composed as follows :—

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance	Riyadh as-Sulh.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice and Education	Habib Abu Shahla.
Minister of the Interior and of Posts and Telegraphs ..	Camille Shamun.
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Public Works	Salim Taqla.
Minister of Defence and Hygiene	Amir Majid Arslan.
Minister of Food Supply and National Economy	Adil Usayran.

The members of the Ministry were respectively Sunni Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic, Druze and Shi'i. Thus the convention which had grown up that the Cabinet should include representatives of all the more important sects was respected. The Ministers, however divided though they might be in religious allegiance, were united in desiring on the one hand a greater measure of self-government for Lebanon, and on the other closer relations between Lebanon and Syria.

17

Iraq recognized the independence of Syria in August and of Lebanon in October. In September the Egyptian Government announced its decision to recognize Lebanese independence and to establish legations in Damascus and Beirut. The Sa'udi Arabian Government also declared its intention to set up a legation in Damascus. These three Governments showed in this and in other ways their satisfaction with the restoration of constitutional rule in the Levant States.

These steps made possible a serious attempt by the Syrians and Lebanese to define their relations with each other, with France, with the other Arab countries and with the United Nations.¹

¹ More recent events are summarized in the Postscript.

PART FOUR
XIII. CONCLUSIONS

I

A SATISFACTORY settlement of the immediate political problems of Syria and Lebanon, as of all the Arabic-speaking countries, should fulfil three conditions. It should be compatible with the requirements of world peace ; it should be in the interest of the Arab peoples and make possible the establishment of stable Governments able to administer the Arab countries adequately and willing to work with each other and with other Governments in matters of common interest ; and it should safeguard the essential interests of the Western Powers.

These three conditions are closely connected with one another. The peace of the world cannot be secured without an improvement in the relations between the Asiatic peoples and the Western Powers. The establishment of stable Arab Governments is impossible except within a stable world-order, and except with the help of the West. The interests of the Powers cannot be maintained by armed force in opposition to the wishes of the inhabitants of the countries in which those interests lie, but only by an agreement from which both parties benefit. Thus none of the three conditions can be satisfied unless the others are.

2

Some at least of the principles on which a settlement should be based are clear. It would be generally agreed that the military and economic weakness of the Arab countries will make necessary the maintenance of foreign armed forces at certain points in the Arab world for a number of years. Subject to this reservation, it would be desirable to give the greatest measure of satisfaction to the legitimate demands of the Arab people. Those demands can be summed up in a single word : equality. The Arabs will not acquiesce in a settlement in which their desires and interests are treated as of minor importance or of none at all. They insist that in fact as well as in form they should be regarded as equal members of the community of nations. If this demand is not conceded, there is a danger that they will turn away from the community of nations and fall victims of a false nationalism based on hatred and aiming at destruction.

The recognition of equality involves the establishment of a measure of self-government equal to that which other nations possess. There is a tendency to-day to point out the dangers of national independence and to condemn sovereignty as a false ideal. That is justifiable, but those who condemn unrestricted nationalism may ignore the germ of truth in it. National self-government is a training school of political virtue, and also a source of enrichment to mankind in so far as a nation has its own vision of life which it wishes to embody in institutions and laws. It only becomes a danger when the nation falls into the sin of pride and begins to worship itself; but this is a danger for all men's communities, not for the nation alone.

A nation is only worthy of self-government, however, in so far as it is prepared to order its own conduct by the principles of justice and equality in accordance with which it demands that other nations should treat it. An Arab Government, or Governments, should be prepared to accept such limitations upon its action as are necessary for the attainment of world peace and prosperity, and to co-operate actively with other Governments to that end. It should also be prepared to re-organize the internal life of the Arab nation on a more just and equitable basis. This will involve not only the recognition of individual freedom but also sweeping social and economic changes, to raise the standard of living and remove the injustices of the existing archaic social order. Such a re-organization should be undertaken not only for its own sake but also because without it stable Government is impossible.

If the Western Powers are to retain their influence in the Middle East they should be prepared to help actively in the work of rebuilding Arab society; that is to say, to give the Arabs a permanent and positive interest in co-operating with them. They should do so without expecting immediate profits, but with the hope that in the long run their work will bear fruit. In other ways, too, they should take a long view. They should learn to regard the Arab countries as a unity, and a unified policy towards them as therefore necessary. For each Power to pursue a policy of its own, not only separate from but perhaps in opposition to that of the others, may be fatal to all in the end; and in order to preserve their essential interests it may be necessary to give up much which though not essential has been valued as if it were.

The experience of the last generation has made clear the truth of some at least of these principles. The statements of policy summarized in the last chapter may be regarded as an attempt, however imperfect, to apply them to the special problems of Syria and Lebanon.

These statements touch both the problem of Franco-British relations in the Middle East and that of Franco-Arab relations. Great Britain has recognized the priority of France's position in Syria and Lebanon over that of other European Powers, subject to the condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given their independence. It follows from this recognition, and from the more general assurances given to Free France in June, 1940, that Great Britain has an obligation not to encroach upon France's position or to use French weakness for her own gain. This does not mean, however, that she can or should wholly ignore what France does with her position. Both her recognition of the French position and her guarantee of the French declarations of 1941 make it inevitable that the Arabs will hold her responsible for the use which Free France makes of her position during the war, and also for what a restored France may do in the future. If during and after the war the French pursue a policy in the Levant States which is unacceptable to their populations, it is Great Britain as much as France which will incur the blame for it. This would have harmful effects upon Great Britain's position and influence in the Arab world.

If it would be impossible to persuade the Syrians and Lebanese to accept a continuation of Mandatory rule (under that name or another), it would be scarcely less difficult to persuade them to conclude treaties with France similar to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or the abortive Treaties of 1936. The essence of those agreements was that a weak Arab State made certain military and other concessions to a strong Western State in return for military protection and the guarantee of its independence. Such an agreement would be very difficult to achieve in this case, although there is a strong body of Free French opinion in favour of it. The Syrians and Lebanese would ask what advantage they have to gain from it. France, they say, cannot give them any better guarantee of their independence than the Atlantic Charter or the friendship of the United Nations and the Arab States have already given

them. Again, the Syrians and Lebanese will not trust France to carry out such a Treaty in the proper spirit ; they remember the bitter experiences of the last twenty years.

No doubt after the war the relations of France with Syria and Lebanon will have to be settled by means of a treaty, but it may have to be a treaty of a different sort. The two States would not, in their present mood, concede more than an agreement by which France gave up all her political interests in the Levant States, and they in return guaranteed the one essential French interest : her cultural position and the institutions which nourish it. Even this agreement would be difficult to make in view of mutual suspicions and unhappy memories. It will only be possible if Great Britain and the U.S.A. use their influence with both sides. They can make it clear to the Syrians and Lebanese that they are underwriting the French renunciation of political designs ; and that in the long run it will be an advantage to the Arabs to have a centre of French culture in Arab Asia. To France they can point out that her cultural influence has been seriously damaged and almost killed by the policy she has followed in the last twenty-five years ; and that they are not asking her to sacrifice her interests but only to pursue a new policy which will as a matter of fact be more in her interest than the old. (Whether or not the Syrians, the Lebanese and the French will be disposed to listen to these British and American explanations will, of course, depend largely on the general nature of their relations with Great Britain and America ; in particular the Syrian and Lebanese attitude will be much affected by the policy of the Anglo-Saxon Powers towards Zionism.)

4

In these circumstances the question of the defence of Syria and Lebanon would presumably form the subject of a further agreement or treaty ; not a treaty with France, however, but with a group of the United Nations, of which France would be one. The details of such an agreement cannot be worked out here ; but it may, as has already been stated, be necessary for certain strong points to be occupied by foreign armed forces for a period of years. Whatever arrangement is made to this end will have to fulfil two conditions if it is to be acceptable to the inhabitants. The first is, that the nationalists should not have an opportunity for believing that their

country is being asked to make concessions which are not demanded of other countries, or which imply a disbelief in its ability to manage its own affairs or a distrust of its intentions. More positively, provision should be made for the co-operation of the Government of the country with the Power or authority in control of the strong points. Secondly, it should be made clear that the arrangements in regard to the holding of strong points are made purely for strategic reasons ; that they do not constitute an occupation of the country ; and that the controlling Power or authority has neither the right nor the wish to use its position to interfere in the country's domestic affairs and foreign policy.

Two developments of the present war might make a military agreement more acceptable even to the less moderate nationalists than it would otherwise be. First, the lease of naval bases in British territory to the United States provides a precedent which might be followed. If the British Government is willing to lease territory to other Powers, a Syrian or Lebanese Government could not resent being asked to do likewise. Secondly, the present military co-operation between the United Nations may be made the basis for an international security system, under which strong points would be occupied by forces responsible to an international authority. The Syrian or Lebanese State, which might object to handing over strong points to a single Power or group of Powers with political and economic interests of its own to further, could not object to handing them over to an international authority on which it would itself be represented.

5

Another question which is bound to be raised in the next few years is that of the relations between Syria and Lebanon. It is certain that there must be a close connexion between them. Syrians and Lebanese are not foreigners to one another ; they are allied by interest, by feeling and by common characteristics. Moreover, the official connexion between the two Republics is very close. They have a single financial and customs system, and there are virtually no restrictions upon the movement of goods and persons between them ; and they possess a number of common administrative services, which until recently were controlled on their behalf by the French authorities but have now been handed over in

principle to joint commissions on which the two Governments are represented.¹ It would be generally agreed that the two States must co-operate at least in some of these matters ; but there is much disagreement, in Syria and Lebanon alike, over the form and degree of the connexion between them.

It is possible to distinguish two extreme views and a number of intermediate positions. On the one hand, there is a school of Arab nationalist thought, common among the Moslems in both Syria and Lebanon, which does not recognize the claim of Lebanon to independence, but regards it as a province of Syria or of the Arab world, distinguished, it is true, from the other provinces by tradition and religious loyalty. At most a limited and temporary autonomy should be granted it, and then only after it had been definitely incorporated in a Syrian or Arab State and reduced to the limits it possessed in Turkish days. At the other extreme is the strong Maronite element which desires Lebanon to be wholly independent of the Arab hinterland ; its relations with Syria should be those of a good neighbour, and it should co-operate with other Middle Eastern States in economic and other matters of common interest, but fundamentally it should regard itself as part of Europe and not of the Arab world. Its eyes should be turned westwards ; and its independence should be guaranteed either by a group of Western States or by a single Western State which would take a special religious and cultural interest in it.

It is probable that the majority of those who think seriously about the question do not believe in either of these two extreme views. There are many Arab nationalists, both Christian and Moslem and in both Syria and Lebanon, who recognize that Lebanon has a special part to play in regard to Syria and to Arab Asia generally. It can be a centre from which Western influences radiate to other Arab countries ; a place where Christians and Moslems learn to live together on a footing of equality and mutual respect ; and a haven where Christians and heterodox Moslems feel safe, and gradually forget their fears of Pan-Arabism and of Sunni domination. Moreover, there are many Lebanese Christians, Druzes and Shi'is who, although not adhering to Arab nationalism and distrustful of it, understand that they cannot live without the most intimate links with Syria and other countries of Arab

¹ See Postscript.

Asia, and are eager for the establishment of such links on condition that their position in Lebanon is safeguarded. There is also a Christian group (and this may be the most important of all for the future) which regards the Lebanese and Syrian Christians as having a special mission not only in Syria and Lebanon but in the whole Arab world—to re-state Christianity in Arabic, to interpret and stand for it in the face of the Moslem world ; this mission they can only perform if, while being integrally a part of the Arab world, they have one place in that world where they feel completely at home. Even then their position will not be easy, for they will live in a state of tension and will undergo many temptations, including the temptation to despair ; but they are willing to endure their difficulties and make them fruitful.

These various ' intermediate positions ' rest upon different principles and assumptions, but they all imply the same view of Lebanon's political future. On the one hand, it should have a relation with Syria and the other Arab countries which is much more than the external relation of independent States to one another ; on the other, it should have liberty to develop its own life and make its own choices. It should possess a character of its own as a centre of Christian life, of Western culture and of religious toleration ; but its life should be for the whole of the Arab world and not for itself alone.

This involves a claim for political equality with other Arab regions. If Syria is independent, Lebanon too should be independent ; if a Greater Syrian or Arab federation is formed, Lebanon should enter it as a member-state on a level with the other members. At the very least, it should possess a full and guaranteed autonomy. For it to maintain and secure such a position will not be easy ; it will always be drawn towards the false extremes of complete immersion in the Arab world and isolation from it, and there will always be a danger of its precarious inner balance being overturned. Such dangers can only be overcome if certain conditions are fulfilled : first, that the Arab nationalist movement as a whole becomes a movement towards the West and so comes to appreciate the peculiar value of Lebanon to the Arab world ; secondly, that the Western Powers take an interest in maintaining the sort of Lebanon defined above ; but thirdly that those Western Powers at the same time take an interest in

the fate of the Arab world as a whole and do not try to use Lebanon as a bastion against the Arabs.

One other condition must be mentioned. Lebanon cannot fulfil its mission if it is dominated by sectarianism. Loyalty to the sect must be held in check by the consciousness of Lebanon as a whole, which itself must be balanced by a healthy Arab national spirit. This will be impossible so long as large portions of the Lebanese population are not reconciled to being parts of Lebanon at all and do not accept the view here stated of the nature of Lebanon. This situation can only be remedied by making certain that the political life of the country is not dominated by a single sect, but rests on a firm union between Christians, orthodox and heterodox Moslems working together in common tasks on a footing of equality.¹

6

A third problem which must be solved is that of the minorities, especially of the 'compact' minorities, the Druzes and Alawis. It should be clear from previous chapters that the problem in the exacerbated form which it had throughout the Mandatory period (although not, of course, in its essence) was a product of the general problem of Franco-Arab relations. The Arab nationalists objected to the grant of autonomy to minorities because they suspected the motives of France. For this reason, it is of extreme importance to draw a clear distinction between whatever military agreement is made with Syria by France or the United Nations and any arrangements which are made for the protection of the minorities. The killing of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 was due largely to the failure to make this distinction clear. The Iraqi Arabs believed that the British Government planned to make use of the Assyrians to retain its military hold over the country even after the Mandate had been brought to an end by the Treaty of 1931; many of the Assyrians believed that the British Government would intervene in their support should a conflict arise between them and the Arabs. The result was suspicion and fear on the one side, and intransigence on the other. A similar situation might arise in Syria or Lebanon were the minorities to think that in the last resort they could always fall back upon invoking armed intervention from outside, or the Arab nationalists to fear that the minorities

¹ For recent changes in Lebanese feeling, see Postscript.

were lending themselves as tools to some foreign Power which planned to win back by devious means the political control which it had formally abandoned.

Provided this essential distinction is made clear, there is no reason to believe that there will arise between a nationalist Government and the 'compact' minorities that state of abnormal tension and mutual suspicion which issues in civil war and massacre. There will, it is true, be administrative grievances, petty tyranny and misunderstandings. It is impossible even in the most tranquil times wholly to prevent them ; and if the wounds which they cause are left to fester they may prove dangerous. But they can be minimized and the harm which they do remedied by the provision of suitable administrative machinery. The Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 laid down, and the Proclamation of Syrian Independence in 1941 re-asserted, the principles which ought to underlie the treatment of the most important of the 'compact' communities, the Druzes and Alawis : on the one hand, their districts should be regarded as integral parts of the Syrian State, but on the other they should be granted within that State tactful and sympathetic administrative treatment adapted to their special needs and traditions. So long as all parties concerned adhere to both these principles and understand the equal importance of both, Druze and Alawi particularism should not present an insoluble problem.

7

In the Jazirah, as in Jebel Druze, the question is one of reconciling two factors : on the one hand, the Christians are frightened of Moslem domination and the Kurds unwilling to accept Arab rule, while the Arabs on their side may tend to underrate the peculiar needs of the region ; but on the other, it is almost inconceivable that the Jazirah, geographically situated as it is, should ultimately become anything except a part of Syria or Iraq. It would be extremely dangerous for the inhabitants if a foreign Power were to hold out to them the hope of permanent autonomy or independence under foreign control. But the Arabs on their side could make the process of absorption easier by wise administration and forbearance. The problem is therefore how to give the Jazirah the special administration which it needs without by so doing encouraging a dream of self-sufficiency or foreign protection.

For the scattered minorities in Syria also there is no possible course except partial assimilation : to learn Arabic if they are not already Arabic-speaking, to perform the duties of ordinary citizens and to share in the communal life of the majority. Equally there is no policy possible for the majority except to make this course easier. Every suggested measure for protecting the minorities is therefore to be judged by whether or not it helps towards assimilation. Protection by a foreign Power is likely to be harmful because it encourages the minorities to believe that assimilation is not necessary. Formal guarantees embodied in constitutions or in international instruments are useful in that they may help to give the minorities a greater feeling of security and to create in the citizens of the State as a whole a consciousness of high standards of toleration and duty. But they are only partially effective. In abnormal times they would be swept aside ; while in normal times discrimination against the minorities is likely to result not from bad intentions on the part of the central Government so much as from lack of understanding or from officiousness on the part of particular officials, or else from purely local causes. The immediate problem is therefore how to minimize the effect of local or personal factors and prevent their influence spreading.

8

No agreement upon the future of Syria and Lebanon would be complete unless it took into account their relations with the other Arab countries. There is a general desire and indeed a need for closer relations than exist at present. Precisely what form these relations would take is a difficult question. But two principles on which they should rest can be stated with assurance : the first, that to be successful a scheme of union must spring from the practical necessities of co-operation between the different countries, and must take into account the varying stages of development, the divergent needs and the mutual jealousies and suspicions of different branches of the Arab people ; and the second, that such a scheme must be drawn up by the Arabs themselves.

But although Arab union must be achieved by the Arabs in their own way and their own time, Great Britain is in a position to give them assistance in their task. Her Government is indeed committed to doing so, both by the general trend of

its policy and by specific undertakings. Thus Mr. Eden, in his speech at the Mansion House on May 29th, 1941, said :

‘ This country has a long tradition of friendship with the Arabs, a friendship that has been proved by deeds, not words alone. We have countless well-wishers among them, as they have many friends here. Some days ago I said in the House of Commons that His Majesty’s Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would go further. The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties, between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government, for their part, will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.’¹

He repeated the main points in this statement in answer to a question in the House of Commons on February 24th, 1943.²

The first result of this encouragement was seen in the middle of 1943, when the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, held a series of discussions on Arab union with representatives of the Iraqi, Transjordanian, Sa’udi Arabian and Syrian Governments. At the end of these discussions it was widely expected that Nahhas Pasha would summon a general Arab conference in order to draw up a practicable and precise scheme.³

9

What are the possibilities of a union of geographical Syria : that is, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan ? Before any such union could be established, a number of practical problems would have to be solved. They spring mainly from the division of geographical Syria into areas of British and French influence. This division has led to the development of

¹ *The Times*, May 30th, 1941.

² *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, Vol. 387, col. 139.

³ For more recent developments in the movement for Arab unity, see Postscript.

partly different systems of law, administration and education, and to cultural differences, which would cause serious difficulty both in the construction of a unified political system and in the successful working of it. What is more important still, the existence of four separate Governments for the last two decades has combined with the natural centrifugal tendency of Arab society to produce local ambitions and feeling and vested interests which it will not be easy to break down ; the rivalry of families and dynasties is only one example of these ambitions and interests. Moreover, it is possible that the French would use their influence against the establishment of a union, from fear that it would mean in practice an extension of British influence in an area which was previously under French control ; how deep and important the resultant tension would be would depend upon the future form of Anglo-French relations and upon the future of French influence in the Levant.

The existence of these problems would make it impossible to establish in the first instance any more than a very loose union ; or perhaps no more than a number of *ad hoc* agreements and joint commissions. Even this, however, would be worth while, since it would arrest the tendency of the four sections of geographical Syria to fall apart from one another. They still form in a sense a single community ; and it would be harmful to all of them if the divisions introduced after the last war continued and led to the break-up of that community.

Even when the effects of artificial division had been wiped out, it would still not be possible to establish a simple unitary State. If the future State of Greater Syria is in principle unitary, it will have to provide for a great measure of administrative decentralization and also for the autonomy of Lebanon. Many thinkers, however, are coming to believe that a unitary State would be less satisfactory than a loose federation, into which Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine would enter as members on an equal footing.

To Arab minds, the inclusion of Palestine in such a federation presupposes the solution of the Zionist problem through the virtual stoppage of Jewish immigration and the establishment of a national Government with an Arab majority.

Although both Jews and Arabs have been quiescent since the outbreak of the war, the problem is no nearer solution now than it was in 1939. The Arabs, not only in Palestine but also in the surrounding countries, are still obsessed by the fear of a Jewish state and of Jewish economic domination, and by resentment against the injustice done to the indigenous people of Palestine. The Jews still refuse, both on principle and because they want security, to live as a minority under Arab rule ; and the horror of the Jewish tragedy in Europe has made them less willing than ever to shut the doors of Palestine against their brothers of the Dispersion. Furthermore, there are still particular issues at stake, which would be grave enough even if the spirits of both sides were not inflamed. These issues have narrowed themselves down to one point : does the British Government intend to carry out the policy of the White Paper of 1939 ? The provisions of the White Paper in regard to the restriction of land sales and of immigration have been carried out at least in principle ; but it still remains to be seen whether His Majesty's Government intends to end immigration after the arrival in Palestine of the 75,000 immigrants who, by the provisions of the White Paper, were to be the last unless Arab consent could be obtained, and whether it will take steps to establish a national administration. Both sides are waiting upon the decision ; and each is prepared to take active measures should the decision go against it.

The Arabs would probably accept the White Paper, not indeed as a final solution of the problem, since for them there can be no such solution until an Arab Palestine is included in an Arab union, but as putting an end to the immediate and pressing dangers. The Zionists would never accept it on any terms ; and the greater part of them appear to have given up the possibility of a settlement by compromise, and to be adopting a maximal programme : large-scale immigration immediately after the war, and the formation of the whole or part of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth. They hope to achieve their ends either by influencing the Governments and peoples of the United Nations, or else by their own strength. Some of the Zionists, however, still believe that an agreement is possible ; and they hope that the establishment of a Greater Syrian or an Arab Federation will help to solve the problem, in that the Arabs would then

feel secure enough to permit a larger measure of Jewish immigration and self-government. Various schemes based on this idea have been put forward. Some, the more hopeful, think that if the Arab demand for union were satisfied in the rest of the Fertile Crescent, the Arabs would be prepared to permit the establishment of an independent State in the whole of Palestine or else, as the Royal Commission proposed in 1937, in part of it. Others want not an independent State but a Jewish member-state of the Federation or else a bi-national member-state, covering the whole of Palestine, representing the Arabs and Jews equally and permitting further immigration until the Jews come nearer than at present to forming half the population.

Such plans do not estimate rightly the intensity of the Arab fear of Zionism. The Arabs are determined at the very least to limit the danger, as they regard it, to Palestine, and if possible to end it even in Palestine. They are therefore not prepared to discuss the definitive status of the Jews in Palestine, or the relation of Palestine to the surrounding countries, until the questions of immigration and land-purchase have been settled. In other words, they regard the inclusion of Palestine in an Arab Federation not as a substitute for the White Paper, but as only to be considered after the White Paper has been applied.

It would be idle to speculate at the present moment how the deadlock can be ended ; much depends on the numbers and situation of the Jews in Eastern Europe after the war, and upon the general settlement of the European problem, much, too, on questions of world-power and world-strategy which cannot now be discussed profitably. But a book on Arab affairs may be pardoned for emphasizing one point which has hitherto been ignored in most discussions of the Palestinian situation : that in addition to a world Jewish problem there is a world Arab problem. It is not simply a question of avoiding injustice or granting compensation to a million peasants in Palestine, it is a question of what form the new unshaped Arab nation is to take, and what part it will play in the world. In Chapter VI the alternatives which lie before the Arabs have been defined : they are those of communion with the West and of excommunication from it. Nothing is so likely to drive the Arabs to make the wrong choice as the continuation of a Zionist policy which they

regard as unjust. It cannot fail to arouse in the Arabs, as it would in any nation similarly placed, strong hostility both towards the Jews and the Western States.

The Arabs will regard as unjust any policy which has not received their prior consent ; and they will not consent to any policy of which the result is likely to be the political or economic domination of any part of the Arab world by the Zionists. If they cannot be persuaded to change their attitude, there are only two possibilities open to Zionism. First, it can try to win the trust of the Arabs by a radical change in its policy ; but this would involve abandoning the ideal which is at the heart of political Zionism. Secondly, it can continue to pursue its present aims in the face of Arab enmity : risking the dangers which that involves in its sense of the Jewish need for Palestine and in the hope that sooner or later the hostility of the Arabs will disappear. This is the tragic choice which faces the Zionists to-day.

11

A union between geographical Syria and Iraq is a further possibility. The two countries differ widely in their economic and social systems ; and there are local interests and jealousies which have been stimulated if not created by the political divisions of the last twenty years, the existence of several Governments, and the vested interests which are bound up with them. In the first instance, therefore, only a loose federation and not a unitary State would be worth considering. The establishment of a federation would raise difficult constitutional questions, which are not, however, insuperable. It would also raise an even more difficult question. Where would be the centre of power in a Syro-Iraqi State ? It would be bound to happen, at least in the early years of the State's existence, that differences of opinion or of interest would arise between the constituent members of the Federation ; skilful drafting of the Constitution would minimize, but not altogether remove the possibility of this occurring. This would cause friction between the two partners, which might be fatal to the Federation. Furthermore, a Syro-Iraqi union would raise in an aggravated form the question of the dynastic rivalries, particularly that of the rivalry between the Hashimite family, which rules Transjordan and Iraq and formerly ruled

Hejaz, and the Sa'udi family which is now master of the greater part of Arabia.

These factors would probably make it impossible to establish even the loosest of federations at the present time. This does not mean, however, that nothing can be done to draw closer the bonds between Iraq and geographical Syria. Both would gain from close collaboration in matters of defence, foreign policy and national education, and the establishment of joint institutions to deal with such economic matters as they have in common.

12

Finally, what are the prospects for a wider union, to include not only geographical Syria and Iraq but also Sa'udi Arabia, the Yemen and Egypt? Even the loosest federation could not be established in the near future. It would raise all the problems dealt with above, some of them, such as the dynastic question, in an even more acute form. New difficulties would also arise: the consciousness of unity and solidarity would probably not be intense and effective enough to outweigh local loyalties and prejudices and also the existence of a very strong Egyptian nationalism. Moreover, the present differences in social and cultural standards between the different parts of the Arab world would make it extremely difficult to frame a common policy for the whole area.

A great deal can, however, be done—and it is very important that it should be done—to strengthen the existing ties between the countries of Arab Asia and Egypt. It would be possible to set up a permanent council and subsidiary institutions for mutual consultation and assistance and the elaboration of a common foreign policy. Trade agreements, the adoption of a common tariff-policy and the establishment of a joint planning authority would strengthen the economic interdependence of the Arab countries; the foundations for this already exist in the linking of the local currencies to sterling and the economic co-operation which the exigencies of the present war have compelled. Cultural relations are already close: Iraqi and Arabian students go to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, and Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian teachers to Iraq and Arabia; Egyptian books and periodicals are read, Egyptian films seen and Egyptian broadcasts listened to throughout the Arab world. The unification of educational systems and programmes has

been discussed and could be carried out up to a certain point.

13

On all these subjects there is much discussion at present between the statesmen and in the journals of the Arab countries ; but the most important step which has been taken towards union has come from the British and American Governments, with the establishment of the Middle East Supply Centre. Established as a war-time institution, with the object of limiting imports and exports in view of the limited shipping available, it is gradually becoming a body for co-ordinating the policies of the Middle Eastern Governments over a wide range of economic matters. It has, for example, arranged for conferences on such questions as rationing, the control of locusts and agriculture. It is to be hoped that it will continue in existence even after the war is over, and form a permanent economic planning organization. But if it were to fulfil this function adequately it would have to become more than an Anglo-American institution ; it would have to include representatives of all the Arab countries.

14

The settlement of the relations of the Arab countries with the Western Powers and with one another is an essential condition of political stability in the Middle East. Unless it is achieved, it is useless to look for that co-operative spirit among Arab nationalists towards the West to bring which into existence should be one of the main aims of Western policy. Again, it will place the Arabs in a position to think concretely and seriously about their problems, by giving them responsibility for the solution of them. But it will not in itself solve those problems. The Western Powers should not imagine that once they have helped to set up a workable system of Arab government their task in the Middle East is over and their essential interests safeguarded by the forces of Arab gratitude. Political friendship cannot rest upon gratitude for past favours but only upon the consciousness of present and future interest. If the Western Powers wish to preserve both their moral influence and their material interests in the Arab countries, they can only do so on the one hand by helping the Arabs to solve the problems of which they are conscious and

on the other by convincing the Arabs that their help is essential. The Arabs for their part should be prepared, once their political equality with the West has been firmly established, to welcome Western co-operation in solving their problems.

There will be many such problems in every sphere of action. The whole position of the Arabs in world-politics, and their relations with the Great Powers, may be changed by the growth of Russian influence in the Middle East. There are here the seeds of dislocation, even of conflict, unless all parties act with restraint. In order to prevent the excessive growth of suspicion and hostility it would be desirable for the Government of the U.S.S.R. to be associated on some level with any settlement of the political problem of Arab independence and union which is reached after the war. A smaller but nevertheless urgent problem is that of clarifying Turkey's policy towards the Arabs and removing the distrust which many of them still feel towards her since the Alexandretta affair.

In internal politics the most urgent task to be accomplished is the spread of genuine political education : that is to say, the willingness to take responsibility, and to treat the Government not as an enemy or an instrument of private profit but as a means to the public welfare ; the wisdom and knowledge to exercise responsibility fruitfully ; and the power of working together and of expressing the national will through political institutions. This task involves a change in the whole spirit of the Arab people.

No less urgent is the change which must be effected in the economic and social structure. It would be out of place here to discuss in detail the question what economic and social system is most suitable to the Arabs, but on the desirability of certain reforms there would be general agreement, except among those whose private interests would be damaged by them. There is a widespread desire for the raising of the standard of public health ; for irrigation, improved agricultural methods and education, the establishment of agricultural co-operatives and credit institutions ; the reform of the system of land tenure ; the foundation of those industries for which the local circumstances are propitious, and the provision of facilities for financing them ; the raising of the level of general education, and the creation of an intellectual élite. These are preliminary tasks which must be accomplished before a stable economic and social life can be established.

Such changes will certainly bring others in their train. As industry develops and agricultural standards are raised, an urban middle class and proletariat and an enlightened peasantry will arise to challenge the at present uncontested power of the landowners. The rivalry of social classes will have political consequences, which may be delayed for a time so long as the nationalists are united in the pursuit of self-government and unity, but will surely arise sooner or later. What form these political consequences will take is still obscure, but it is certain that the near future will see the growth of strong Social Democratic and Communist movements, and the spread of other parties, which propose far-reaching social reforms. (It was mentioned in Chapter XII that the years of war have already seen the beginnings of such a development.) In these circumstances, it would be dangerous if Great Britain or the Western Powers were identified in the mind of the rising classes with the landowners; and if they were regarded as obstacles to a change in the balance of social classes. That might happen in several ways. It might be thought that a Western Power was using its influence in order to maintain in office a Government which was opposed to social change; or again Western business firms might be regarded as hindrances to the creation of an indigenous industry or the raising of the standard of living of the workers. This danger would be lessened if unofficial Western institutions were to take a leading part in social reform movements, but always in response to a felt need and in partnership with Arab institutions.

In another sphere, that of culture, the Western nations have as great a part to play. The task of the next two or three generations of Arab thinkers will be, as was that of their predecessors, to deepen their understanding of European civilization and of their own predicament, and to spread that understanding on one level to an intellectual élite and on another to the common people by means of the educational systems which are being built up. They cannot do this without Western help: teachers in their schools and universities, advisers in their departments of education, scholars and thinkers fertilizing the intellectual movement in Cairo, Beirut and wherever else it may be found. In this age, when the Arab intellect is still unformed, an immense influence may be gained by a few individuals who possess the necessary

virtues : courage and clearness in their thought, devotion to their task and respect for those whom they are privileged to serve.

15

One other, more fundamental, problem underlies all those mentioned here, as it underlies all which has been written in this book. In the last century the natural order of human relationships has been perverted in the dealings between the Arabs and the West. Instead of mutual respect and understanding and co-operation in tasks of common concern, there have been contempt, hatred, the claim to dominate, the claim to be left alone and a failure of understanding. To impute motives or to ascribe blame would be idle ; it is the problem of the future which alone matters. How can a healthy moral relationship be restored between Europe and the Arabs? This in its turn gives rise to a further question : how can a healthy spiritual relationship be established between Islam and Christianity? At this point, where political thought reaches its limit, our essay must come to an end.

POSTSCRIPT : THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1943,
TO APRIL, 1945

I

CHAPTER XII carried the political history of Syria and Lebanon down to the restoration of constitutional forms and the assumption of office by national Governments (in Damascus in August, 1943, and in Beirut in September).¹ From the first it was clear that the nationalists did not regard their accession to power as the end of the national struggle. Syria and Lebanon had been formally recognized as independent in 1941, and the restoration of the constitutions could be regarded as the first step towards making self-government a reality ; but there were still other steps to be taken. Some of them could not, it is true, be taken before the end of the war. In his proclamations of independence, General Catroux had explicitly stated that the needs of war required Syria and Lebanon to conduct their policy in accordance with that of the Allies. The Allies must assume responsibility for the defence of the country and its war production, and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should place their armed forces at the Allies' disposal for those purposes, as well as aerodromes, harbours and communications ; and the closest collaboration should exist between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Free French Delegate-General on the one hand and the Syrian and Lebanese police and gendarmerie on the other. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should also collaborate with the Allies in matters concerning the economic war, and should follow the general policy of the sterling bloc in the economic and financial spheres.²

Such restrictions were recognized to be necessary by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, which looked on them as a contribution they could make to the Allied war-effort. There were, however, other limitations upon their freedom of action.

First, there were limitations upon the legislative power of the two Governments, imposed on the one hand by the power of the Delegate-General to legislate by summary decree, and on the other by certain general reservations contained in the Syrian and Lebanese Constitutions. Thus Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution stated :—

‘Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et

¹See pp. 256, 257.

²See pp. 247, 250.

ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included :

i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for

internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.)

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed :

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of

revenue. Control of concessionary companies would give them authority over the railway administration, the ports, the water and electricity companies and the tobacco monopoly, all of them in the hands of French companies and between them covering an important section of the country's economic life. The transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' would make possible the creation of Syrian and Lebanese Armies.

2

Faced with these demands the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (C.F.L.N.) defined its attitude sharply. In the first place, it claimed that it had inherited the Mandate from the French Republic ; the Mandate conferred upon France certain obligations which neither she nor the Syrians and Lebanese were entitled to repudiate ; they could only be ended or modified by the League of Nations or whatever organization might replace it. No definitive change of a radical kind could therefore be made until the League were revived or a successor to it established.

Secondly, the Committee, while admitting the possibility of a transfer of powers, sought to make it conditional on the willingness of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to conclude with them Treaties guaranteeing on the one hand the independence of the two States and on the other the special position and interests of France. The declarations of independence had foreshadowed the conclusion of such Treaties ; and it was therefore claimed that the grant of independence had been conditional upon it.

Subsequently, under the pressure of events, the Committee admitted the right of the two Governments to demand immediate legislative and administrative concessions, but emphasized that the transfer of powers should take place in a correct way. In view of the importance of the issues involved, it should only take place after negotiation and agreement with the representatives of France. Any attempt to modify the present situation by unilateral action, without such formal agreement, could only be regarded as a deliberate insult to France.

To each of these theses the Syrians and Lebanese had an answer. To the first, they replied that they had never recognized the Mandate, which had been imposed upon them against their will and without their consent being asked.

Furthermore, they did not recognize the Algiers Committee as the legitimate inheritor of the Mandatory obligations of France. Even granting, however, that Free France had inherited the Mandate, General Catroux had proclaimed the independence of the two States, not as something to be granted in the future, but as something to take effect from the moment of his proclamation. It might be that technically Free France had had no authority to end the Mandate, but in practice the Mandate had ceased to exist on the day of his declaration ; and unless Free France wished to go back upon the declaration and the proclamations of independence, she was bound henceforth to treat the Mandate as virtually a dead letter.

To the second argument, that the C.F.L.N. could only make the desired concessions in return for the conclusion of treaties, they replied that the declarations of independence, while envisaging the possibility of such treaties, had in no way made the grant of independence conditional upon their being negotiated. Independence had been given unconditionally (except for the limitations made necessary by the state of war) ; and if Syria and Lebanon were really independent, they had a right to decide for themselves whether or not to make treaties with a foreign State, and could not be forced into it by the threat that powers which were already theirs by right would otherwise be withheld. Furthermore, they had no intention of signing Treaties if at all, until after the war, since they had no reason to believe that France would then necessarily honour treaties concluded in her name by the C.F.L.N.

As for the third argument, that the concessions demanded could only be made by means of agreements, they, too, preferred that the questions at issue should be settled if possible through agreement with the C.F.L.N. But if the Committee were unwilling, as it at first seemed to be, they could not give up their right to take matters into their own hands. What did the independence of a State mean, if it could not unilaterally alter its constitution and establish its own administrative services ?

Beneath these arguments and replies there lay an intense mutual distrust and suspicion, which were the real cause of the crisis. The nationalists of Syria and Lebanon had no confidence in the willingness of France ever to grant them genuine self-government. They were afraid that unless they

exerted pressure nothing would be done ; and that after the war, if France's strength revived, she would attempt to re-establish her position by force. It was therefore vital for them, while it was possible, to put themselves in a position in which the opposition of France to their aspirations could no longer harm them. It was particularly important to obtain possession of those administrative services which had always been used as instruments of French policy, and might still be used to obstruct the new Nationalist governments during the war and subsequently to overthrow them : the *Sûreté Générale* and the *Services Spéciaux*, the Funds of Common Interest, the *Troupes Spéciales*.

The French on their side regarded the claims of the Syrians and Lebanese as part of a movement which was primarily and deliberately anti-French, and of which the purpose was to take advantage of France's weakness in order to destroy French influence in the Levant. They would have preferred to make no concessions to Arab nationalism at all ; but since they were bound to do so in virtue of promises already made, they would only do so in return for a guarantee of their position and interests. To give up the Common Interests and other services, the one bargaining counter they had, without obtaining such a guarantee would be a severe blow to French national prestige and to the movement of revival which since 1941 had placed a symbolic value upon Syria and Lebanon.

3

The neighbouring Arab States were deeply concerned in the struggle of Syria and Lebanon for self-government. They had always been interested in it because of ties of language and sentiment ; but in 1943 the matter became even more important because of the current discussions on Arab unity. Reference has already been made to these discussions in Chapters XII and XIII. It has been mentioned that after the re-establishment of constitutional forms in Syria, Nahhas Pasha invited the Syrian Government to send representatives to discuss the Arab question with him. The Syrian delegation visited Cairo in October and held conversations on Arab unity with the Egyptian Premier ; its visit aroused much public attention in Egypt, and it was generally expected that a Lebanese delegation would soon follow it to Cairo. Thus the Levant States were drawn into the movement for unity ; for

political, strategic and economic reasons it was impossible to conceive of an Arab union in which they were not included ; but it was clear that they could not take an effective part in that movement until they possessed self-government and effective freedom of political action. It was therefore a general Arab interest to see Syria and Lebanon possessed of self-government. More than that, if a crisis should arise over the grant of self-government, it would be vital for the other Arab countries to give what help they could to the Syrians and Lebanese, because such a crisis would be a test of the effective strength of Arab unity. In regard to Lebanon there was a special reason for going to her help : Lebanon was only half-heartedly Arab nationalist, and nothing would strengthen her Arab sentiment so much as a practical demonstration of the concern of the other Arab countries for her welfare and of the benefits she could obtain from their assistance.

4

It was in fact the Lebanese Government which first challenged the French on the issue of the transfer of powers. The new Prime Minister, Riyadh as-Sulh, made a statement of policy to the Chamber on October 7th, 1943, announcing the Government's intention to propose a revision of the Constitution. This, he said, would be purged of all provisions inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, so that henceforward no authorities other than the legitimate representatives of the nation would participate in its government. During the following weeks the Government, while preparing its constitutional measure, was also engaged in controversy with the French authorities as to its right to modify the Constitution without previous agreement with the Mandatory Power. The controversy was made public by C.F.L.N. in a communiqué dated November 5th. This stated that the Committee could not recognize the validity of a unilateral revision of the Constitution ; but that this decision did not affect the determination of France ' to accord Lebanon complete independence by means of negotiations conducted between the two parties in the spirit of loyal and friendly collaboration which must continue as in the past to inspire the special relations uniting Lebanon and France'. The Lebanese Government proceeded with the arrangements they

had made for submitting their measure to the Chamber, where it was carried by 48 votes to none on the 8th. The amendments affected the following Articles of the Constitution :

Article 1. References to the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations were eliminated, and Lebanon was described as ' a sovereign State '.

Article 11. French was no longer described as an official language.

Article 52. The treaty-making power was no longer to be limited by the reservations laid down in the Mandate.

Articles 90-94. These were annulled. They had provided that the exercise of the constitutional powers of Lebanese authorities should be subject to the maintenance of the Mandatory's rights and obligations ; that Lebanon should eventually enter the League of Nations through the good offices of the Mandatory ; that good relations would be maintained with ' the neighbouring countries under French Mandate ' ; that disputes liable to lead to war should be submitted to the Mandatory's arbitration ; and that agreements would be reached between Lebanon and France for the representation of the former, in countries where Lebanese residents were numerous, by means of attachés in French diplomatic and consular missions.

Articles 95 and 102. References to the Mandate were omitted.

On November 10th, two days after the passage of these amendments through the Chamber, M. Helleu returned from a visit to Algiers. In the early hours of the following morning the Lebanese President and the majority of the Ministers were, by his order, arrested and removed from Beirut. A few hours later the Delegate-General issued decrees declaring the amendments null and void, suspending the Constitution, dissolving the Chamber and appointing Emile Edde—Bishara al-Khuri's unsuccessful opponent in the recent elections—as Head of the State and the Government.

These measures caused immediate and vigorous reactions, both in Lebanon and elsewhere. Throughout the next eleven days there was a general strike in the Lebanese towns ; shops were shut, the ordinary newspapers ceased to appear and there were demonstrations in the streets. These led to clashes with

French troops, and to the death or injury of a number of civilians. The two Ministers who had not been arrested, together with a majority of the Deputies, continued to assert their authority from a mountain retreat and began to organize an armed force.

During these critical days the Lebanese people displayed a striking unity. The national cause took precedence over deep-seated sectarian conflicts, and very few even among the Maronites dissociated themselves from the united front. Edde failed to form a political cabinet, and was forced to attempt the expedient of a council of civil servants.

Nevertheless, the country remained outwardly calm. That the Lebanese did not resort to an armed rising was due in large part to the confidence of their leaders in the value of the diplomatic support which they received from the Governments of the independent Arab States, of the United States and of Great Britain. The British attitude was defined by Mr. Law in the House of Commons on November 23rd :

‘ The interest of His Majesty’s Government in this dispute is twofold. First of all, we have endorsed the promises of independence given to the Lebanese people by General Catroux in 1941. His Majesty’s Government have followed with sympathy and interest the subsequent development of constitutional government in the Lebanon. Secondly, the Lebanon is of vital importance to the war effort both as an operational base and from the point of view of communications. Any threat of a breakdown of law and order is therefore of direct concern to His Majesty’s Government.’

Impressed by the gravity of the situation created by M. Helleu’s drastic action, the C.F.L.N. sent General Catroux to take charge in Beirut. He arrived there on the 19th and, having examined the situation in all its aspects, recommended the reinstatement of the Lebanese President, the release of the imprisoned Ministers and the recall of M. Helleu. Acceptance of this programme was announced in Algiers on the 21st, and on the following day the Lebanese leaders returned to Beirut in triumph. It was at once apparent that the reinstatement of the Ministers, as well as of the President, was inevitable, and the French authorities agreed to this further concession. Furthermore, M. Chataigneau, who had provisionally taken M. Helleu’s place as Delegate-General, cancelled the decrees

of November 11th with the exception of that which declared the constitutional amendments null and void.

5

The acute crisis was now over, but the problem from which it had sprung was still unsolved. When the Lebanese Chamber re-assembled, the Premier asserted his Government's view that the reforms of November 8th were still in force. Moreover, the Syrian authorities lost no time, once the tension in Lebanon was relaxed, in taking parallel action. At an extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber on January 24th, 1944, the President of the Republic and the Deputies took an oath of allegiance to a new Constitution which comprised Articles 1-115 of the existing text. The effect of this was to annul Article 116. Earlier, on December 1st, the Syrian Premier had declared that Syria did not recognize the Mandate, and was not willing to conclude a Treaty as a condition of the transfer of powers which properly belonged to her ; had demanded the surrender by the French of all the attributes of sovereignty, under those limitations only which were necessitated by the state of war ; and had affirmed that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were in agreement on the administration of the common interests.

The C.F.L.N. left these claims and assertions unchallenged, and announced that General Catroux would again go to Beirut, this time for the purpose of negotiating with the two Governments on the transfer of powers. The negotiations resulted in an agreement, concluded on December 22nd, which provided that the powers previously exercised by French authorities in the name of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be transferred to their control. They would take over the services included in the category of Common Interests as from January 1st, and other powers by specific agreements still to be concluded. Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the two States had survived a sharp test of their will to independence and had extended the range of their autonomous administration.

6

In the course of the year 1944 there were a number of changes in the political situation in Syria and Lebanon. Some of these changes were of no more than local importance.

Thus, in October the Ministry of Saadullah al-Jabiri in Syria was replaced by that of Faris al-Khuri, who had previously been President of the Chamber; the change was made for internal political reasons, and the new Government was composed largely of the same Ministers and followed the same general policy as its predecessor. In April, 1945, the Ministry was reconstructed. In Lebanon, too, there was a ministerial change: in January, 1945, the Government of Riyadh as-Sulh was replaced by that of Abdul-Hamid al-Karami, a Sunni Moslem deputy from Tripoli.

A change affecting the structure of the Syrian Republic took place in September, with the incorporation of the province of Jebel Druze fully in the Syrian State. It had already been formally incorporated in February, 1942, but had preserved a special administrative and financial régime which was now abolished. This step was taken at the request of the Administrative Council of Jebel Druze. A similar step was not taken in the Alawi province; although there was a party in favour of it, the forces of separatism were still strong, and the situation was complicated by the existence of disorder and unrest fomented by Sulaiman Murshid and his associates.

Other changes of greater importance, because they affected more immediately the problem of Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, were the transfer of power to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and the financial agreement of February, 1944:

- (i) In accordance with the agreement made by General Catroux with the two Governments on December 22nd, 1943, a series of particular agreements was negotiated during 1944, and by the end of the year almost all the services in question had been formally handed over, including the Customs Administration, the Financial and Economic Services, the control of the tobacco monopoly and concessionary companies, the Press Censorship, the Beduin control and the 'Sûreté Générale' (although a French 'Sûreté aux Armées' was retained). These transfers gave the two Governments almost all the attributes of independent governments. At the end of 1944 the only important attribute which had not been transferred was the control of the local levies, the 'Troupes Spéciales'.

In regard to the 'Services Economiques' and certain other departments, the experiment was tried of administering them by joint Syro-Lebanese commissions ; but for the most part the transferred services were administered separately by the two Governments. To the more ardent nationalists, this was an unsatisfactory element in a transfer which was otherwise to be welcomed. They complained also that the transfer was more in name than in reality, since for reasons of efficiency the French personnel of the services was retained temporarily.

- (ii) In February, 1944, an Anglo-French financial agreement was signed. It named a 'franc area' composed of all territories under the control of the French Committee of National Liberation, and fixed the rate of exchange at 200 francs to the pound sterling. With the agreement of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, a special area fixed the rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound at 22.65 francs (it had previously been 20 francs), and thus prevented any change in the present rate of 8.83 Syro-Lebanese pounds to the pound sterling. The French Committee also agreed to revalue certain franc assets of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, and, should there be any further modification in the value of the franc, to guarantee the Syro-Lebanese pound against any resulting loss.

The agreement was widely criticized in Syria and Lebanon. It was regarded as contravening the allied declarations of June, 1941, which promised Syria and Lebanon full membership of the sterling bloc. Moreover, by weakening the link between the pound sterling and the currency of the two States, it created barriers between them and the other Arab States at a time when the movement for closer association between the Arab countries was gathering renewed strength. More important still, it was observed that the agreement was only temporary, and could be terminated by either party at three months' notice. When it should come to an end, there was a danger

that the Syro-Lebanese currency would once more share in the precarious fortunes of the franc ; and its reserves would be under the control of the French Government, which might be tempted to use this control in order to strike a hard political or financial bargain.

7

It has already been mentioned that by the end of 1944 all important services administered by the Delegation-General had been transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, with the exception of the 'Troupes Spéciales'. These troops, whose numbers had been considerably augmented since the allied occupation in 1941, and who now formed a reasonably well-disciplined and well-armed force of several thousands, were under the French territorial command. Throughout the year the two Governments pressed for their formal transfer, while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments for their part did not admit that the question of the 'Troupes' had anything to do with the question of the treaties. In their eyes the transfer of the 'Troupes' was a logical consequence of promises and declarations already made by the French : General Catroux, in his declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, had stated that the two States were at liberty to raise national armies. Moreover, the transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' was a necessary preliminary to any negotiations for a treaty ; such negotiations could only take place on a footing of complete equality, and equality could not exist so long as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments did not possess armed forces and so long as the French held over their heads the threat of refusal to transfer the 'Troupes'.

In addition to insisting on their right to control the

'Troupes,' the two Governments emphasized their need for th&n. The experience of 1936-1939 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will. No Government could expect obedience and respect so long as it was not able to curb the pretensions of the overmighty subject ; this was particularly true of a country like Syria, where semi-feudal tenures were still to be found, localism was so strong a force, and there existed large Beduin tribes traditionally recalcitrant to civil government and having had full opportunity to arm themselves during the war. Local disorders had already taken place among the Beduin in the Jazirah and in the area dominated by Sulaiman Murshid. It was impossible to rely entirely upon French-controlled forces to prevent disorder, since that would be to admit that France was still the real power in the country and the Government only a façade ; loyalty and obedience would only be given where real authority lay.

There was another reason for the attitude of the Syrian Government. They remembered that in 1920 the French had occupied Damascus and overturned the national Government by force ; and that in 1925 the national revolt had been suppressed with the help of local levies drawn from the Circassian and other minorities. They were afraid that at some time in the future the French Government might be tempted to repeat its action and to restore its authority in Damascus with the help of the 'Troupes Spéciales', who included a large number of Circassians, Kurds and other minorities organized in separate units. Since the 'Troupes' were the only considerable armed force under French command in the Levant, their transfer to the local Governments would remove this weapon from the hands of the French.

For all these reasons the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanded the immediate and unconditional transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales', or else, if this were refused, their disbandment. Otherwise they would proceed with the formation of national armies. Both Governments made special appropriations for this purpose in their 1944 and 1945 budgets.

With this fundamental difference of opinion between the French point of view and that of the Syrians and Lebanese, it is not surprising that when discussions on the subject opened in the early months of 1944 they led to little result. A draft

agreement was, it is true, reached between the Syrian Government and the Delegate-General, General Beynet, but negotiations were then broken off by the French Committee in Algiers. With Lebanon a limited agreement was reached ; in June it was arranged that a battalion wholly officered by Lebanese would be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government pending the conclusion of a general agreement. By the end of the year no further progress had been made, and the new year opened with demonstrations in Damascus in favour of the formation of an army and against what was believed to be the too indulgent attitude of the Government towards French delays.

8

A still more fundamental question, that of the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, became urgent during 1944.

The French Government claimed that, in spite of the declarations of independence made in 1941 and the subsequent transfer of powers, legally the Mandate still remained in force and would remain until a restored League of Nations or another international authority should bring it to an end ; as in the case of Iraq, a necessary preliminary to its being brought to an end was the conclusion of treaties of alliance and friendship with the Mandatory Power. They pointed out that the declarations of independence had referred to the negotiation of such treaties, and even claimed that independence had not been granted unconditionally but only on condition that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments entered into treaties with France. They referred further to Great Britain's recognition of France's pre-eminent and privileged position in the Levant, and maintained that treaties were necessary in order to define and safeguard her position.

France's insistence on the signature of treaties had several motives. There was first her desire to preserve her political, economic and other interests in the Levant States themselves. Again, there was the fear that a withdrawal from the Levant would lower her prestige in North Africa and encourage the demands of the nationalists there. Moreover, so long as Metropolitan France was not liberated, the Fighting French were naturally reluctant to give up a particle of their position anywhere in the world where they still retained it. The

liberation of France in the course of 1944 deprived this factor of its importance, and there were signs that those who had worked in the movement of resistance inside France were less interested in the Levant and less insistent on retaining their rights there than those who had been associated with General de Gaulle. (The liberation also worked in the other direction, however ; it enormously strengthened the bargaining position of the French Government in their dealings with the Levant States and with the great Powers.)

There was another factor of great importance in determining France's attitude. For more than twenty years a natural process of events had been tending to draw Syria and Lebanon into the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence, economically and culturally, no less than politically. In part this was an aspect of a world-process, the gradual extension of Anglo-Saxon influence everywhere ; in part, however, it was due to local conditions, to the fact that Syria and Lebanon were integral parts of the Eastern Arab world in which British influence was dominant. The war had strengthened this tendency : on the one hand, France's power in the world had declined in proportion to that of the Anglo-Saxon powers, and on the other, the movement for Arab unity was drawing close the ties between Syria and Lebanon and their neighbours. It was, therefore, possible that if France withdrew from the Levant States her place would be taken by Great Britain, inevitably and without any deliberate British intention. France would thus have withdrawn, not in favour of Syrian and Lebanese independence, but in favour of another world Power. Even a Frenchman who believed in Anglo-French friendship and had no suspicion of British intentions could not regard this prospect with pleasure.

The treaties which the French Government contemplated were similar in principle to the Anglo-Iraqi agreement, but rather more onerous in some ways. It wanted a military convention giving it the right to use a number of naval, military and air bases, and to send a military mission to organize the Syrian and Lebanese armies ; a diplomatic and consular convention giving France's representative in the Levant States precedence over other members of the diplomatic corps, and providing for the care of Syrian and Lebanese interests by France's representatives in those countries in which the States were not directly represented ; a cultural agreement

safeguarding the position of the French language and culture in education ; a financial agreement perpetuating the connexion between the Syro-Lebanese currency and the franc ; an undertaking by the two Governments to employ French advisers and technicians in preference to nationals of other States ; and adequate guarantees for the position of French schools, concessionary companies and other institutions. It is probable, however, that the more far-sighted and moderate members of the French Government did not believe they had any chance of obtaining a settlement so favourable as this, and would have been satisfied with any agreement, however tenuous, which would enable them to save their faces.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments, for their part, were unwilling to bind themselves to France by such comprehensive treaties. They denied the French assertions that the Mandate was still in force, that it could only be extinguished after the conclusion of treaties and that the declarations of independence had been conditional on such treaties being made. Their attitude sprang partly from distrust based upon twenty years' experience of Mandatory rule, the memories of 1920 and 1925, past attempts to negotiate treaties and the cession of Alexandretta. It was due also to the belief that Syria and Lebanon had nothing to gain from such a close alliance with France. Their independence was already recognized by the world and did not need protecting. Moreover, France would not be in a position to protect them effectively, and they had not sufficient common interests with her to justify their linking their fate with hers permanently. The Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi Treaties were 'points of equilibrium', based upon and expressing essential common interests, not creating a new situation so much as formalizing one which already existed. But a Franco-Syrian or Franco-Lebanese treaty on the same model would not be a 'point of equilibrium', but an obstacle in the way of the natural development of the Levant States and could not therefore constitute a definitive settlement.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were unwilling, therefore, to sign an exclusive military convention with France ; to link their currency permanently with the franc ; to bind themselves to employ only French officials in their administrations ; to give such cultural undertakings as would limit their freedom of action to plan their educational systems as

they thought fit ; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action ; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1944, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1944 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

9

The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty ; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent and less inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a ' moderate ' ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

as in Syria ; and the external question of relations with France was complicated by various internal questions.

Before 1943, there had been a reasonably clear division of opinion in Lebanon. On the one side stood the Maronites and other Uniates, with a number of the other Christians and heterodox Moslems ; they were in favour of Lebanese independence within its present enlarged frontiers and under French protection. On the other side were the greater part of the Moslems and the non-Catholic Christians, and all, Christians and Moslems alike, who held Arab nationalist views. They were opposed to Lebanese independence under French protection, and in general desired the reduction of Lebanon to its old frontiers and the replacement of independence by autonomy inside the Syrian State.

In November, 1943, the greater part of both groups united in opposition to France : the second group because they had always been opposed to French domination and the first because, while they had wanted French protection, they were not willing to be treated as mere tools and were sincerely attached to their independence. Their resistance was successful, and resulted in the gradual transfer of powers to the Lebanese Government and a partial withdrawal of French influence. (This process had already begun, but was accelerated by the November crisis.) This, in its turn, modified the internal political balance of Lebanon. So long as French influence had been paramount, it had been used in order to maintain the predominance of the Maronite and pro-French element. Now that French influence was diminishing however, this element could no longer retain its dominant position. The Maronites did not constitute a majority of the population, and even inside the Maronite community pro-French feeling was not so strong as it had been. The way was open for other groups to secure power in Lebanon.

This change in the internal situation itself led to further changes in political feeling. The more extreme of the Maronites and Lebanese separatists hoped for the restoration of French influence, and were now willing, if necessary, to accept a reduction in the size of Lebanon which would give it once more a large Christian majority. At the other extreme were some of the Moslems, who were now willing to accept the independence of Greater Lebanon for tactical reasons : either from personal interest or in the hope that in a few years' time, when their

greater natural increase had given the Moslems a majority in Lebanon, they would be able to destroy the independence of Lebanon and incorporate it in Syria.

Between these two extremes there was a more balanced and moderate group. Although many of its members had opposed the independence and enlargement of Lebanon in the past, they were now willing to accept Lebanese independence within its present frontiers, but only on two conditions : the first that Lebanon followed a policy of real independence and was not subservient to France or any other Power, and the second that she co-operated closely with the other Arab States. This group included both Moslems and Christians. Its policy was based upon a number of considerations. Some of the Christians wanted an independent Arab Lebanon as a centre of Arab Christian civilization, others because they no longer believed in the possibility of French or other foreign protection and wanted an alternative. Some of the Moslems advocated Lebanese independence inside an Arab union as a means of gradually teaching the Christians to forget their fears of Arab nationalism. Others again, both Christians and Moslems, hoped that Lebanon might play a special part in the Arab world, as a centre of Western civilization and lay nationalism.

The possibility of a stable Lebanon depended entirely on this intermediate group. The success of this group, in its turn, depended on its discovering some basis of unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. The need for such unity led to an attempt to develop a specifically Lebanese Arab nationalism. It was also one of the causes, although by no means the only one, for the spread of Communism which was one of the features of the year in Lebanon, and also to a smaller extent in Syria.

None of these groups was fully organized or articulate, and the Lebanese political scene changed continuously and rapidly. One factor however remained stable : the majority of the population no longer wanted or believed in French protection, and any attempts by France to split Lebanon from Syria on the question of the treaty were bound to fail.

The question of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations was complicated by its connexion with the question of Anglo-French relations in the Levant. Great Britain's policy

in the Levant States was based upon two commitments undertaken in 1941 : first, her endorsement of General Catroux's declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence, and secondly, the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, by which Great Britain recognized France's privileged and pre-eminent position over any other European power in the Levant, subject to the essential condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given independence. Behind these two undertakings there lay two interests. On the one hand, Great Britain was vitally interested in securing stable, friendly and contented régimes in Syria and Lebanon. The experience of the last decades had shown that any movement of unrest or discontent in the Levant States would have immediate repercussions in other Arab regions in which Great Britain was more directly interested. There was, moreover, a new consideration involved : as the Power which had occupied the Levant in 1941 and restored French rule there, Great Britain would be held responsible for what France did, and her intentions towards the Arab world as a whole would be largely judged by what happened in Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, Great Britain urgently needed the friendship of France in Europe and the world ; Anglo-French dissension in the Levant might react upon Anglo-French relations in the world ; and such dissension was likely to arise if the French suspected that Great Britain was anxious for them to withdraw from the Levant in order to take their place. It was, therefore, of great importance for Great Britain to avoid giving any ground for this suspicion ; this was the more difficult because of that natural tendency to the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Levant which has already been mentioned. Syrian and Lebanese independence would in fact, and even with the severest of self-denying ordinances on the part of Great Britain, mean an extension of Anglo-Saxon influence ; it was, therefore, essential for Great Britain to avoid giving the impression that she approved of this tendency and was trying to accelerate it.

It was clear from the beginning that, although it might be possible to reconcile these two interests, it would at least be difficult. From 1941 to the end of 1943, however, the need to try to reconcile them did not arise in an acute form, because the essential condition laid down in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement—the establishment of Syrian and Lebanese independence—had not yet been properly fulfilled. British efforts

were therefore directed to persuading the Free French to make their declarations of independence a reality by the restoration of self-governing institutions. These efforts led to considerable tension between Great Britain and Free France. Many Frenchmen refused to believe that British insistence on the independence of the two States was due only to a desire to fulfil the promises made in 1941. Their suspicions were directed particularly against the British Minister, Sir E. L. Spears, who continued to champion the cause of the Levant States with force and enthusiasm even after he was succeeded as Minister by Mr. T. A. Shone in December, 1944. Apart from the disagreement on general policy, there were other causes of tension: the difficulties arising from the combination of a British supreme command with a French territorial command, the existence of a network of British political and security officers, the inevitable clash of two very different temperaments and administrative systems.

This phase came to an end with the restoration of national government, the Lebanese crisis of November, 1943, and the subsequent agreement for the transfer of powers. In 1944 a new phase opened: the search for a definitive settlement of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations. In this new phase it was no longer possible to delay the attempt to reconcile the two aspects of British policy. Short of denouncing one or other of her undertakings, only one course was possible for her. She must try to persuade both sides to make some sort of definitive agreement on paper. The exact terms of the agreement were secondary, so long as France secured such concessions as might be regarded as constituting a privileged position. What was important was that an agreement of some kind should be made and neither side should feel it had been forced out of its position or had lost prestige. To this end it was important to prevent a conflict or another crisis like that of November, 1943; and an essential means of preventing conflict was to refrain from leading either side to believe that, should a crisis come, it was certain of British support.

A definitive solution could only be reached, if at all, by free agreement; there was no question of forcing the Syrians and Lebanese to make a treaty. Nor, if a treaty was not made, could there be any question of abrogating the declarations of independence or a repetition of what had happened in 1920. On the other hand, should the French fail to secure a guarantee

of their position, there was no question of Great Britain's trying to usurp their place or profit from the wreckage of their hopes.

Finally, in all this complex situation, Great Britain must remember that she was only one of a number of interested Powers, who had their own views on the question and who had not endorsed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. While trying to secure the fulfilment of that agreement, Great Britain could not allow her policy to drift too far from that of her Allies.

This general line of policy was authoritatively defined by Mr. Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on February 27th, 1945. Reporting on the Crimea Conference, and his subsequent meetings with Arab leaders in Egypt, he said :

‘ Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude towards the French and to encourage negotiation for a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also the Lebanon. I must make clear once and for all the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French Allies. That position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, the British Government has made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France, in view of the many cultural and historic connexions which France has so long established with Syria. We hope it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization, and that French privilege will also be recognized.

‘ However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not therefore be placed on the shoulders of Great Britain alone.

We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States recognize and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country. All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are fitting and necessary subjects for the Peace Conference, at which we must resolutely strive for final settlements of lasting peace between all the States and races comprised in the Middle East and in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.¹

II

The last sentence of Mr. Churchill's statement referred to a new factor which had made itself felt in the past year. Since 1941, the United States of America had refrained from recognizing the independence of Syria and Lebanon, and had made it clear that she would not give recognition until the independence of the two States became a reality. By 1944, the transfer of powers had reached a point where the U.S. Government felt itself justified in changing its attitude. In September, it formally recognized the independence of the two States. Mr. George Wadsworth, who had previously been American Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent, was appointed the first U.S. Minister to the two States.

Already, in July, the Government of the U.S.S.R. had accorded its recognition. It appointed M. Solod as its first Minister in October.

Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at the time of that recognition and subsequently, made it clear that they recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence unconditionally and that they did not accept the privileged and pre-eminent position of France or any other Power in the Levant. In other words, they did not endorse the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941.

A number of the States also gave their recognition, and by the end of the year the only important Allied or neutral State which had not yet done so was Turkey. A consequence of this change in the international status of the two countries was the appointment of a number of Syrian and Lebanese diplomatic and Consular representatives in foreign countries. The formal sovereignty of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was further emphasized by their declaration of war on Germany and Japan in February, 1945, their signature of the declaration

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 408, col. 1,290.

of the United Nations in April and their invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

12

Another development which greatly strengthened the position of the two States was the establishment of the Arab League. In the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, had held a series of conversations on Arab unity with the representatives of other Arab Governments. On their completion, he decided to summon a preparatory conference or committee to draw a plan of union. The Committee met in Alexandria on September 28th, 1944. It was attended by representatives of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian, Sa'udi-Arabian and Yemeni Governments, and by a representative of the Palestinian-Arab parties. Its work was completed by the publication on October 7th of a 'Protocol', signed by the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, and later adhered to by Sa'udi-Arabia and Yemen; the Palestinian, as not representing a Government, did not sign it.

The Protocol proclaimed the formation of a League of Arab States, composed of the independent Arab States which agreed to join it. It was to have a Council, on which the States would be represented on an equal footing. Its task would be to supervise the execution of agreements concluded between these States, to organize periodical meetings and to co-ordinate their political policies. The Council's decisions would be applicable to those who accepted them, but would be executory and obligatory in cases where disagreement arose between two members of the League and they sought the Council's intervention for its settlement. It would be forbidden to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between members. Each State would have the right to conclude with other States, members or non-members of the League, treaties which were not in contradiction with the text or spirit of this agreement; no member was to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or any of its members. The Council would offer its mediation in any conflict that might arise between members of the League or with non-members.

A Commission was to be formed immediately by members of the Preparatory Committee with a view to drawing up the

statutes of the Council and examining political questions which might form the subject of agreements between the Arab States. Arab States represented on the Committee would co-operate closely on economic, financial, cultural, social and other matters. Commissions of experts for each type of question would be set up to draft plans for co-operation in these matters. When all the commissions should have concluded their work, the Preparatory Committee would meet to examine the results of their studies with a view to convening the general Arab Congress.

The Committee hoped that in the future the Arab countries would consolidate these first results with others, particularly if, after the conclusion of the war, institutions were created which would unite the nations with closer and stronger ties.

The Protocol also contained two special decisions, the one relating to Lebanon and the other to Palestine. The former stated that 'the Arab States represented in the Preparatory Committee affirm unanimously their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers, which have already been recognized by their Governments after Lebanon had followed a policy of independence as proclaimed by her Government in its ministerial programme, which was unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on October 7th, 1943.'

The decision in regard to Palestine stated that Palestine constituted one of the important elements in the Arab world ; the rights of the Arabs could not be touched without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world. The Committee considered that the engagements entered into by Great Britain, comprising the cessation of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to Arabs and the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence, represented acquired rights of the Arabs and their execution would be a step towards the desired aim. The Committee proclaimed its support for the cause of Palestine. While sympathizing with the sufferings of the Jews, it thought that nothing could be more arbitrary and unjust than to settle the question of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, the victims of which would be the Arabs of Palestine.

The political sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee met in Cairo in February, 1945, to draft the constitution of the Arab League. After its work was completed, the Preparatory

Committee met once more in Cairo on March 17th. It included representations of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian and Sa'udi-Arabian Governments and of the Arabs of Palestine. On March 22nd the representatives of these six Governments signed the 'Pact of the Arab League' at the first meeting of the Plenary Arab Congress. It was not signed by the Palestinian delegate, since he did not represent an Arab Government. A copy was sent to the Imam of Yemen for his adherence.

The Pact, which differed considerably from the Protocol of Alexandria and in general was less binding upon the signatories, stated that the Arab League was composed of the independent Arab States signatory to the Pact; any independent Arab State could join the League on application. The object of the League was to draw closer the relations between member-States, to co-ordinate their political action, safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and interest itself in general in questions concerning the Arab countries; also to ensure that, within the framework of the régime and the conditions prevailing in each State, a close co-operation should exist in economic and financial questions, matters of communications, cultural matters, questions connected with nationality, passports and extradition, social affairs and public health. The League would have a Council on which each member-State would have one vote. The Council would try to realize the objects of the League, supervise the execution of agreements concluded between members, and determine the means by which the League would collaborate with such international organizations as might be formed in future. There would also be special commissions for each of the questions enumerated above; representatives of other Arab States would be able to participate in these commissions on conditions to be determined by the Council.

The Pact forbade the use of force to settle disputes between member-States. Decisions of the Council would be binding in disputes not affecting the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the States and in which the contending parties sought settlement by the Council. The Council would mediate in any dispute likely to lead to war between two member-States or a member-State and a third State. Decisions in cases of arbitration and mediation would be by a majority vote. In the case of aggression or the threat of it, the

State attacked could demand the immediate summoning of the Council, which would decide on the necessary steps by unanimous vote. Unanimous decisions of the Council would be binding on all members of the League, majority decisions only on those States which accepted them.

Each member-State undertook to respect the system of government of the other members and to abstain from any action tending to change that system. Member-States wishing to establish closer relations than those envisaged in the Pact might conclude agreements to this end.

The permanent seat of the League was to be Cairo, but the Council could decide to meet elsewhere. The Council would meet in ordinary session twice a year, in extraordinary session when necessary. The League would have a permanent Secretariat-General. (An Egyptian, Abdur-Rahman Azzam Bey, was appointed the first Secretary-General.) The expenses of the League would be shared by the member-States. The presidency of the Council would rotate among the representatives of the member-States.

Any member-State might withdraw from the League after a year's notice, and the Council might exclude any member which had not fulfilled its obligations, by unanimous vote. The Pact could be modified by a two-thirds majority of the member-States. The Pact was to come into force after four States had ratified it.

An annex to the Pact declared that the *de jure* international existence and independence of Palestine since her liberation from Ottoman rule could not be questioned. If, for reasons independent of her will, the external attributes of independence had not yet materialized, this could not constitute an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the Council. In these circumstances, and until she should enjoy the attributes of independence, the Council would choose an Arab representative from Palestine to participate in its work.

A further annex dealt with the participation of Arab countries not members of the Council in the work of the commissions to be set up under the Pact. The signatory States recommended the Council to go as far as possible in co-operating with them, and to make all efforts to learn their needs and understand their aspirations, and to use all political means possible to improve their conditions and secure their future.

A week later, on March 31st, the Syrian Chamber ratified the Pact. It was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber on April 7th.

The formation of an Arab League, however loose, had immediate repercussions on the situation in the Levant States and will probably have further repercussions in the future. It made clear that in any conflict which might arise over the independence of Syria and Lebanon, they would have the full support of the Arab world ; at the same time it provided another reason why the two States should keep their hands free and not undertake any commitments which might prevent their fulfilling their new obligations as members of the League.

The establishment of the Arab League may have particularly far-reaching consequences for Lebanon. Both at Alexandria and at Cairo the Arab States made it clear that they were prepared to go a long way to allay the fears which the thought of Arab union aroused in the minds of a section of the Lebanese Christians. The Lebanese article of the Alexandria Protocol emphasized that so long as Lebanon was willing to align her policy with that of the other Arab States she need not fear any demands upon her or claims for frontier revision, and could hope (as had been proved in November, 1943) for their support and help in her struggle for independence ; while there is reason to believe that the clauses inserted into the Cairo Pact safeguarding sovereignty and freedom of action of the member-States were due to the anxiety of the Arab States to do anything possible to win the adherence of Lebanon. If their efforts should be vain, they would no doubt be forced to reconsider their attitude towards Lebanon.

APPENDIX A

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

1. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.
2. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.
3. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.
4. Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tesson, December 11th, 1937.
5. Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.
6. Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of Jebel Druze, the Alawis and the Jazirah, 1939.
7. Fundamental Principles of Future Status of Alexandretta, adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.
8. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.
9. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.
10. Proclamation of General Dentz concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 2nd, 1941.
11. General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.
12. General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.
13. Convention on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.
14. General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28th, 1941.
15. General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.
16. Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944.

No. 1 : *The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.*¹

The Council of the League of Nations,

WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations ; and

¹ Q. Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 607-11.

WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it ; and

WHEREAS, The terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval ; and

WHEREAS, The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. in conformity with the following provisions ; and

WHEREAS, By the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations ;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :

Article 1: The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 2: The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

Article 3: The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Article 4: The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Article 5: The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organization provided for in Article 6.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1924, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 6: The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the disposition of the founders.

Article 7: Pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 8: The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 9: The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (*Conseils de fabrique*) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Article 10: The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or the local government, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

Article 11: The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any state member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign state in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said states; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of these natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations, but on condition that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concessions in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the fiscal resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the state or through an organization under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preferential treatment which would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

Article 12: The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art or industries.

Article 13: The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

Article 14: The Mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from this date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent

department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The administration of Syria and the Lebanon shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 15: Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organizing the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 16: French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 17: The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

Article 18: The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 19: On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

Article 20 : The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

No. 2 : *The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.*¹

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien ;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante ;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification ;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui subsisteront entre les deux États après la cessation du mandat, et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République française et Son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne, ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires :

S. E. le Comte de Martel, ambassadeur, Haut-Commissaire ;
LL. El Djemil bey Mardam, Président du Conseil, Sadallah bey El Djabri, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères, Choucri bey Kouatli, Ministre des Finances et de la Défense ;

qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit :

¹Ministère des Affaires Étrangères : *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936* (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-28.

Article premier : Il y aura paix et amitié perpétuelle entre la France et la Syrie.

Une alliance est établie entre les deux États indépendants et souverains en consécration de leur amitié et des liens qui les unissent pour la défense de la paix et la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts communs.

Article 2 : En toute matière de politique étrangère de nature à affecter leurs communs intérêts, les deux gouvernements conviennent de se consulter pleinement et sans réserve.

Au regard des puissances étrangères, ils s'engagent à adopter une attitude conforme à leur alliance et à éviter toute action de nature à compromettre leurs relations avec les autres puissances.

Chaque gouvernement accréditera auprès de l'autre un représentant diplomatique.

Article 3 : Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes prendront toutes mesures utiles pour assurer, au jour de la cessation du mandat, le transfert au seul Gouvernement syrien, des droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et autres actes internationaux conclus par le Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne la Syrie ou en son nom.

Article 4 : Au cas où un différend entre la Syrie et un État tiers engendrerait une situation de nature à créer un risque de rupture avec cet État, les deux Gouvernements se concerteront en vue du règlement du différend par les voies pacifiques, conformément aux stipulations du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de toute autre convention internationale applicable à un tel cas.

Si, malgré les mesures prévues au paragraphe précédent, l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes se trouvait engagée dans un conflit, l'autre Haute Partie Contractante lui prêterait immédiatement appui en qualité d'alliée. En cas de menace imminente de guerre, les Hautes Parties Contractantes se concerteront immédiatement pour prendre les mesures de défense nécessaires. L'aide du Gouvernement syrien consistera à fournir au Gouvernement français sur territoire syrien toutes facilités et toute assistance en son pouvoir, y compris l'usage des voies ferrées, cours d'eau, ports, aérodromes, plans d'eau et autres moyens de communication.

Article 5 : La responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre en Syrie et celle de la défense du territoire incombent au Gouvernement syrien.

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire à la Syrie pendant la durée du Traité suivant les prévisions de la convention annexe.

En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'exécution des obligations qui lui incombent aux termes de l'article précédent du présent traité, le Gouvernement syrien reconnaît que le

maintien permanent et la protection en toutes circonstances des voies de transit aérien du Gouvernement français qui empruntent le territoire syrien, sont dans l'intérêt de l'alliance.

Article 6 : Le présent traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans.

Les conventions et accords annexes d'application auront la même durée que le traité lui-même, à moins qu'une durée moindre ne soit stipulée dans l'acte, ou à moins que les Hautes Parties Contractantes ne soient d'accord pour les reviser afin de tenir compte des situations nouvelles.

Les négociations pour le renouvellement ou la modification du traité seront ouvertes, si, à partir de la vingtième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

Article 7 : Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications effectué aussitôt que possible.

Il sera communiqué à la Société des Nations.

Ce traité entrera en vigueur, en même temps que les conventions et accords annexes, au jour de l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations.

Article 8 : Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement français sera déchargé des responsabilités et obligations qui lui incombent, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, du fait tant de décisions internationales que d'actes de la Société des Nations.

Ces responsabilités et obligations, dans la mesure où elles subsisteraient, seront automatiquement transférées au Gouvernement syrien.

Article 9 : Le présent traité est rédigé en français et en arabe, ces deux textes sont officiels, le texte français faisant foi.

Au cas où une contestation s'élèverait au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application de ce traité, et où cette contestation n'aurait pu être réglée définitivement par voie de négociation directe, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de recourir aux procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage prévues par le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Fait à Damas, en quadruple exemplaire, le 22 décembre, 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

S. EL DJABRI.

CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

CONVENTION MILITAIRE

Article premier : Le Gouvernement syrien, se substituant aux autorités françaises, prend sous sa responsabilité les forces militaires constituées, avec les charges et les obligations afférentes.

Article 2 : Les forces armées syriennes doivent comprendre au minimum une division d'infanterie, une brigade de cavalerie et les services correspondants.

Article 3 : Le Gouvernement français s'engage à accorder au Gouvernement de la République syrienne, à sa demande, les facilités ci-après, les dépenses devant en incomber au Gouvernement syrien :

(a) Mise à la disposition du Gouvernement syrien d'une mission militaire pour son armée, sa gendarmerie, sa marine ou son aviation militaire.

Le rôle, la composition et le statut de la mission seront déterminés d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements avant l'entrée en vigueur du traité d'alliance.

Étant donné qu'il serait désirable que l'entraînement et l'instruction fussent identiques dans les armées des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à n'engager que des Français en qualité d'instructeurs et de spécialistes.

Les instructeurs ou spécialistes seraient demandés au Gouvernement français et relèveraient au point de vue de l'administration et de la discipline générale du chef de la mission militaire.

Les officiers de la mission militaire française pourront être appelés à exercer temporairement un commandement effectif dans les forces armées syriennes, sur demande adressée au représentant du Gouvernement français et agréé par lui. Dans ce cas, ces officiers relèveront du commandement normal de l'unité à laquelle ils seront affectés pour tout ce qui touche à l'exercice du commandement qui leur est confié.

(b) Envoi dans les écoles, centres d'instruction et corps de troupes français et à bord des bâtiments de guerre français de tout le personnel des forces armées syriennes que le Gouvernement syrien aura jugé nécessaire de faire instruire en dehors de la Syrie, étant entendu toutefois que le Gouvernement syrien conserverait sa liberté d'envoyer dans quelque autre pays les membres de ce personnel que les écoles et centres d'instruction français précités ne seraient pas en mesure d'accueillir.

Article 4 : Pour faciliter l'exécution des obligations de l'alliance, le Gouvernement syrien adoptera pour ses forces armées un armement, un matériel et, dans la mesure nécessaire, un équipement du même modèle que ceux en usage dans les forces armées françaises.

Le gouvernement français accordera toutes facilités au Gouvernement syrien pour que ce dernier puisse assurer en France la fourniture aux forces armées syriennes, des armes, munitions, navires, avions, matériel et équipement du modèle le plus récent.

Article 5 : En vue de répondre aux dispositions du troisième alinéa de l'article 5 du Traité, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage

à mettre pour la durée de l'alliance à la disposition du Gouvernement français des emplacements pour deux bases aériennes.

Ces emplacements seront choisis par le Gouvernement français en des points dont l'éloignement des quatre grandes villes ne saurait être inférieur à 40 kilomètres environ.

Provisoirement, le Gouvernement français est autorisé à utiliser comme bases les aérodromes de Nérab et Mezzé. Le transfert aux nouveaux emplacements s'effectuera dès que les nouvelles bases auront été aménagées dans les mêmes conditions de construction et d'équipement que les anciennes qui deviendront le propriété du Gouvernement syrien, à charge pour ce Gouvernement de supporter les frais de cette opération.

Indépendamment de ces bases et en attendant que les forces syriennes soient en mesure d'assumer la charge de l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage actuellement équipés, le Gouvernement français accepte d'apporter son concours à l'entretien de ces terrains, étant entendu que ce concours ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits de propriété du Gouvernement syrien sur ceux-ci.

Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à fournir à la demande et aux frais du Gouvernement français et aux conditions qui feront l'objet d'un accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, des gardes spéciaux, pris dans ses propres troupes, qui coopéreront avec les forces françaises chargées d'assurer la sécurité, l'équipement et l'entretien des bases aériennes, et avec les spécialistes des forces aériennes françaises provisoirement affectés à l'équipement et à l'entretien des terrains d'atterrissage susvisés.

Le Gouvernement français consent à maintenir des troupes au Djebel Druze et aux Alaouites, pour une durée de cinq années à compter de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité.

Les points de stationnement de ces troupes seront définis par un accord entre les deux Gouvernements.

Le Gouvernement syrien laissera à la disposition du commandement français qui en assumera l'entretien et l'instruction, les unités stationnées dans ces régions ; il facilitera le recrutement des éléments locaux nécessaires pour assurer le maintien de ces effectifs.

Il est spécifié que le maintien des forces françaises en ces divers points ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains de la Syrie.

Article 6 : Le Gouvernement syrien accordera toutes facilités possibles pour l'entretien, l'instruction, les déplacements, les transports et les communications des forces françaises, soit autour des points où elles stationnent, soit en transit entre ces points, ainsi que pour le transport, l'emmagasiner de tous les approvisionnements et équipements nécessaires à ces forces. Ces facilités

comprennent l'usage des routes, chemins de fer, voies navigables, ports, quais, aérodromes, plans d'eau, le droit de survol et l'utilisation des réseaux télégraphiques, téléphoniques et radiotélégraphiques. En aucun cas, il ne pourra être établi de tarif de discrimination à l'encontre du Gouvernement français.

Les navires de guerre français auront licence générale de pénétrer et de séjourner dans les eaux syriennes et de visiter les ports syriens, étant entendu que le Gouvernement syrien recevra notification préalable des visites aux ports syriens.

Le Gouvernement syrien mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement français tous emplacements et locaux nécessaires aux besoins des forces françaises.

Les modalités d'application de cette disposition, ainsi que des différentes questions relatives tant au domaine militaire français qu'à celui dont il a l'usufruit, feront l'objet d'accords particuliers. L'exécution de ces accords ne devra entraîner pour le Gouvernement français aucune aggravation des charges actuellement existantes.

Article 7 : En exécution de l'article 5 du Traité d'alliance et sous réserve des modifications que les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviendraient d'y apporter par la suite, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à assurer aux forces françaises et aux militaires ou marins français isolés ainsi qu'aux employés civils français et leurs familles se trouvant sur le territoire syrien en vertu de l'alliance, les privilèges et immunités dont ces militaires, marins et civils jouissaient en Syrie lors de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente Convention.

Article 8 : Le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à reprendre, à entretenir et à garder les terrains d'aviation créés par l'autorité française en Syrie, à la date d'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'alliance ou ceux dont la création serait jugée nécessaire par les Hautes Parties Contractantes à la sécurité aérienne (en dehors des établissements et terrains mentionnés à l'article 5) ; les conditions de reprise feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

Les aéronefs des forces françaises auront, d'une façon générale, le droit de survol du territoire syrien, sous réserve de l'observation des mêmes règles de circulation qu'en France, en particulier en ce qui concerne le survol des agglomérations et lieux de réunion fréquentés. Ils auront la jouissance des terrains d'aviation et plans d'eau du territoire syrien. Le Gouvernement français pourra conserver ou créer sur ces terrains des installations dont l'établissement et l'entretien seront à sa charge.

Le Gouvernement français pourra confier les magasins et ateliers conservés ou créés à des spécialistes des forces aériennes détachés à cet effet.

Toutes facilités seront accordées par le Gouvernement syrien pour l'entretien de ces établissements et de leur personnel.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 1

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En me référant à l'article 1^{er} de la Convention militaire, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Se référant à l'article 1^{er} de la Convention militaire, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître par une lettre en date de ce jour que le Gouvernement syrien considère les droits acquis par les officiers, sous-officiers et militaires syriens des troupes spéciales comme faisant partie des charges et obligations visées par cet article.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

PROTOCOLE No. 1

Se référant à l'article 7 de la Convention militaire, les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d'accord pour décider de fixer, avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité et en se conformant aux arrangements intervenus dans des circonstances similaires, les privilèges et immunités auxquels se réfère l'article susvisé.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

D. de MARTEL.

S. EL DJABRI.

CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 2

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Comme suite au Traité signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'en considération de l'amitié et de l'alliance étroite existant entre nos

deux pays, le Gouvernement syrien recrutera en France les conseillers techniques, magistrats et fonctionnaires étrangers dont il jugera utile la présence en Syrie.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relativement à l'emploi de fonctionnaires étrangers en Syrie. J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE de LETTRES No. 3

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Me référant à l'article 2 du Traité que nous avons signé à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien demande au Gouvernement français de bien vouloir assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Répondant à la lettre de Votre Excellence, en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement syrien et conformément aux usages internationaux suivis en ces matières, le Gouvernement français acceptera volontiers d'assurer la protection des ressortissants et des intérêts syriens, partout où le Gouvernement syrien ne serait pas directement représenté.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 4

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En me référant à l'article 2 du Traité que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de

Votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique du Gouvernement de la République française en Syrie aura qualité d'ambassadeur.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

En réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, désireux de marquer sa satisfaction à la suite de la nomination du représentant de la République française en qualité de Premier Ambassadeur en Syrie, décide que son rang de préséance par rapport aux représentants des autres Puissances restera conféré à ses successeurs.

Le Gouvernement syrien tient, à cette occasion, à porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le représentant diplomatique de la Syrie auprès du Gouvernement de la République française aura rang de Ministre Plénipotentiaire pendant la durée du présent Traité.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 5

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, vous avez bien voulu me confirmer que le Gouvernement syrien assurera le maintien des garanties de droit public stipulées dans la constitution syrienne en faveur des individus et des communautés et donnera plein effet à ces garanties.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette obligeante communication et de remercier Votre Excellence des assurances qu'elle contient.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

J'ai l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à Votre Excellence le texte des arrêtés Nos. 265/L.R. du 2 décembre et 274/L.R. du 5 décembre 1936, portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires du Djebel Druze et de Lattaquieh et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

Ces textes donnent effet à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui concerne, tant le rattachement de ces deux territoires à l'État de Syrie, que l'opportunité de maintenir à ces deux mêmes territoires un régime spécial administratif et financier conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ARRÊTÉ No. 265/L.R.

PORTANT PROMULGATION DU RÈGLEMENT
ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922 ;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire ;

Vu le décret du 16 juillet 1933 ;

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargée d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie ;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'arrêté No. 3114 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire du Djebel Druze, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le territoire du Djebel Druze fait partie de l'État de Syrie.

Article 2 : Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'État de Syrie, d'un régime administratif spécial et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Article 3 : Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le

territoire du Djebel Druze est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Article 4 : Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur au lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien.

Damas, le 2 décembre 1936.

de MARTEL.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le territoire du Djebel Druze, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants :

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 2 : Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du territoire.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières qui sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Article 3 : Le conseil administratif est composé de neuf membres élus suivant le mode de scrutin en vigueur dans l'État, et de trois membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président de la République sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les Présidents des Chambres de Commerce et d'Agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du Conseil sont élus, ou nommés, pour quatre ans. Le Conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Article 4 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. Le produit de tous impôts d'État, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;
2. Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'État de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne ;
3. Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit par des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1. Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire ;
2. Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État égale à 5 p. 100 du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;
3. Le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ou à son bénéfice ;
4. Le service des pensions.

Article 5 : Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service et soumis avant le 1^{er} octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans un délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'État et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du territoire.

Article 6 : Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre, pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 7 : Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

ARRÊTÉ No. 274 L.R.

PORTANT PROMULGATION DU RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE ALAOUITE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922 ;

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire ;

Vu le décret du 16 juillet 1933 ;

Attendu qu'un accord a été réalisé à Paris entre le Gouvernement français et la délégation qui avait été chargé d'établir les bases d'un traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie ;

Attendu que cet accord comporte le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté dont l'exercice avait été réservé au Haut-Commissaire par l'arrêté No. 3113 du 14 mai 1930 et la définition des modalités du régime spécial en matière administrative et financière que le Gouvernement syrien entend assurer au territoire de Lattaquieh, conformément aux principes définis par la Société des Nations,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le territoire de Lattaquieh fait partie de l'État de Syrie.

Article 2 : Ce territoire bénéficie, au sein de l'État de Syrie, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Article 3 : Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le territoire de Lattaquieh est régi par la constitution, les lois et les règlements généraux de la République syrienne.

Article 4 : Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien.

Beyrouth, le 5 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE ALAOUITE

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le territoire de Lattaquieh dans ses limites actuelles, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants :—

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 2 : Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du territoire.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières que sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Article 3 : Le Conseil administratif est composé d'au moins treize membres élus suivant le mode du scrutin en vigueur dans l'État, et de quatre membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les Présidents des Chambres de Commerce et d'Agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du Conseil sont élus ou nommés pour quatre ans. Le Conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Article 4 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. Le produit de tous impôts d'État, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;
2. Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après

défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'État de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne ;

3. Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit par des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1. Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire ;
2. Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État égale à 5 p. 100 du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;
3. Le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ou à son bénéfice ;
4. Le service des pensions.

Article 5 : Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service, et soumis avant le 1^{er} octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans le délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'État et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du territoire.

Article 6 : Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 7 : Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer le texte des arrêtés No. 265/L.R. du 2 décembre et No. 274/L.R. du 5 décembre portant transfert au Gouvernement syrien des prérogatives de souveraineté sur les territoires du Djebel Druze et de Lattaquieh et établissant le régime spécial administratif et financier de ces territoires.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien après avoir pris connaissance de ces textes, les estime conformes à l'accord intervenu à Paris en ce qui touche ces matières.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 2

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes constatent leur accord sur les points suivants :

Afin de préparer le transfert au Gouvernement syrien des pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières, le Gouvernement syrien est prêt à entrer en négociations dès la ratification du traité franco-syrien pour régler les questions pendantes entre la Syrie et le Liban.

Le Gouvernement français pour sa part est prêt à assurer le transfert susvisé conformément à toute règlement résultant de ces négociations.

Au cas où le règlement ne comporterait ni existence d'un organe commun à la Syrie et au Liban, ni modalités de collaboration entre les administrations syriennes et libanaises, le Gouvernement syrien n'établira pas, à l'encontre du Liban, sous condition de réciprocité, de régime discriminatoire par rapport aux autres états détachés de l'ancien empire ottoman.

En cas d'absence d'organe commun, le Gouvernement français transférera directement au Gouvernement syrien les pouvoirs de législation et de gestion actuellement exercés par le représentant de la France, pour le compte de la Syrie, en matières économiques et financières.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
CHOUCRI KOUATLI.
S. EL DJABRI.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 7

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien est disposé à conserver aux établissements d'enseignement, d'assistance et de bienfaisance étrangers ainsi qu'aux missions de recherches archéologiques, le bénéfice du régime actuel des œuvres et des antiquités.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement syrien relative-ment au régime des œuvres et des antiquités en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

PROTOCOLE No. 3

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à négocier, dès ratification du traité franco-syrien, une convention universitaire.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

D. de MARTEL.

S. EL DJABRI.

CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 8

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Au moment où les relations avec la France vont être réglées par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, que sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, sous réserve des modifications qui seraient apportées, d'accord entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes, pour tenir compte des conditions économiques et financières existant en Syrie, aux concessions et conventions intéressant les finances de l'État ou des collectivités publiques, le Gouvernement syrien s'engage à respecter les droits acquis institués au nom de la Syrie et pour son compte, au bénéfice des personnes physiques et morales françaises.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 9

*Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire
de la République française.*

Au moment où les relations entre la France et la Syrie vont se trouver définies par un traité d'amitié et d'alliance, j'ai l'honneur de donner l'assurance à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

*Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil
de la République syrienne.*

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement syrien maintiendra la parité monétaire existant entre la monnaie syrienne et la monnaie française.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 10

*Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil
de la République syrienne.*

En vue de fixer la situation respective des ressortissants français en Syrie et syriens en France, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une Convention d'établissement.

Cette Convention portera confirmation du *modus vivendi* établi par le décret du Président de la République française, en date du 25 avril 1935.

Il sera en outre précisé :—

1. Que les ressortissants de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes jouiront du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne l'accès auprès des tribunaux de l'autre partie, tant pour réclamer que pour défendre leurs droits à tous les degrés de juridiction établis par les lois.

2. Qu'en ce qui concerne l'accès et le séjour les ressortissants syriens bénéficieront dans les colonies françaises du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

Le Gouvernement français assurera ce traitement aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés qui sont ou seraient admis à s'établir sur le territoire des colonies françaises, sous

réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public ou de sûreté, ainsi que de la législation locale.

Le Gouvernement français recommandera au Gouvernement tunisien de ne pas établir de discrimination à l'encontre des ressortissants syriens, en ce qui concerne leur accès et leur séjour en Tunisie et d'accorder également aux ressortissants syriens, personnes physiques ou sociétés, établies sur le territoire tunisien, le bénéfice des droits commun aux ressortissants des diverses puissances, sous réserve de l'observation des lois d'ordre public et de sûreté ainsi que de la législation locale.

De même, les ressortissants des colonies et protectorats bénéficieront en Syrie du traitement accordé aux ressortissants de la Nation la plus favorisée.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des conditions dans lesquelles le Gouvernement français était prêt à négocier avec le Gouvernement syrien une Convention d'établissement.

J'ai l'honneur de faire part à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement syrien, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français sur les termes de cette lettre, prend acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 4

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à entrer en négociations après ratification du Traité pour définir, dans le délai fixé pour l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, un régime judiciaire s'inspirant de l'accord du 1^{er} mars 1936 et propre à concilier le souci de protection des intérêts étrangers avec les progrès accomplis par le Gouvernement syrien dans l'organisation de la justice.

Le Gouvernement français prêtera son plein appui au Gouvernement syrien pour assurer, dans ce même délai, la mise en application de ce régime.

En attendant la conclusion de cette négociation et dès la ratification du Traité, sera mis en œuvre un programme de réformes comportant :

1. Application du principe de l'unité de juridiction par le groupement des juridictions ;

2. Réduction dans le cadre des magistrats français ;
3. Définition de l'intérêt étranger, de manière à remédier à certains abus tels que la fictivité et le détournement de juridiction par la création d'un intérêt étranger en fraude de la loi ;
4. Suppression de la clause attributive de compétence entre ressortissants syriens.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

D. de MARTEL.

CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

S. el DJABRI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 11

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, au Président du Conseil de la République syrienne.

En vertu des décisions de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français était autorisé à demander au Gouvernement syrien de participer aux frais d'entretien de ses forces militaires et fondé à s'entendre avec lui en vue du remboursement de toutes les dépenses encourues par lui pour l'organisation de l'administration, le développement des ressources locales et l'exécution des travaux publics en Syrie.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français, tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'État pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une Commission arbitrale mixte au moment où s'effectuera la remise.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

D. de MARTEL.

Le Président du Conseil de la République syrienne, au Haut-Commissaire de la République française.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître les intentions du Gouvernement français en ce qui touche les dépenses civiles et militaires encourues par la France en Syrie.

Le Gouvernement français tenant compte de la prochaine accession de la Syrie au statut d'État pleinement indépendant, a décidé, à l'occasion de la signature du Traité d'alliance, de ne pas demander le remboursement de ces dépenses.

Seuls feront l'objet d'un remboursement les divers immeubles

et installations remis au Gouvernement syrien et dont le prix sera évalué par une Commission arbitrale mixte, au moment où s'effectuera cette remise.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

PROTOCOLE No. 5

Se référant au 4^e alinéa du préambule du Traité, les Hautes Parties Contractantes tiennent à préciser que leur intention est de consacrer les deux premières années du délai de trois ans que stipule ce texte à la mise en place de toutes les institutions syriennes destinées à assurer la reprise par le Gouvernement syrien des responsabilités qu'assume actuellement le représentant de la France pour le compte de la Syrie, la troisième année du délai susvisé étant destinée à l'adaptation de ces institutions à l'exercice de ces responsabilités.

Se référant par ailleurs au protocole No. 2, les Hautes Parties Contractantes considèrent que les négociations prévues au 2^e alinéa de ce texte doivent aboutir dans un délai d'une année à compter de la date à laquelle elles seront engagées.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront toutes diligences pour que ces négociations s'ouvrent à une date aussi proche que possible du 1^{er} janvier 1937.

Au cas où le règlement résultant de ces négociations ne comporterait pas l'existence d'un organe commun, les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de limiter à six mois le délai supplémentaire consacré à l'organisation des administrations syriennes auxquelles seront transférées les attributions économiques et financières actuellement exercées pour le compte de la Syrie par le représentant de la France.

Damas, le 22 décembre 1936.

JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

D. de MARTEL.

CHOUCRI KOUATLI.

S. el DJABRI.

No. 3 : *Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.*¹

(Only sections differing from Franco-Syrian Treaty)

TEXT OF TREATY

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République Libanaise . . . formalités de ratification ;

¹S. Heald (ed.). *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), pp. 459-64.

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un Traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir les relations qui existeront entre les deux États, après la cessation du Mandat, sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance et d'en fixer, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui feront partie intégrante du Traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République Française et Son Excellence le Président de la République Libanaise ont convenu ce qui suit :

Article 1 : identical, mutatis mutandis.

Article 2 : identical, except for para. 2.

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage à ne pas adopter à l'égard des États tiers d'attitude incompatible avec l'alliance et à s'abstenir de tout accord incompatible avec le présent Traité.

Article 3 : identical.

Article 4 : identical, except for phrase in para. 2 :

... les deux Gouvernements se *concerteraient* ...

Article 5 : identical, except for phrases in paras. 2 and 3 :

Le Gouvernement français accepte de prêter son concours militaire, *aérien et naval* au Liban pendant la durée du Traité, suivant les prévisions de la Convention annexe.

... des *voies de communication* du Gouvernement français ...

Article 6 : para. 2, identical, changes in paras. 1 and 3 :

Le présent Traité est conclu pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans, *et renouvelable par tacite reconduction pour une égale durée.* ...

Les négociations pour des *modifications éventuelles à apporter au Traité* seront ouvertes si, au cours de la vingt-quatrième année de son application, un des deux Gouvernements le demande.

Articles 7 and 8 : identical.

Article 9 : identical, except for one verbal change.

Fait à Beyrouth, en quadruple exemplaire, le 13 novembre 1936, en foi de quoi ont signé :

Pour la France : D. de MARTEL.

Pour le Liban : E. EDDÉ, Emir KHALED, E.-G. TABET, Abdel RAZZAK, H. JIMBLAT, P. TRAD, Becharra KHOURY, OSSERAN, SELEIKIAN.

MILITARY CONVENTION

This is identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the Military Convention in the Franco-Syrian Treaty, except for the following differences :

Article 2 : Les forces armées libanaises doivent comprendre a 1 minimum une brigade mixte et ses services.

Article 3 : identical except for omission of last four lines.

Article 5 : En vue de répondre aux dispositions du deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 du Traité, le Gouvernement français s'engage à maintenir sur le territoire libanais, jusqu'à nouvel accord des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, des éléments des forces françaises de l'armée de terre, de l'air et de la marine, stationnées au Levant.

Les conditions particulières de ce stationnement et la collaboration entre les forces françaises et libanaises feront l'objet d'accords périodiques entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il est spécifié que le stationnement de forces françaises en territoire libanais ne constitue pas une occupation et ne porte pas atteinte aux droits souverains du Liban.

Article 6 : identical except for omission of last three paragraphs.

Article 8 : omitted.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND ANNEXED PROTOCOLS

The texts of these are identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with those annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty, except for the following differences :

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 4

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

En attendant l'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais, désireux d'établir une liaison plus étroite entre les émigrés libanais et la métropole, demande au Gouvernement français son accord sur la création de postes d'attachés libanais auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la République française dans les villes où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

Il lui demande également de vouloir bien lui prêter tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Répondant à la lettre de Votre Excellence en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de lui faire savoir que, pour accéder au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement libanais, le Gouvernement français est d'accord pour que des postes d'attachés libanais soient créés auprès des représentants diplomatiques et consulaires français, dans les villes de l'étranger où les intérêts libanais justifient cette mesure.

D'une manière générale, le Gouvernement français prêterait tout son appui pour la défense des intérêts divers des émigrés.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 5

This is identical with No. 4 in the Franco-Syrian Treaty.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants, sans distinction aucune.

Il est également disposé à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État.

Le Gouvernement libanais assurera, dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique, une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que le Gouvernement libanais est disposé à garantir l'égalité des droits civils et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants, sans distinction aucune, à assurer une représentation équitable des différents éléments du pays dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État et à assurer, dans la répartition des dépenses d'utilité publique, une juste proportion entre les différentes régions.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES No. 6 BIS

Le Président de la République libanaise, au Haut Commissaire de la République française.

J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'échange de lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement Libanais assurera, le plus tôt possible et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, l'unification du régime fiscal.

Dans le même esprit, le Gouvernement libanais est également disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives comportant :

1°. L'octroi aux municipalités d'attributions plus étendues ;

2°. La création de conseils de districts, habilités à étudier les questions d'intérêt local.

Suivant l'importance des matières, lesdits conseils pourront soit donner leur avis, soit se prononcer définitivement.

Leurs décisions définitives seront, suivant des cas à déterminer, soumises ou non à l'approbation du Gouvernement central.

Lesdits conseils seront, notamment, consultés sur les affectations de la part du budget des dépenses intéressant leur district.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République française, au Président de la République libanaise.

Par une lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que, pour donner effet aux stipulations de l'échange de lettres No. 6, le Gouvernement libanais assurera, le plus tôt possible et en tout cas avant l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, l'unification du régime fiscal et que, dans le même esprit, il est disposé à appliquer à l'ensemble du territoire de la République un programme de réformes administratives.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre acte de cette obligeante communication.

Protocols No. 1-3 and 5 are identical with those annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty ; No. 4 consists of the first two paragraphs only of No. 4 annexed to the Franco-Syrian Treaty.

No. 4 : *Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tesson, December 11th, 1937.*¹

le 11 décembre 1937.

Son Excellence Monsieur de Tesson, Sous-Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Etrangères.

Monsieur le ministre,

Au cours des échanges de vues que mon séjour à Paris m'a permis d'avoir avec Votre Excellence, il nous a été donné d'examiner, dans toute leur ampleur, les diverses questions que, dans l'ordre tant politique et administratif qu'économique, soulève la mise en œuvre de la collaboration franco-syrienne, telle que celle-ci a été définie par le traité du 22 décembre 1936. L'occasion m'a été ainsi offerte de constater notre complet accord sur l'intérêt mutuel de nos deux pays à entretenir et à développer dans une atmosphère d'amitié confiante leurs relations, et sur les moyens les plus propres à les faire fructifier. Parmi les problèmes que nous avons débattus, il en est deux sur lesquels notre attention s'est portée d'une manière toute spéciale.

Le premier concerne le statut des minorités. A cet égard,

¹ *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères : Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1937 (Paris, 1938), pp. 215-17.*

il m'est agréable de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, comme je l'ai souligné dans mes récentes déclarations au Parlement, les mesures prises après les regrettables incidents dont la Djezireh a été le théâtre, ont eu d'heureux effets. La situation dans cette région tend à redevenir normale. L'attachement de la Syrie à son existence nationale n'a rien qui ne se concilie avec le plein exercice des droits qui sont garantis aux communautés et aux individus, et auxquels se réfère l'annexe No. 5 au traité du 22 décembre 1936. Animé de ce sentiment, mon Gouvernement se prépare à mettre en application la loi sur les mohafazats, qui est aussi conforme aux intérêts généraux du pays qu'aux intérêts particuliers de chacune des régions qui le composent.

Le second de ces problèmes concerne l'exécution des clauses énoncées à l'annexe No. 2 au traité. La Syrie a conscience des bienfaits que, pour l'organisation de ses services publics, elle peut attendre du concours de la technique française. C'est dans cet esprit qu'au plus tôt, il conviendra de constituer le cadre permanent des fonctions en cause et de recruter les agents qui auront à les occuper. Pour la désignation des titulaires, mon pays souhaiterait vivement qu'il y fût pourvu sur présentation, par le Gouvernement français, de candidatures qualifiées.

Je me félicite d'être en mesure de donner à Votre Excellence les assurances qui précèdent. Je ne doute pas que, si besoin était, elles ne fussent de nature à la convaincre du désir profond et sincère qu'a la Syrie de pratiquer de manière large et confiante la politique que, reprenant et confirmant une tradition séculaire, le traité d'alliance a eu pour objet de définir.

Agréé, Monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Signé : DJEMIL MARDAM BEY.

le 11 décembre 1937.

Son Excellence Djemil Mardam Bey, Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République syrienne.

Monsieur le président,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à Votre Excellence de la lettre qu'à la date de ce jour Elle a bien voulu me faire parvenir et dont je reproduis ci-après la teneur :

"Au cours des échanges de vues que mon séjour à Paris m'a permis d'avoir avec Votre Excellence, il nous a été donné d'examiner, dans toute leur ampleur, les diverses questions que, dans l'ordre tant politique et administratif qu'économique, soulève la mise en œuvre de la collaboration franco-syrienne, telle que celle-ci a été définie par le traité du 22 décembre 1936. L'occasion m'a été ainsi offerte de constater notre complet accord sur l'intérêt

mutuel de nos deux pays à entretenir et à développer dans une atmosphère d'amitié confiante leurs relations, et sur les moyens les plus propres à les faire fructifier. Parmi les problèmes que nous avons débattus, il en est deux sur lesquels notre attention s'est portée d'une manière toute spéciale.

"Le premier concerne le statut des minorités. A cet égard, il m'est agréable de confirmer à Votre Excellence que, comme je l'ai souligné dans mes récentes déclarations au Parlement, les mesures prises après les regrettables incidents dont la Djezireh a été le théâtre, ont eu d'heureux effets. La situation dans cette région tend à redevenir normale. L'attachement de la Syrie à son existence nationale n'a rien qui ne se concilie avec le plein exercice des droits qui sont garantis aux communautés et aux individus, et auxquels se réfère l'annexe No. 5 au traité du 22 décembre 1936. Animé de ce sentiment, mon Gouvernement se prépare à mettre en application la loi sur les mohafazats, qui est aussi conforme aux intérêts généraux du pays qu'aux intérêts particuliers de chacune des régions qui le composent.

"Le second de ces problèmes concerne l'exécution des clauses énoncées à l'annexe No. 2 au traité. La Syrie a conscience des bienfaits que, pour l'organisation de ses services publics, elle peut attendre du concours de la technique française. C'est dans cet esprit qu'au plus tôt, il conviendra de constituer le cadre permanent des fonctions en cause et de recruter les agents qui auront à les occuper. Pour la désignation des titulaires, mon pays souhaiterait vivement qu'il y fût pourvu sur présentation, par le Gouvernement français, de candidatures qualifiées.

"Je me félicite d'être en mesure de donner à Votre Excellence les assurances qui précèdent. Je ne doute pas que, si besoin était, elles ne fussent de nature à La convaincre du désir profond et sincère qu'a la Syrie de pratiquer de manière large et confiante la politique que, reprenant et confirmant une tradition séculaire, le traité d'alliance a eu pour objet de définir."

C'est très volontiers qu'au nom du Gouvernement de la République, je prends acte des éclaircissements et des assurances que, spontanément, Votre Excellence a tenu à me fournir. Je ne doute pas que l'opinion française n'y voie une nouvelle preuve du vif désir de la Syrie de pratiquer dans un esprit large, confiant et sincère la politique d'alliance et de collaboration à laquelle nos deux pays sont également attachés et dont ils attendent, tous deux, le raffermissement des liens qui les unissent. De nos échanges de vues, j'emporte la certitude qu'en accord avec Ses collègues, Votre Excellence aura à cœur de hâter l'entrée en vigueur de toutes les mesures qui nous sont apparues indispensables pour donner aux engagements souscrits de part et d'autre leur plein effet.

De mon côté, mon Gouvernement, sensible à la valeur de ces apaisements, qui touchent à tous les domaines, et soucieux d'accélérer la mise en œuvre du nouveau régime, s'emploiera à obtenir que la Chambre des Députés entreprenne l'examen du traité du 22 décembre 1936 avant le premier mars prochain. Dans l'intervalle, il s'efforcera de presser la solution des divers problèmes en suspens. Il est de l'intérêt commun des deux pays que l'ensemble du système soit effectivement organisé avant l'expiration des délais qui, ainsi que M. Viénot, mon prédécesseur, vous en a donné l'assurance à la date du 17 février dernier, courent à partir du premier janvier 1937.

Agréé, Monsieur le président, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Signé : TESSAN.

No. 5 : *The Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.*¹

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE

Après la signature du Protocole en date de ce jour, le gouvernement français et le gouvernement syrien ont, d'un commun accord, reconnu qu'il était de l'intérêt des deux parties de hâter le plus possible l'entrée en vigueur du statut défini par le traité du 22 décembre 1936, et par les actes annexés et complémentaires.

Ils estiment en conséquence qu'il serait à souhaiter que le parlement syrien donnât son approbation, au plus tard le 20 janvier 1939, et que le parlement français, saisi, avant le 10 décembre prochain, des rapports des commissions compétentes, autorisât la ratification desdits textes avant le 31 janvier 1939.

Dans ces conditions, la dévolution à l'administration syrienne des attributions encore retenues par l'autorité mandataire, aurait lieu dans le courant du mois de février prochain.

Fait en double en Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
GEORGES BONNET.

PROTOCOLE

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, soucieux de ne rien négliger qui puisse contribuer à rendre plus étroites et plus confiantes l'amitié et la collaboration des deux pays, ont repris l'examen des différentes questions que soulève l'avenir de leurs rapports.

1. Le gouvernement syrien rappelle les mesures par lesquelles il se propose de donner leur plein effet aux engagements énoncés

¹ *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), July, 1939, pp. 355-57.

dans l'échange des notes du 11 décembre 1937. Il souligne qu'il a également prorogé le privilège de l'institut d'émission et stabilisé, dans des conditions conformes aux intérêts permanents du pays, le régime de la recherche et de l'exploitation des gîtes petrolifères. Il ajoute qu'il est dans son intention de solliciter le plus rapidement possible du Parlement l'approbation dudit accord ainsi que des textes qui en ont procédé.

2. En ce qui concerne le cadre permanent des fonctions à confier à des agents placés à la disposition de la Syrie par la France, le gouvernement syrien confirme que le conseiller affecté au département de l'intérieur sera assisté de deux adjoints, dont l'un sera détaché à demeure dans les confins septentrionaux.

3. Insistant sur la nécessité d'apaiser certaines préoccupations auxquelles la France, tenue par la pérennité de ses traditions, ne pourrait, sans déroger, rester indifférente, le gouvernement de la République se réjouit de constater que la Syrie est résolue à garantir efficacement à tous la liberté de conscience ainsi que l'exercice des droits qui en découlent, et en particulier, à reconnaître aux chrétiens, en toute matière, la faculté de récuser les canons et la juridiction coraniques.

4. Encore que la convention scolaire ne doive, en vertu du traité du 22 décembre 1936, être conclue que postérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur de ce dernier, le gouvernement syrien aura, dans ce domaine, à cœur de veiller à ce que le régime des examens n'ait à aucun degré, pour effet de restreindre la place du français dans les programmes, ni, non plus, à porter atteinte à la faveur dont jouit actuellement auprès des élèves l'enseignement de cette langue.

Soucieux, de son côté, de raffermir les liens moraux qui unissent les deux pays, le gouvernement français prendra au bénéfice des étudiants syriens, les mesures propres à leur permettre de parfaire en France leur formation dans les conditions les plus avantageuses.

5. Conscients de leur intérêt mutuel à développer leurs échanges commerciaux, les parties contractantes, chacune en ce qui la concerne, prendront, à cet effet, les mesures appropriées.

En matière financière, le gouvernement français prêtera, de son côté, son concours au gouvernement syrien.

6. Convaincu de l'intérêt mutuel des parties contractantes à mettre le plus promptement possible en vigueur le traité, ainsi que tous les textes qui en dérivent, et désireux de donner à la Syrie une nouvelle preuve d'amitié et de confiance, le gouvernement français ne verrait pas d'inconvénient à ce que le terme du délai prévu par l'article 4 du préambule du traité et par l'alinéa premier du protocole 5 fut fixé au 30 septembre 1939. Il se propose de soumettre aux Chambres cette novation symbolique,

qui acquerrait valeur contractuelle par l'insertion, dans le corps des instruments de ratification, du présent protocole, dûment revêtu de l'approbation du parlement syrien et du parlement français.

7. Dès l'échange des instruments de ratification, la Syrie accréditera un représentant diplomatique à Paris.

Fait en double à Paris, le 14 novembre 1938.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY.
GEORGES BONNET.

No. 6 : *Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of the Alawi Territory, Jebel Druze, and the Jazirah, July 1st, 1939.*¹

I. RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE AUTONOME ALAOUITE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 274/LR du 5 décembre 1936,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le règlement organique du territoire autonome alaouite annexé à l'arrêté 274/LR, du 5 décembre 1936, est remplacé par le règlement organique administratif et financier annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Le règlement organique

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté le territoire autonome alaouite, dans l'État de Syrie, en matière administrative et financière, est fixé par le présent règlement organique.

Article 2 : Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, l'administrateur supérieur, assisté d'un conseil des directeurs et chefs de service, et le conseil du territoire sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 3 : Les emplois publics sont répartis équitablement entre les diverses communautés du territoire dans toute la mesure compatible avec les besoins d'une bonne administration.

¹ *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), August, 1939, pp. 443-53.

De l'administrateur supérieur

Article 4 : Le Chef de l'État de Syrie nomme l'administrateur supérieur sur la présentation du conseil du territoire.

L'administrateur doit jouir de ses droits civils et politiques. Il est nommé pour 5 ans. Son mandat est renouvelable.

Il y a incompatibilité entre les fonctions d'administrateur et tout mandat électif.

Article 5 : La présentation de l'administrateur est faite par le conseil du territoire suivant un vote au scrutin secret à la majorité des 2/3 des membres composant le Conseil. La majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés suffit au deuxième tour de scrutin et la majorité relative au troisième.

Le conseil du territoire se réunit, à cet effet, un mois avant l'expiration des pouvoirs de l'administrateur ; il est convoqué au plus tôt en cas de vacance du poste par décès, démission, ou pour toute autre cause.

Article 6 : Le directeur ou chef de service de l'intérieur assume l'intérim des fonctions de l'administrateur en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de ce dernier, ou de vacance du poste.

Article 7 : L'administrateur est le chef et la plus haute autorité de l'administration locale. Il est le représentant du pouvoir central sur le territoire.

Il a la charge de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

Il assure l'exécution de la loi et des règlements.

Il administre le territoire avec le concours de directeurs ou chefs de service placés à la tête des services publics.

En vertu de la délégation permanente du Chef de l'État de Syrie, il nomme à tous les emplois.

Il est ordonnateur du budget local.

Il représente en justice le territoire.

Il exerce le pouvoir réglementaire en matière locale, après avis conforme du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service et sous réserve des attributions du conseil du territoire.

Il a qualité pour passer contrat avec des fonctionnaires ou magistrats français.

Article 8 : Il convoque les collèges électoraux, aux dates et dans les conditions fixées par les dispositions législatives.

Il convoque le conseil du territoire en session ordinaire et en session extraordinaire et prononce la clôture des sessions.

Il peut ajourner le conseil pour un mois par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service. Le conseil ne peut être ajourné plus de deux fois consécutives.

Il peut le dissoudre par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

En cas de dissolution, l'administrateur doit convoquer les collèges électoraux dans un délai de quatre mois.

• *Du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service*

Article 9 : Le conseil des directeurs et chefs de service est composé des directeurs, conseillers et chefs des services généraux de l'administration centrale du territoire.

Il est présidé par l'administrateur et se réunit sur convocation de ce dernier.

Il procède au moyen de délibérations prises à la majorité des voix des membres composant le conseil. La voix de l'administrateur est prépondérante.

Article 10 : Le conseil des directeurs et chefs de service assiste l'administrateur dans l'examen des affaires intéressant l'administration du territoire.

Indépendamment des questions expressément visées dans le présent règlement organique, l'administrateur doit obligatoirement prendre l'accord du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service dans toute affaire présentée au conseil du territoire, ainsi que dans les matières suivantes :

1. nomination et promotion des directeurs, chefs de service et caïmacams ;
2. rectification des prévisions budgétaires en cours d'exercice ;
3. déclarations d'utilité publique et décisions relatives aux concessions ;

Mention de la délibération du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service est portée à tous actes où cette formalité est requise.

Du conseil du territoire

Article 11 : Le conseil du territoire est composé d'au moins 17 membres, ceux-ci sont élus suivant le mode de scrutin fixé par le règlement électoral du 25 février 1930. Le conseil actuellement en exercice conservera son mandat jusqu'à expiration normale de ce dernier.

Le règlement électoral ne pourra être modifié que par un vote du conseil acquis à la majorité des deux tiers des voix composant le conseil.

Les membres du conseil sont élus pour six ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié. Pour le premier renouvellement, les circonscriptions des membres sortants seront désignées par voie de tirage au sort effectué à la diligence du conseil.

Article 12 : Le conseil du territoire se réunit chaque année en deux sessions ordinaires, l'une en novembre, l'autre en avril. La durée de chacune de ces sessions ne peut excéder quinze jours.

Le conseil peut en outre être convoqué en session extraordinaire.

Article 13 : A la première séance de la session de novembre, le

conseil du territoire procède, avant toute discussion, à l'élection de son bureau qui demeure en fonctions jusqu'à la session de novembre de l'année suivante.

Le conseil établit son règlement intérieur.

Article 14 : Le conseil du territoire exerce ses attributions par voie de délibération. Le vote est public et ne peut être émis par procuration.

Le conseil ne peut valablement délibérer que si la moitié plus un de ses membres sont présent à la séance. Ses décisions sont prises à la majorité des membres présents. La voix du président est prépondérante en cas de partage, sauf le cas de scrutin secret.

Il est voté au scrutin secret toutes les fois que le tiers des membres présents le réclament, ou qu'il s'agit de procéder à une élection.

Dans ce dernier cas, si la majorité absolue n'a pas été obtenue au premier tour de scrutin, la majorité relative suffit. En cas d'égalité de voix, le plus âgé est déclaré élu.

Article 15 : Le président de séance a la police de l'assemblée. Il est chargé de faire observer par celle-ci son règlement intérieur.

Article 16 : L'administrateur a accès au conseil ; il peut y prendre la parole, mais il n'a pas voix délibérative. Il peut s'y faire assister de conseillers, directeurs ou chefs de service.

Article 17 : L'administrateur peut, avant la clôture de la session, demander qu'une délibération du conseil soit remise en discussion. Si le conseil confirme son premier vote à la majorité des deux tiers, la délibération est acquise.

Article 18 : Le budget, le compte définitif des exercices clos, les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire ou engageant ses finances sont soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire.

Les attributions du conseil en ces matières sont définies par les articles 19 à 25 du présent règlement organique.

Sont également soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire les actes portant modification du nombre et des limites des circonscriptions administratives, la création ou la suppression de municipalités, les règlements concernant le statut des fonctionnaires, les pensions et retraites, l'organisation municipale et plus généralement les actes réglementaires intéressant l'organisation administrative ou les finances du territoire.

Du budget

Article 19 : Le territoire bénéficie de l'autonomie financière.

Article 20 : Le projet de budget est préparé et présenté par l'administrateur, assisté du conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

Il est communiqué aux membres du conseil du territoire huit

jours au moins avant l'ouverture de la session de novembre en même temps que le compte définitif de l'exercice écoulé.

Le budget voté par le conseil du territoire est promulgué par l'administrateur avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 21 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1. le produit de tous impôts, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire, et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;
2. une quote-part de l'excédent des recettes communes sur les dépenses communes ;
3. des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versés, soit par des États ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1. toutes les dépenses des services publics sur le territoire ;
2. une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État de Syrie, égale à 5% du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;
3. le service des emprunts contractés par le territoire ;
4. le service des pensions incombant au territoire.

Article 22 : Peuvent faire l'objet d'inscription d'office au budget :

1. les dettes exigibles régulièrement contractées ainsi que les dépenses des exercices clos ;
2. les dépenses de gendarmerie, de police, et celles relatives à la sécurité.

S'il y a lieu, l'inscription d'office est faite par un arrêté de l'administrateur pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service.

Article 23 : La constitution organique des services ne peut être modifiée par voie budgétaire.

Article 24 : Lorsque, dans l'intervalle des sessions, des circonstances imprévues rendent nécessaires des dépenses urgentes, l'administrateur peut, par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service, ouvrir des crédits extraordinaires ou supplémentaires, à charge de les présenter au conseil du territoire au cours de la session suivante.

Article 25 : La session ordinaire du conseil du territoire tenue en novembre est spécialement consacrée au vote du budget, auquel il doit être procédé avant toute autre discussion, l'élection du bureau exceptée.

Si le conseil n'a pas définitivement statué sur le projet du budget avant la fin de la session, l'administrateur pourra le convoquer en session extraordinaire pour en poursuivre la discussion. La durée de cette session est limitée à quinze jours. Ce délai écoulé, s'il n'a pas été statué définitivement sur le budget, l'administrateur, par arrêté motivé pris en conseil des directeurs et chefs de service,

rendra le projet de budget obligatoire en tenant compte dans la mesure du possible des votes déjà acquis.

Dispositions diverses

Article 26 : Le drapeau national est celui de l'État syrien ; le territoire autonome alaouite conservera son pavillon spécial.

Article 27 : Les conseillers et inspecteurs français, mis à la disposition du territoire, pourront être délégués dans les fonctions de directeurs ou de chefs de service.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE JUDICIAIRE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 32/LR du 12 février 1937,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire du territoire autonome alaouite est fixée par le règlement organique annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence, et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire en matière civile, commerciale, administrative et pénale du territoire autonome comprend :

Un tribunal supérieur à Lattaquié dont la compétence territoriale s'étend à tout le territoire,

Des tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance, dont un à Lattaquié,

Des justices de paix, en principe une par caza.

Article 2 : Les fonctions de directeur de la justice, chef du service judiciaire, sont exercées par le président du tribunal supérieur qui est un magistrat français.

Le président du tribunal de 1^{ère} instance de Lattaquié est également un magistrat français.

Ces magistrats relèvent de l'inspecteur général français de la justice en Syrie.

Ils sont nommés par le Chef de l'État Syrien sur la proposition du Gouvernement Français.

Article 3 : Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 2, les

magistrats du territoire sont nommés par l'administrateur sur proposition du directeur de la justice.

Article 4 : Le tribunal supérieur connaît souverainement et sans recours :

- des appels des tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance,
- des affaires criminelles,
- du contentieux administratif,
- de tous les conflits de juridiction à l'intérieur du territoire.

Il constitue, en s'adjoignant le président du tribunal de 1^{ère} instance de Lattaquié et un juge de ce tribunal, le conseil supérieur de la magistrature, le conseil de discipline des auxiliaires de justice, la commission d'avancement des magistrats et celle des auxiliaires de justice.

Article 5 : Les tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance et les justices de paix connaissent des affaires qui leur sont soumises conformément à la loi, sauf ce qui est dit au présent arrêté.

Article 6 : En matière civile et commerciale, les justices de paix statuent toujours en premier ressort ; appel est porté pour toutes les justices de paix du territoire devant le tribunal de 1^{ère} instance de Lattaquié qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Dans les mêmes matières, les tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance statuent toujours en premier ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justice de paix.

En matière pénale les justices de paix connaissent définitivement et sans aucune voie de recours des contraventions. Elle connaissent en premier ressort des délits qui sont de leur compétence aux termes de la loi, à charge d'appel pour toutes les justices de paix du territoire devant le tribunal de 1^{ère} instance de Lattaquié qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Les délits non attribués aux justices de paix sont de la compétence exclusive des tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance qui statuent toujours en premier ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justices de paix.

Article 7 : Il n'est rien modifié à l'organisation actuelle en ce qui concerne les affaires de la compétence des tribunaux S.E.M.E. Toutefois, le service de la justice de paix S.E.M.E. de Lattaquié sera assuré par le président français du tribunal de Lattaquié.

Article 8 : Tous les conflits de compétence entre les juridictions du territoire et celles des autres territoires seront soumis, pour règlement de juge, à la Cour de Cassation de Syrie ayant la composition prévue par l'article 2 de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1820, du 17 février 1928, et ses modifications.

Article 9 : Les magistrats français seront recrutés dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté interministériel français du 10 juillet 1936 et ses modificatifs ; ils seront soumis aux dispositions de

l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 7 PARIC du 18 décembre 1931 et aux arrêtés le modifiant ou le complétant.

II. RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE DU TERRITOIRE AUTONOME DU DJEBEL DRUZE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 205 LR du 2 décembre 1936,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Le règlement organique du territoire autonome du Djebel Druze, annexé à l'arrêté 205 LR du 2 décembre 1936, est remplacé par le règlement organique, administratif et financier annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925 le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Le règlement organique

Article premier : Le régime spécial dont est doté le territoire autonome du Djebel Druze dans l'État de Syrie en matière administrative et financière est fixé par le présent règlement organique.

Article 2 : Pour assurer l'application de ce régime l'administrateur supérieur, assisté d'un conseil du territoire, est investi des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Article 3 : Les emplois publics sont répartis équitablement entre les diverses communautés du territoire dans toute la mesure compatible avec les besoins d'une bonne administration.

De l'administrateur supérieur

Article 4 : Le Chef de l'État de Syrie nomme l'administrateur supérieur sur la présentation du conseil du territoire.

L'administrateur doit jouir de ses droits civils et politiques. Il est nommé pour cinq ans. Son mandat est renouvelable.

Article 5 : La présentation de l'administrateur est faite par le conseil du territoire, suivant un vote au scrutin secret à la majorité des deux tiers des membres composant le conseil. La majorité absolue des suffrages exprimés suffit au deuxième tour de scrutin et la majorité relative au troisième.

Le conseil du territoire se réunit à cet effet un mois avant l'expiration des pouvoirs de l'administrateur ; il est convoqué au plus tôt en cas de vacance du poste par décès, démission, ou pour toute autre cause.

Article 6 : Le Vice-Président du conseil du territoire assume l'intérim des fonctions de l'administrateur en cas d'absence ou d'empêchement de ce dernier, ou de vacance du poste.

Article 7 : L'administrateur est le chef et la plus haute autorité de l'administration locale. Il est le représentant du pouvoir central sur le territoire. Il préside le conseil du territoire.

Il a la charge de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité publique.

Il assure l'exécution de la loi et des règlements.

Il administre le territoire avec le concours de directeurs ou chefs de service placés à la tête des services publics.

En vertu de la délégation permanente du chef de l'État de Syrie, il nomme à tous les emplois.

Il est ordonnateur du budget local.

Il représente en justice le territoire.

Il exerce le pouvoir réglementaire en matières locales, sous réserve des attributions du conseil du territoire.

Il exerce le droit de grâce sur proposition d'une commission de trois membres présidée par le directeur de la Justice.

Il peut accorder des remises de peine dans les mêmes formes.

Il a qualité pour passer contrat avec des fonctionnaires ou magistrats français.

Article 8 : Il convoque les collèges électoraux aux dates et dans les conditions fixées par les dispositions législatives.

Il convoque le conseil du territoire en session ordinaire et en session extraordinaire et prononce la clôture des sessions.

Il peut dissoudre par arrêté motivé le conseil du territoire.

En cas de dissolution, l'administrateur doit convoquer les collèges électoraux dans un délai de quatre mois.

Du conseil du territoire

Article 9 : Le conseil du territoire est composé de 12 membres. Ceux-ci sont élus suivant le mode de scrutin actuellement en vigueur dans l'État. Il est présidé par l'administrateur. Le conseil actuellement en exercice conservera son mandat jusqu'à expiration normale de ce dernier.

Le règlement électoral ne pourra être modifié que par un vote du conseil acquis à la majorité des deux tiers des voix composant le conseil.

Les membres du conseil sont élus pour six ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié. Pour le premier renouvellement, les circonscriptions des membres sortants seront désignées par voie de tirage au sort effectué à la diligence du conseil.

Article 10 : Le conseil du territoire se réunit chaque année en deux sessions ordinaires, l'une en novembre, l'autre en avril. La durée de chacune de ces sessions ne peut excéder quinze jours.

Le conseil peut en outre être convoqué en session extraordinaire.

Article 11 : A la première séance de la session de novembre, le conseil du territoire procède, avant toute discussion, à l'élection de son bureau qui demeure en fonctions jusqu'à la session de novembre de l'année suivante.

Article 12 : Le conseil du territoire exerce ses attributions par voie de délibérations. Le vote ne peut être émis par procuration.

Le conseil ne peut valablement délibérer que si la moitié plus un de ses membres sont présents à la séance. Ses décisions sont prises à la majorité des membres présents. La voix du Président est prépondérante en cas de partage, sauf le cas de scrutin secret.

Il est voté au scrutin secret toutes les fois que le tiers des membres présents le réclament ou qu'il s'agit de procéder à une élection.

Dans ce dernier cas, si la majorité absolue n'a pas été obtenue au premier tour du scrutin, la majorité relative suffit. En cas d'égalité de voix, le plus âgé est déclaré élu.

Article 13 : Le président de la séance a la police de l'Assemblée.

Article 14 : Les conseillers, directeurs et chefs de service du territoire peuvent être invités à assister aux séances du conseil et à y prendre la parole, mais ils n'ont pas voix délibérative.

Article 15 : L'administrateur peut, avant la clôture de la session, demander qu'une délibération du conseil soit remise en discussion. Si le conseil confirme son premier vote à la majorité de deux tiers la délibération est acquise.

Article 16 : Le budget, le compte définitif des exercices clos, les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le territoire ou engageant ses finances, sont soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire.

Les attributions du conseil en ces matières sont définies par les articles 17 à 23 du présent règlement organique.

Sont également soumis par l'administrateur à l'approbation du conseil du territoire les actes portant modification du nombre et des limites des circonscriptions administratives, la création ou la suppression des municipalités, les règlements concernant le statut des fonctionnaires, les pensions et retraites, l'organisation municipale et plus généralement les actes réglementaires intéressant l'organisation administrative ou les finances du territoire.

Du budget

Article 17 : Le territoire bénéficie de l'autonomie financière.

Article 18 : Le projet de budget est préparé par l'administrateur assisté des conseillers, directeurs et chefs de service.

Il est communiqué aux membres du conseil du territoire 8 jours au moins avant l'ouverture de la session de novembre, en même temps que le compte définitif de l'exercice écoulé.

Le budget voté par le conseil du territoire est promulgué par l'administrateur avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Article 19 : Le budget du territoire comprend en recettes :

1°. le produit de tous impôts, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée ;

2°. une quote-part de l'excédent des recettes communes sur les dépenses communes ;

3°. des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versés soit par des États ou des collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du territoire comprend en dépenses :

1°. toutes les dépenses des services publics sur le territoire ;

2°. une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'État de Syrie, égale à 5% du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire ;

3°. le service des emprunts contractés sur le territoire ;

4°. éventuellement le service des pensions incombant au territoire.

Article 20 : Peuvent faire l'objet d'inscription d'office au budget :

1°. les dettes exigibles régulièrement contractées ainsi que les dépenses des exercices clos ;

2°. les dépenses de gendarmerie, de police et celles relatives à la sécurité.

S'il y a lieu, l'inscription d'office est faite par un arrêté de l'administrateur.

Article 21 : La constitution organique des services ne peut être modifiée par voie budgétaire.

Article 22 : Lorsque, dans l'intervalle des sessions, des circonstances imprévues rendent nécessaires des dépenses urgentes, l'administrateur peut, par arrêté motivé pris sur la proposition des directeurs ou chefs de services intéressés, ouvrir des crédits extraordinaires ou supplémentaires, à charge de les présenter au conseil du territoire au cours de la session suivante.

Article 23 : La session ordinaire du conseil du territoire tenue en novembre est spécialement consacrée au vote du budget auquel il doit être procédé avant toute autre discussion, l'élection du bureau exceptée.

Si le conseil n'a pas définitivement statué sur le projet de budget avant la fin de la session, l'administrateur pourra le convoquer en session extraordinaire pour en poursuivre la discussion. La durée de cette session est limitée à 15 jours. Ce délai écoulé, s'il n'a

pas été statué définitivement sur le budget, l'administrateur, par arrêté motivé, rendra le projet de budget obligatoire en tenant compte dans la mesure du possible des votes déjà acquis.

Dispositions diverses

Article 24 : Le drapeau national est celui de l'État syrien ; le territoire autonome du Djebel Druze conserve son pavillon spécial.

Article 25 : Les conseillers et inspecteurs français mis à la disposition du territoire pourront être délégués dans les fonctions de directeurs ou de chefs de service.

RÈGLEMENT ORGANIQUE JUDICIAIRE

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut Commissaire,

Vu l'arrêté No. 31/LR du 12 février 1937,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire du territoire autonome du Djebel Druze est fixée par le règlement organique annexé au présent arrêté.

Article 2 : Ce règlement organique entrera en application dès la mise en vigueur du présent arrêté.

Article 3 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut Commissariat.

Article premier : L'organisation judiciaire en matière civile, commerciale, administrative et pénale du territoire autonome comprend :

Un tribunal supérieur à Soueida, dont la compétence territoriale s'étend à tout le territoire,

Un tribunal de 1^{re} instance à Soueida, dont la compétence territoriale s'étend également à tout le territoire,

Des justices de paix, en principe une par caza.

Article 2 : Les fonctions de directeur de la justice, chef du service judiciaire, sont exercées par le président du tribunal supérieur. Celui-ci est un magistrat ou ancien magistrat français.

Le tribunal de 1^{re} instance peut être également présidé par un magistrat ou ancien magistrat français.

Ces magistrats relèvent de l'inspecteur général français de la justice en Syrie. Ils sont nommés par le Chef de l'État syrien sur la proposition du gouvernement français.

Article 3 : Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 2, les magistrats du territoire sont nommés par l'administrateur sur proposition du directeur de la justice.

Article 4 : Le tribunal supérieur connaît souverainement et sans recours :

- des appels des tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance ;
- des affaires criminelles ;
- du contentieux administratif ;
- de tous les conflits de juridiction à l'intérieur du territoire.

Il constitue le conseil supérieur de la magistrature, le conseil de discipline des auxiliaires de justice, la commission d'avancement des magistrats et celle des auxiliaires de justice.

Article 5 : Le tribunal de 1^{ère} instance et les justices de paix connaissent des affaires qui leur sont soumises, conformément à la loi, sauf ce qui est dit au présent arrêté.

Article 6 : En matière civile et commerciale, les justices de paix statuent toujours en 1^{er} ressort ; l'appel est porté devant le tribunal de 1^{ère} instance qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Dans les mêmes matières, les tribunaux de 1^{ère} instance statuent toujours en 1^{er} ressort, sauf ce qui est dit ci-dessus de l'appel des affaires de justice de paix.

En matière pénale, les justices de paix connaissent définitivement et sans aucune voie de recours des contraventions. Elles connaissent en 1^{er} ressort des délits qui sont de leur compétence aux termes de la loi, à charge d'appel devant le tribunal de 1^{ère} instance qui statue sans aucune voie de recours.

Les délits non attribués aux justices de paix sont de la compétence exclusive du tribunal de 1^{ère} instance qui statue toujours en 1^{er} ressort, sauf lorsqu'il est juridiction d'appel des justices de paix.

Article 7 : Il n'est rien modifié à l'organisation actuelle en ce qui concerne les affaires de la compétence des tribunaux S.E.M.E.

Article 8 : Tous les conflits de compétence entre les juridictions du territoire et celles des autres territoires seront soumis, pour règlement de juges, à la Cour de Cassation de Syrie ayant la composition prévue par l'article 2 de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 1820, du 17 février 1928, et ses modificatifs.

Article 9 : Les magistrats français seront recrutés dans les conditions prévues par l'arrêté interministériel français du 10 juillet 1936 et ses modificatifs ; ils seront soumis aux dispositions de l'arrêté du Haut-Commissaire No. 7/PARIC du 18 décembre 1931 et aux arrêtés le modifiant ou le complétant.

Toutefois, à titre provisoire, il pourra ne pas être créé de poste dans le cadre des magistrats français, le service étant assuré, soit par la délégation d'un magistrat des tribunaux S.E.M.E. de Syrie,

soit par la désignation d'un ancien magistrat des juridictions du Levant, dont la situation sera réglée par contrat spécial.

ARRÊTÉ No. 138/LR DU 1^{er} JUILLET 1939

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

Vu les arrêtés No. 274/LR et 265/LR des 5 et 2 décembre 1936,

Vu les arrêtés No. 132/LR et 133/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939,

Vu les arrêtés No. 134/LR et 136/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939,

Considérant qu'il importe d'assurer pendant une période probatoire le fonctionnement régulier du régime instauré par les précédents arrêtés :

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : L'application des arrêtés No. 132/LR, 133/LR et 134/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939 sera assurée, s'il en est besoin, par le Haut-Commissaire qui pourvoiera éventuellement aux nominations qui n'auraient pas été faites conformément aux textes précités.

Article 2 : Les représentants du Haut-Commissaire dans les territoires soumis au régime spécial prévu par les arrêtés No. 132/LR et 133/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939 pourront, par décision motivée, s'opposer à l'exécution de toute mesure contraire aux dispositions des règlements organiques annexés aux dits arrêtés.

A cet effet, ils recevront communication des décisions de l'administrateur ainsi que des délibérations du conseil du territoire avant leur mise en vigueur.

Article 3 : Ils assureront le contrôle des engagements de dépenses. Ils pourront en déléguer l'exercice.

Article 4 : Ils assureront le contrôle des services administratifs civils, y compris les municipalités, et celui des services financiers, y compris la Banque agricole ; ils pourront déléguer l'exercice de ce contrôle.

Article 5 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

Bejruth, le 1^{er} juillet 1939.

Le Secrétaire général
S/ EHRHARDT.

Le Haut-Commissaire
S/ PUAUX.

P.A. le Chef de section
chargé du bureau d'ordre
G. DUMONT.

Le Conseiller Législatif
S/ A. MAZAS.

III. RÉGIME ADMINISTRATIF DU MOHAFAZAT DE LA DJÉZIREH

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française,

Vu l'Acte de Mandat du 24 juillet 1922,

Vu le décret du 23 novembre 1920 fixant les pouvoirs du Haut-Commissaire,

ARRÊTE :

Article premier : Les pouvoirs et attributions dévolus par les lois et règlements en vigueur à l'administrateur du mohafazat de la Djézireh seront exercés, jusqu'à ce qu'il en soit autrement disposé, par le délégué adjoint du Haut-Commissaire de la République Française à Hassetché.

Il pourra être assisté dans ses fonctions par un administrateur-adjoint syrien.

Article 2 : Vu l'urgence et conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 de l'arrêté 96/S du 14 avril 1925, le présent arrêté entrera en vigueur par voie d'affichage à la porte du Haut-Commissariat.

No. 7 : *Fundamental Principles to govern the Future Status of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, submitted by M. Sandler and adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.*¹

1. The Sanjak shall constitute a separate entity. It shall enjoy full independence in its internal affairs. The State of Syria shall be responsible for the conduct of its foreign affairs, subject to the provisions contained in No. 3 below.

The Sanjak and Syria shall have the same customs and monetary administration.

2. In the Sanjak, Turkish shall be an official language, and the Council shall determine, in accordance with the procedure laid down in paragraph 10, the character and conditions of the use of another language.

3. No international agreement concluded by the State of Syria, which is likely to affect in any way whatever the independence and sovereignty of that State, and no international decision having the same effects may be applied to the Sanjak without the express consent in advance of the Council of the League of Nations.

4. Special officials shall ensure the necessary liaison between the two executive authorities in matters for which responsibility will rest with Syria.

As regards such matters, the legislative assemblies of Syria and the Sanjak shall be entitled to establish inter-parliamentary liaison and to determine the details of such liaison.

5. Supervision by the Council of the League of Nations to

¹ *Official Journal of League of Nations*, February, 1937 (Geneva, 1937), p. 119.

ensure respect for the Statute and Fundamental Law of the Sanjak, such supervision to be exercised in the following conditions :

(a) Presence on the spot of a delegate of French nationality appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

(b) Power of the delegate to suspend for a maximum period of four months any legislative or governmental act contrary to the provisions of the Statute or of the Fundamental Law. In such case, the delegate shall be bound immediately to refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, with whom the final decision shall rest.

(c) The French Government and the Turkish Government declare their willingness to give effect to the recommendations which the Council of the League of Nations may make to them to ensure respect for the decisions taken by the Council.

If, in virtue of the Council's decision, the two Governments have to take joint action, they will previously consult one another regarding the details of such action.

The Council's powers and rights as regards demilitarization shall be determined subsequently.

6. The Sanjak shall have no army. No compulsory military service may be introduced and no military works may be constructed in the Sanjak. Only local police forces not exceeding . . . men may be organized in the Sanjak, and no armaments other than those required for the said police force may be introduced or maintained in the Sanjak. The technical details shall be determined in a subsequent agreement.

7. A Franco-Turkish Treaty shall be concluded. This treaty shall contain stipulations determining the manner in which Turkey and France shall guarantee the territorial integrity of the Sanjak. This guarantee shall operate after consultation between the two parties.

An agreement shall be concluded between France, Turkey and Syria for the purpose of guaranteeing the inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier and of prohibiting in Turkish and Syrian territory any organizations or activities directed against the régime in force in the other country and that country's security.

8. The Statute of the Sanjak shall contain a clause specifying the rights and facilities to be enjoyed by Turkey in the port of Alexandretta, in order to enable her to make use to the fullest possible extent of that port for her transit trade.

9. The Statute and the Fundamental Law shall enter into force as soon as the Council has so decided.

10. The Council's decisions and recommendations shall be taken by a two-thirds majority without reckoning the votes of the parties concerned.

No. 8 : *Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.*¹

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Le président de la République française et le président de la République turque, animés du désir de raffermir dans l'intérêt commun des deux pays, les liens d'une amitié sincère, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont désigné pour leur plénipotentiaires à savoir :

Le président de la République turque : M. le docteur Tcvfik Rustu Aras, député d'Izmir, ministre des affaires étrangères ;

Le président de la République française : M. Henri Ponsot, ambassadeur extraordinaire plénipotentiaire en Turquie ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article premier : Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à n'entrer dans aucune entente d'ordre politique ou économique et dans aucune combinaison dirigée contre l'une d'elles.

Article 2 : Si l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, malgré son attitude pacifique, est attaquée par une ou plusieurs autres puissances, l'autre Partie, pendant toute la durée du conflit, ne prêterait aucune aide ou assistance, de quelque nature que ce soit, à l'agresseur ou aux agresseurs.

Article 3 : Également attachées au maintien de la paix générale et de la sécurité en Méditerranée orientale, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, en présence de toute situation dont le développement apparaîtrait comme pouvant conduire à faire jouer l'engagement de garantie qui résulte pour elles du traité de garantie de l'intégrité territoriale du sandjak du 29 mai 1937, se concerteront en vue d'assurer l'exécution de leurs obligations et de s'accorder mutuellement les facilités nécessaires à cet effet.

Article 4 : L'acte général d'arbitrage, dans toute la mesure où il est en vigueur entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes au moment de la signature du présent traité, continuera pendant toute la durée de celui-ci à fixer entre elles les méthodes de règlement des différends et conflits.

Article 5 : Le présent traité ne dérogera pas aux dispositions par lesquelles, à l'égard de certains différends, une méthode particulière de règlement a été établie entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Article 6 : Le présent traité ne pourra pas être interprété comme restreignant la mission dévolue à la Société des Nations ou comme

¹ S. Heald (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1937 (London, 1939), pp. 515-17.

portant atteinte aux obligations qui découlent pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes du pacte de la Société des nations.

Article 7 : Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées aussitôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur à compter de l'échange de ratifications. Il aura une durée de dix ans et sauf dénonciation, il sera considéré comme renouvelé par tacite reconduction pour une période de cinq années et ainsi de suite.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires sus-nommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

JOINT DECLARATION

Le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc, vu le traité d'amitié signé aujourd'hui et destiné à remplacer le traité d'amitié, de conciliation et d'arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930 entre la France et la Turquie, constatent par la présente déclaration leur accord en vue :

1. De poursuivre sa mise en vigueur en application du statut du sandjak d'Alexandrette et de la loi fondamentale adoptée par le conseil de la Société des nations le 29 mai 1937 dans l'esprit de l'accord d'Ankara du 20 octobre 1921 qui, en reconnaissant la prépondérance des éléments turcs au sandjak, a amené le gouvernement turc à affirmer de son côté que la question du sandjak n'est pas une question territoriale pour la Turquie.

2. De maintenir entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage établies sous le régime du mandat par la convention d'Ankara du 30 mai 1926, et pour éviter toute interruption de ces relations à la suite de la venue à terme de cette convention et des accords qui la complètent, d'en proroger la validité pour une période d'un an, étant toutefois entendu que les dispositions de ces accords relatifs au droit de pacage et de transhumance sont supprimées à dater de ce jour.

3. De maintenir en vigueur pour la même durée la procédure de conciliation et d'arbitrage établie entre la Turquie et les pays placés sous l'autorité de la République française par le protocole joint au traité franco-turc d'amitié, de conciliation et d'arbitrage en date du 3 février 1930.

4. De fixer les dernières modalités en vue du règlement de la question des optants par un nouveau protocole qui se substitue au paragraphe no. 1 de l'échange de lettres du 29 mai 1937 entre le ministre des affaires étrangères de Turquie et l'ambassadeur de France, étant entendu que ce protocole entrera en vigueur le jour même de la signature de la présente déclaration à laquelle il est annexé.

5. D'admettre au bénéfice du traitement de la nation la plus

favorisée en ce qui concerne le droit et les conditions d'établissement, et notamment la compétence judiciaire, les ressortissants turcs en Syrie et au Liban et les ressortissants syriens et libanais en Turquie.

6. Les deux gouvernements conviennent, aussitôt que le gouvernement syrien sera en situation de le faire, de transformer et de compléter la convention actuelle de bon voisinage maintenue en vigueur dans les conditions précisées au paragraphe 2 de la présente déclaration, en traité d'amitié entre la Turquie, la Syrie et la France, en l'adaptant aux conditions nouvelles dans l'évolution du mandat.

7. La convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage du 30 mai 1926 ayant été conclue entre le gouvernement turc et le gouvernement de la République française, agissant en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont reconnus par les actes internationaux sur la Syrie et le Liban, il est entendu que pour autant que ces dispositions intéressent le Liban, elle fera, le moment venu, l'objet d'un accord spécial.

Il est par ailleurs, convenu que des négociations seront ouvertes aussitôt que possible pour assurer le développement des relations commerciales entre la Turquie, la Syrie et le Liban.

8. Les gouvernements français et turc conviennent enfin de négocier prochainement un traité d'établissement pour fixer la situation des Français en Turquie et des Turcs en France.

No. 9 : *Franco-Turkish Agreements on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.*¹

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE

1. Le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc sont entrés en étroite consultation et les discussions dans lesquelles ils se sont engagés et qui sont encore en cours ont révélé leur identité de vue habituelle.

2. Il est convenu que les deux États concluront un accord définitif de longue durée comportant des engagements réciproques dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité nationale.

3. En attendant la conclusion de l'accord définitif, le gouvernement français et le gouvernement turc déclarent que, dans le cas d'un acte d'agression qui conduirait à une guerre dans la région méditerranéenne, ils seraient prêts à coopérer effectivement et à s'accorder mutuellement toute l'aide et l'assistance en leur pouvoir.

4. Cette déclaration, ainsi que l'accord envisagé, n'est dirigée contre aucun pays, mais a pour but d'assurer à la France et à la Turquie une aide et une assistance réciproques dans le cas où celles-ci s'avèreraient nécessaires.

¹ *Oriente Moderno* (Rome), July, 1939, p. 357 ; August, 1939, pp. 438-43.

5. Il est reconnu par les deux gouvernements que certaines questions, y compris la définition plus précise des diverses conditions dans lesquelles se déclencherait le jeu des engagements réciproques, demanderont un examen plus approfondi avant que l'accord définitif ne puisse être conclu. Cet examen est actuellement en cours.

6. Les deux gouvernements reconnaissent qu'il est également nécessaire d'assurer l'établissement de la sécurité dans les Balkans et sont en consultation afin d'atteindre ce but le plus rapidement possible.

7. Il est entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus énoncées n'empêchent ni l'un ni l'autre gouvernement de conclure, dans l'intérêt général de la consolidation de la paix, des accords avec d'autres pays.

Paris, le 23 juin 1939.

BONNET-SUAD DAVAZ.

ARRANGEMENT PORTANT RÈGLEMENT DÉFINITIF DES QUESTIONS TERRITORIALES ENTRE LA TURQUIE ET LA SYRIE

PRÉAMBULE

Le Président de la République française et le Président de la République turque,

Ayant égard aux dispositions énoncées dans l'art. 7 de l'accord du 20 octobre 1921 et dans la lettre complétant les articles 7 et 8 dudit accord,

Convaincus de l'intérêt que présente un règlement territorial qui, consolidant définitivement la frontière entre la Syrie et la Turquie, ait pour effet d'affranchir de toute équivoque, et par la même d'assainir les rapports mutuels des deux pays,

Ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE :

Son Excellence M. RENÉ MASSIGLI, ambassadeur de France en Turquie, commandeur de la Légion d'honneur,

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE :

M. SUKRU SARACOGLU, ministre des affaires étrangères, député d'Izmir.

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pouvoirs et les avoir trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

Article premier : La France en ce qui la concerne consent à ce que la ligne décrite par les protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930 soit rectifiée :

(a) Depuis le point où le Kara-Sou franchit la frontière actuelle jusqu'à la borne portant le n. 230, de manière à coïncider avec la limite dont l'abornement sur le terrain se trouve consigné dans le protocole souscrit à Antioche le 19 mai 1939, étant entendu que le village de Guemid, entre les bornes 17 et 20, sera entièrement attribué à la Turquie et que de la borne n. 224 la ligne rejoindra directement la borne n. 230, laissant en territoire turc la route allant de Yeni-Chéhir à Antioche ;

(b) Et de la borne portant le n. 419 suivant une ligne se dirigeant vers le Nord-Est jusqu'à un point à environ 1.200 mètres Sud-Ouest d'Anskorane, de ce point passant à l'Est d'Anskorane et de Godja-Qairaq, elle se dirigera vers le Nord jusqu'à un point situé à environ un kilomètre Nord-Est de Godja-Qairaq.

De ce point la ligne se dirigera vers l'Ouest jusqu'à un point situé environ à un kilomètre au Nord du Château ruiné pour gagner ensuite au Sud-Ouest la côte 1010 (Ouest du Château ruiné) ; elle empruntera ensuite en direction du Sud-Ouest le fond du ravin du Nord de Bachourte qui aboutit vers le ruisseau de Kara-Dourane et suivra enfin ce ruisseau jusqu'à la mer.

Dans les trois secteurs ci-dessus énoncés, la commission qui a achevé ses opérations le 19 mai 1939 sera chargée de déterminer sur le terrain la nouvelle ligne.

Les territoires sis au delà de la ligne ainsi définie seront évacués par les forces françaises au plus tard le 23 juillet 1939, date à laquelle sera également achevée la translation par les autorités françaises des attributions restant entre leurs mains.

Article 2 : Les citoyens du Sandjak d'Alexandrette établis sur les territoires visés au dernier alinéa de l'article 1^{er} acquerront de plein droit la nationalité turque.

Article 3 : Les personnes âgées de plus de dix-huit ans acquérant en vertu de l'article 2 la nationalité turque auront la faculté, pendant une période de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent arrangement, d'opter pour la nationalité syrienne ou libanaise.

Les personnes désirant faire usage de la faculté prévue ci-dessus remettront une déclaration à cet effet à l'autorité administrative dont relève le lieu de leur résidence. Un récépissé leur sera délivré. Les listes d'optants seront communiquées à intervalles aussi rapprochés que possible à l'autorité consulaire française.

Article 4 : Les personnes ayant exercé le droit d'option conformément aux dispositions de l'article 2, devront, dans les dix-huit mois qui suivront, transporter leur domicile hors de la Turquie.

Elles devront liquider leurs biens immobiliers et elles seront libres d'aliéner ou d'emporter leur biens meubles de toute nature, ainsi que leur cheptel.

Les montants provenant de la liquidation ci-dessus prévue seront versés à un compte bloqué à la Banque centrale de la République de Turquie à Alexandrette, où ils feront, quant au mode de leur transfert, l'objet d'un arrangement spécial entre les gouvernements français et turc.

Les montants en monnaies autre que la monnaie turque se trouvant en la possession des personnes visées à l'alinéa 1^{er} du présent article pourront être exportés suivant les modalités prévues au procès-verbal annexé au présent arrangement.

Article 5 : Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de dix-huit ans suivront la condition de leurs parents pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions énoncées aux articles 2, 3 et 4.

Article 6 : Le Gouvernement français aura le droit de nommer un gardien pour l'entretien et la garde du cimetière français d'Alexandrette, sis sur un terrain appartenant à l'État français, et qui sera maintenu dans sa consistance actuelle.

Article 7 : La Turquie reconnaît comme constituant la limite définitive de son territoire la ligne décrite par la convention du 30 mai 1926, le protocole du 22 juin 1929 et le protocole du 3 mai 1930, telle qu'elle se trouve rectifiée en vertu du présent arrangement.

En conséquence, la Turquie condamne toute action qui serait de nature à porter atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale, à mettre en péril ou à compromettre la tranquillité intérieure de la Syrie ou qui tendrait aux mêmes fins et elle s'engage à interdire, et éventuellement à réprimer sur son territoire, toute action de cette nature.

Article 8 : Aucune disposition des traités et accords antérieurs ne pourra être interprétée comme étant contraire aux engagements stipulés à l'article 7.

Article 9 : Les hautes parties contractantes prendront, la France en territoire syrien et la Turquie sur son propre territoire, toutes mesures propres à empêcher la préparation ou la perpétration d'actes dirigés contre la sécurité ou le régime respectifs des deux pays voisins.

Article 10 : En vue de permettre la conclusion d'un nouvel accord, la convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage en date du 30 mai 1926 et les accords complémentaires sont prorogés jusqu'au 15 mars 1940.

Les dispositions de ces actes seront valables pour l'ensemble de la frontière turco-syrienne telle qu'elle résulte des protocoles du 30 mai 1926, du 22 juin 1929 et du 3 mai 1930, ainsi que de la ratification prévue par le présent arrangement.

Il est toutefois entendu que les dispositions relatives aux droits de pacage et de transhumance sont tenues pour supprimées.

Article 11 : Le présent arrangement sera ratifié et les instruments de ratification seront échangés à Paris le plus tôt que faire se pourra et au plus tard le 22 juillet 1939. Il entrera en vigueur le jour de l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent arrangement et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGU.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

PROTOCOLE

Au moment de procéder à la signature de l'arrangement en date de ce jour,

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés se sont également convenus des dispositions ci-après :

Article premier : La Turquie décharge les gouvernements syrien et libanais de toute obligation se rapportant au service des pensions militaires et civiles des citoyens du Sandjak qui acquerront la nationalité turque en vertu de l'article 2 de l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie et qui n'exerceront pas le droit d'option prévu à l'article 3 dudit arrangement.

Aucune charge n'incombait à la Turquie pour le service des pensions militaires et civiles de personnes ne remplissant pas les conditions visées à l'alinéa précédent.

Article 2 : I. Les biens, droits et intérêts au Sandjak des personnes morales de nationalité française, ainsi que les biens immobiliers des personnes physiques appartenant à la même nationalité passeront en toute propriété au gouvernement turc moyennant une somme globale de trente-cinq millions de francs français.

Sur cette somme :

(a) Trois millions de francs français seront versés, dès la mise en vigueur des actes en date de ce jour, en contrevaletur des biens visés à l'annexe I du présent protocole ;

(b) Vingt-cinq millions de francs français seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement français dans les trente jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent protocole ;

(c) le reliquat sera versé le 23 août 1939 au compte de clearing.

II. Les personnes morales visées au présent article pourront disposer de leurs avoirs liquides en monnaies étrangères en se conformant aux stipulations du procès-verbal annexé à l'article 4 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Leurs avoirs en monnaie turque seront versés au compte bloqué visé au troisième alinéa dudit article 4.

III. Pour le transfert de leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et du produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens meubles, les personnes physiques de nationalité française bénéficieront des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant.

Article 3 : Les mutations foncières prévues au présent protocole ne donneront lieu à la perception d'aucun impôt, ni droit. Elles auront lieu sans frais d'aucune sorte.

Article 4 : La ligne du chemin de fer Payas-Alexandrette sera remise dans un délai de trente jours, à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent protocole, à l'administration des chemins de fer de l'État turc qui en assumera l'exploitation.

Les modalités du transfert seront déterminées entre les deux administrations intéressées.

Article 5 : Sous réserve des règlements prévus dans le présent protocole et dans l'arrangement en date de ce jour, les hautes parties contractantes déclarent renoncer mutuellement à toute revendication financière ultérieure, fondée sur les ajustements résultant dudit arrangement.

Article 6 : Le présent protocole sera ratifié. Les instruments de ratification en seront échangés dans les mêmes conditions que de ceux de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

ANNEXE I

Ad. Article 2.

Moyennant le versement entre les mains du caissier-payeur central du Trésor public à Paris, dès la mise en vigueur de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, de la somme de 3 millions de francs français, la France cède à la Turquie en toute propriété les dépendances du domain militaire dans le territoire du Hatay, savoir :

(a) L'immeuble sis à Alexandrette dénommé caserne Derigoin et déjà occupé par les troupes turques ;

(b) Le réseau téléphonique de l'armée française du Levant.

La cession de la caserne comprends le fonds, les clôtures, les bâtiments dans la consistance et l'état où ils se trouvaient au moment où la garnison turque en a pris possession.

Le réseau cédé comprend les lignes, tant urbaines qu'inter-urbaines, et tant aériennes que souterraines, les installations, et

appareils existant, tant dans les postes centraux qu'aux domiciles des abonnés. Reste propriété de l'armée française le matériel appartenant aux éléments des forces françaises qui stationnent actuellement dans le territoire. Les modalités de la remise du réseau seront arrêtées d'un commun accord par les représentants des hautes parties contractantes à Antioche. Toutefois, les troupes françaises n'auront pas à se dessaisir, antérieurement au 23 juillet 1939, des lignes qui leur sont nécessaires.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

' ANNEXE II

Les deux immeubles de la Banque de Syrie et du Liban à Alexandrette et à Antioche ont été attribués, en toute propriété, à l'État français, et leur contrevaletur (1 million de francs français) a été déduite des montants dont il a été tenu compte pour calculer la somme globale à verser par le Gouvernement turc au Gouvernement français, ainsi qu'il est stipulé à l'article 2 du protocole.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

Se référant à l'article 4 de l'arrangement signé en date de ce jour, les hautes parties contractantes sont convenues de ce qui suit :

Les personnes physiques ayant exercé leur droit d'option en conformité des dispositions des articles 3 et 5 de l'arrangement en date de ce jour, ainsi que les personnes morales sandjakiennes, établies sur les territoires visés à l'article 1^{er}, dernier alinéa, dudit arrangement et désireuses, en liaison avec l'option sus-visée, de cesser leur activité dans le Sandjak, auront la faculté d'emporter avec elles leurs avoirs en devises étrangères à condition qu'elles aient effectué, dans les quinze jours qui suivront l'avis y relatif qui sera publié dans le Sandjak dès la signature du présent arrangement, les dépôts prévus par les dispositions ci-dessous énoncées, le fait d'effectuer ces dépôts ne constituant aucune présomption quant à l'exercice du droit d'option ou à la décision de cesser l'activité.

1. Les personnes morales ci-dessus visées, désireuses de transférer à l'étranger leurs avoirs en devises étrangères sont tenues d'en faire le dépôt à la succursale de la Banque centrale de la République à Alexandrette ou à la Banque agricole à Antioche, agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale.

Le permis d'exportation y afférant leur sera délivré par l'office

du change sur présentation du certificat de dépôt délivré par la Banque centrale ou par la Banque agricole agissant pour le compte de la Banque centrale et sur la preuve que ces montants ont été acquis antérieurement à la mise en vigueur dans le Sandjak de la réglementation sur l'exportation des devises. Il sera, le cas échéant, déduit de ces montants les sommes en devises étrangères, qui, à la date du dépôt, seraient dues par ces personnes morales à toutes personnes ayant acquis et gardé la nationalité turque en vertu des articles 2 et 3 de l'arrangement susmentionné.

Les monnaies étrangères détenues par lesdites personnes morales et acquises après la mise en vigueur de la réglementation susvisée devront être converties en monnaie turque. Elles ne pourront être transférées qu'en conformité des dispositions de l'article 4 (*sic*) de l'alinéa 3 de l'arrangement.

2. Les personnes physiques et morales exerçant le commerce d'exportation devront établir que les sommes déposées ne constituent pas le produit d'une exportation de marchandises faite après la date de la mise en vigueur dans le Sandjak de la réglementation de l'exportation des devises.

Les devises étrangères constituant la contrevaletur des marchandises exportées sous le régime de ladite réglementation ne pouvant faire l'objet du mode de transfert ci-dessus prévu, les engagements assumés par ces exportateurs quant à la rentrée de devises étrangères demeurent valables.

3. Les personnes physiques ne rentrant pas dans la catégorie mentionnée à l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus ne seront pas tenues de prouver la provenance des devises dont elles effectueront le dépôt. Sur présentation des certificats de dépôts, les permis de transfert de devises leur seront immédiatement délivrés.

4. Les pièces de monnaie en or seront pour leur exportation soumises aux mêmes règles que les devises étrangères.

Fait à Ankara, en double exemplaire, le 23 juin 1939.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

ÉCHANGE DE LETTRES

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

*A Son Excellence M. René Massigli,
ambassadeur de France, Ankara.*

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

Me référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le gouvernement de la République reconnaît la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés, passés par le haut commissaire de la République

française, au nom de l'administration du Sandjak, en ce qui concerne les fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé par l'article 1^{er} de l'arrangement susdit.

I. Contrat avec l'université de Princeton et les musées nationaux de la République française (date du contrat : 8 avril 1937 ; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1^{er} janvier 1937) ;

II. Contrat avec la mission du musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Léonard Woolley (date du contrat : 1^{er} octobre 1936 ; durée du contrat : cinq ans) ;

III. Contrat avec la mission de l'institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEwan (date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935 ; durée du contrat : six ans).

Veillez agréer, monsieur l'ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

*A Son Excellence M. Sükrü Saracoglu,
ministre des affaires étrangères, Ankara.*

Monsieur le ministre,

Par sa lettre en date de ce jour, Votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à ma connaissance que le gouvernement de la République reconnaissait la validité des contrats ci-après énumérés et relatifs aux fouilles archéologiques à effectuer dans le territoire visé à l'article 1^{er} de l'arrangement en date de ce jour.

I. Contrat avec l'université de Princeton et les musées nationaux de la République française (date du contrat : 8 avril 1937 ; durée du contrat : six ans à dater du 1^{er} janvier 1937) ;

II. Contrat avec la mission du musée britannique, sous la direction de Sir Léonard Woolley (date du contrat : 1^{er} octobre 1936 ; durée du contrat : cinq ans) ;

III. Contrat avec la mission de l'institut oriental de Chicago, sous la direction du Dr. Calvin MacEwan (date du contrat : 20 septembre 1935 ; durée du contrat : six ans).

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier de cette communication, dont j'ai pris acte.

Veillez agréer, monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

*A Son Excellence M. René Massigli,
ambassadeur de France, Ankara.*

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

En me référant à l'arrangement portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, à la date de

ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit.

Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1^{er} dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur l'ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) SARACOGLU.

Ankara, le 23 juin 1939.

*A Son Excellence M. Sükrü Saracoglu,
ministre des affaires étrangères, Ankara.*

Monsieur le ministre,

Par sa lettre du 23 juin, Votre Excellence a bien voulu, en se référant à l'arrangement en date de ce jour portant règlement définitif des questions territoriales entre la Turquie et la Syrie, porter à ma connaissance ce qui suit :

“ Sans préjudice des dispositions spéciales des accords en date de ce jour, le gouvernement turc est décidé, si la demande lui en est faite par les intéressés, à faire bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 4 de l'arrangement et du procès-verbal s'y référant les personnes physiques et morales de nationalité étrangère, établies à la date de l'arrangement dans les territoires visés à l'article 1^{er} dudit arrangement et désirant transférer hors du territoire leurs avoirs en monnaies étrangères et le produit de la liquidation éventuelle de leurs biens de toute nature.”

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de cette communication dont j'ai pris acte.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur le ministre, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

(S.) MASSIGLI.

No. 10 : *Proclamation of General Dentz concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 2nd, 1941.*¹

Peuple Syrien,

Le 31 décembre dernier, quelques jours après mon arrivée à Beyrouth, je me suis adressé à vous pour affirmer que la France entendait poursuivre la mission dont elle assumait la charge et la

¹ *Les Echos de Syrie* (Damascus), April 2nd, 1941.

mener à bien en utilisant toutes les forces spirituelles des deux nations syrienne et libanaise. J'ajoutai que nous aurions à envisager sans délai les modalités politiques et économiques d'une coopération à laquelle les habitants de ces pays ont offert le meilleur d'eux-mêmes.

Nous procédons depuis lors à une série de consultations auprès des principales personnalités syriennes. Ces entretiens font ressortir les conclusions suivantes :

1°. L'indépendance de la Syrie reste la fin à laquelle les Syriens aspirent. La France n'a cessé d'y souscrire. Mais, dans les conditions actuelles et aussi longtemps que la vie internationale ne sera pas rétablie sur des bases stables, chacun reconnaît qu'aucune réforme définitive réglant soit le statut de la Syrie, soit la forme de son gouvernement, ne saurait être envisagée.

2°. L'opinion publique syrienne souhaite un gouvernement composé de personnalités politiques et auxquelles des attributions plus étendues seraient accordées.

3°. Un programme économique et social doit être mis immédiatement en œuvre afin de répondre aux nécessités de l'heure : ravitaillement, résorption du chômage, amélioration de la production agricole, reprise des affaires, exécution de travaux d'intérêt public.

Dans ces conditions et sous le signe d'une plus large collaboration qui doit amener ultérieurement la Syrie à son indépendance, j'ai décidé de procéder à un aménagement du statut syrien.

1°. Le Conseil des Directeurs Syrien sera remplacé par un Ministère qui aura à sa tête un chef de gouvernement.

2°. Le Gouvernement sera assisté d'une Assemblée Consultative composée des principaux représentants de la vie politique, culturelle et économique du pays et des nouvelles générations.

Les Alaouites et les Druzes, tout en conservant leur statut, seront représentés dans cette Assemblée.

3°. Un Conseil d'État sera chargé de l'élaboration des lois.

4°. Le Gouvernement Syrien participera à l'organisation générale du ravitaillement en ce qui concerne les intérêts communs de la Syrie et du Liban et assumera la direction du ravitaillement pour la Syrie.

5°. Le Gouvernement mettra en œuvre un important programme de travaux publics.

L'heure des réalisations est venue.

Les difficultés actuelles seront résolues par la coopération de tous les éléments du Peuple Syrien et non par des manifestations de rue.

La Nation Syrienne entend poursuivre son activité dans l'ordre et la paix. Cette paix et cet ordre seront sauvegardés.

No. 11 : *General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.*¹

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban !

Au moment où les forces de la France Libre, unies aux forces de l'Empire Britannique, son allié, pénètrent sur votre territoire, je déclare que j'assume les pouvoirs, les responsabilités et les devoirs de représentant de la France au Levant.

Je le fais au nom de la France Libre, qui s'identifie avec la France traditionnelle et réelle, et au nom de son chef, le général de Gaulle.

En cette capacité, je viens mettre fin au régime du mandat et vous proclame² libres et indépendants.

Vous serez donc désormais des peuples souverains et indépendants et vous pourrez soit vous constituer en États séparés, soit vous unir en un seul État. Dans les deux cas, votre indépendance et votre statut souverain seront garantis par un traité dans lequel seront définies nos relations réciproques. Ce traité sera négocié aussitôt que possible entre vos représentants et moi-même. En attendant sa conclusion, notre situation mutuelle sera une unité étroite en vue de la réalisation d'un idéal et de buts communs.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban, ma déclaration vous montre que si les Français Libres et les forces britanniques traversent votre frontière, ce n'est pas pour vous enlever votre liberté, c'est pour l'assurer. C'est pour chasser de Syrie les troupes de Hitler. C'est pour empêcher le Levant de devenir une base ennemie dirigée contre les Anglais et contre nous-mêmes.

Nous qui combattons pour la liberté des peuples, nous ne pouvons permettre à l'ennemi d'inonder votre pays pas à pas, de s'assurer de vos personnes et de vos biens et de faire de vous des esclaves. Nous ne pouvons laisser les populations que la France a promis de défendre, tomber aux mains du maître le plus cruel et le plus impitoyable que l'histoire ait connu. Nous ne pouvons permettre que soient livrés à l'ennemi les intérêts séculaires de la France dans le Levant.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban ! Si, répondant à notre appel, vous vous ralliez à nous, vous saurez que le gouvernement britannique, d'accord avec la France Libre, a promis de vous accorder tous les avantages dont jouissent les pays libres associés à lui. Ainsi, le blocus sera levé et vous entrez immédiatement en relations avec le bloc sterling, qui ouvrira à vos importations et exportations les plus vastes possibilités. Vous pourrez acheter et vendre librement à tous les pays libres.

Habitants de Syrie et du Liban ! Une grande heure de votre

¹ *France* (London), June 9th, 1941. ² Some texts read : "proclamer".

histoire a sonné. La France vous déclare indépendants par la voix de ses fils qui luttent pour sa vie et pour la liberté du monde.

No. 12 : *General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.*¹

Damas, le 24 juin 1941.

Mon cher Général,

Par décrets en date de ce jour, je vous ai nommé Délégué général et plénipotentiaire et Commandant en chef au Levant.

Vous exercerez vos pouvoirs et attributions en mon nom et au nom du Conseil de défense de l'Empire Français. Votre mission consistera essentiellement à diriger le rétablissement au Levant d'une situation intérieure et économique aussi proche de la normale que le permettront les circonstances de la guerre ; à négocier avec les représentants qualifiés des populations des traités instituant l'indépendance et la souveraineté des États du Levant ainsi que l'alliance de ces états avec la France et sauvegardant les droits et intérêts de la France ; à assurer la défense de tout le territoire contre l'ennemi ; à coopérer avec les alliés aux opérations de guerre en Orient.

En attendant que le régime nouveau issu des futurs traités puisse être appliqué, ce qui devra être fait aussitôt que possible, vous assumerez tous les pouvoirs que détenait jusqu'ici le haut-Commissaire de France au Levant et toutes les responsabilités qui lui incombent. Par la suite, vos attributions seront celles du représentant de la France dans le cadre des traités et de commandant en chef de nos forces.

Il vous appartiendra de provoquer dès que possible la réunion d'assemblées réellement représentatives de l'ensemble des populations et la formation de gouvernements approuvés par ces assemblées, avec lesquels vous entamerez aussitôt des négociations tendant à la conclusion des traités d'alliance. Les traités devront être conclus entre ces gouvernements et moi-même.

Malgré les déchirements et les vicissitudes résultant des revers momentanés des armées françaises et des intrigues de l'envahisseur de notre pays, le mandat confié à la France au Levant par la Société des Nations en 1923 doit être conduit à son terme et l'œuvre de la France doit être continuée.

C'est pourquoi vous prendrez comme point de départ des négociations avec les États du Levant les traités d'alliance conclus en 1936 avec ces états. Vous proposerez aux gouvernements des États du Levant que les dispositions temporaires à prendre en commun pour répondre aux nécessités de notre défense commune dans la guerre actuelle, fassent l'objet de conventions particulières.

¹ *Journal Officiel de la France Combattante* (London), Deuxième Année, No. 9, August 28th, 1942.

Je me réserve de faire part, le moment venu, à la Société des Nations du remplacement au Levant du régime du mandat par un régime nouveau et répondant aux fins pour lesquelles le mandat avait été institué.

Croyez, mon cher Général, à mes sentiments cordialement dévoués.

C. DE GAULLE.

No. 13 : *Text of the Convention Initialled on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.*¹

1. Hostilities ceased on July 11th, 1941, at 21.01 hrs. Greenwich mean time.

2. The Allied forces will occupy Syro-Lebanese territory : the French forces will be concentrated in certain areas selected by a Committee formed of representatives of both parties. This concentration will be completed by Tuesday, July 15th, 1941, at 12.00 hrs., at which hour Allied forces will move to occupy certain strategic points. Up to the time of their repatriation the French troops will remain under French command, with a restricted establishment which will provide for their maintenance from existing stocks. Special measures are foreseen for the Jebel Druze, where, for security reasons, the French troops will remain in garrison until relieved by British troops.

3. In order to ensure public security, the occupation of the principal localities in Syria and Lebanon will be undertaken in accordance with a programme which will allow immediate replacement of the French by the occupying forces.

4. Minefields, whether on sea or on land, will be disclosed to the occupying authorities.

5. Full honours of war will be granted to the French forces. The latter will retire to the selected areas with all arms, including guns, machine guns, tanks and armoured cars, and their ammunition. All measures will be taken by the French Command to prevent arms and ammunition being left unguarded on the battlefield or elsewhere. The French military authorities will give every assistance in recovering arms which may be in the hands of the population.

6. In consideration of the honours of war, French officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers are permitted to retain their individual arms (rifles or carbines, revolvers, bayonets, swords or sabres). However, the soldiers will not be allowed to carry ammunition. In each unit for security reasons a small quantity of ammunition will be retained. The Gendarmerie will retain its arms and a limited amount of ammunition.

¹ *The Times* (London), July 16th, 1941.

All other war material, including guns, coastal batteries, anti-aircraft guns and military transport will be stocked under British control. The latter will inspect this material and will have the right to take over the material that may be required by them : the remainder will be destroyed by the French authorities under British control.

7. Prisoners of the Allied forces will be forthwith set free, including those who have been transferred to France. As regards the latter, the British authorities reserve the right to hold as Prisoners of War an equal number of French officers as far as possible of similar rank until those prisoners transferred to France have been released. The French prisoners will be released when the whole of the Syro-Lebanese territory has been occupied and the clauses of this Convention fulfilled. They will then be enabled to join their units for repatriation.

8. The alternatives of rallying to the Allied cause or of being repatriated will be left to the free choice of the individual whether military or civil. In the case of civilians who do not rally to the Allied cause individual applications to remain in Syria or Lebanon will be considered by the British authorities.

9. Executive officials, officials of the technical services and Special Service officers will remain at their posts so long as is necessary to ensure the continuance of the administration of the country and until such time as they can be relieved. They can then be repatriated if they so wish. Their services may be dispensed with if their work or attitude is not satisfactory.

10. The British authorities agree to the repatriation by French ships of French troops and of French subjects, with the reservation that this repatriation will be limited to those who have opted therefor. The British authorities reserve the right to control all matters relative to the repatriation of these people.

11. Holdings of French subjects to be repatriated will be transferred in accordance with terms to be arranged. These people will receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to British subjects who have lately left Syria.

12. French cultural institutions, including hospitals, schools, missions, etc., are assured that their rights will be respected. The rights of these institutions must not be allowed to conflict with Allied military interests.

13. All public services, including railways, tramways, public transport, electricity and water will be maintained in operation and handed over intact.

14. All means of communication, including telephones, telegraphs, wireless and the submarine cable, will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities. The French Command will

have the use of telegram facilities with France on the same conditions as the general public.

15. Port installations, naval establishments and all ships including British in Syrian and Lebanese territorial water will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities.

16. All aircraft and air installations and equipment in Syria or the Lebanon will be handed over intact. On the signature of the present Agreement British aircraft are empowered to use any air base and alighting area in the Lebanon and Syria.

17. Fuel stocks shall be handed over intact. The quantity necessary for military transport will be placed at the disposal of the French Command.

18. Currency and other means of payment in circulation or in reserve, in possession of banks or other public authorities will be safeguarded.

19. The British military authorities reserve the right to take into their service "Troupes Spéciales du Levant" progressively as they are discharged by the French authorities. The arms of these troops will be handed over to the British authorities.

20. The British authorities will not prosecute in any way native Syrians and Lebanese who have been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity.

21. The carrying into effect of the terms of the Convention will be controlled and regulated by a "Commission of Control" which will sit at Beirut and will be composed of five members. Three of the members, including the President, will be nominated by the British authorities, the remaining two by the French authorities.

This "Commission of Control" is empowered to appoint sub-commissions and to co-opt the services of such experts as may be necessary.

22. This Convention is drawn up in English and in French. In case of dispute the English text will be authoritative.

No. 14 : *General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 28th, 1941.*¹

Syriens,

Le 8 juin dernier, lors de l'entrée au Levant des armées alliées, dans un manifeste que je vous ai adressé au nom de la France Libre et de son chef, le Général de Gaulle, j'ai reconnu à la Syrie la qualité d'État souverain et indépendant, sous la garantie d'un traité définissant nos rapports réciproques.

Le Gouvernement britannique, allié de la France Libre, agissant en accord avec elle, s'est, par une déclaration simultanée, associé à cet acte politique important.

¹ *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London Première année, No. 23, December 9th, 1941.

Le 16 de ce mois, j'ai rendu effective ma déclaration du 8 juin, en la faisant passer du plan du principe acquis à celui des institutions et des réalités.

L'ère est donc ouverte où la Syrie indépendante et souveraine régira elle-même ses destinées.

Son Excellence le Cheikh Tageddine el Hassani a accepté d'organiser le nouveau régime d'indépendance. Son expérience des affaires et son sentiment profond des nécessités publiques le désignaient pour cette haute mission. Je l'assure ainsi que toute la nation syrienne de mon appui et de ma loyale collaboration.

J'exercerai cette collaboration en m'inspirant des considérations ci-après :

L'État syrien jouit dès maintenant des droits et prérogatives attachés à la qualité d'état indépendant et souverain. Ces droits et ces prérogatives subiront les seules restrictions qu'imposent l'état actuel de guerre et la sécurité du territoire.

Par ailleurs, sa position d'allié de fait de la France Libre et de la Grande Bretagne requiert une étroite conformité de sa politique avec celle des Alliés.

En accédant à la vie internationale indépendante, la Syrie accède naturellement aux droits et obligations souscrits jusqu'ici en son nom.

Elle a la faculté de désigner des représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays où elle jugera que ses intérêts exigent l'installation d'une pareille représentation. Partout ailleurs, les autorités de la France Libre lui prêteront leurs offices pour assurer la défense des droits et intérêts généraux de la Syrie, ainsi que la protection des ressortissants syriens.

L'État syrien a la faculté de constituer ses forces militaires nationales. La France Libre lui prêtera, à cette fin, tout son concours.

La Grande Bretagne s'étant déjà engagée à plusieurs reprises à reconnaître l'indépendance de la Syrie, la France Libre interviendra, sans délai, auprès des autres puissances alliées ou amies, pour que celles-ci reconnaissent également l'indépendance de l'État syrien.

La France Libre considère que l'État de Syrie constitue politiquement et territorialement une unité indivisible, dont l'intégrité doit être préservée de tout démembrement. Elle favorisera, en conséquence, le resserrement des liens politiques, culturels et économiques qui unissent les différentes fractions de la Syrie. A cette fin, le Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire de la France Libre révisera les textes fixant les statuts particuliers accordés antérieurement à certaines régions, de manière que, tout en conservant l'autonomie financière et administrative à laquelle elles se montrent

fermement attachées, elles soient politiquement subordonnées au pouvoir central syrien. Ainsi se trouvent conciliés le principe de l'unité syrienne et les aspirations particulières de ces régions.

Il demeure en outre entendu que les garanties de droit public inscrites dans les statuts organiques en faveur des individus et des communautés sont maintenues et recevront leur plein effet.

La France Libre s'engage à s'entremettre auprès de la Syrie et du Liban afin que soient recherchées et instituées les bases d'une collaboration économique entre les deux pays et que soient éliminées les difficultés que cette collaboration rencontre dans le présent.

Cette entente, nécessaire entre deux pays frères et voisins, doit garantir les droits légitimes et respectifs des deux parties, et établir leurs rapports sur la base de la confiance réciproque.

En vue de sauvegarder l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Syrie et pour mener à bien la lutte commune, les Alliés assumeront, pendant la période de guerre, la défense du pays. A cette fin, le Gouvernement syrien mettra à la disposition du commandement allié, pour coopérer à la défense du territoire, les forces nationales syriennes. De même, le commandement allié disposera dès maintenant dans la mesure où les nécessités militaires l'exigeront, de l'équipement et des services publics de la Syrie, notamment des voies de communication, des aérodomes et des aménagements côtiers. La défense du territoire exige également qu'une étroite collaboration existe en tous temps entre le Général Commandant en Chef et Délégué Général, et les services de gendarmerie, de police et de sûreté de l'État syrien. La Syrie doit être en effet défendue en temps de guerre, non seulement contre ses ennemis du dehors, mais aussi contre ceux du dedans.

En raison de l'inclusion de la Syrie dans la zone de guerre et dans le système économique et financier des Alliés, la plus étroite collaboration entre le Gouvernement syrien et les Alliés est également nécessaire pour assurer, pendant la durée des hostilités et dans l'intérêt commun, l'obligation et le respect de toutes mesures prises en vue de conduire à bonne fin la guerre économique.

Dans ce but, pendant la durée des hostilités, les plus grandes facilités seront accordées pour assurer dans la plus large mesure, la liberté des échanges entre la Syrie et les pays du bloc sterling. La Syrie, entrée maintenant dans le bloc sterling, adoptera, dans l'ordre économique et financier, et notamment dans le domaine du change, les mesures nécessaires pour rester en harmonie avec la politique générale du bloc sterling.

Les stipulations qui précèdent concilient le respect de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté syriennes avec les nécessités de l'état de guerre. Elles sont inspirées par une pensée unique, qui est celle de gagner la guerre et d'assurer par ce moyen à la Syrie

un avenir de peuple libre. Elles apportent au problème franco-syrien une solution qui procède de la volonté de la France Libre de ne pas retarder, malgré la guerre, l'accomplissement des aspirations nationales syriennes et l'exécution des engagements des Alliés. Mais il est nécessaire qu'un règlement définitif y soit substitué au plus tôt, sous la forme du traité franco-syrien qui consacrera définitivement l'indépendance du pays.

Vive la Syrie indépendante !

Vive l'Angleterre !

Vive la France !

No. 15 : *General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.*¹

Libanais,

La proclamation que je vous ai adressée le 8 juin dernier au nom du Général de Gaulle, chef de la France Libre, et que la Grande-Bretagne a appuyée par une déclaration particulière et simultanée, a reconnu au Liban, sous la garantie d'un traité à conclure en vue de définir les rapports réciproques franco-libanais, la qualité d'État souverain et indépendant.

Dépositaire de la tradition libérale française et soucieuse de faire honneur aux engagements contractés envers vous, la France Libre, en entrant au Levant, a commencé en dépit de la guerre et en dépit de l'état d'exception qu'elle impose, par un acte d'émancipation : elle vous a rendus libres et indépendants.

Vos aspirations sont satisfaites. Il s'agit maintenant d'organiser votre indépendance. En ce qui me concerne, deux devoirs tutélaires m'incombent. Le premier, de remettre le soin d'installer et de diriger le régime à une personnalité hautement qualifiée dans la conjoncture présente pour accomplir cette tâche difficile. Après de très larges consultations qui se sont adressées à la fois aux hommes et aux sentiments publics sur toute l'étendue du territoire, j'ai discerné que les vœux de la nation libanaise désignaient Son Excellence M. Naccache. Je lui ai demandé de conserver le pouvoir avec le titre et les prérogatives de Président de la République et de gouverner par les moyens d'un ministère qui serait responsable devant lui et au sein duquel serait assurée la juste représentation de toutes les régions et de toutes les confessions qui constituent la nation libanaise.

J'assure le Président Naccache, ainsi que la communauté libanaise, de ma sollicitude et de mon entier concours.

Le second devoir consiste à définir dans son esprit et ses formes la collaboration à instituer entre le Liban et la France Libre, en attendant la conclusion d'un traité d'alliance et d'amitié.

¹ *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), Première année, No. 13, December 9th, 1941.

En reconnaissant votre indépendance, la France ne fait que s'inspirer de son amitié traditionnelle pour le Liban, de sa mission tutélaire dans ce pays au cours des siècles et de la situation privilégiée qu'elle a ainsi acquise. Son aide et son assistance demeurent en toutes choses assurées au Liban dans l'esprit du traité franco-libanais d'alliance et d'amitié de 1936 qui a reçu l'approbation unanime de la population libanaise. En outre, les circonstances de guerre et l'occupation par les forces alliées du territoire libanais placent temporairement le Liban dans une situation particulière. Il en découle un certain nombre de droits et d'obligations dont, en particulier, ceux stipulés ci-après :

L'État libanais jouit dès maintenant des droits et prérogatives attachés à la qualité d'état indépendant et souverain. Ces droits et ces prérogatives subissent les restrictions qu'imposent l'état actuel de guerre et la sécurité du territoire et des armées alliées.

Par ailleurs sa position d'allié de fait de la France Libre et de la Grande-Bretagne, requiert une étroite conformité de sa politique avec celle des alliés. En accédant à la vie internationale indépendante, le Liban succède naturellement aux droits et obligations résultant de tous traités, conventions et actes internationaux conclus par la France en ce qui concerne le Liban ou en son nom. Il a la faculté de désigner ses représentants diplomatiques auprès des pays où ses intérêts exigeront une pareille représentation. Partout ailleurs, les autorités de la France lui prêteront leurs offices pour assurer la défense des droits et intérêts libanais, ainsi que la protection des ressortissants libanais. L'État libanais a la faculté de constituer ses forces militaires nationales et la France lui prêterà à cette fin tout son concours.

La Grande-Bretagne s'étant déjà engagée à plusieurs reprises à reconnaître l'indépendance du Liban la France interviendra sans délai auprès des autres puissances alliées ou amis pour que celles-ci reconnaissent également l'indépendance de l'État libanais.

La France considère que l'État du Liban constitue politiquement et territorialement une unité indivisible dont l'intégrité doit être préservée de toute atteinte. Elle favorise en conséquence le resserrement des liens politiques, culturels et économiques qui unissent les différentes parties du Liban. De son côté à même fin, le gouvernement du Liban garantira l'égalité des droits civils, religieux et politiques entre tous ses ressortissants sans distinction aucune. Il assurera la répartition équitable des différents éléments du pays dans les hautes charges et dans l'ensemble des emplois de l'État. Il assurera aussi dans la répartition des dépenses publiques une juste proportion entre les différentes régions. Il procédera le plus tôt possible à l'unification du régime fiscal ainsi qu'aux réformes administratives nécessaires.

La France s'engage à s'entremettre entre le Liban et la Syrie afin que soient recherchées et instituées les bases d'une coopération économique entre les deux pays, et que soient éliminées les difficultés que cette collaboration rencontre dans le présent. Cette entente, nécessaire entre les deux pays frères et voisins, doit garantir les droits légitimes et respectifs des deux parties et établir leurs rapports sur une base de confiance réciproque. En vue de sauvegarder l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban et de mener à bien la lutte commune, les alliés assumeront pendant la période de guerre la défense du pays. A cette fin, le gouvernement libanais mettra à la disposition du commandement allié, pour coopérer à la défense du territoire, les forces nationales libanaises. De même, le commandement allié disposera dès maintenant, dans la mesure où les nécessités militaires l'exigeront, de l'équipement et des services publics du Liban, notamment des voies de communication, aérodromes et aménagements côtiers. La défense du territoire exige également qu'une étroite collaboration existe en tout temps entre le Général Commandant en Chef et Délégué Général et les services de gendarmerie, de police et de sûreté de l'État du Liban.

Le Liban doit être en état de défense en temps de guerre, non seulement contre ses ennemis du dehors mais aussi contre ses ennemis du dedans. En raison de l'inclusion du Liban dans la zone de guerre et dans le système économique et financier des alliés la plus étroite collaboration entre le gouvernement libanais et les alliés est également nécessaire pour assurer, pendant la durée des hostilités et dans l'intérêt commun, l'obligation et le respect de toutes mesures nécessaires prises en vue de conduire à bonne fin la guerre économique. Dans ce but, pendant la durée des hostilités, les plus grandes facilités seront accordées pour assurer dans la plus large mesure la liberté des échanges entre le Liban et les pays du bloc sterling.

Le Liban, entré maintenant dans le bloc sterling, adoptera dans l'ordre économique et financier et notamment dans le domaine du change, les mesures nécessaires pour rester en harmonie avec la politique du bloc sterling.

Les stipulations qui précèdent concilient le respect de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté du Liban avec la mission séculaire de la France et avec les nécessités de l'état de guerre. Elles sont dominées par la pensée de gagner la guerre et d'assurer par ce moyen au Liban un avenir de peuple libre. Elles apporteront au problème franco-libanais une solution qui procède de la volonté de la France de ne pas retarder, malgré la guerre, l'accomplissement des aspirations nationales du Liban et l'exécution de ses propres engagements, mais il est nécessaire qu'un règlement

définitif y soit substitué au plus tôt sous la forme du traité franco-libanais qui consacrera définitivement l'indépendance du pays.

Vive le Liban indépendant !

Vive la France !

No. 16 : *Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944.*¹

CONVENTION

conclue à Damas, le 22 décembre 1943, entre la France, la Syrie et le Liban, concernant le transfert des Services des Intérêts Communs aux États

République Syrienne

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, s'est entretenu aujourd'hui avec L.L.E.E. Saadallah Djabri, Président du Conseil, Jamil Bey Mardam, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Khaled bey Azem, Ministre des Finances, représentants du Gouvernement syrien, et L.L.E.E. Riad Bey Solh, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Finances, et Sélim Bey Tacla, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, représentants du Gouvernement libanais.

Les échanges de vues se sont poursuivis dans une atmosphère d'entière cordialité et de compréhension réciproque en présence de S.E. Choucri Bey Kouatli, Président de la République syrienne.

Ces conversations avaient été précédées par des pourparlers similaires entre le Général Catroux et les représentants du Gouvernement libanais en présence de S.S. Cheikh Béchara El-Khoury, Président de la République libanaise.

A l'issue de la conférence l'entente est intervenue sur la déclaration suivante :

Un accord est intervenu à la date de ce jour entre S.E. le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les Représentants des deux Gouvernements syrien et libanais, pour la remise à ces Gouvernements des attributions exercées en leur nom par les autorités françaises. Par suite de cet accord, les intérêts communs, avec leur personnel, seront transférés aux deux États syrien et libanais, avec droit de législation et de réglementation à la date de 1^{er} janvier prochain.

Les modalités concernant la passation de ces pouvoirs feront l'objet d'accords particuliers.

Fait à Damas, le 22 décembre 1943.

Signé : JAMIL MARDAM BEY,	SAADALLAH JABRI,
KHALED EL AZEM,	SELIM BEY TACLA,
RIAD SOLH,	CATROUX.

¹ *Journal Officiel* of the Lebanese Republic (Beirut), No. 9, 1944. *

PROTOCOLE

du 3 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie
et du Liban de l'Administration générale des
Douanes

République Libanaise

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Beyrouth, le 3 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas, entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les représentants des gouvernements syrien et libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 3 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban de l'administration générale des Douanes.

Le personnel de cette administration est passé à la même date au service des deux gouvernements, compte tenu des termes des deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Les accords internationaux conclus par la France en matière douanière et les responsabilités internationales assumées par elle en cette même matière jusqu'à ce jour, du nom de la Syrie et du Liban, sont désormais à la charge des deux États.

Signé :

KHALED EL AZEM,

YVES CHATAIGNEAU,
RIAD SOLH.

PROTOCOLE

du 3 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie et
du Liban du contrôle de la régie co-intéressée
libano-syrienne des tabacs et tombacs

République Libanaise

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Beyrouth, le 3 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas, entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les représentants des gouvernements syrien et libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 3 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux

états de Syrie et du Liban du Contrôle de la Régie co-intéressée libano-syrienne des tabacs et tombacs.

Le personnel de ce contrôle est passé à la même date au service des deux gouvernements, compte tenu des termes des deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé :

KHALED EL AZEM,

YVES CHATAIGNEAU,
RIAD SOLH.

PROTOCOLE

du 5 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert à l'État du Liban du
contrôle des Sociétés concessionnaires :

Electricité de Beyrouth : Compagnie des Eaux de
Beyrouth

Damas, le 5 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission, et les Représentants du Gouvernement Libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et le Gouvernement Libanais ont procédé le 5 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif à l'État du Liban du Contrôle des Sociétés Concessionnaires ci-après :

Electricité de Beyrouth.

Compagnie des Eaux de Beyrouth.

Le personnel du contrôle de ces Sociétés est passé à la même date au service du Gouvernement libanais, compte tenu des termes de la lettre adressée le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par le Président du Conseil Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé : YVES CHATAIGNEAU,

ABI CHAHLA.

PROTOCOLE

du 5 janvier 1944

Concernant le transfert aux deux États de Syrie
et du Liban du contrôle de l'Administration des
Phares

République Syrienne

Présidence du Conseil des Ministres Cabinet.

Damas, le 5 janvier 1944.

PROTOCOLE

En exécution de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 à Damas entre le Général d'Armée Catroux, Commissaire d'État en mission,

et les Représentants des Gouvernements Syrien¹ et Libanais, M. Chataigneau, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, et les deux Gouvernements intéressés ont procédé le 5 janvier 1944 au transfert effectif aux deux États de Syrie et du Liban du Contrôle de l'Administration des Phares.

Le personnel de ce contrôle est passé à la même date au service des deux Gouvernements, compte tenu des termes de deux lettres adressées le 27 décembre 1943 au Général d'Armée Catroux par les Présidents du Conseil Syrien et Libanais relativement aux fonctionnaires français.

Signé :

KHALED EL AZEM,

ABI CHAHLA,

YVES CHATAIGNEAU.

APPENDIX B

RECENT STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF SYRIA AND LEBANON

More up-to-date estimates of the population than those given in Chapters V and VII have come to hand since the text of this book was completed. They are as follows :

TABLE I
POPULATION BY PROVINCES (' MUHAFAZATS ')

SYRIA :

Muhafazat of Damascus	603,889
Aleppo	870,139
Homs	212,424
Hama	157,458
Hauran	112,842
Euphrates	225,023
Jazirah	146,001
Jebel Druze	80,128
Latakia (Alawis)	452,507
<i>Total</i>	2,860,411

LEBANON

Muhafazat of Beirut	174,001
Mount Lebanon	335,774
North Lebanon	246,964
South Lebanon	212,848
Biqa'	157,014
<i>Total</i>	1,126,601
<i>Total for Syria and Lebanon</i>	3,987,012

NOTES :

- (1) The Beduin are not included in the Syrian figures. Their total number has been estimated at about 400,000.
- (2) The Syrian figures give the population as it was at the end of 1943, the Lebanese figures are for the end of 1944.

TABLE II

POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY	SYRIA	LEBANON
Sunnis	1,971,053	235,595
Shi'is	12,742	209,338
Druzes	87,184	74,311
Alawis	325,311	—
Isma'ilis	28,527	—
'Latins' (i.e. Roman Catholics of the Latin rite)	5,996	3,117
Maronites	13,349	327,846
Greek Catholics	46,733	64,280
Greek Orthodox	136,957	109,883
Armenian Catholics	16,790	10,048
Armenian Orthodox	101,747	59,749
Syrian Catholics	16,247	4,984
Syrian Orthodox	40,135	3,753
Chaldaean Catholics	4,719	1,330
Nestorians	9,176	—
Protestants	11,187	10,440
Jews	29,770	5,666
Yazidis	2,788	—
Various	—	6,261
<i>Total</i>	2,860,411	1,126,601

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

This is neither a complete bibliography nor a list of the sources on which the present work is based. Its only purpose is to offer suggestions to readers who desire to follow up any of the subjects touched on in the text.

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- Abbasid Caliphate, 21-22, 101, 146
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- Abdul-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, 41, 49, 57, 76, 115
- Abdul-Hamid II, 33, 38-99, 76
- Abdullah ibn Husain, Amir, 48, 55, 227
- Abdul-Majid, 30
- Abdul-Munim, Amir, 227
- al-Abid, Izzat Pasha, 194
 - Muhammad Ali, 194, 205
- Abu'l-Ala al-Ma'ari, 22
- Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahani, 22
- Abu Shahla, Habib, 257
- Acre, 23, 25, 28, 46, 146, 240
- Aegean Sea, 15
- Africa, North, 20, 24, 27, 40, 96-97, 105, 156, 168, 293
 - West, Syrians in, 15, 35
- Aga Khan, 123
- Agriculture, 10, 17, 25, 26, 29, 33, 38, 66, 85-88, 92, 140, 174, 175, 185, 276
- Al-Ahd, 40, 41
- Alkhtal, 20
- Akkar, plain of, 8
- Alawis, 22, 61, 121, 123
 - of Alexandretta, 208
 - and France, 167, 185, 266
 - Kurdish-speaking, 126
 - scattered, 144
 - State of: Latakia *q.v.*
- Aleppo, 11, 22, 23, 25, 43, 46, 50, 54, 116, 145, 196, 238, 240
 - character of, 68, 145
 - pashalik of, 24
 - population, 86, 88, 145
 - Province of, 142, 145
 - and Turkey, 161, 209
 - State of, 172, 173
 - Vilayet of, 31, 44
- Alexander the Great, 16
- Alexandretta, port, 8, 11, 161, 208
 - sanjaq, 43, 57, 172, 173, 194
 - cession to Turkey, 125, 136, 145, 161, 206-213, 217, 218, 221, 223, 231, 276, 295
 - Franco-Turkish agreements (1938) text, 358-360; (1939) text, 360-369
 - Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, 57, 172, 207
 - Principles adopted by League Council (1937) text, 356-357
- Alexandria, 157
 - Protocol, 303-304, 305, 307
- Ali, Caliph, 20, 21, 122, 123
- Allenby, Field-Marshal Lord, 48-49, 50
- Alliance Israélite, 94
- Amanus, The, 8
- America, Syrians in, 15, 34, 35, 37, 41, 90, 91, 117, 159
 - See also United States of America
- Amil, Jebel, 129
- al-Amq, Plain of, 8
- Amudah, 216
- Anazah tribes, 24, 87
- Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty (1939), 231
- Anglo-French Agreement (1919), 53
 - Armistice Convention (1941), 240, text 373-375
 - Declaration (1918), 48
 - Financial Agreement (1944), 290-291
 - Ansariyah, Jebel, 8, 139
- Anti-Lebanon Range, 9
- Antioch, 17, 18, 22
 - cession to Turkey, 161. See Alexandretta
 - Patriarch of (Greek Orthodox), 124 (Maronite), 125, 181 (Syrian Orthodox), 124
 - plain of, 8
- Anti-Semitism, 106, 107, 108
- Aqaba, 8
- Antonius, George, 40, 49
- Antourah, College of, 148
- Araba, Wadi, 8
- Arab Bureau, 47
 - Club, 224
 - Congresses (Damascus, 1920), 53 (Jerusalem, 1931), 114 (Bludan, 1937), 114-115, 222
 - Covenant, 114
 - Government, 50, 54, 55, 292
 - High Committee, 222
- Arabia, 6, 19, 24, 47, 49, 57, 73, 76, 96
 - conquest of Syria, 19-21
 - immigrants from, 12-13, 21, 24, 65
 - influences, 13, 19, 59, 64-65, 96-7
 - trade-routes, 11, 17
 - See also Hejaz, Nejd, Yemen
- Arabia, Sa'udi, 76, 114, 115, 116, 253, 258, 269, 274, 303, 305
- Arabic language and literature, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 64, 65, 79, 80, 95, 103, 124, 125, 165, 175, 208, 268
 - revival of, 36-37, 80, 116
- Arab League, formation of, 269, 284-285, 303-307
 - Pact of, 305-307
- Arab nationalism, 1, 3, 39-40, 41, 43 ff, 49, 50, 57-58, 84, 96 ff, 114, 116-120, 132-135, 145, 162, 186, 197, 209, 221, 222-225, 233-235, 236-237, 256, 281 ff, 303-307
 - aims of, 1, 99, 100-101, 178
 - and Britain, 41, 43 ff, 104-105, 158, 167, 233, 261, 262, 268-269, 299. See also Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan
 - "extremists," 178-179, 191, 194. See under National Bloc

- Arab nationalism and France, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 84, 104-105, 128, 133, 135, 156, 167-169, 177-179, 183, 185, 186-189, 193, 195, 196, 199, 200, 206, 209, 211-212, 223-224, 228, 230, 233-234, 235, 250, 252, 254, 261-262, 282-284, 292, 293, 295-296, 297-298
 and Germany, 224, 233, 237
 insurrections (1925), 115, 144, 185-189, 223, 292. *See also* Iraq, Palestine
 and Islam, 102-104, 128, 135, 167. *See* Arabo-Islamic civilisation
 and minorities, 103-104, 128-129, 132-136, 138, 140, 141, 143-144, 145, 177, 183-184, 185, 187, 189, 214-217, 264, 266-268, 292
 "moderates," 178-179, 191, 193, 194, 195
 secret societies, 40, 41, 43, 116
 and West, 1-2, 98-100, 101, 102, 104-105, 259 ff, 265, 275-278
 youth organizations, 197-198, 224-225
 and Zionism, 106-115, 270-273. *See also* Balfour declaration, Palestine
 Arabo-Islamic civilization, 13, 19-22, 59-69, 96, 99, 100-101, 102-103, 128
 impact of West upon, 1-3, 13, 59 ff, 98 ff
 Arabo-Islamic Congress (Cairo, 1938), 115
 Arab Ottoman Brotherhood, 40
 Arab Revolt, the, 43, 48, 49, 57
 Aramaeans, 15
 Aramaic civilization (Greco-), 20, 21
 influences, 97
 language, 17, 19, 97
 Aristotle, 77, 78
 Armenia, 47, 136
 Armenian language, 124, 125, 135
 nationalism, 135-136
 Armenians, 56, 65, 96, 120, 121, 125, 129, 135-136, 145, 160, 188, 208, 212
 Catholic, 121, 125
 Orthodox (Gregorians), 121, 124, 125
 Arslan, Amir Adil, 192
 Amir Majid, 257
 Amir Shakib, 186, 206
 Asia, Arab, unity of, 105-106
 Asia, central, 11, 12, 20, 22, 97, 126
 Asia Minor, 6, 11, 12, 15, 24, 125
 Assassins, the, 123
 Assemani, Joseph, 26
 Assyria, 15
 Assyrians (Nestorians), 96, 121, 124, 125
 of Iraq, 125-126, 140, 168, 218, 266
 settlement in Jazirah, 126, 140
 al-Atasi, Hashim, 191, 192, 205
 Atlantic Charter, 261
 al-Atrash, Hasan, 214
 Salim, 187
 Sultan, 187, 188, 206
 Australia, Syrians in, 35
 al-Ayyubi, Ata, 199, 205, 256
 al-Azm, Haqqi, 194, 196
 Khalid, 236, 246, 256
 al-Azmah, Nabih, 192, 227
 Azzam Bey, Abdur-Rahman, 306
 Baalbek, 8, 172
 Badr ad-Din al-Hasani, Shaikh, 190, 247
 Baghdad, 11, 21, 162, 236-237
 vilayet, 42, 46
 Baibars, 23
 al-Bakri, Nasib, 206, 214
 Balfour Declaration, 46-47, 54, 106, 112, 113
 Arab opposition to, 47, 50, 107-108, 199, 223
 Balikh, R., 9
 Balkans, The, 24, 40
Banco di Roma, 159
Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, 89, 154, 177, 219
Banque Française de Syrie, 154
Banque Misr-Syrie-Liban, 161
 Barakat, Subhi, 173, 190
 al-Barazi, Husni, 254
 Barazi, tribe, 141
 Bases (naval, military and air), 154-156, 157, 201, 237, 238, 249, 263, 294
 Bashir, Amir, 27, 28, 29, 148
 Basra, 11, 21
 vilayet, 46
 Beduin, 11, 12, 17, 24, 26, 48, 64-65, 66, 69, 87-88, 116, 145, 205, 213, 224, 292
Contrôle Bédouin, 170, 206, 281, 289
 of Jazirah, 140-141
 settlement of, 12-13, 17, 65-66, 87-88, 126, 141, 174
 Beirut, 17, 27, 36, 38, 49, 50, 73, 77, 81, 88, 91, 116, 135, 158, 170, 181, 188, 196, 204, 238, 240
 port, 8, 11, 38, 88, 153, 184
 vilayet, 31, 44, incorporated in Greater Lebanon, 129, 172, 184
 Berbers, 97
 Bergeon, M., 219
 Berlin, Treaty of, 33, 149
 Beynet, General, 293
 Biqa', the, 8, 9, 86, 129, 181, 238
 incorporated in Greater Lebanon, 129, 172

- Bonnet, Georges, 218, 219, 220
 Bonnet-Mardam Declaration (1938),
 218, 219, 220, text, 340-342
 al-Bukhari, Nasuhi, 227, 228, 256
 Bustani family, 37
 Byzantium, 16, 17, 19, 22
- Cairo, 36-37, 73, 77, 306
 Pact (1945), 305-306
 de Caix, Robert, 169-170
 Canaanites, 15
 Capitulations, 26, 147, 148, 164, 174,
 224
 Carbillet, Captain, 187
 Carmathians, 22
 Catholics, 23, 81, 121, 124-125, 144,
 167, 183
 French protectorate, 26, 28, 56, 128,
 144, 147, 148, 149-150, 156,
 167, 183
 See also Armenian, Chaldean,
 Greek, Syrian Catholics; Mar-
 onites; Missions; Uniate
 Churches
 Catroux, General Georges, 238, 241-
 243, 246, 247, 252, 256, 257,
 279, 287-288
 proclamations (June 8, 1941),
 241-242, 252, text 371-372,
 (September 28, 1941), 174,
 179, 247-250, text 375-378,
 (November 26, 1941), 174,
 179, 250-252 text 378-381
- Caucasus, 125, 127
 Chalcedon, Council of, 124
 Chaldaeans, 121, 125, 126
 Charlemagne, 146
 Chataigneau, Yves, 287
 Chiappe, Jean, 232
 China, 124
 Christianity, 15, 18, 20, 26, 62, 76
 intellectual revival, 80-81, 132
 and Islam, 2, 23, 61-62, 73, 75, 76-
 77, 79, 264, 278
 Christians, 18, 19, 61, 92, 121, 123-
 125, 126, 142-144, 218
 and Arab nationalism, 40, 41, 103-
 104, 128-129, 143-144
 of Beirut, 38, 129
 education, 93-94, 139, 142-143
 French protectorate, *see* Catholics
 See Jazirah, Jebel Druze,
 Latakia, Lebanon
 as mediators, 79-81, 134, 265
 under Moslem rule, 20, 61-63, 143
 particularism, 97
 Russian protectorate, *see* Greek
 Orthodox
 See also under different denominations
 Chrysostom, 18
 Churchill, Winston, 245-246, 301-302
 Cilicia, 11, 46, 50, 53, 56-57
- Cinema, 69, 93, 274
 Circassians, 96, 127, 142, 144, 188, 292
 Clemenceau, Georges, 52, 53
 Climate, 9-10
 Collet, Colonel, 240
Comité Français de la Libération Nationale
 (C.F.L.N.), 282-293
 Commerce, *see* Trade and Trade-
 routes
 Committee for the Defence of Pales-
 tine, 114, 222-223
 Committee of Union and Progress, 39
 Common Interests, 171, 191, 195, 202,
 222, 263-264, 280, 281, 284,
 288, 289-290
 Agreement (1943), 288, text 381-384
 Conference of, 194
 Communications, internal, *see* rail-
 ways, roads
 strategic, 155-156, 157, 158, 159,
 201, 287
 Communist Party, 120, 316, 198, 230,
 254, 277
 Communities Statute, 181-182, 225-226,
 227
Compagnie Algérienne, 154
 Concessionary companies, 88, 99, 153,
 171, 280, 282, 289, 296
 Conscription, abolished, 54, 85
Conseillers, 171-172, 206, 281
 Constantinople, 28, 29
 Constitutional Bloc (Syria), 224
 Constitutional developments, Leba-
 nese, *see* Lebanon
 Syrian, 172-173, 174, 185 ff, 189-196,
 205-206, 213-217, 226-229, 235-
 236, 241 ff, 247-250, 252, 253-
 254, 256, 258, 279 ff
 Constitutionalist group, 184, 204
Crédit Français d'Algérie et de Tunisie, 154
 Crusades, 22-23, 146
 Crusading States, 22-23, 130, 146
 Cults, Syrian, 18
 Customs administration, 171, 222, 280,
 281, 289
 Cyprus, 157
- Dair az-Zur, 88, 238
 mutassarifat of, 31
 Damascus, 9, 11, 19, 22, 23, 25, 32,
 43, 46, 49, 54, 116, 141, 158,
 184, 188, 196, 238, 240, 292, 293
 capital of Umayyads, 20-21
 Syrian Republic, 173
 character of, 17, 68, 145
 Congress (1920), 53
 pashalik, 24
 Province, 142
 State of, 172, 173
 vilayet, 31
 Damur, 240
 ad-Dandashi, Abdur-Razzaq, 198 •

- ad-Da'uq, Ahmad, 252, 254
 Dead Sea, 8
 Defence, 164, 171, 230, 262-263, 279
 Delbos, Yvon, 200
 Delegate-General, 243, 279
 powers of, 279, 280-281
 Delegation-General, 289-291
 Dentz, General Henri, 233, 235-236, 238, 240
 proclamation (April 1941), 235-236, text 369-370
 Dera', 238
 Desert, Arabian, 11, 64
 Little, 9, 11
 Syrian, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 24, 48, 96, 127
 Diarbekr, 11
 Dinaric (Armenoid) type, 96
 Disraeli, 157
 Druzes, of Jebel Druze, *see* Jebel Druze
 of Lebanon, *see* Lebanon
 scattered, 144
 Druzism, 14, 22, 61, 121, 123, 139
 Dynasts, local, 22, 24, 30, 66, 67, 130
- Economic conditions, 2, 10-12, 16-17, 18-19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 38, 49, 65-68, 69-70, 90-91, 99-100, 118, 165, 222, 231, 233, 235, 254-256, 276
 Edde, Emilc, 184, 200, 257, 286
 Eden, Anthony, 269
 Edessa, 18, 22
 Education, 26, 29, 35-36, 74-75, 83-84, 92, 93-95, 132, 139, 143, 149, 152-153, 164, 175, 185, 224, 236, 270, 276-277, 295-296
 mission schools, 26, 29, 34, 35-36, 79, 83, 94, 143, 148, 149, 152, 157, 158-159
 Egypt, 6, 12, 15, 23, 40, 96-97, 115, 148, 157, 199, 274, 303, 305
 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936), 116, 199, 295
 conquests of Syria, 15, 22, 28-29, 123, 149
 cultural influence, 36-37, 79, 274
 economic leadership, 161
 interests in Syria, 161
 nationalism, 274
 political leadership, 40, 105, 115, 269, 284, 303, 306
 recognition of Levant States, 253, 258
 religious influence, 22, 37, 75, 76, 123
 Syrians in, 34, 37, 41, 117, 186
 trade with, 11, 67, 90, 161, 233
 union with, 274
 English language and literature, 37, 83
 Ephesus, Council of, 124
 Esdraclon, 8, 9
 Eshmiadzin, Catholics of, 124
 Euphrates, Province, 142, 144
 river, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 24, 86, 238
- Fakhr ad-Din, Amir, 24-25
 Faisal ibn Husain, Amir (later King), 48, 50-54, 58, 155, 172
 Faisal II, 227
 Far East, trade-routes, 10
 al-Farabi, 22
 al-Fatat, 40, 41
 Fatimid Caliphs, 22, 123
 Fascism, 196, 197, 231
 Feddan tribe, 87
 Federation, schemes for, 51, 269-275
 Syrian (1922), 173
 Fertile Crescent, the, 6, 13, 65, 272
 federation, 273-274
 partition of, 46, 57
 unity of, 236
 Feudal System, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 66-67, 69, 91-92, 130, 137, 138, 139, 175, 187, 292
 Finance, 89, 154, 174, 177, 290-291.
 See also franc, sterling
 Franc, 89, 177, 222, 291, 295
 area, 290-291
 France, and Arab nationalists, *see* Arab nationalism
 armistice (1940), 231
 effect on Syrian opinion, 233
 demands for French protection, 41, 50, 51, 297
 establishment of French rule, 44, 46, 50-58
 historic connexion with Levant, 23, 25-26, 28, 32, 33, 146-150
 interests in Syria, 41-42, 146, 151-157, 262
 and Lebanon, *see* Lebanon
 Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, 4, 53-54, 55, 58, 133, 146, 150, 163 ff, 241, 243-244, 269, 293
 cost of, 155, 171
 refusal to recognise, 54, 177, 178, 234, 235, 282-283, 285 ff, 288
 terms of, 164-166
 text, 308-314
 and minorities, 128, 133, 144, 151-152, 167, 266
 And see separately
 pledges to Arabs, 48
 pledges to Levant States, *see* Catroux; Independence; Lebanon
 policy in Levant States, 3, 57, 128, 135, 138, 139-140, 141, 151, 167 ff, 180 ff, 230, 231
 criticism of, 176-178
 economic, 86 ff, 174, 175, 176-177
 Free French, 241, 258, 279-302
 Vichy, 231-236
 protection of Levant Christians, *see* Catholics
 French opinion on Mandate, 167-170
 on 1936 Treaties, 203-204, 217-218, 219-220

- France, opposition to French rule, 50, 52, 104, 128, 177 ff, 252, and *see* Arab nationalism
 - relations with Britain in Levant, 43-44, 51-52, 56, 58, 83, 232, 233, 244-246, 261, 294, 298-302
 - trade with, 90
- Francis I, 147
- Franco-Lebanese Treaty, *see* Lebanon
- Franco-Ottoman Concordat (1535), 36, 147
- Treaty (1802), 148
- Franco-Syrian Treaty (abortive 1932-1933), 194-196, (1936), 161, 190 ff, 217 ff, 231, 267
 - terms of (1936), 200-203
 - text (1936), 314-333
 - projected (1941 onwards), 241, 243-244, 261-262, 282-283, 293-296
- Franco-Turkish agreements (1921), 57, (1926), 57. *See also* Alexandretta
- Free National Front, 223
- French language and literature, 37, 80, 83-84, 132, 149, 152-153, 156, 165, 178, 219, 286, 295
- French Revolution, the, 148
- Frontiers, 4, 8, 16, 33, 46, 281
 - with Iraq, 56
 - with Palestine, 56
 - with Transjordan, 56
 - with Turkey, 56-57, 160-161, 208, 213
- Galilee, 8, 112
- de Gaulle, General Charles, 241, 243, 244-245, 247, 250, 253, 294
 - letter to General Catroux, 243-244, text 372-373
- Gaza, 11
- Geneva, Syrians in, 186
- Germany, 33, 43
 - declaration of war on (1944), 302
 - influence, 33, 224, 232, 237
 - interests in Syria, 159
 - offensive of 1940, 231
 - trade with, 90
 - use of Syrian airfields, 237
- Ghab marshes, 8
- Ghassanids, 17
- Ghutah, The, 9, 10
- Gouraud, General, 54, 173
- Great Britain, and Arab nationalists, *see* Arab nationalism
 - and Druzes, 28, 29, 31
 - extension of influence, 244, 270, 294, 299
 - and independence of Levant States, endorsement of Catroux manifesto (1941), 242, 244, 299
 - recognition, 252
 - statements of policy, 232, 244-246, 287, 301-302
- Great Britain, interests in Syria, 42, 157-158
 - mandates in Near East, *see* Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan
 - mediation in Levant States, 262, 300
 - occupation of Syria, *see* Syrian campaign
 - pledges to Arabs, 43-44, 47, 48, 104, 106, 112, 113, 150, 269, 271
 - pledges to French, 44-46, 150, 244-246, 261, 299
 - pledges to Jews, 112, 113, 271, *see* Balfour Declaration
 - statement of policy (July 1940), 232
 - trade with, 90
- Greece, Hellenistic cities, 16, 17
 - civilization, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 101
 - language and literature, 15, 16, 17, 20, 75
- Macedonian conquest of Syria, 16
- philosophy, 18, 76, 77, 78, 79
- religions, 18
- Greek Catholics, 121, 125, 129, 137
- Greek Orthodox, 81, 121, 123-124, 125, 129, 134, 137, 139, 208
 - and Arab nationalism, 134, 144
- Russian protectorate, 28, 144, 148, 149, 160
- Gregorians, *see* Armenian Orthodox
- Gulhane Decree, 30
- al-Haffar, Lutfi, 226, 234, 256
- Hafiz Ibrahim, 37
- Haifa, 8, 42, 46, 89, 112, 155, 157
- Hakim, Caliph, 123
- al-Hakim, Hasan, 250, 254
- Hama, 43, 46, 50, 88, 240
 - Province of, 86, 142
- Isma'ilis, 144
- Hamdanids, 22
- Hananu, Ibrahim, 186, 191, 192, 199
- Harun ar-Rashid, 146
- Hasbaya, 172
- Hashimites, 273-274, *see* Abdullah, Faisal, Husain
- Hassetteh, 140, 215, 216, 229
- Hatay, the, *see* Alexandretta, sanjaq
- Hatti Humayan Decree, 30
- Hauran, the, 9, 10, 16, 17, 56, 86, 87, 142, 144, 238
 - insurrection, 186
- Health, 91, 276
 - services, 85, 175, 185
- Hebrews, 15
- Hebrew language and literature, 42
- Hicjaz, 6, 8, 9, 41, 47, 49, 57, 115, 273-274
- Helleu, Jean, 256, 257, 286-287
- Henry-Haye, G., 169, 219
- Hermon, Mt., 9
- Herzl, Theodor, 43

- High Commissariat, 170-171
 becomes Delegation-General, 243
 High Commissioner, 166, 170-171, 172,
 186, 189, 206
 replaced by Delegate-General, 243
 Hittites, 15
 Hoarding, 231, 233, 255
 Hogarth, D. G., 47
 Holy Places, Christian, 23, 26, 30, 33,
 56, 112, 146, 149
 Jewish, 112
 Moslem, 41, 68
 Homs, 11, 16, 43, 46, 50, 88, 238, 240
 lake, 8
 province, 8, 86, 142, 188
 Hoybun party, 141-142
 Hulah, 8, 56
 Hull, Cordell, 253
 Huntziger, General, 219
 Husain ibn Ali, 122
 Husain, The Sharif, 41-48, 49, 50, 115
 Husain-McMahon correspondence, 43-
 44, 46, 50, 52, 106, 150
- Ibrahim Pasha, 28-29, 149
 Ilkhans, 23
 Imams, Isma'ili, 122-123
 Shi'i, 122
 Independence, Lebanese, *see* Lebanon
 Syrian, promise of (June 8, 1941),
 241-242, 252, text 371-372
 proclamation of (September 28,
 1941), 174, 179, 247-250, 267,
 283, 293, text 375-378
 recognition of, 252, 253, 302
 India, 10, 69, 157
 Government of, 42, 57
 Industry, 88, 276
 Iraq, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 21, 24, 47, 48,
 96-97, 107, 115, 118, 127, 141,
 142, 234, 236, 238, 269, 303, 305
 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1922), 190,
 (1930), 116, 168, 179, 194, 224,
 261, 294, 295
 Assyrians, 125-126, 140, 218, 266
 British mandate, 52, 57
 occupation, 49
 Zone, 44-45
 frontiers with Syria, 56
 interests in Syria, 161-162
 insurrections, 53, 115, 236-237
 nationalist movements, 40, 41, 53,
 162, 234, 236
 oil, 42, 56, 154, 157, 159
 recognition of Levant States, 258
 religious movements, 22, 124, 127
 trade with, 90, 233
 union with, 227, 273-274
 Iraq Petroleum Company, 154-155, 159
 Irrigation, 66, 86, 175, 256, 276
 Islam, and Arab nationalism, *see* Arab
 nationalism
 Islam, beliefs of, 59*ff
 and Christianity, *see* Christianity*
 civilization, *see* Arabo-Islamic
 conversion of Syria, 19, 21, 61
 intellectual revival, need for, 77-79
 Modernist Movement, 76-77
 and non-Moslems, 19-20, 60, 61-63
 revival movement, 75-76
 rise of, 19 ff
 sects, 21, 61, 63, 121, 122-123, and
 see Alawi, Carmathian, Druze,
 Isma'ili, Shi'i
 and secularism, 81-82
 and the State, 60, 62-63
 and Westernization, 2, 69, 73 ff
 Isma'ilis, 22, 61, 121, 122-123, 139, 144
 Istiqlal, 192, 257
 Italy, 169, 230, 231
 Armistice commission, 232
 attempts to gain Catholic protection,
 33, 150, 159
 interests in Syria, 159
 trade and traders, 23, 24, 25, 90, 146,
 159
- al-Jabiri, Ihsan, 206, 214
 Saadullah, 191, 234, 256, 288, 289
 Jacobites, *see* Syrian Orthodox
 Jaffa, 8
 Janissaries, 26
 Japan, 88, 90
 declaration of war on, 302
 Jazirah, 9, 10, 56, 57, 86, 137, 140-142,
 174, 215-217, 224, 267
 and Arab nationalism, 141, 215-216
 autonomous administration (1939),
 228, 229, text 356
 Beduin, 87, 140-141, 292
 Christians, 215-216, 218
 and France, 141, 151, 215
 revolts and disturbances, 215-217,
 218, 220, 292
 oil, 86, 155, 218
 separatism, 141-142, 151, 206, 215-
 217, 267
 settlement, 87, 126, 140-141
 Jazzar, Ahmad, 25, 26, 28
 Jebel Druze, 4, 9, 10, 31, 56, 93, 137-
 139, 140, 266-267
 administration (before 1918), 31,
 137, (1922), 172-173, (Organic
 Law, 1930), 189, 194, (under
 Franco-Syrian Treaty, 1936),
 199, 201, 205, 206, 213, 267,
 text 323-325, (1939), 228-229,
 text 349-355, (1942), 253 (1944),
 289
 and Arab nationalism, 138, 186, 189,
 195, 199, 214
 and Christians, 137, 213
 disturbances and revolts, 185, 187-
 189, 214, 220

- Jebel Druze, feudalism, 66, 128, 137, 138-139
 and France, 138, 151, 187, 201, 214
 separatism, 138, 151, 189, 200, 205, 206, 214, 217, 266-267
 settlement by Druzes, 25, 27, 33, 137
- Jedda, 47
- Jemal ad-Din al-Afghani, 75
- Jemal Pasha, 49, 116, 118
- Jerusalem, 19, 22, 31, 48
 Mufti of, 222
- Jesus, 18, 59, 62
- Jews, 15, 16, 20
 Dispersion, 18, 106, 108, 111, 271
 under Moslem rule, 20, 61-63
 of Syria, 18, 38, 61, 92, 121, 125, 145
See also Palestine, Zionism
- Jibran, Khalil, 37
- John of Damascus, 20
- Jordan, river, 8
 valley, 10
- de Jouvencel, Henri, 189, 190
- Judaism, 15, 42, 61-62
- Jumayyil, Pierre, 198
- Karam, Yusuf, 32-33
 al-Karami, Abdul-Hamid, 289
 al-Kayyali, Abdur-Rahman, 256
- Kemal, Mustafa, 53, 56
- Kerbela, 122
- Khabur, R., 9
- Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, 204
- al-Khatib, Bahij, 228, 235
 Zaki, 223
- Khazin family, 147
- al-Khuri, Bishara, 184, 257, 286-287
 Faris, 191, 205, 256, 289
- King-Crane Commission, 52
- Kiswe, 238
- Kurdish language, 126
- Kurdistan, 6, 9, 11, 126, 142
- Kurds, 31, 96, 126, 160, 292
- Kurds, in Alexandretta, 208
 in Beirut, 145
 and Christians, 216
 in Damascus, 141, 145
 and France, 141, 167, 215, 292
 insurrections and unrest, 215
 in Jazirah, 140-142, 145, 267
 nationalism and separatism, 141-142, 145, 215-217, 267
 in northern Syria, 57, 65, 145, 160
- Kutchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of, 148
- Lampson, Sir Miles (Lord Killearn), 242
- Land registration and survey, 87, 175
 tenure, 66, 67, 87, 175, 276
- Landowning class, 118
- Latakia (Government, Province or State), 4, 66, 86, 93, 137, 139-140, 266-267
 Latakia, administration (before 1918), 139, (1920), 172, (1922), 173, (1925), 173, (Organic Law, 1930), 185, 194, (under Franco-Syrian Treaty, 1936), 221, 202, 205-206, 213, 214-215, 267, text, 325-327, (1939), 228-229, text, 342-349, (1942), 253, 289
 Alawis, 31, 139-140, 185, 214, 224, 235, 250, 266, 267
 insurrections and unrest, 214, 220, 289, 292
 Separatism, 97, 139-140, 151, 185, 200, 205, 206, 214, 217, 267, 289
 Arab nationalism, 186, 195, 200, 214, 266-267
 Christians, 139, 185
 Isma'ilis, 129
 Sunnis, 139, 185
 (port), 8, 11, 88
 Law, 29, 30, 33, 153, 173, 181-182
 courts of, 62-63, 153, 173-174, 181
 mixed, 174, 224
 French influence, 153
 Moslem, 20, 60, 62-63, 69, 76, 81, 173, 225
 Roman, 17
 Law, Richard, 287
 League of National Action, 197-198, 224
 League of Nations, 51, 126, 163-165, 190, 194, 195, 201, 203, 233, 235
 and Alexandretta, 207-210
 approval of mandates, 55
 Covenant (art. 22), 163, 166
 French withdrawal from, 233-234
 Permanent Mandates Commission, 113, 163, 166, 189-190, 218
 Lebanon, 5, 23-24, 24-25, 29, 31-33, 38, 87, 116, 129ff, 167, 180-185, 188, 189, 200, 204-205, 254, 289
 and Arab League, 285, 303, 304, 305, 307
 Arab nationalism, 40, 97, 132-135, 183, 186, 257, 264-266
 Armenians, 135-136
 as asylum, 21, 27, 129-130, 183, 264
 autonomy and autonomists, 24-25, 27, 32, 41, 51, 130, 132-135, 183, 257, 270
 Christians, 21, 25, 32, 40, 41, 50, 51, 81, 93, 97, 129-136, 147, 149, 151, 180, 183, 197, 254, 264-265; *see also separately*
 Communal representation, 32, 182, 205, 257, 258
 Constitutional developments, 31, 32-33, 149, 180, 182, 189, 204-205, 230, 236, 246, 257, 279ff
 Crisis of 1943, 285-288, 300
 effects of, 297-298

- Lebanon, different conceptions of,
 133-135, 183-184, 264-266
 Druzes, 129, 149, 181, 184, 264
 Britain and, 28, 29, 31
 emigration to Jebel Druze, 25, 27,
 33, 137
 feudalism, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32
 insurrections, 23, 188
 and Maronites, 25, 27, 31-33, 149
 education, 93, 132
 emigration, 132
 and France, 28, 41, 44, 46, 50, 51,
 52, 53, 54, 55, 132-135, 147,
 149, 151, 180 ff, 183, 200, 204,
 254, 297-298
 Greater, 4, 51, 129, 151, 172, 173,
 180, 184, 186, 252, 264, 297, 298,
 307
 Greek Catholics, 129
 Greek Orthodox, 129, 134
 independence proclaimed, 174, 250-
 252, 253, 283, 293, 299, text,
 378-381
 independence promised, 241-242,
 243, text, 371-373
 independence recognized, 252, 253,
 302
 International Commission (1861),
 32, 149
 Lebanese nationalism, 96, 133-134,
 183, 184, 198, 205, 252, 264-
 265, 297-298
 Maronites, 21, 23, 29, 32, 97, 121,
 125, 129, 130, 134-135, 149,
 180-181, 182, 183, 198, 200,
 204, 264, 287
 and Druzes, 25, 27, 31-33, 149
 and France, 28, 50, 132, 147, 148,
 149, 183, 200, 204, 297
 minorities, 129-136, 180 ff
 political parties, 120, 184-185, 196-
 198, 204
 relations with Syria, 186, 193, 195,
 201, 202, 222, 241, 263-266,
 297, 298; *see also* Common
 Interests
 Representative Council (1922), 172
 sectarianism, 129, 204, 205, 266,
 287, 298
 Statute of 1864, 32-33, 149
 Syrian nationalism, 197, 205
 Shi'is, 23, 129, 135, 181, 184, 264
 Sunnis, 129, 181, 182, 184, 204
 Treaty with France (1936), 200, 203,
 204, 219, 231, 244, text, 333-337
 projected (1941 onwards), 241,
 243-244, 261-262, 282-283, 293-
 296
Troupes Spéciales, 293
 Lebanon, Mt., 8, 27, 238
 Levantinism, 70-72
Ligue de la Patrie Arabe, 39
 Litahi, R., 8, 86
 Literary Club, 40 •
 Liturgy, Arabic, 124
 Armenian, 124
 Syriac, 124, 125
 Lloyd-George, David, 47, 52
 Loyalties, communal, 14, 61, 63-64,
 67, 93, 127, 266
 divided, 80
 local, 14, 29, 67, 68, 93, 117, 172
 loss of, 64, 69 ff, 99
See also Alawis, Jazirah, Jebel
 Druze, Lebanon
 Lucian, 17
 Lyttelton, Oliver, 244
 Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement (1941),
 244-245, 299, 301, 302
 Maan, 11
 Maani dynasty, 24-25, 130
 Maccabees, 16
 Mahmud II, 30
 Maisalun, 54
 Mamluke conquest, 23-24
 al-Manfaluti, 37
 Mardam Bey, Jamil, 191, 205, 217-
 218, 219, 223, 224, 226, 234, 256
 Mardam-Tessan exchange of letters
 (1937), 217, text, 337-340
 Maronite College (Rome), 26
 Maronites, *see* Lebanon
 Mar Shimun, the, 124
 de Martel, Comte, 195-196, 199, 205,
 225-226
 Mawali, 21
 McMahon, Sir Henry, 43-44, *see*
 Husain - McMahon correspon-
 dence
 Mecca, 11
 Mediterranean influences, 13, 16, 21,
 69, 79, 96
 sea, 4, 6, 8, 11, 116, 162
 world, 14
 Meleager, 17
 Mersina, 43
 Merjayun, 238, 240
 Mesopotamia, *see* Iraq
 Metawila, *see* Shi'is
 Metullah, 238
 Mezze, 240
 Middle East Supply Centre, 255, 275
 Millet system, 63, 127
 Milli tribe, 141
 Minerals, 86
 Minorities, 3, 121-145, 151-152, 180-
 185, 192, 195, 201, 203-204,
 217, 218, 228, 266 ff
 compact, 61, 137-142, 266
 racial or linguistic, 65, 96, 121, 125-
 127, 135-136, 140-142, 160
 religious, 18, 22, 61-63, 120, 121-
 125, 127 ff, 174-175, 216, 225
 scattered, 61, 137, 142-145, 268
See also under individual minorities

- Mission Latque*, 36, 94, 149
 Missions, 165
 Catholic, 26, 83, 144, 147, 148, 149, 152, 160
 Nestorian, 124
 Protestant, 83, 125, 157
 rivalry, 83
 schools, *see* Education
 Mittelhauser, General, 231-232
 Mongol invaders, 23, 124
 "Moderates," 191, 193, 194, 199
 Monophysites, 17, 18, 19, 124; *see* Armenian, Syrian Orthodox
 Monotheism, 19
 Monotheletes, 18, 125
 Moses, 59
 Mosul, 11, 23, 126, 218
 included in French zone, 46
 included in British zone, 52, 56, 218
 oil, 42, 46
 Muawiya, 20, 21, 122
 Muhammad (the Prophet), 19, 59, 60, 122
 Muhammad Ali, 28-29, 36, 74, 148-149, 150
 al-Mutanabbi, 22
 Murshid, Sulaiman, 214, 289, 292
 Musha' system, 87, 175
 Music, 75
 Mutran, Khalil, 37

 Nabataeans, 17
 Naccache, Alfred, 236, 246, 251
 an-Nahhas Pasha, Mustafa, 269, 284, 303
Najjadah, 198
 Nami, Damad Ahmad, 190, 191
 Napoleon, 28, 148
 Napoleon III, 32
 National Bloc, 191, 193, 198, 199, 205 ff, 230, 234, 250, 254, 256
 in office, 205, 206, 209, 212, 220, 221-225, 226-227, 256 ff
 opposition to, 206, 221-225
 revival of, 250, 256
 Nationalism, 60, 97-98, 260; *see* Arab, Armenian, Egyptian, Kurdish, Lebanese, Syrian nationalism; Zionism
 Nationalist Youth, 198, 225
 National Pact, 199
 Negeb, 8
 Nejd, 6, 11, 49, 115
 Neo-Platonism, 18
 Nestorians, 18, 19; *see* Assyrians
 "New Order," 232, 233
 Nimr, 37
 Nizib, 29
 Nomads, *see* Beduin
 Nur ad-Din, 23
 Nuri as-Said, 234
 Nusairis, *see* Alawis

Office des Céréales Panifiables, 255
 Oil, 219, 224; *see* Jazirah, Iraq, Mosul, Persia
 pipeline, Kirkuk-Haifa, 155, 157
 Kirkuk-Tripoli, 88, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159
 Orontes, R., 8, 86
 Orthodox Church, 18, 19, 121, 123-124; *see* Armenian, Greek, Syrian Orthodox
 Ottoman Debt, 174
 Decentralization, party of, 40
 Empire, 14, 24 ff, 147 ff
 conquest of Syria, 24
 disintegration, 27-28, 40
 foreign intervention, 27-29, 30, 31-32, 33, 148-149
 partition, 43, 47-48, 163
 relations with France, 26, 28, 29, 31-32, 33, 147-150
 rule, 24 ff, 30 ff, 38-40, 41, 49, 63, 67, 68-69, 82, 89, 130, 137, 139
 war with Egypt, 28-29, 148-149

 Palestine, 11, 12, 48, 106-115, 175
 186, 237, 238, 269-273
 Alexandria Protocol (1944) and, 303, 304
 Arab League and, 305, 306
 Faisal and, 51, 53, 54
 France and, 52, 56
 frontiers with Syria, 56
 incorporated in British zone, 50, 52, 53
 insurrections and unrest, 108, 158, 162, 199, 206, 222, 231, 236
 international administration proposed, 46, 52
 Jewish settlement in, 38, 42, 46-47, 51, 57, 106-115, 145, 270 ff
 King-Crane Commission and, 52
 Mandate, 4, 54, 55
 part of geographical Syria (*q.v.*), 4
 Round Table Conference (1939), 113, 115
 Royal Commission on (1936), 112-113, 272
 trade with, 90, 233
 Syro-Palestinian Committees, 186
 union with, 269-270
 White Paper (1922), 111-112 (1939), 113, 271
 See also Arab nationalism, Balfour Declaration, Zionism
 Palmyra, 11, 17, 187, 238
 Pan-Arabism, *see* Arab nationalism
 Pan-Islamic movement, 39, 75-76, 186
 Pan-Turanianism, 41
 Papinian, 17
 Parthians, 16
 Parties, political, 277
 Lebanese, *see* Lebanon

- Parties, Syrian, 120, 186, 191-192, 196-198
- Patriarchal system, 65, 92
- Peel Commission, 112-113, 272
- People's Party, 186, 190
- Permanent Court of International Justice, 166
- Pashas, 24, 26, 66
- Persia, 11, 19, 142
- conquest of Syria, 15, 19
- influences, 69, 97
- oil, 42, 157
- Persian Gulf, 6, 11, 157
- Petra, 11
- Petroleum Concessions (Syria and Lebanon), Ltd., 155
- Pichon, M., 52
- Picot, Georges, 44; *see* Sykes-Picot Agreement
- Phalanges Libanaises*, 198, 205
- Philosophy, European, 75
- Greek, 18, 76, 77
- Islamic, 22, 77-79
- neo-Thomist, 78
- Secularist, 81-82
- Phoenician influences, 133
- Phoenicians, 14, 15
- Pilgrimage, the, 11, 38, 60, 68
- Plato, 77, 78
- Polonics, 76-77
- Political responsibility, 118, 276
- Ponsot, M., 190-195
- Popular Front, 168, 200, 203, 218
- Population census, 85, 121, 175, 385-386
- characteristics of, 14, 79
- composition of, 13, 15, 24, 57, 65, 96-97, 121, 129, 133, 137, 139, 141, 142, 180, 210, 386
- decline of, 21, 24, 25
- distribution of, 85-86, 385
- emigration, 34, 79, 83, 85, 117, 118, 132, 145
- growth of, 38, 85
- immigration, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 38, 65, 66, 135-136, 140-141
- movement of, 25, 137
- Porphyry, 18
- Ports, 8, 38, 88, 89, 116, 153, 164, 175, 184
- Press, the, 37, 39
- censorship, 281, 289
- Protestants, 121, 125; *see also* Missions
- Profiteering, 49, 231, 233, 235
- Ptolemies, 16
- Puaux, Gabriel, 214, 225-229, 230-231, 232
- Public works, 16-17, 38, 170, 175, 256
- Qaisites, 21, 25
- Qamishli, 140, 215
- Qasim Amin, 37
- Quncitra, 238, 240
- al-Quwatli, Shukri, 192, 219, 224, 235, 254, 256, 257
- Quran, the, 36, 60, 76, 103, 122
- Railways, 38, 88, 89, 153, 171
- Baghdad, 33, 160
- Damas-Hama-et-Prolongement* (D.H.P.), 153-154, 238
- Damascus-Medina, 38
- Haifa-Tripoli, 256
- Rayaq-Aleppo, 54
- Rainfall, 9-10, 86
- Rashaya, 172, 188
- Rashid Ali, 237
- Rashid Rida, 37
- Raslan, Mazhar, 206, 214, 256
- Rayaq, 54, 238
- Reafforestation, 86
- de Redcliffe, Stratford, 30
- Red Sea, 6, 8
- Rihani, Amin, 37
- Riou, Gaston, 220
- Roads, 89, 91, 174, 256
- Romanticism, 98
- Rome, cities in Syria, 17
- civilization, 16 ff, 75
- Syrian contribution to, 14-15, 16, 17, 18
- Empire, 14, 16-18
- Roumania, trade with, 90
- Routes, of migration, 12
- military, 12
- See also* Trade
- Russia, 75, 106, 127, 276
- Russia, Armenian attitude towards, 136
- and Greek Orthodox, 28, 144, 149, 160
- and Holy Places, 30, 149
- intervention in Ottoman Empire, 28, 29, 33, 148
- and Levant States, 160, 302
- novelists, 70
- and Sykes-Picot Agreement, 44, 47
- Ruwala tribe, 87
- Saadeh, Antun, 197
- Saida, *see* Sidon
- Saladin, 23
- Samarqand, 23
- Sandler, M., 207
- San Francisco Conference, 303
- San Remo Conference, 53-54, 55-56
- Sarrail, General, 187-188, 189
- Sarruf, 37
- Sassanids, 19
- Sba tribe, 87
- Science, 75, 76-77, 82
- Sectarianism, 61, 63-64, 127; *see* Loyalties
- Secularism, 75, 81-83, 103

- Seleucids, 16, 17
 Seljuq Turks, 22
 Semitic dynasties, 17
 influences, 13, 15, 17, 21, 96-97
 languages, 13, 17, 19
 States, 15, 17
Services Economiques, 289, 290
Services Spéciaux, 170, 176, 281, 284
 Shahbandar, Dr. Abdur-Rahman, 188,
 206, 219, 223-224, 234
 Shahbandarist group, 223-224, 230,
 250
 Shamiyyah, Tawfiq, 216, 256
 Shammar tribe, 24, 87
 Shamun, Camille, 257
 Shawqi, Ahmad, 37
 al-Shidiac, Faris, 37
 Shihab, Amir Khalid, 204
 Shihabi dynasty, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 130
 Shi'is, 21, 28, 61, 121, 122, 123; *see*
 also Lebanon
 Shone, Terence A., 300
 Sidon (Saida), 8, 11
 included in Lebanon, 129, 172
 pashalik of, 24
 Sunni predominance, 181
 Sinai Peninsula, 4, 6, 8
 Sirhan, Wadi, 11
 Social conditions, 2, 27, 29, 30, 33-34,
 64-65, 66, 82-83, 87, 91-93, 99-100,
 118-120, 130, 137, 138, 139, 143, 152,
 175, 185, 187, 260, 276-277
 Socialism, 120, 254, 277
 Solod, M., 302
 Spain, 15, 20
 Spears, Major-General Sir Edward
 Louis, 252, 300
 Sterling, 89, 167, 242, 244, 249-250,
 255, 290
 Strikes, 199, 225, 235, 286
 Sudan, 34
 Suez Canal, 42, 157
 as-Sulh, Riyadh, 192, 257, 285-288, 289
 Sami, 254
 Sunnis, 21, 28, 61, 121, 122, 134, 137,
 208, 212, 227
 non-Arabic-speaking, 126-127, 142,
 144-145
 See also Latakia, Lebanon, Sidon,
 Tripoli
 Sur, *see* Tyre
Sûreté aux Armées, 289
Sûreté Générale, 170, 280-281, 284, 289
 Suwaida, 188
 Sykes, Sir Mark, 44
 Sykes-Picot agreement, 44-46, 47, 50,
 52, 150
 Syria, geographical, defined, 4, 8
 partition of, 4, 6, 44-46, 49-50, 53-54,
 55, 56, 57, 89, 172-173
 effects of partition, 269-270
 opposition to partition, 44, 52,
 53, 178, 192-193
 Syria, schemes for reunion (Greater
 Syria), 269-270
 separatism, 117
 Syriac, 124, 125, 126
 Syrian campaign (1798-9), 28, 148
 (1831-2), 28-29, 149
 (1839), 29
 (1917-18), 48-49
 (1941), 237-240
 Syrian Catholics, 121, 125, 140, 216
 Arabic-speaking, 97
 Syriac-speaking, 126
 Syrian nationalism, 50, 96, 119-120,
 183, 197, 252
 Syrian Orthodox, 121, 124, 125, 140
 Arabic-speaking, 97
 Syriac-speaking, 126
 Syrian National Party, 120, 197, 205
 Syro-Palestinian Committees, 186

 Tabit, Dr. Ayyub, 256, 257
 Taghlibids, 17
 Taha Husain, 37
 Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, Shaikh, 190,
 191, 196, 199, 247, 248, 250, 256
 Tamerlane, 23
 Tanukhids, 17, 22
 Tappouni, Cardinal, 216
 Taqla, 37
 Taqla, Salim, 257
 Tashnak party, 136
 Trad, Petro, 257
 Taurus, Mts., 4, 6, 8, 13, 126
 Tawfiq al-Hakim, 37
 Taxation, 20, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 66,
 87, 165, 174
 Temperature, 10
Le Temps, 203-204
 de Tesson, François, 217; *see* Mardam-
 Tesson exchange of letters
 Theocracy, 60, 69, 73, 81, 103, 127
 Tigris, 6, 11, 57
 Titus, 18
 Tobacco, 10, 86
 monopoly, 171, 282, 289
 Tourists, 90
 Towns, 11, 12, 17, 67-68, 88, 196
 Trade and Trade-routes, 10, 11-12, 15,
 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 27, 67-68,
 88, 89-90, 146, 148, 154, 157,
 175, 233
 Trade-unionism, 92
 Traditions, the, 76, 122
 Trajan, 17
 Transjordan, 9, 10, 11, 115, 188, 238
 269, 303, 305
 Arab administration, 50, 55
 frontiers with Syria, 56
 included in British zone, 46, 54, 55
 independence, 55, 104, 107
 part of geographical Syria, 4
 Peel Commission, 112-113, 272.

- Transjordan, trade with, 90
 union with, 269-270
- Tribalism, 14, 64-65, 66, 67, 87, 141
- Tripoli (Syrian), 8, 11, 22, 88
 included in Greater Lebanon, 129,
 172, 184
 pashalik of, 24
 pipe-line, 154, 156, 157
 Sunnis, 181, 184
- Troupes Spéciales*, 171, 280, 282, 284,
 289, 291-293
- Turcomans, 31, 65, 96, 126, 142, 145,
 160
- Turco-Syrian Treaty (1926), 209
 (1940), 231
- Turkey, 41, 43, 47, 49, 53, 56-57, 116,
 117, 126, 141, 142, 145, 169,
 234, 237, 276
 and Alexandretta, 57, 125, 136, 206-
 213, 218
 and Cilicia, 53, 56-57
 interests in Syria, 160-161
 non-recognition of Levant States,
 253, 302
 refugees from, 125, 126, 136, 140,
 145, 160, 212
See also Ottoman
- Turkish Petroleum Company, 42; *see*
also Iraq P.C.
- Turks, of Alexandretta, 207, 208, 210,
 211, 212
- Turks (in Syria), 57, 65, 160
- Turkish language and dialects, 126,
 172, 207, 208
- Tyre (Sur), 8, 11, 238
 incorporated in Greater Lebanon,
 129, 172
- Ulpian, 17
- al-Ulshi, Jamil, 254
- Umayyad Caliphs, 20, 21, 100, 122
- Uniate Churches, 26, 125, 148, 149,
 160; *see* Armenian, Chaldean,
 Greek, Syrian Catholics;
 Maronites
- "Unionist" group, 184, 204
- United Nations, 261, 262, 263
 declaration, signed by Levant States,
 303
- United States of America, Arab
 attitude towards, 50
 interests in Syria, 158-159
 mediation in Levant States, 262
 projected mandate, 52
 recognition of mandates, 55, 253
 recognition of Levant States, 253, 302
 Syrians in, 159 *and see* America
 trade with, 90
See also Missions; University of Beirut
- Université de S. Joseph*, 36, 83-84, 93,
 94, 152
- University of Beirut, American, 36,
 82-83, 89-84, 93, 94, 159
- University of Damascus, State, 93, 175
- Urfa, 11
- Usayran, Adil, 257
- Vatican, 26, 56, 149, 160
- Versailles Conference, 51-52
- Viénot, Pierre, 168-169, 200, 203
- Wadsworth, George, 253, 302
- Wahabism, 76, 77
- Wagfs*, 67
- War, Crimean, 30, 33, 149
 1914-1918, 4, 41 ff, 155, 230-231
 1939-1945, 230 ff, 302
- Weizmann, Chaim, 51
- Western civilization, impact on Arab
 world; *see* Arabo-Islamic civili-
 zation
- Levant States as mediators of, 2, 79-
 80, 264-265
 spread of, 27 ff, 33 ff, 69, 73 ff, 132, 277
 two sources, 83-84
- Western powers, relations with Arabs,
 1-3, 102, 104-105, 259-260, 264,
 265-266, 275-278, *and see*
separately
- Western technique and goods, 75, 88,
 91, 99
- Weygand, General Maxime, 173, 187,
 230, 231
- Wheat supply, 255
- Wilson, President, 47-48, 52
- Wilson, General Sir Henry Maitland,
 237
- Women, 20
 status of, 92-93
- al-Yafi, Abdullah, 204
- Yahya, Imam, 305
- Yazidis, 127
 Kurdish-speaking, 126
- Yaziji family, 37
- Yemen, 6, 114, 115, 274, 303, 305
- Yemenites, 21, 25
- Young Turks, 39, 41, 106
- Youth movements, 196-198, 224-225
- Zaghlul, 118
- Zaidan, 37
- Zengi, 23
- Ziadah, May, 37
- Zionism, 42-43, 46-47, 50, 51, 52, 53,
 106-115, 145, 186, 223, 270-
 273; *see also* Balfour Declara-
 tion, Palestine.

